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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the role and purpose of the United Kingdom Minister 
for Sport 1964-2009, with particular reference to sports policy-making. The literature 
review seeks to establish the position of the Minister in the context of post-war British 
politics and party government This is followed by an exposition of the methodological 
approach that will be taken and the research methods involved. Several theoretical 
models of policy-making are outlined, against which the various Ministers' activities 
have been tested. Evidence has been gathered, presented, and discussed from both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, including interviews with key figures, to help 
answer the research question: "What is the role of the Minister for Sport in the policy-
making process for UK sport?" It is concluded that UK Ministers for Sport have had a 
relatively small role in policy-making, mainly because their position in government has 
been too junior. Their main function has been to raise the profile of sport, act as 
ambassadors for it, and encourage participation. 
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Introduction: UK Minister for Sport 1964 to 2009 
It has sometimes been suggested that Lord Hailsham (formerly Quintin Hogg) was the 
first British Minister for Sport (see Athletics Weekly, 2001; Coughlan, 1990; 
Houlihan, 1991). Indeed Hailsham (1990) tells us that, "Of the various strange events 
that befell me in 1963, none was more bizarre than my appointment as Minister with 
special responsibility for sport" (p. 335). 
The importance that Hailsham (1975) attached to the assignment can be assessed from 
his own words: 
The idea of a Minister for Sport has always appalled me. It savours of 
dictatorship and the nastiest kind of populist or Fascist dictatorship at that. 
Moreover, I am not a man who enjoys ''watching'' sport, and ever since I got 
rid finally of the incubus of compulsory games at school, I have carefully 
eschewed almost all forms of sport or game which depends on a marked-out 
ground, a racetrack, a swimming bath, a pitch, or what have you, to enable it 
to be carried on (p. 206). 
It is perhaps indicative of government attitudes towards sport at the time that the 
Minister, whose nominal responsibility it was, actually disliked watching sport, 
avoided taking part in sport, and was even opposed to the appointment of a Minister 
to deal with the subject area. 
With this negative approach, Hailsham, by his own account, seems to have done little 
for sport in the year or so to the 1964 election, other than set up a small secretariat 
under Sir John Lang (Hailsham, 1990), while his official title at this time was Lord 
President of the Council. Geoffrey Lewis (1997), Hailsham's biographer, believed 
that, "The assignment for Sport was a bizarre one. He was almost perversely unsuited. 
There is here a case to answer on the charge of electoral gimmickry" (p. 197). 
Hailsham himself confirms elsewhere (1975) that he did not take sport seriously. He 
notes dismissively, "This particular activity was a minor matter, and I thought 
comparatively little of it at the time since it occurred at a period when other things 
were preoccupying my mind" (p. 207). One of the things occupying his mind in 1963 
was achieving the leadership of the Conservative Party, and thus the office of Prime 
Minister. Instead, he was beaten by Alex Douglas-Home, a man passionate about 
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playing and watching cricket (Douglas-Home, 1976). 
Also in 1963, Harold Wilson became leader of the Labour Party. On 15 October 1964 
he won the general election and with it the job that Hailsham really desired 
(Hennessy, 2000). Wilson was thus in a position to appoint Denis HoweIl as the first 
Minister for Sport to take the job seriously. HoweIl devotes a great deal of his 
autobiography (1990) to his involvement in sport, compared with the few dismissive 
lines in Hailsham's two volumes of memoirs (1975, 1990). Therefore it seems 
appropriate to consider Howell as the first true Minister for Sport in Britain, a 
description that Hailsham clearly did not merit or seek. 
WiIson had filled all the senior posts in his new government by 20 October 1964, and 
was appointing the junior Ministers. It is a British convention for the Prime Minister 
to appoint all the junior Ministers, rather than delegating this to the Cabinet Ministers 
to whom they will report (Headey, 1974; Dorey, 2005). Denis HoweIl was called to 
Number 10 Downing Street, where Wilson offered him the post of Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State at the Department of Education and Science (Wilson. 1971). 
The circumstances of the appointment have also been described by HoweIl in his 
autobiography. Howell (1990) remembers that Wilson told him, "You will be the first 
Minister for Sport" (pp. 141-2). 
Howell went on to take over and expand the small sports unit previously set up to 
advise Hailsham. He was fortunate in retaining the services of the semi-retired Sir 
John Lang, a highly-regarded civil servant. This is illustrated by Lord Carrington, 
who was appointed as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1959, with Lang as his 
Permanent Secretary. Carrington (1988) describes him as, "one of the most, if not the 
most, astute civil servants of his generation" and a person who, "ruled the Civil 
Service roost with a rod of iron" (p. 148). For a junior Minister, such as Howell, to 
work with a person of Lang's stature was quite unusual and very fortuitous for him. 
Denis Howell was keen to set up a sports council, as recommended by the Wolfenden 
Committee (1960), but Lang immediately presented Howell with a paper setting out 
the arguments against this course of action. Howell was not impressed by the work 
carried out on sport by the outgoing Conservative administration and its civil servants, 
recalling that, "John Lang handed me half a dozen of the thinnest files I have ever 
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seen and told me this represented the previous Government's thinking on sport" 
(Howell, 1990: p. 143). From this inauspicious start, Denis Howell's own contribution 
to sports policy was substantial, including the speedy establishment of the Sports 
Council under his leadership in 1965 (despite Sir John Lang's advice). 
There have now been 13 Ministers for Sport, 1964-2009, five of whom were Labour 
and eight Conservative. These are set out in Appendix 1, showing the dates of their 
appointments, titles, and departments. Denis Howell held the post for far longer than 
any of the others. He was also the only one to hold it twice, 1964-70 and 1974-79, his 
two spells in office lasting for almost 11 years. The average tenure for all post-holders 
at the time of Gerry Sutcliffe's appointment in June 2007 was 42.7 months. If Howell 
is excluded, the average for the others is only 34.7 months (Butler and Butler, 2000; 
Hansard, 2000-07). 
However, a high turnover of Ministers and a short time in office are quite nonna! 
phenomena in British politics, as Berlinski et al (2007) have discovered. To take a 
few examples of named offices at junior ministerial level (a trend started by Harold 
Wilson), a pattern emerges that confirms their findings. For instance, there were 14 
Ministers for Defence Procurement from 1971 to 2005 (the office was vacant from 
1972 to 1981), with an average of only 21.6 months in office. From 1979 to 2005 
there were 13 Ministers for Local Government, whose average time in post was 24 
months. There were 12 Ministers for Social Security from 1976 to 2005, with an 
average of 32.3 months in the job (Butler and Butler, 2000; Hansard, 2000-05; see 
also Chapter 4, pp. 115-17). By these standards, Ministers for Sport have actually 
enjoyed a relatively lengthy time in office. 
The Minister for Sport is a strange creature in British political life. Since the inception 
of the office, it has always been held at junior ministerial level (parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State or Minister of State) in the House of Commons. According to 
Theakston (1987, 1999), there is really no difference in status between a 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary and a Minister of State, with the true change in 
influence coming at Cabinet member level. Theakston illustrates this from his own 
experience: 
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During many interviews with serving and fonner office-holders at all levels, 
no one demurred at my working assumption that ministers of state were also 
junior ministers: no minister of state objected to my questioning him or her on 
the grounds that my subject had nothing to do with them! (1981: p. vii). 
The post has never been located in the Cabinet, nor in the House of Lords, and none 
of the 13 post-holders has ever achieved Cabinet office in any other job before or 
after. By contrast, Hailsham was a Cabinet Minister many times, in different posts, 
between 1951 and 1981 (Butler and Butler, 2000), and was a potential Prime Minister. 
The Parliamentary careers of the Ministers for Sport will be explored in more depth 
later and compared with those other of junior Ministers (such as those cited above) in 
Chapter 4. The career prospects of junior Ministers as a whole may help us to 
understand better where Ministers for Sport fit in to the larger processes of 
government. 
It is interesting to note that only one of the 13 Ministers for Sport resigned; Tony 
Banks did so in 1999 to help pursue the unsuccessful bid for England to host the 2006 
football World Cup. After retiring from the Commons in April 2005, he was given a 
life peerage in the Prime Minister's May dissolution honours list (Hurst, 2005), but 
unfortunately died on 8 January 2006 (The Daily Telegraph, 2006). None has died in 
office, whereas most ended their terms with election defeat, sacking, or a sideways 
move. 
Denis Howell was the :first former Minister for Sport to go to the House of Lords on 
retirement from the Commons, having been awarded a life peerage in 1992, and was 
later followed there by three others. Hector Monro received his life peerage in 1991, 
after stepping down as MP for Dumfries. Colin Moynihan inherited his father's title 
and became one of the 92 "elected hereditary" peers, while most of the other 
Conservative Sports Ministers received knighthoods. Following the 2005 election, 
only Robert Key and Kate Hoey amongst former Ministers for Sport were still in the 
House of Commons (The Guardian, 2005). Richard Cabom was re-appointed as 
Minister for Sport after the 2005 election (Bose, 2005), until he was replaced by 
Gerry SutcIiffe when Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in June 2001 (Kelso, 
2007). 
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The 13 Ministers seem to have kept a relatively low profile in Parliament. During the 
1964-2005 period, there have only been a handful of occasions when sport has been 
the subject of a debate in the House of Commons, normally initiated by backbenchers. 
In most of those cases, the debates were wide-ranging, to include recreation, youth 
services, sports facilities, or the Sports Council. A true debate on sport is a rarity, and 
one initiated by the Minister for Sport is even rarer, something that will be discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
Nor does the Minister for Sport deal only with sport. The Minister has a wide range of 
duties, depending on the department where he or she has been located. These have 
ranged from Education to Environment at different times, with the office presently 
situated in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Appendix 1 shows the five 
different government departments where sport has been placed, with Education 
briefly appearing a second time in 1990-92. Denis Howell gives us some idea of what 
a Minister for Sport does on a day-to-day basis, reflecting on his experience in the 
Education Department at the time of his first appointment: 
Day two [in October 1964] started with an astonishing surprise. I arrived at the 
office to find three huge bundles of files on my desk. Kay [Masters; his 
principal private secretary] explained to me that I had responsibility for 
teacher discipline and, on behalf of the Minister, I had to take decisions about 
300 or more cases a year. It was clearly going to take me some considerable 
time to carry out this responsibility in a satisfactory manner (1990: pp. 144-5). 
Howell's recollections indicate that the Ministers are likely to spend a great deal of 
time on subjects other than sport, but it is not clear what the real proportion is. 
Houlihan (1991) has suggested that they devote only around 25% of their time to 
sport. Richard Tracey (Minister for Sport 1985-87) is quoted by a journalist as 
claiming to have spent around 20% of his working day on sport (Rowbottom, 1997). 
When Denis Howell was asked to quantify the time he spent on sport he could not do 
so because of his, "ever changing responsibilities" (Hansard: House of Commons 
Debates, 10 November 1976, vol. 919, col. 168). Theakston (1987), however, 
suggests that Howell spent around half his time on sport and half on education in the 
1960s. He also quotes Eldon Griffiths who, "told a House of Commons Select 
Committee that 99.7% of his time was devoted to his DOE [Department of the 
Environment] work, the rest to sport" (p. 155). 
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So according to the Ministers themselves, or to outside observers such as journalists 
and academics, they spend somewhere between 0.3% and 50% of their time on sport! 
There is obviously a huge gap in our knowledge that needs to be filled here, and this 
will be addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Knowledge of the Minister for Sport's contribution to sports policy, and even what he 
or she does most of the time, is therefore fairly scanty. We know an insufficient 
amount about what Ministers for Sport do in Parliament, and what purpose he or she 
actually serves; this will be explored more fully in the literature review. Little is 
known of how their role fits into a wider sports network or community outside 
Parliament. This seems to be a fairly weak ministerial office in the UK., even if the 
office-holder is an able person, which raises a whole series of questions, including the 
following: 
• How do Ministers for Sport spend their time? 
• What proportion of their time is spent on sport? 
• What subj ects do they deal with in Parliament, other than sport? 
• Do they become involved in debates as active parliamentarians? 
• Do they pilot through sports legislation in Parliament? 
• Do they answer parliamentary questions, and if so, on what subjects? 
• Is their role concerned only with routine matters, or does it also involve sports 
policy? 
• Do they have a key role in a wider sports network or community outside 
Parliament? 
• Have they had any significant influence when key decisions on sport have been 
taken? 
• How has the office of Minister for Sport developed over the years? 
These issues may be summarised in the overarching research question: "What is the 
role of the Minister for Sport in the policy-making process for UK sport?" 
The research also relates to some of the most important sporting issues faced by our 
society. For example, when London made its bid for the 2012 Olympic Games a 
strong Minister would have provided a powerful signal that the bid was serious. As 
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some commentators have pointed out, other countries have influential Ministers who 
are in their Cabinets (Houlihan, 1997; Kelso, 2004), including France, the capital city 
of which was a rival bidder. A Cabinet Minister could also be more assertive on such 
matters as drugs in sport, bad behaviour amongst professional football players, or 
tobacco sponsorship. Indeed, it may be convenient for other areas of government 
policy that there is no strong Sports Minister, since this might tend to conflict with 
wider government aims. 
The literature review that follows will look at the history of government involvement 
in sport and the role of Ministers and parties in the post-war period. It will discuss 
some of what has been written about the Ministers for Sport since the office was 
established in 1964. A methodological approach will be proposed, followed by an 
examination of some of the theoretical works in politics which may help to place in 
context the role of the Minister in the policy-making process for sport. There will then 
be an examination of various ministerial offices, including that of the Minister for 
Sport, and an assessment of their contribution to parliamentary activity. This will be 
followed by a presentation of the data derived from interviews with former Ministers 
for Sport and Cabinet Ministers, past and present civil servants, sports administrators, 
policy advisers, and others involved in the sporting world at the upper levels. The data 
will then be analysed in relation to the theoretical literature. Finally, some conclusions 
will be presented to help answer the research question. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this literature review is to critically assess the relevant existing 
literature. It will discuss what is already known about the topic using the available 
evidence. It draws on a wide range of sources, including monographs, edited 
collections, newspaper articles, biographies, autobiographies, and diaries. However, 
the politics of sport is in general a subject not well covered in the journal literature. 
Coakley and Dunning (2002: p. xxiv) provide a helpful table, showing sports-related 
journals. These cover many subject areas, including anthropology, history, and 
sociology, but not political science. This absence is reflected in the present review, 
which necessarily contains a relatively small number of references to journal articles, 
though many are cited in relation to policy analysis and elsewhere. 
There will be an initial review of historical studies of sport in Britain, mainly from the 
nineteenth century to the present, followed by an examination of increasing 
government and political party involvement in sport. There will then be a discussion 
of the social and political trends in Britain during the twentieth century, particularly 
the post-war period. Leading on from this, the role of governments, Ministers, and 
civil servants will be set out. Finally, and within this context, the contribution of the 
Ministers for Sport will be reviewed from the literature about them or by them. 
1.2 Sport and Politics 
In introducing his edited collection of essays on the politics of sport, Lincoln Allison 
(1986) cautions against trying to produce an exact defInition of the term "sport", since 
it means many different things to many people. However, he captures very well the 
changed emphasis of the word, which occurred in the nineteenth century: 
In English, the primary meaning of the word "sport" changed dramatically in 
the period after 1880. Before that date, if you picked up a book on sport, a 
sportsman's bedside book, companion, or whatever, it would certainly have 
been about some combination of hunting, shooting or fIshing, about man's 
ritualised preying on other species. But increasingly in the Edwardian period, 
and almost universally after 1930, sport as such referred to purely human 
competitions like athletics and organised games (p. 5). 
10 
Likewise, trying to define "politics" is not straightforward. Bernard Crick (1976) 
looks at the word's Greek origins in the expressionpolis or, "an aggregate of many 
members" (p. 17) forming a state, as suggested by Aristotle. He goes on to show how 
the meaning of "politics" has changed through the ages and then offers his own 
definition of its modem usage: 
Politics, then, can be simply defined as the activity by which differing interests 
within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in 
proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole 
community (p. 21). 
Very often the practitioners of politics are people who are members of governments, 
or who desire to form governments. They may be elected, or they may be part of 
authoritarian regimes of the Right or the Left, for which elections are irrelevant. 
Politicians and politics may operate at national, local, regional, or some other level, as 
Crick (1976) discusses. The worlds of sport and politics overlap, and sometimes 
collide, when the exponents of these crafts involve themselves in each other's 
activities. In 1980, for example, the International Olympic Committee (lOC) found 
itself heavily embroiled in world politics to an unprecedented degree, following the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. In his study of the modem Olympics, 
Guttmann (2002) tracks the response of the United States' government: 
It was a major crisis, but the foreign policy options available to President 
Jimmy Carter were meagre. Diplomatic protests were clearly useless, and the 
Soviet Union was in a position to veto any measure considered by the U.N. 
Security Council. Economic reprisals are always costly, and the Carter 
administration was already in economic trouble as a result of inflated oil prices 
(p.149). 
Guttmann (2002) then shows how Carter proposed a US boycott of the Games, a 
gesture that would not harm the American economy, and which quickly gained 
overwhelming support from a supine US Congress. The US Olympic Committee, was 
subjected to intense pressure by Carter's administration, in the face of which, "abject 
capitulation followed" (p. 151). Carter then sought world-wide political endorsement, 
that Mrs Thatcher in Britain was only too happy to give, along with many other 
leaders. However, the world of sport was generally unsupportive of the boycott, 
putting sporting organisations very much at odds with their governments for years to 
come. 
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British examples of politics and sport clashing are numerous. For instance, Neil 
Macfarlane (1986), a former Minister for Sport, has written of Mrs Thatcher's 
indifference and even hostility to sport. Following incidents of hooliganism in 1985 
she invited leading members of the Football League and the Football Association 
(FA) to meet her and other Ministers in Downing Street, where she treated them with 
barely-disguised contempt. After the Heysel disaster in 19851 she ignored their views 
completely. Macfarlane (1986) writes that: 
She was quite explicit that she expected the Football Association to withdraw 
all English teams from Europe, pre-empting any decision that might be 
reached by UEFA. Twenty-four hours later the FA dutifully announced that 
Everton, who had won the League championship, Manchester United, the FA 
Cup-winners, and the four clubs which had qualified for the UEFA Cup -
Tottenham, Liverpool, Norwich and Southampton - were not to have their 
names forwarded to the European association (pp. 26-7). 
As Elias and Dunning (1986) demonstrate, football has often been at odds with the 
government of the day, particularly over law and order issues relating to football 
hooliganism. Tensions have also occurred for other reasons, such as the construction 
of a new national stadium or in the regulation of football's business affairs, as shown 
by Tom Bower (2003), ajournalist. He has described the FA as, "masters of delusion" 
(p. 174), out of touch with the modem age and incapable of dealing in a sensible way 
with government. 
Sporting bodies, like the Football League and the FA, will themselves generate their 
own internal politics, since they have governing structures, heirarchies, elites, 
rulebooks, and elections. People who hold positions of authority within sporting 
bodies may behave in similar ways to politicians in the wider world, as these 
organisations have emerged into what they are at the present time. But in a clash with 
government, they are unlikely to win if the politicians assert their full authority. 
1.3 Sporting Developments in Britain and the Increasing Role of Government 
The development of sport in its modem, recognisable form has been well catalogued 
by a number of writers, including Brailsford (1992), Birley (1996), Holt (1989), and 
Holt and Mason (2000). These authors have concurred with Allison (1986) as to how 
our conception of the meaning of "sport" has changed completely from animal 
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hunting, fighting, or baiting activities, to one of the interpersonal or inter-team 
competitions of today. 
Derek Birley (1996) traces the origins of sport in Britain back to Roman times, when 
it consisted mainly of various forms of hunting. As for the next thousand years or so, 
he concedes that, "Our knowledge of British sport in the Dark Ages is limited" (p. 
12). His study therefore concentrates mainly on the period from the thirteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries. Denis Brailsford (1992) agrees with this view in a book which 
covers an even wider time-span, though in less detail: 
Whatever later lyricists may have made of some lost pastoral idyll, the truth is 
that we know far too little of the sports of our distant ancestors. Medieval 
writers have left only scant and scattered evidence of the people's play (p. 1). 
Nowadays most modem sports have social class connotations, just as was the case for 
many centuries with earlier forms of sport. Birley (1996) reminds us that, for the 
aristocracy, "Hunting was an important status symbol" in the eighteenth century (p. 
130), as it had been for the likes of Thomas Becket in the twelfth century. Birley 
(1996) describes how the poor people of London in Becket's day had rather different 
sporting pursuits from the aristocracy: 
At Easter there were water sports, including one using boats from which the 
contestants tried to hit a target with a lance as they passed. In summer, there 
were jumping, wrestling, casting the stone, archery, spear-throwing and 
sword-fighting for the men and dancing for the women, whilst on winter feast 
days there was bull- bear- or boar-baiting, and when the Moorfields marshes 
froze over men strapped bones to their shoes and propelled themselves with 
pointed sticks across the ice (p. 20). 
Apart from animal-baiting, most of these activities have survived to the present day in 
one form or another, as have pugilism, village football, and various forms of racquet 
or bat games. Holt (1989) examines how the huge development of these organised 
sports came about in the nineteenth century. This is embodied in the parallel worlds of 
Victorian amateurism in the public schools and the professional sports associated with 
the new urban, working class communities. As Holt (1989) says: 
By 1900 the scale of working-class involvement in organised sport was 
astounding. During the Edwardian period upwards of six million people a year 
paid to watch First Division professional football alone, and half a million or 
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more played in leagues admitted to the Football Association of England and 
Wales (p. 135). 
In their study of post-war British sport, Holt and Mason (2000) pay particular 
attention to the amateur/professional dichotomy, with its moral undertones: 
Amateurism was a marriage of honour and competition, of an upper-class 
ideal of chivalry and a new middle-class belief in the moral value of strenuous 
effort. These values and structures had a major part in shaping British cultural 
identity and remained tenacious in the post-war years (p. 36). 
Holt and Mason (2000) show how professionalism is now universal for almost all elite 
sportsmen or women, even in games such as flat green bowling. They identify around 
eight thousand full-time professionals, mainly in football, rugby, cricket, and golf, 
while amateurism remains the norm for the millions of participants below the top 
level. Their study goes on to look at how sport has become a highly-professional 
business, with increased commercialisation, regulation, legislation, and involvement 
by government. In their view, "The government could intervene in sport when it 
seemed in the national interest to do so" (p. 147). 
However, government involvement in sport is not at all new. The Game Law of 1390, 
for example, was introduced to protect landed interests. Brailsford (1992) believes 
that: 
In the case of hunting, the statutory controls were a straight protection of 
privilege, to protect it as a sport against those for whom it might be a vital 
necessity. It was designed to make hunting very much an elite pursuit (p. 14). 
Elias (1986) suggests that fox-hunting was, "closely associated with a specific code of 
manners" (pp. 24-5). It was part of a "civilizing process", in which the warrior class 
came under stricter control when the modem nation state began to emerge after the 
Middle Ages. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a "sportization" of pastimes, 
such as horse racing, tennis, and athletics was well under way. Formal rules were 
established, and there was a greater sensitivity to violence (for example, by the 
wearing of boxing gloves to reduce injury). Many of these sporting forms were 
exported abroad, a process which Elias sees as, "another example of a civilizing 
spurt" (p. 22). 
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Elias and Dunning's (1986) collection of essays examines, inter alia, the growing role 
of the state in suppressing working-class sport, so that social order could be better 
maintained. They observe that, "In the Middle Ages the kings and the authorities of 
towns tried for centuries to put a stop to the playing of football, among other reasons 
because it almost invariably ended in bloodshed" (p. 119). In various essays, they 
demonstrate how the state's power to influence sport has since expanded enormously 
in the modern era. 
During the fourteenth century, most lower-class sport in England was effectively 
banned by government because it interfered with archery practice. Although the 
English lost at Bannockburn in 1314, and won at Crecy in 1346, their archers were a 
formidable and deadly presence at both (Brailsford, 1992). Following Crecy, the 
English archers: 
Not only initiated a new phase in the history of warfare but also, in one sense, 
a new episode in the history of sport. Henceforth, for nearly three centuries, 
governments would look to promoting skill and strength in the use of the new, 
demanding weapon (Brailsford, 1992: p. 6). 
John Hargreaves (1986) also shows how popu1ar sporting forms were repressed from 
an early stage, not just by government, but also by the aristocracy, the church, the 
forces of law and order, and other elite groups holding power throughout many 
centuries. He uses hegemony theory to argue his main thesis that: 
Sport was significantly implicated in the process whereby the growing 
economic and political power of the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Britain 
was eventually transformed into that class's hegemony in the latter part of the 
century (p. 7). 
Although working-class cu1ture and sporting forms were continually threatened, 
Hargreaves suggests that, "Popular culture under attack proved remarkably resilient" 
(p. 31). The delay in getting legislation passed, the inability of police and militia to 
enforce it, and popular resistance, ensured that many working-class sports and games 
survived. Hargreaves (1986) goes on to look at the cultural and social changes in 
popular sporting forms, mainly in their organised manifestation after the Industrial 
Revolution. 
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In recent years there has been a growing interest in sports politics and the involvement 
of government in sports. A number of works have looked at how modem sport is 
organised and fmanced, as well as topics such as drugs, national identity, gender, 
apartheid, and so on. For example, Allison's 1986 collection covers issues that were 
highly relevant in the rapidly-changing world of the time, such as apartheid in sport. 
By the time his 1993 edition was published, apartheid was dead, influenced at least in 
some measure by sporting boycotts of South Africa. Similarly, the first edition 
covered elite sport in the Soviet Union and its satellites, a political entity that had 
collapsed completely by the time of his later work. Allison (1993) himself comments 
that the years between the editions, "have contained as much change to sport and its 
political context as the previous generation, perhaps as much as any generation since 
the period from 1860 to 1890" (p. I). 
Terry Monnington (1993), writing in Allison's second edition, analyses the role of 
politicians in sport. He asserts that: 
In her own way, Mrs Thatcher has significantly altered the sporting agenda in 
Britain and has shown a readiness both to use sport for political ends and to 
intervene in the sports context when she deemed it necessary (p. 144). 
Monnington (1993) cites the examples of support for the 1980 Olympic boycott, 
Thatcher's antipathy towards the ostracism of South Africa from world sport, the 
Football Spectators' Bill, and the direction of investment in sport towards 
diversionary activities for disaffected youth. 
Barrie Houlihan (1991) takes up these themes, and many others, in a definitive work 
on sport and sport policy-making in Britain. He shows how government intervenes in 
sport when it is convenient, how sport is organised in Britain, the role of local 
authorities, the financing of sport, and the policy process for sport. This process could 
lead to the development of a "policy community", as it does in many other areas, such 
as housing, education, or farming (Boulihan, 1991). Building on the work of Rhodes 
(1986) he claims that, "policy communities often develop around government 
departments" (p. 167). However, the key relationships in a policy community for sport 
are shown to be clustered around the Sports Council, with the CCPR, local authorities, 
the Minister for Sport, and others, at the periphery (p. 168). This tends to suggest that 
the Minister for Sport is not the key figure in the policy-making process for sport. 
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These points will be returned to in Chapter 3, when models of policy-making are 
discussed. 
Houlihan (1991) goes on to look at the role of the Minister for Sport, who is the link 
between government and the wider world of sport. Of all the Ministers for Sport, he 
suggests that, "None of them, with the exception ofDenis Howell, who seemed to like 
the job, has been an impressive figure or politically influential" (p. 261). The sports 
policy community might coalesce around a powerful and significant Minister for 
Sport, the government's main representative in that field. As Houlihan (1991) shows, 
the government's key position gives it a uniquely powerful role: "While it does not 
control all resources, it generally exercises significant control over some, such as 
finance, and may well possess a near monopoly of others, such as political authority" 
(p. 167). This is something on which a strong and effective Minister should be able to 
capitalise. 
In another work, Houlihan (1997) compares the organisation of British sport and the 
policy process for sport, with those of Australia, Canada, the USA, and the Republic 
of Ireland. He suggests that an important reason for using the comparative method is 
that, "Through careful comparison, policy-makers may learn which policies it is 
probably wise to avoid and which are most likely to prove useful" (Houlihan, 1997: p. 
7). In the cases of the USA, Canada, and Australia, federal structures ensure that there 
are rival power bases and sports networks at state level. The USA in particular has 
always been antipathetic to government involvement in many areas of society because 
of its free-market ideology. It is not surprising therefore that sport is seen as 
something for their government to leave alone, in terms of giving financial and other 
support, although there are occasions when it does intervene in sport for other reasons. 
One such example, cited earlier, is President Carter's initiation of the 1980 Olympic 
Boycott which Mrs Thatcher supported (Monnington in Allison, 1993; Guttman, 
2002). The Republic of Ireland, although a unitary state, is heavily influenced by 
external events due to its small size. Of the common themes identified in his cross-
national comparison, Houlihan (1997) sees the role of government as one of the main 
features: 
Of particular importance is the steady increase in the involvement of 
government in sport whether as a provider, exploiter or regulator. For some 
countries with a welfare state tradition, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia, 
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the expansion of the government's role has not been problematic but for the 
United States the growth of government involvement has been most sharply 
contested but no less significant (p. 60). 
The increasing role of government in sport may be a feature of the so-called post-war 
consensus in the United Kingdom. This consensus and its impact on sport will be 
examined in the next section. 
1.4 The British Post-War Consensus and its Effect on Sport 
For many years after 1945, until the 1970s, British governments of both main parties 
largely agreed on the shape and size of state provision in health, education, welfare, 
defence, and other programmes. There was, in effect, a "consensus" on the role of the 
state as a provider ofa wide range of services. Kavanagh and Morris (1989) give one 
of the most succinct and informative accounts of this process. They discuss the 
contribution made by William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes in the 1940s to 
government social and economic policy. This has come to be expressed in different 
ways but with similar meanings: 
Welfare capitalism, or the mixed or managed economy, or Keynesian social 
democracy, are the terms most often used to describe the elements of the post-
war consensus (Kavanagh and Morris, 1989: p. 4). 
Another description of British society since 1945, still widely applied, is the "welfare 
state". Derek Fraser (1984) points out that, "The term itself did not become commonly 
used until the 1940s" although, "It was the end product of a very long historical 
process" (p. xxi). Peden (1991) tracks this process from the Victorian period, through 
the social reforms of the early twentieth-century Liberal governmen!s, and into the 
post-war age of the Labour and Conservative governments' managed economy. At the 
height of the Victorian era in 1870, government spending accounted for only nine per 
cent of gross national product. This figure had risen to well over 40% by the 1980s, 
even at the pinnacle of the Thatcherite crusade to cut back the state (Peden, 1991). 
According to an Institute of Fiscal Studies' pre-election report in 2005, the 
government was still spending 41.2% of national income in 2004-05, a figure that was 
expected to rise still further (Elliott and Seager, 2005). 
Gamble (1981) sees this shift towards much greater state provision of services as, "A 
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triumph of social democracy" (p. 102). At the same time, only a relatively wealthy 
country with a vigorous economy could afford such a huge investment in social and 
welfare services. Wilson and Wilson (1991) suggest that, "Over the long ~ 
economic growth has been incomparably the most important factor in raising the 
standard of living of all income groups" (p. 14). 
The Heath government of 1970-74 was thought at the time to be more radical in 
economic policies, compared with Harold Wtlson in 1964-70, although Gamble 
(1994) suggests that the consensus on the post-war social and economic settlement 
was largely maintained by a Conservative government under Heath. In retrospect, the 
Heath government was considered as a period of continuity rather than change. A 
departure from consensus is frequently identified more precisely as occurring the 
point at which the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, applied for an 
emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund in December 1976. Peter 
Riddell (1985) claims that: 
If there has been a Thatcher experiment, it was launched by Denis Healey. It 
was the response of a clever and flexible man to the breakdown of the post-
war consensus on economic management and to external pressures. In 
contrast, the Conservative approach has been based on belief (pp. 59-60). 
Mrs Thatcher's government, when elected in 1979, acted with the conviction that the 
days of corporatism and compromise, under Wilson, Heath and Callaghan, were over. 
They built on the foundations laid by Denis Healey to exact greater control on public 
spending. Thatcher's Ministers believed that previous governments' policies had been 
fundamentally wrong. In examining Mrs Thatcher's economic legacy, Nigel Hea1ey 
(1993) states, "Mrs Thatcher's government was elected on the basis of a programme 
which was diametrically opposed to the economic philosophy of the post-war 
consensus between the two major political parties" (p. 1). 
Gamble (1994) takes a similar view to Hea1ey (1993). He shows how New Right ideas 
became the dominant ideology in the Conservative government This was not, "a 
unified movement or a coherent doctrine" (Gamble, 1994: p. 34). It was an eclectic 
blend of social and economic teaching from thinkers such as Haye~ Friedman, and 
others. What they had in common was a desire to reduce the size of the state, 
encourage a highly competitive economy, and ensure strong defence of the country, or 
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as Gamble (1994) puts it, ''the doctrine of the free economy and the strong state" (p. 
35). In such a climate of opinion, consensus was anathema to many Conservatives, 
who wanted to sweep away what they saw as an outmoded post-war settlement. There 
was no necessary contradiction in being a Conservative and radical at the same time, 
as Gamble (1994) points out: "Conservative critics of corporatism argued that it 
produced weak government. They wanted a new, strong state that did not need to 
bargain with organised interests" (p. 30). 
Mrs Thatcher's successor, John Major, was not a conviction-driven politician in the 
same mould as she was. However, there was no discernible break. with the free-
market, self-reliant type of policies she espoused. An edited work by Dunleavy, et al 
(2000) examines how British politics has changed in recent years. In this, Steven 
Fielding (2000) suggests that there has been more continuity than change: 
Major was, however, ideologically indistinct from Thatcher. His governments 
privatized what remained of the state sector and introduced market 
mechanisms into public services (p. 18). 
Dunleavy et al (2000) set out the arguments for politics returning to "normal" after 
Thatcher and Major, with a re-establishment of broad party agreement on the main 
policy lines (p. 1). Others observe that, while there may be a less confrontational 
atmosphere in politics, there has been no return to the old ways. For example Budge, 
et al (2004) see continuity with Conservative policies in the Labour government that 
was fIrst elected in 1997: 
The Labour Party, along with other Social Democratic parties in Europe, has 
largely abandoned high-tax, high-spending policies in favour of fIscal 
rectitude (i.e. low taxation and restraints on public spending and inflation). 
This sea change in policy has had important consequences for British politics 
and for the British economy (p. 17). 
It has been noted by both Haywood et al (1995) and Henry (1993) that, despite the 
differing ideological standpoints of governments in the post-war period, investment in 
sport has not been seriously affected. There have been no fundamental changes of 
policy following the move from post-war consensus as there have been with other 
services, such as housing or nationalised industries. The Sports Council (and its 
successor bodies) has more or less retained a consistent level of funding, while the 
Minister for Sport has been retained as an office in government throughout this time. 
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Haywood et al (1995) track the social democratic consensus in relation to sport and 
leisure through a series of policy documents produced by the two major parties. They 
claim that, "The Wilson Government of 1964-70 is particularly significant in the 
development of post-war leisure policy" (p. 176). The Labour government of the time 
not only established the Sports Council, but also developed policies for the arts, the 
countryside, and the National Parks. When the Conservatives were elected in 1970, 
the consensus was largely undisturbed in these areas and Labour policies were not 
dismantled. As Henry (1993) reminds us: 
When policy initiatives were introduced by the post-war Labour governments, 
not only did the Heath administration (1970-4) not attempt to rescind such 
arrangements, it continued to fund increasing levels of finance for the leisure 
quangos (p. 56). 
The Heath government made the Sports Council an independent body and continued 
to fund it at a similar level as before. This was at a time when it was actively trying to 
cut back on some government activities and programmes, without radically breaking 
with the post-war consensus. Gamble (1994) argues that, "The Heath government 
began by dismantling many of the interventionist agencies used by Labour to 
implement its policies" (p. 82). He gives examples of the Prices and Incomes Board, 
the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, and the Ministry of Technology as some of 
the agencies that the Heath government abolished. Nevertheless, Gamble (1994) 
shows that these were relatively small-scale cutbacks compared with those made by 
the first Thatcher government. 
Henry (1990) illustrates in a time-series how the annual grant to the Sports Council 
rose from £3.6m in 1972-73 to £41.9m in 1989-90. This increased to £47m in 1995-
96, the last year before reorganisation, leading to the creation of UK Sport and the 
various national Councils such as Sport England (Sports Council 1995-96). By 2002-
03, Sport England alone received £79.6m from governmenf (Sport England 2002-03). 
In the same year, UK Sport was given over £15m by government and had almost 
£30m available to distribute in Lottery funding (UK Sport 2002-03). If these figures 
seem generous, the importance of sport to society and the economy should not be 
underestimated. Holt and Mason (2000) observe that: 
No government can ignore an industry the size of sport and leisure which not 
only accounts for about £10 billion annually of consumer expenditure but 
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employs 750,000 workers and currently pays £3.5 billion per year in tax 
revenues. Sport is Britain's eleventh largest industry and expanding fast (p. 
66). 
The next section looks at how parties, governments, and Ministers have responded to 
the growth of the sport and leisure sector, a phenomenon that has occurred during a 
period of increasing affluence in Britain. 
1.5 Sport and Party Politics in the UK Since 1945 
In the twentieth century, until the 1950s, there was little direct government 
intervention to assist sport, with policy in this area being relatively undeveloped in 
Britain. Sensing the need for a more focussed policy to present to government, in 
1957 the Central Council for Physical Recreation (CCPR) commissioned Sir John 
Wolfenden to undertake an enquiry and make recommendations. Wolfenden's (1960) 
report was very influential, and became the basis for government policy at that time. 
One of the suggestions rejected by Wo1fenden was that, "There should be established 
a new Department of State, called the Ministry of Sport, which should have an overall 
direction both of finance and policy" (p. 97). 
The Committee believed that this, "was foreign to the whole national attitude towards 
sport" (p. 97), a sentiment with which Lord Hailsham would probably have agreed . 
. Instead, the Committee recommended the establishment of the Sports Council, or 
"Sports Development Council" as they described it (p. 100). Wolfenden did not 
recommend the appointment of a Sports Minister. The Committee envisaged the 
"Sports Development Council" would report directly to the Lord President of the 
Council or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was not until Denis Howell was 
appointed as the first true Minister for Sport in 1964, that the Sports Council was 
finally established in 1965 (Howell, 1990). Lord Hailsham (1975, 1990) makes no 
mention at all of Wolfenden in his memoirs, although he was nominally responsible 
for sport shortly after the report appeared and was Lord President of the Council. 
Two books, by Coughlan (1990) and Pickup (1996), have looked at the Sports 
Council in some detail. In so doing they have provided a number of worthwhile 
insights into the Minister for Sport's relationship with that body and with sports 
politics generally. John Coghlan was Deputy Director of the Sports Council from 
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1980 to 1988; before this he had had a long career in sports education and 
administration. David Pickup, a former civil servant, was the Council's Director from 
1988 to 1993. Both have tracked the influence of government in sport at a time of 
important issues, such as drugs, mass participation, abandonment of amateurism in 
elite sport, hooliganism, and so on and both have first-hand experience of how the 
Minister for Sport has or has not influenced these events. 
Coghlan (1990) sees the early years of the Sports Council as extremely valuable in 
providing a critical link with the machinery of government, since the Minister for 
Sport was also its chairman: 
It was, however, quite clear from the beginning that the Sports Council, 
although advisory, was intended to be a dynamic and promotional body. It was 
to advise the Government but with the Government being largely represented 
by the Minister for Sport in the Chair, it was overwhelmingly likely that such 
advice would be accepted (p. 22). 
John Coghlan was not appointed to head the Sports Council in 1988 when John 
Wheatley resigned as Director-General (Coghlan, 1990) because of the internal 
politics of the organisation. Instead the job went to David Pickup, someone from 
outside of the sporting environment. Pickup (1996) readily admits to his lack of 
knowledge of the sporting world: 
I have to confess to having been less than comprehensively informed about the 
origins, development, role, structure or policies of the Sports Council. I was 
ignorant of the existence of the territorial cousins: the Sports Councils of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (p. 2). 
Some other authors have looked at sport and leisure in a wider sense, but in so doing, 
have also discussed the Sports Council and the role of the Minister for Sport. For 
example, Haywood, et al (1995) track the period from Wolfenden (1960) to the 
establishment of the Sports Council and the role of various Ministers for Sport. 
However, they say little about the role of central government in determining sport or 
leisure policy. This area is covered better by Henry (1993), who looks at the effects of 
political ideology on sport and leisure provision at both national and local levels. He 
tells us that: 
If politics are concerned with the allocation of scarce resources then clearly 
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leisure is a political issue, even if only in terms of governmental decisions 
about the aims, level and appropriateness of investment in leisure from the 
public purse (p. 27). 
This growing government investment in sport seems to be a common feature in most 
Western democracies, including Britain. The British government has taken an 
increasing interest in sport during the post-war period in many different ways, and for 
many reasons, such as promoting good health, occupying idle youth, and bolstering 
national prestige. According to Henry (1993), this ''welfare'' notion of sports and 
leisure provision has come under attack from many angles, including the Right, 
feminists, and even social democrats. He says that despite this, "Perhaps what was 
surprising was that in the early part of the 1980s leisure provision, as the 'luxury' end 
of the welfare services framework, was not immediately reduced or even dismantled" 
(pp. 58-9). He also looks at the role of local government in sport and leisure 
provision, and points out that, "Despite the ideological significance and generally high 
public profile of the leisure quangos, local government is by far the most significant 
vehicle for the delivery of leisure services" (p. 90). 
Gratton and Taylor (2000) also provide evidence of sports and leisure funding by 
central and local government. They agree with Henry (1993) about the significance of 
local government in supporting such services, and present data showing that local 
authorities spent twice as much on this in 1995 as central government did. As 
economists, they set out a wealth of data on the income from broadcasting, 
sponsorship, government, sales of tickets, National Lottery, and other sources. They 
assert that sport and leisure: 
Accounts for over a quarter of all consumer spending and over 10 per cent of 
total employment in the UK., and brings in over £20 billion per annum in 
foreign exchange. Sport is not the largest sector of the leisure industry, but it is 
amongst the fastest growing (p. 3). 
The sport and leisure sector is now a major industry in Britain. With such a significant 
share of the national economy, it is little wonder that governments have become 
progressively more involved in sport. One way in which they have done so is through 
their programmes for government, as set out in their election manifestos. When 
Labour won the 1945 and 1950 elections, they were more concerned with 
restructuring the country's industrial base than tinkering with people's leisure 
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interests. Indeed, as Holt and Mason (2000) observe, ''the post-war Labour 
government did not have a sports policy" (p. 146). 
This lack of a sports policy is reflected in the Labour's Party's 1945 election 
manifesto, when all that was said on the wider leisure agenda was: 
National and local authorities should co-operate to enable people to enjoy their 
leisure to the full, to have opportunities for healthy recreation. By the 
provision of concert halls, modem libraries, theatres and suitable civic centres, 
we desire to assure to our people full access to the great heritage of culture in 
this nation (p. 7). 
By the 1950 election, the Labour Party still had no leisure and recreation policy, but 
they were edging towards it in their manifesto: 
National Parks will be established in the fairest parts of Britain. Footpaths will 
be preserved and access to the countryside will be secured for all hikers and 
cyclists. There is also need for more playing fields for the children, and 
wherever possible these will be provided (p. 8). 
The Conservatives had nothing at all to announce on sport or leisure at either the 1945 
or 1950 elections. At the 1951 election neither of the main parties mentioned it in 
their manifestos. The election of 1955 was the first in which both parties included 
some mention of recreation at the same time. Labour made the very specific pledge to 
abolish tax on sport, and not much else: 
We shall provide more playing fields. We shall abolish the tax on sport and the 
living theatre (p. 4). 
In 1955 the Conservatives half-heartedly wanted to do something for better facilities, 
though this could hardly be described as a sport and recreation policy: 
Grants will continue to be given for playing fields, community centres and 
youth clubs (p. 6). 
Anticipating Wolfenden (1960) in 1959, Labour advocated establishing a Sports 
Council, with £5m for the purpose: 
We shall make much better provision for the enjoyment of sport, the arts and 
countryside. A Sports Council will be set up with a grant of £5 million (p. 4). 
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This is the first time a specific figure was mentioned in relation to sports funding in a 
major British election manifesto, and one of the very few times any fmancial 
commitment was made. In actual fact, it was 1973-74 before the Sports Council 
achieved this level of funding in a single year (Henry, 1993). Labour did not have to 
fulfil their promise since the Conservatives won the 1959 election. The Tories in that 
year presented what was, for them, their most specific proposals for sport so far: 
Measures will be taken to encourage Youth Leadership and the provision of 
attractive youth clubs, more playing fields and better facilities for sport (p. 6). 
By the mid-1960s, both parties' policies were becoming more specific. Labour again 
pledged to create a Sports Council in their 1964 manifesto. They stated that they 
would develop: 
the national parks: preserve access to the coast and protect it from pollution 
and unplanned development: set up a sports council to supply in consultation 
with local authorities and voluntary bodies the physical equipment, coaching 
facilities and playing fields that are so badly needed (p. 18). 
However, in 1964 there was no mention that a Minister for Sport would be created; 
this was Harold Wilson's personal, spontaneous initiative, as Howell (1990) describes 
in his memoirs. The Conservatives advocated investment in a range of new facilities: 
There remains a need in and around the towns and cities for many more sports 
grounds, playing fields, running tracks, swimming baths and gymnasia. Local 
authorities have been advised on how to combine with their neighbours for the 
larger projects, and a substantial programme will be authorised (p. 15). 
By 1966 the policies on offer from both parties were again somewhat vague. Each 
wanted more facilities, though without much definition or commitment, and better 
access to water for recreation. For Labour, the only specific mention of sport was the 
following: 
A new Minister is energetically creating, through regional sports councils, a 
new approach to the provision of facilities for sport (p. 14). 
The Conservative manifesto for 1966 included little on sport. No specific proposals 
were made for improving facilities, and the document simply noted that, if elected, the 
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Conservatives would: 
plan the coast and countryside in such a way as to increase their natural 
beauty, increase the holiday attractions of Britain, and encourage provision for 
the growing numbers who leave the towns to sail, ski, climb, picnic or go 
caravaning (p. 8). 
At the 1970 election Labour had more to announce on sport than ever before. In fact, 
it is the closest that either of the two main parties had reached at that stage to an actual 
policy for sport, and is worth quoting in full: 
Labour's National Sports Council and the nine Regional Sports Councils are 
developing facilities and identifying recreational needs in sport. The next step 
is to assist in the establishment of regional sports centres. We shall encourage 
the design of new schools so that they can also serve as multi-purpose sports 
centres for the adult community. 200 schools are already being designed for 
this purpose. We shall seek to cater for the growth sports, golfing, squash, 
sailing and so on. Angling is one of our most popular sports and we shall give 
special attention to its two great problems of greater access to fishing waters 
and to the prevention of pollution (p. 17). 
Since Labour lost the 1970 election, they were unable to implement these detailed 
policies. The Conservatives, who won in 1970, promised very little, except making 
the Sports Council an independent body: 
The Sports Council is fulfilling an important function in carrying out research 
and advising the Government on capital investment in recreation by local 
authorities, and on grant-aid to voluntary organisations. We will make the 
Sports Council an independent body, and make it responsible for the grant-
aiding functions at present exercised by the Government (p. 28). 
The Conservatives' support for the Sports Council, a Labour initiative, tends to show 
a bi-partisan approach of sports policy. However, this was a time when the Tories 
were beginning to experiment with social and economic policies at variance with the 
post-war consensus, such as allowing some "lame duck" industries to go out of 
business (Gamble, 1994). An independent Sports Council was something that was 
actually delivered by the Conservatives in the following year, after their election 
victory in 1970. 
With the February 1974 election being fought in an atmosphere of industrial crisis, 
Labour neglected to mention sport or recreation at all (for the first time since 1951). 
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The Conservatives, for their part, made a rather weak attempt to include something on 
the subject: 
We shall give further impetus to the Sports Council, whose powers and funds 
we have already greatly expanded. Professional football clubs as well as 
amateur sports organisations will be encouraged to join with local authorities 
and voluntary bodies in the redevelopment of town centre grounds for multi-
purpose recreational needs (p. 17). 
As the governing party by October 1974, Labour may have felt it necessary to put 
something about sport in their manifesto. They therefore included only the second 
reference to the Minister for Sport in all of the 34 Labour or Conservative Party 
manifestos between 1945 and 2005: 
Labour appointed the first ever Minister of Sport and Recreation. We will 
continue to develop and improve the facilities for sport and leisure for all our 
citizens (p. 10). 
The Conservatives made another half-hearted effort to mention sport in October 1974. 
They produced a fairly meaningless statement without offering any commitments: 
At a time when economic conditions necessarily impose limits on public 
spending, we will nevertheless continue to give as much help as we can to the 
arts, to sport and to broadcasting, and we will be particularly keen to 
encourage local effort and involvement (p. 22). 
After the "winter of discontent" in 1978-79, Labour lost the 1979 election. The single 
reference to sport in the manifesto of that year concerned extending facilities and 
putting an unspecified amount of "more money" into sport and leisure: 
In a society where leisure is increasing year by year, Labour wants to make 
facilities for sport and -leisure-available to alb We will continue to put more 
money into these activities (p. 18). 
The incoming Conservative government had little time for sport, certainly of the state-
supported variety which was incompatible with the free market. However, a brief 
mention of sport was included, with some worthy, but fairly non-committal, thoughts 
being expressed about encouraging recreation: 
Sport and recreation have also been hit by inflation and high taxation. We will 
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continue to support the Sports Councils in the encouragement of recreation 
and international sporting achievement (p. 26). 
Labour's 1983 manifesto was memorably described by Gerald Kaufman as, ''the 
longest suicide note in history" (quoted in Anderson and Mann, 1997: p. 17). It was 
laden with nationalisation, workers' control, increased taxation, and unilateral nuclear 
disarmament. However, some room was found for sport, without making any real 
promises: 
Encourage greater participation in sport and recreation. Give incentives to 
voluntary bodies to involve themselves more widely in the provision of 
sporting and community facilities. Encourage local authorities and other 
owners of facilities to make them much more available to public use. Set up an 
immediate enquiry into the fmancial basis of sport and recreation. Review the 
provision of national sporting facilities, so as to secure a fairer geographical 
distribution. Ensure that the sporting talent of the nation receives sufficient 
support to enable them to bring sporting success to Britain (p. 32). 
The Conservatives had similar vague ideas about widening participation and 
encouraging the voluntary sector in 1983, when they included a fairly lengthy 
statement without making any specific commitments: 
The Government has increased the real level of funding for the Sports Council. 
The Urban Aid and Derelict Land Programmes have also contributed to new 
sporting projects. By these means, and by offering one pound of government 
money for every one pound raised locally, we have begun to transform sports 
facilities in the inner cities. But there are still plenty of sports facilities which 
could be opened up to the general public. In particular, to reinforce our 
initiatives for better use of schools and playing fields, we shall urge every 
local education authority to make school and college premises available for 
use outside school hours and in the holidays. In all these initiatives, voluntary 
bodies will be enabled to play a bigger part. We have kept up the pressure for 
public access to parks and reservoirs for anglers and all those who enjoy and 
respect the countryside (p. 31). 
The 1987 Labour manifesto was a little more focussed, with pledges on a "Sports 
Trust" and "Support Sports Programme". These initiatives indicate that some thought 
was actually being brought to bear on the subject. There was also the first mention of 
bringing major events to Britain: 
Our "Support Sport Programme" will provide more resources for physical 
education and training through more playing fields and facilities, better 
equipment and well-trained teachers and instructors. We will nourish special 
talents and encourage wider participation in sport. We will encourage schools 
29 
to open up their recreational facilities to the whole community and prevent the 
selling off of school and other sports grounds. We will set up a Sports Trust to 
channel resources into the development of community sporting facilities and 
the attraction of major international sporting events to Britain (p. 14). 
The Tories continued with their usual pledges on encouraging participation. In 
addition, law and order featured strongly in the sports section for the one and only 
time amongst the 34 post-war manifestos. There were promises to clamp down on 
football hooliganism and ban the sale of alcohol at grounds: 
We have increased funding for the Sports Council from £15 million in 
1978179 to £37 million in 1987/88. We will continue to work with the Council 
and, through our funding of the Sports Council National Centres, we will 
encourage the pursuit of excellence in our sports. We want to encourage 
competitive sports through schools and clubs and we strongly oppose any 
attempts to ban competitive sports in schools. We will continue to encourage 
schools and colleges to open their facilities for community use wherever 
possible to co-operate with other owners to achieve public access to sport 
premises. Football hooliganism has tarnished the good name of British 
sportsmanship. We have acted to control the sale of alcohol at sports grounds. 
We have enhanced police powers to stop and search at football grounds and 
we have encouraged tougher sentencing of hooligans (p. 69). 
Labour's 1992 manifesto promised rate relief to voluntary clubs, an initiative later 
implemented by Richard Caborn (Mackay, 2004). There was also the fIrst, and so far 
only, hint of an equity agenda, with a reference to, "all ages and abilities" (p. 21). 
However, neither this nor indeed any of the Labour or Conservative manifestos has 
ever specifIcally mentioned the needs of ethnic minorities, women, the disabled, or 
other disadvantaged groups: 
As people have more leisure, they also need better facilities for sport. We will 
encourage councils to invest in modern, well-staffed sports centres for the 
enjoyment of people of all ages and abilities, and give mandatory rate relief to 
voluntary sports clubs. New facilities and better backing for people with 
outstanding talent will help put Britain back on the international sporting map. 
We will review sports taxation, reform the Sports Councils and make football 
grounds safe for spectators. We will stop the wanton sale of school playing 
fields and ensure that sport takes its proper place within the curriculum (p. 21). 
The 1992 Conservative manifesto was a complete break with the party's past, 
reflecting Prime Minister Major's personal interest in sport. Their proposals on sport 
were the most detailed ever in a British election manifesto. The following two extracts 
illustrate this: 
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We propose to introduce a National Lottery from 1994, which would help 
provide funds for a number of good causes in the artistic, sporting, heritage 
and charitable fields - and from which some funds would be put aside for a 
Millennium Fund (p. 44) 
We will continue to encourage private sector sponsorship of sport. We will 
encourage more effective use of local sport and leisure facilities through 
compulsory competitive tendering [CCT]. We want to see more dual use of 
school playing fields and halls and will give schools more freedom in their 
management (p. 45). 
The Conservative commitment to a National Lottery was to be fulfilled in 1994, 
thereby transforming the prospects for many elite sports competitors. However, the 
promise to undertake CCT of facilities is one of the few "ideological" references in 
the sports sections of the manifestos. There were several other specific pledges, 
including a £55 million package to support Manchester's Olympic bid. 
The Conservatives followed this up in 1997 with another comprehensive manifesto 
for sport. Most of the pledges centred on spending Lottery money on an English 
National Stadium, an Academy of Sport, 1,000 community coaches, and supporting 
athletes. For instance: 
The National Lottery will also help us train and promote British sporting 
talent. The English National Stadium and British Academy of Sport, funded by 
the Lottery, will be new focal points for sporting events and excellence. We 
will encourage more young people to play sport by ensuring every school 
plays a minimum level of sport, including competitive sports, and developing 
a network of Sporting Ambassadors - sporting celebrities who will visit 
schools to inspire young people. We will also encourage the Sports Council to 
use Lottery money to employ over 1000 additional community sports coaches 
to assist in schools (p. 44). 
They were not able to implement these proposals because Labour won the 1997 
election. Labour's own manifesto was fairly lacklustre in relation to sport. Once again 
they wanted to support excellence, encourage participation, and ban the sale of school 
playing fields. For the third time, they proposed to attract major events to Britain, 
including the Olympic Games: 
A Labour government will take the lead in extending opportunities for 
participation in sports; and in identifying sporting excellence and supporting it. 
School sports must be the foundation. We will bring the government's policy 
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of forcing schools to sell off playing fields to an end. We will provide full 
backing to the bid to host the 2006 football World Cup in England. A Labour 
government will also work to bring the Olympics and other major international 
sporting events to Britain (p. 30). 
The commitment to bring major events to Britain took some time to be fulfilled, 
following the abortive 2006 World Cup bid and the ScottishlIrish applications to host 
the European Football Championships 2008. However, the government gave full 
backing to the successful London Olympic bid for 2012. Labour followed up their 
relatively sketchy proposals for sport in 1997 with much more detailed ones in 2001. 
This manifesto contained their most comprehensive aspirations for sport, and a very 
wide range of initiatives: 
We pledge a sports entitlement for all children, giving them access to at least 
two hours a week of sport in or after school. Thanks to our ban on the enforced 
sale of playing fields and a commitment of nearly £1 billion to new sports 
facilities and 1,000 school sports co-ordinators, all children will be offered 
coaching and competitive games. We have pledged to fund 200 specialist 
sports colleges. We will maintain the elite funding we put in place for 
individual athletes, with a first-class athletics stadium for the World Athletics 
Championships in 2005 and a new stadium in Manchester for next year's 
Commonwealth Games (p. 23). 
In addition to those set out above in 2001, there would a sell-off of the Tote,3 support 
for amateur sports clubs, a free vote in the Commons on banning fox hunting,4 and a 
refusal to ban angling and shooting. By this stage the Manchester stadium was largely 
complete,S but the 2005 World Athletics Championships had to be forfeited because 
London lacked a suitable stadium and the government failed to ensure that it was 
built. 
The Conservatives countered in 2001 with a return to some of their more traditional 
proposals, such as increased sport in schools, charitable status for voluntary sports 
clubs, streamlined funding for sport, and the encouragement of private investment. 
They would also: 
ensure that our elite athletes get the funding they need to achieve excellence in 
the future. Conservatives will give back to headteachers and governors the 
right to offer adequate time for sport. We will also give further protection to 
playing fields (p. 42). 
Labour's 2005 manifesto contained many of the same promises as that of 2001, such 
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as a bid for the 2012 Olympics, support for amateur clubs, and encouragement of 
school sport. Indeed, the emphasis on school sport became its most significant feature: 
Investment in school sports will ensure that by 2010 all children will receive 
two hours of high-quality PE or sport per week. Every child should have the 
chance to compete at school. We have clamped down on the sale of paying 
fields: 96 per cent of schools in Schools Sports Partnerships now hold at least 
one sports day or sports festival each year. All secondary schools will be 
expected to field teams in regular competitive fixtures (p. 95). 
The emphasis was very much on grass-roots sports, community facilities, sport for all, 
and school sport, with little mention of elite sport. By contrast, the Conservatives 
almost ignored sport, with only a fleeting mention of the Lottery and a promise to 
reverse the ban on hunting with dogs. 
Throughout most of the manifestos there is a strong impression that sport has been 
mentioned very much as an afterthought. It often merits only a couple of lines, or at 
most one or two paragraphs. In many cases it is buried within other subject areas, such 
as education (e.g. sharing of school facilities), or environment (e.g. opening up the 
countryside). On a number of occasions, sport is coupled with the arts, as if they were 
one and the same thing. 
Only in the case of the Conservatives' 1992 manifesto was sport really flagged up as 
being of some significance. It was usually tagged on near the end, a long way behind 
the economy, taxation, law and order, defence, foreign policy, education, social 
services, and so on. Even where sport is given its own small sub-section, the contents 
are often very vague. 
Some themes constantly appear, particularly those on the fringes of what could be 
considered true sport (e.g. national parks, footpaths, opening up the countryside, 
sharing of facilities, sales of school playing fields, better use of waterways for 
leisure). Many people would agree that more sport in schools is a good thing, so the 
parties have found it very easy to include this aspiration in their manifestos without 
actually doing much about it. Furthermore, no government could be pinned down on 
delivering these kinds of promises, since they are difficult to evaluate. 
There are few definite pledges, and even fewer stated objectives which have been 
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fulfilled (the creation of the Sports Council, National Lottery funding, Manchester 
Commonwealth Games stadium, 2012 Olympics stand out as honourable exceptions). 
Many promises have not been fully delivered (e.g. the pledge to bring major events to 
Britain, a Manchester Olympics, or a major stadium in London for the 2005 World 
Athletics Championships), although the European Football Championships of 1996 
and the 2002 Commonwealth Games were staged in Britain. The existence of the 
Minister for Sport merits only two mentions (Labour, in 1966 and October 1974). 
Perhaps this is an indication of the value attached to the office by successive 
Governments and Oppositions when writing their manifestos. 
There appear to be few real ideological differences between the parties when writing 
their manifesto proposals for sport. There is no clearly-defmed "Labour view" of 
sport, nor is there a Conservative one either. While some authors (e.g. Macfarlane, 
1986; Houlihan, 1991) have shown how Labour and Conservative governments have 
taken ideological stances in response to particular events, such as football 
hooliganism, there is not much evidence of this in their manifestos. 
There are some differences in emphasis, with a tendency for Labour policies to centre 
more on what the government can do via the Sports Council, by developing new 
facilities, or through the schools. In the Conservative manifestos, there is more focus 
on self-help, voluntarism, and competitive tendering. Only once was there a true 
ideological position taken, when the Conservatives flagged up law and order in 1987, 
in response to hooliganism in football at that time. 
Overall, there has been a trend for both main parties to develop a more comprehensive 
approach to sport and leisure with the passage of time. There is a clear tendency for 
some of the later manifestos from the 1990s onwards to present more developed ideas. 
However, the Minister for Sport has not necessarily played a significant role in the 
processes of government or in delivering government policies, as the following 
section illustrates. 
1.6 Governments and Ministers 
British governments have not ignored sport, as Holt and Mason (2000) have shown. 
They have paid it an increasing amount of attention, not least by creating and 
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maintaining the post of Minister for Sport. Although there has been such a Minister 
since 1964, the post has always been outside the Cabinet, in contrast with some other 
countries. For example, Canada has had a Cabinet-level Minister for Sport since 1973 
(Houlihan, 1997). In Britain, by contrast, Houlihan (1997) suggests, "the absence of a 
voice at Cabinet level" (p. 96) has been a major disadvantage for sports policy. 
Journalist, Paul Kelso (2004) noted that France made their bid for the 2012 Olympics 
with a Sports Minister who was a full member of the French Cabinet. It has often been 
proposed that the British Sports Minister should also be in the Cabinet. Two press 
articles, by Charlie Whelan (1999) and lan Ridley (2001), illustrate this point of view: 
It is all very well for the Government to back the World Cup bid and to get 
high-profile brownie points for doing so, but so much more needs to be done 
for grass-roots sport, particularly in schools, and in oIder that the sports 
minister has clout to do that she should be in the Cabinet (Whelan: p. 7). 
There is one signal that Tony Blair might send out to sport as a guide to intent 
when he comes to consider the composition of his next government on Friday 
morning. It is to grant Hoey, as a minister, a Cabinet position so she can keep 
sport on the main agenda (Ridley: p. 8). 
Whelan was writing shortly after Kate Hoey had been appointed as the Minister for 
Sport in succession to Tony Banks. Ridley made his suggestion just before the 2001 
election. Not only was Hoey sacked as a Minister the following week, the post 
remained firmly outside of the Cabinet. In 2005, a report co-authored by Kate Hoey 
and Colin Moynihan on the future of British sport, also called for a Cabinet-level 
Sports Minister (Hoey and Moynihan, 2005; Mackay, 2005c). According to Hoey and 
Moynihan (2005), "it is essential that we have a Secretary of State for Sport - a strong 
voice for sport within the Cabinet" (p. 5). 
It is thus implied that a Minister for Sport in the Cabinet would be much more 
powerful than one outside. This presumes that the Cabinet is the main constitutional 
instrument of British government and policy-making. But there has been much 
discussion by political scientists and politicians over many years as to whether or not 
it is true. For instance, John Mackintosh's (1968) classic account still rated the 
Cabinet as a key institution in British government in the 1960s, though not as 
important as it had been in the nineteenth century. He informs us: 
The point is that the Cabinet is no longer the nineteenth-century body which 
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took virtually all decisions, where legislation was worked out, the 
parliamentary programme devised and in which ministers could raise any 
issue. The importance of the Cabinet is, as has been indicated, that it 
reconciles, records and authorises (pp. 611-12). 
Other commentators in the 1960s detected a gradual erosion in the power of the 
Cabinet. For example, George Brown as Foreign Secretary was convinced that Harold 
Wilson was introducing a presidential system. Brown (1971) describes how this led to 
his resignation from the government in 1968: 
I resigned on a matter of fundamental principle, because it seemed to me that 
the Prime Minister was not only introducing a "presidential" system into the 
running of the Government that is wholly alien to the British constitutional 
system - others have been tempted to do it that way too - but was so operating 
it that decisions were being taken over the heads and without the knowledge of 
Ministers, and far too often outsiders in his entourage seemed to be almost the 
only effective "Cabinet" (p. 169). 
In a single long sentence, George Brown encapsulates the view held by many other 
Ministers, then and later, such as that of Ian Gilmour (1993) a former Thatcher 
Cabinet Minister. He asserts that key decisions were taken outside the Cabinet by 
small groups of Thatcher intimates during his time as Lord Privy Seal 1979-81. 
Michael Heseltine was Defence Secretary when he resigned in January 1986 over the 
"Westland affair". The fmal straw for him was a critical decision, taken without his 
knowledge, by the Prime Minister and her close advisers in December 1985. Heseltine 
(2001) writes in his autobiography: 
The Prime Minister refused to allow a discussion in Cabinet that day. I insisted 
that the Cabinet secretary should record my protest in the Cabinet minutes. 
When the minutes were circulated there was no reference to any discussion 
about Westland and consequently no record of my protest (p. 538). 
Between Wilson and Thatcher, Edward Heath acted in a similar way, with his 
domination over Cabinet and a tendency to take key decisions with a handful of close 
advisers. James Fox (1975) examined the work of the Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS), a body set up by Heath to advise the Prime Minister. He writes that Heath 
had a, "quasi-autocratic style of government in Cabinet" (p. 278). Furthermore, 
"Heath's concentration of power obviously gives the idea that,presidential power is 
slowly creeping up on No. 10" (p. 279). Hennessy (1990) takes a more charitable 
view of Heath, seeing the CPRS as a very important managerial and policy-making 
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innovation that he introduced. 
A more recent perspective on the Cabinet has been provided by Burch and Holliday 
(1996). They pay tribute to Mackintosh, whose, "broad historical sweep" they 
acknowledge (p. 3). However, using a series of case-studies of policy decisions, they 
illustrate the growing importance of the Cabinet Office and Prime Ministerial 
patronage, to the Cabinet's detriment. They recognise that the Cabinet, while not as 
significant as in former times, can still be a powerful force in policy-making. In their 
view, "Over time the cabinet itself has become marginalised, though it can - and does 
- still take major decisions" (p. 44). 
Burch and Holliday (1996) studied a period up to the mid-1990s when the 
Conservatives were in office. The process of declining Cabinet importance seems to 
have gone even further under New Labour. Many current writers have concluded that 
important decisions are taken by individuals outside Cabinet, that Cabinet meetings 
are short and infrequent, and that the power of the Prime Ministerial office has 
reached new heights. In a more recent assessment King (2007) observes, "Modem 
cabinets are far too large to be effective decision-making bodies" (p. 329), having 
reached a twentieth-century high point under Callaghan in 1976-79. 
The literature is still growing, hut Hennessy (1990, 2000, 2004), Burch and Holliday 
(2005), and Heffeman (2005) are amongst those who have described the changes over 
the last twenty years or so. One of the leading commentators in the field, Hennessy 
(2000), sees the Blair style of government as fitting in to a model of concentric 
circles, rather than a pyramidal or hierarchical one. Hennessy (2004) suggests that 
when Ministers meet with Blair: 
Policy discussion takes place in smaller, more informal groups - more 
sessions on the sofa in the prime minister's study; less formal occasions round 
the cabinet table (p. 6). 
This idea of concentric circles at the heart of government, with greater power residing 
with the innermost ones, is also used by Budge et at (2004), who describe this inner-
circle as the "core executive", comprising of the most senior Cabinet Ministers, 
trusted policy advisers, senior civil servants, and other influential people. Those 
whose position is in the outer circles, including junior Ministers, have very little 
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influence on policy-making. This concept will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
Most close observers agree that a Cabinet Minister's role is likely to be a very 
powerful one, compared with that of a junior Minister, in terms of controlling 
resources and having access to the Prime Minister and policy networks. Although not 
all Cabinet Ministers will be part of the "core executive" Cabinet office gives 
Ministers greater authority. Headey (1974) analysed the skills and ambitions of 
Cabinet Ministers, after interviewing a large number of them. While most saw 
themselves as effective and influential, few seemed to have any clear idea of policy 
objectives; their main aim was simply attaining Cabinet office. It was Headey's 
perception that, "A Minister may cast himself as a policy initiator but in reality make 
no contribution to policy whatever" (p. 172). An understanding of a Minister's work, 
and his delegation of tasks to junior Ministers such as Sports Ministers, is important 
when considering their role, something which Theakston (1985) examined. He 
concluded that the influence of junior Ministers depended a lot on their relationships 
with their Secretaries of State, who were rarely willing to cede much power. 
While some Cabinet Ministers may not necessarily be effective as policy-makers, 
most junior Ministers are ambitious for Cabinet office because of its enhanced status 
and influence. It is not so much that Cabinet is important in itself, but rather the 
perception of power that attaches to its members. Headey (1974) suggests that some 
junior offices are much more likely to lead to the Cabinet than others, particularly 
ones attached to the Treasury. In Chapter 4, Table 3 it can be seen that first 
appointments in the Whips, Treasury, Defence, and Education are much more likely 
to lead to Cabinet office than any others. However, relatively few junior Ministers 
ever reach the Cabinet. Theakston (1987) puts the figure at approximately a quarter. 
The calculations set out in Table 4 confirm a figure of 24% for all Ministers in the 
1964-2005 period. In addition, a comparison of Ministers for Sport with other junior 
Ministers confirms that the former are amongst the least likely to be promoted. 
Some ex-Cabinet ministers, including Tony Benn (1988-2002), Richard Crossman 
(1975-77), and Barbara Castle (1980) have published diaries of their time in office. 
Unfortunately, no Minister for Sport has yet published a diary. Indeed, diaries or 
memoirs by junior Ministers are quite rare. Amongst the few who have produced 
diaries are Oiles Brandreth (1999), Edwina Currie (2002), and the three volumes by 
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AIan Clark (1993, 2001, 2003). They all speak of the tedium of a junior Minister's 
life, the dogsbody tasks given to them by senior Ministers, and the burning desire for 
promotion which never came. Edwina Currie (2002) writes amusingly of this when 
she says, "And if the only way to get a promotion to Minister of State was to go to 
Scotland I'd do that willingly and have a whale of a time up there" (p. 44). Currie 
never had to make the sacrifice of going to Scotland, and was never offered promotion 
either. Her career as an Under-Secretary lasted only from 1986 to 1988 (Butler and 
Butler, 2000). 
It is now almost mandatory for ex-Cabinet Ministers to produce their memoirs. A few 
examples include George Brown (1971), Denis Healey (1989), Lord Hailsham (1975 
and 1990), Nigel Lawson (1992), Barbara Castle (1993), Michael Heseltine (2001), 
and John Nott (2002). AIl were eager for the ultimate promotion to Prime Minister, 
and write about this with varying degrees of candour, but none of them achieved their 
goal. Regrettably, they have little to say about Ministers for Sport. 
Memoirs by junior Ministers are almost as rare as diaries. Gerald Kaufinan (1997) has 
written entertainingly about a junior Minister's fairly tedious, routine job, where 
promotion is the main aim. The Minister is likely to carry out the most mundane tasks 
for his or her boss, the Secretary of State, while being patronised by the civil servants. 
Kaufinan (1997) writes that on moving from the backbenches to junior office: 
The new minister may turn out to be rude, lazy, irascible, dirty, a drunkard or 
- worst of all- stupid. To begin with, they [the civil servants] operate on the 
safest principle, namely that he is an imbecile (p. 23). 
The creator and head ofthe Prime Minister's Policy Unit under Wilson and Callaghan 
1974-79, Bemard Donoughue, became a junior agriculture Minister 1997-99. In his 
memoirs (2003) he wrote of the limitations of his ministerial role: 
I quickly realised that today being a junior minister in any Whitehall 
department feels very insignificant, and certainly much more inconsequential 
than when I was previously in the government in the 1970s (p. 
338).6 
Donoughue (2003) was very close to Denis Howell from the 1950s, describing him as, 
"my closest political friend" (p. 92), who appointed him as a member of the Sports 
Council in 1965. Only Howell amongst ex-Sports Ministers has written his 
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autobiography (1990). It is a full account of his life in politics, showing his intense 
commitment to promoting sport. Neil Macfarlane's book (1986) is semi-
autobiographical, describing some of his activities as Minister for Sport and his views 
on various sports topics. Both of these monographs will be discussed in the next 
section. 
According to Headey (1974) and Dorey (2005), junior Ministers are almost always 
imposed on Cabinet Ministers by the Prime Minister. However, the memoirs of all the 
Prime Ministers in the 1964-1997 period reveal little of their Sports Ministers' (or 
other junior Ministers') appointments. Harold Wilson (1971) briefly mentions 
Howell's appointment in 1964: 
In Education, Denis Howell, who had an unrivalled knowledge of sporting 
problems, was appointed as a junior minister with special responsibility for 
sport. Indeed he rapidly acquired the title throughout the press and the sporting 
world of "Minister of Sport" (p. 10). 
Wilson (1979) also deals with Howell's reappointment in 1974 (although he got the 
dates wrong). He noted that the Ministers for Arts and Sport had helped to improve 
the quality of life in Britain during his first administration, so he intended to retain the 
positions: 
Denis Howell, responsible for sport, was able to spend twice as much in 1970-
71 as in 1963-64, and had revolutionised the provision of sports facilities for 
young people in general and particularly for competitive sports, swimming, 
athletics and cycling (p. 18). 
John Major (1999) deals with sport at some length. He describes the establishment of 
the Department of National Heritage in 1992, and enthuses about his vision of Lottery 
funding to improve participation and performance in sport. He had a high regard for 
lain Sproat whom he appointed as the Minister for Sport 1993-97: 
lain was enthusiastic as I had hoped he would be. He was no respecter of 
seniority or bureaucracy, and trod on many toes, but he was very effective and 
knew he could rely on my full support (p. 412). 
Major does not mention Robert Key, his Minister for Sport from 1992 to 1993. The 
other Minister for Sport during his premiership was Robert Atkins, who was in post 
from 1990 to 1992. Major (1999) talks of him as a friend who entered the Commons 
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on the same day in 1979, but does not discuss him as Minister for Sport. Thatcher 
(1993) notes only that, ''Neil Macfarlane (as Sports minister)" (p. 279), who was part 
ofa small committee set up in 1982 to devise policies for a second term. Interestingly, 
Thatcher (1995) reveals a little of her own unsuspected sporting achievements. When 
her son caught chickenpox in 1960, the family missed a summer holiday in Brittany: 
To compensate, still more adventurously, we decided to go skiing at 
Lenzerheide in Switzerland at Christmas. None of us had ever skied before, so 
we joined a ski club in Sloane Square and took a course in skiing from 
Lillywhites before we went. The holiday was a great success, and we went 
back to the same hotel year after year. I loved the scenery and the exercise. 
And I loved the hot chocolate and pastries afterwards even more (1995: p. 
105-6). 
Of the other Prime Ministers who appointed Ministers for Sport in the 1964-1997 
period, only James Callaghan and Edward Heath have nothing whatsoever to report 
on the subject. Callaghan (1987) appeared to have had no sporting interests at all, 
according to his personal account, though his biographer, Kenneth Morgan (1997) 
observes that when he was sixteen: 
He took to running in Fratton Park before school began and played in the 
school football team in 1928, although apparently with limited skill. He also 
took part in athletics on behalf ofWallington House: he was not a great athlete 
(p. 12). 
Morgan goes on to report that, "After his youthful efforts at rugby and tennis, he 
played no games and took little exercise apart from some hiking expeditions on 
holiday" (p. 125). Heath (1998) claimed to be a lifelong Arsenal supporter and he was 
also devoted to sailing. He wrote movingly of the sinking in a storm of his beloved 
Morning Cloud and the drowning of two friends when he recorded, "The October 
election [1974] came in the wake of a personal tragedy, the loss of my third Morning 
Cloud in September" (p. 526). As Geoffrey Howe (1994) describes it the yacht, 
"foundered in a force-nine gale off the Sussex coast" (p. 87). Luckily for Heath he 
was not on the vessel at the time, but was campaigning for the forthcoming election. 
Tony Blair has not yet written his account for 1997-2007. When he does, he may have 
something to say on the Minister for Sport, given his backing for events such as the 
2012 London Olympic bid, and his own contribution to ensuring its success. More 
specific literature on the Ministers for Sport will now be examined, including some 
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written by themselves and other politicians. 
1.7 Ministers for Sport 
There is a relative paucity of literature by the Ministers for Sport themselves. Being 
junior Ministers, they are not normally famous enough to find a market for their 
publications. Junior Ministers in general are fairly anonymous in most government 
departments. The three who published their diaries, Brandreth (1999), Clark (1993, 
2001, 2003), and Currie (2002), acquired fame or notoriety outside their ministerial 
jobs. Gerald Kaufinan (1997), who produced a humorous guidebook for aspiring 
Ministers rather than a diary, is something of an elder statesman who missed Cabinet 
office mainly because his party was out of power for many years. As an ex-junior 
Minister, Kaufinan (1997) generously said of Denis Howell that he was, "an 
inevitable minister of sport" (p. 5), because of his great knowledge of the subject. 
From their positions inside the Sports Council as Deputy Director 1980 to 1988 and 
Director 1988 to 1993 respectively, John Coghlan (1990) and David Pickup (1996) 
give their views on all Ministers for Sport from Howell to Hoey. These accounts stem 
from fIrst-hand meetings with the respective Ministers. As sporting administrators, 
they regarded some of the Ministers much more highly than others, with Howell and 
Moynihan at the top of the ability and industriousness range. On the other hand, 
Sproat was seen by them as the most abrasive and Tracey as the least noticeable. 
When the Sports Council became an independent body in 1972, with a chairman from 
outside the government arena, Coghlan (1990) feels that it lost this valuable 
influence.7 He speaks highly of Howell' s role as a Minister and chairman of the Sports 
Council. He also praises Eldon Griffiths and Hector Momo for taking a, "bi-partisan 
approach to sporting issues" (p. 208), compared with their more ideological 
successors such as Neil Macfarlane, whom he was pleased to see departing, ''to the 
obscurity of the backbenches" in 1985 (p. 208). 
Denis Howell is a rare exception amongst junior Ministers. He was fairly well-known 
to the public during the 1960s and 1970s, for activities both inside and outside sport. 
He produced his autobiography (1990) at the age of 67 when his ministerial career 
was clearly over. It is not an especially well-written book, since he seems to have 
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eschewed the assistance of a ghost writer or editor. Nevertheless, he devotes around 
two-thirds of the 400 pages to his work as Minister for Sport, such as establishing the 
Sports Council, and dealing with football hooliganism. Howell describes being born 
into a working-class family in Birmingham on 4 September 1923. After school he 
worked in a bicycle factory, became a Labour Councillor at 27, and entered 
Parliament in 1955 for the Birmingham All-Saints constituency. He was a football 
referee at the highest level in England, as well as being heavily involved in other 
sports, including athletics through Birchfield Harriers. For many years as an MP, 
Howell was an advocate of what "New Labour" was later to call 'joined up 
government" for sport and recreation. In Howell's (1990) own words: 
The Sports Council, the Countryside Commission, the Nature Conservancy 
Council, the water industry and the local authorities (including the education 
authorities) ought to be working together under ministerial leadership to 
provide unlimited possibilities from which people can choose their leisure 
time enjoyment. No such policy exists. I have always believed that the Arts 
Council and the tourist industry should be added to these to provide a new 
department of state (p. 375). 
Howell was, in effect, writing his own job description here for a Cabinet post, which 
John Major created with the Department of National Heritage in 1992, later 
transformed into Culture, Media and Sport by Tony Blair. Neil Macfarlane (1986) 
suggests that Howell would have really liked to be called the, "Minister for the 
Quality of Life" (p. 63). Macfarlane goes on to comment: 
Although Denis never made a Department for the Quality of Life, he seemed 
to end up withjust about every other ministerial task that was going, because it 
is a Prime Minister's prerogative to bestow upon a junior member of the 
Government any current problems which might need some form of trouble-
shooting (p. 63). 
Macfarlane then gives the examples of drought, floods, snow, and oil slicks which 
Callaghan and Wilson delegated to Howell. Harold Wilson respected Howell as an 
influential Labour figure in the 1950s, through the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism. Six years after Howell's death Tam Dalyell (2004) said of him, "He thus 
had a power-base in the party; Harold Wilson, from a different political stable, could 
never ignore Howell" (p.496). Dalyell's portrait of Howell in The Dictionary of 
National Biography (2004), and Howell's anonymous obituarist in The Times (20 
April 1998), both concentrated on his achievements for sport. Howell retired from the 
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Commons in 1992, without ever attaining Cabinet rank. In Theakston's view (1987) 
Howell was, ''trapped in a political ghetto" and "his career suffered as a result" (p. 
156). He quotes an unidentified political colleague of Howell who observed, "He's 
almost a person you can't take seriously in a higher dimension after all these years 
with Sport, but he could be a very useful member of the Cabinet" (p. 156). 
This is a view shared by Bernard Donoughue. As already mentioned (p. 39) they had a 
close political and personal relationship going back to the 1950s. Donoughue has now 
published his diary of this period (2005), in which he makes frequent reference to his 
friend Howell, someone with whom he shared a similar political philosophy. He 
writes that in 1974, "I was then personally closest to Denis Howell and William 
Rodgers, both right-wing Gaitskellite MPs" (p. 1), and frequently describes him as, 
"myoId friend Denis Howell" (p. 128). After the February 1974 election Donoughue 
sympathises that Howell has not been promoted by recording, "He is disappointed at 
again being Minister of Sport" (p. 64). By January 1975, Howell, "resents still not 
being made a Privy Councillor" (p. 273), an honour that would have been a 
recompense for not being given Cabinet office. He observes sadly in November 1975 
that, "Denis must be frustrated, doing a job little different from 11 years ago" (p. 551), 
although he was promoted to Minister of State in October 1969. 
When Wilson retired in March 1976, Callaghan retained Howell as Minister for Sport 
but gave him no promotion. Denis Howell went to the House of Lords with a life 
peerage in 1992, still a vigorous advocate for sport to the end, and died on 19 April 
1998. He held no other ministerial office, because Labour had been out of power since 
1979 (The Times, 20 April 1998). 
Howell was succeeded by Eldon Griffiths, who was born on 25 May 1925. He was 
educated at Cambridge and Yale, pursued a career in journalism, then worked at the 
Conservative Research Department from 1962 to 1964. He entered the House of 
Commons as MP for Bury St. Edmunds in 1964 (Who's Who, 1997). As Minister for 
Sport, Griffiths' main achievement was to oversee the independence of the Sports 
Council. In doing so, Coghlan (1990) describes him as, "Charming, non-
interventionist, more concerned with other ministerial duties apart from sport but 
determined to carry out his party's policy to establish an independent body" (p. 127). 
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Denis Howell profoundly disagreed with this policy because the Sports Council was 
effectively his creation. He was annoyed that Griffiths had not discussed the matter 
with him beforehand. As he recorded in his autobiography (1990), "There was no 
consultation with me by Eldon Griffiths about the Charter proposal" (p. 214). Howell 
evidently still saw himself as heir-apparent to the job and upholder of its integrity. 
As a colleague from the same political party, Neil Macfarlane (1986) paints a more 
sympathetic picture of Griffiths: 
Eldon Griffiths held office before I entered the house, but by all accounts he 
was a most energetic member of what he accurately described as the smallest 
and most unimportant trade union in the House. Performing an opening 
ceremony at a swimming pool, he was quite likely to challenge the local 
mayor to a race over a couple of lengths, and would invariably come first (p. 
63). 
Griffiths held no other ministerial office before or after sport, although he was an 
Opposition spokesman on trade and industry, then Europe 1974-76. He later became a 
backbench spokesman for the Police Federation. Griffiths impressed Douglas Hurd 
when he was a Home Office Minister in 1983. According to Hurd (2003) who was 
piloting through the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, Griffiths was a staunch 
defender of the status quo, who represented a traditional Conservative Party view of 
law and order. 
He was given a knighthood in 1985 and left the Commons in 1992 to pursue a 
business career in the USA (Who's Who, 1997; Butler and Butler, 2000), a country to 
which he had a lifelong attachment. In his autobiography, Geoffrey Howe (1994), 
describes him as, "a leading Conservative Americanist" (p. 328). 
Hector Monro had the misfortune to be Minister for Sport during Mrs Thatcher's first 
government, which meant that he had to deal with the consequences of her support for 
President Carter's proposed boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games, following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Denis Howell (1990) rated him highly for his, "proper 
sporting pedigree having been a former president of the Scottish Rugby Union" (p. 
345). He also says of him: 
He is relaxed in his approach and easy to talk to, so it is regrettable that he did 
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not survive the 1980 Moscow Olympic fiasco. I doubt very much if Hector 
approved very much of his Government's boycott policy and he was certainly 
not allowed to take part in the famous debate in the House (p. 345). 
Neil Macfarlane (1986) felt that Monro was on the verge of resigning over the 
Olympic boycott issue because of the way in which he was treated. Macfarlane recalls 
that, "The following year he was removed from office by the Prime Minister and I 
succeeded him" (p. 225). 
As a Minister for Sport Monro was quite highly regarded during his two-year stint in 
office. In Coghlan's (1990) opinion, "Monro was quiet, knowledgeable and effective: 
constructive in all he did" (p. 127). One of his sporting interests was shooting. 
Douglas Hurd (2003) remembers that as a Home Office Minister in 1988, he was 
given the task of introducing legislation to control firearms after the Hungerford 
massacre of 1987. Hector Monro organised an expert lobby to oppose this, without 
success. Hurd (2003) later came to see that Monro was right, especially when further 
legislation was introduced post-Dunblane, "which destroyed a sporting activity far 
removed from the Dunblane killings" (p. 356). 
It is notable that he was the only MP from a non-English constituency who ever held 
the office (although lain Sproat had previously represented a Scottish seat from 1970 
to 1983). He had a long career in the House of Commons as MP for Dumfries 1964-
97 and in the Lords with a life peerage from 1997. He was junior Minister in the 
Whips' Office from 1970 to 1971 and in the Scottish Office from 1971 to 1974. 
Monro was born in 1922, of an upper-middle-class farming family, with extensive 
landholdings in the south-west of Scotland. After his sacking as Minister for Sport in 
September 1981, he was given a knighthood, but attained no further office under 
Thatcher. In 1992-95 he was brought back to the Scottish Office as a Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary by John Major (Who's Who, 1997; Macfarlane, 1986; Butler and 
Butler, 2000). 
Neil Macfarlane (1986) explains in the preface to his book that it is, "not intended to 
be a memoir of four years as minister for sport" (p. 8). Unlike Howell's book (1990), 
it is not autobiographical, but it contains a wealth of detail on some the most 
important issues he dealt with, including, sporting contact with South Africa, Zola 
Budd's passport application in 1984, tobacco sponsorship, drugs, and football 
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hooliganism. When he was appointed in September 1981, Michael Heseltine was his 
boss, as Secretary of State for the Environment. He asked Macfarlane, "You do like 
SpOI4 don't you? (p. 69). Macfarlane continues: 
He omitted to ask whether I was interested in gypsies and gems, ancient 
monuments, sites of special scientific interest, national heritage, zoos, national 
parks, Royal parks and palaces, nature conservation, planning and land 
reclamation. All of these and more come lDlder the umbrella of the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State with responsibility for sport. No other 
Minister for Sport in the world has comparable duties (p. 69). 
Macfarlane seemed to work. well with Heseltine and became a close ally of his in the 
longer term. When it came to the Conservative leadership election of 1990, Crick 
(1997) records that, "Heseltine was proposed by Sir Neil Macfarlane, his junior sports 
minister from DoE days" (p. 346), who also campaigned for him. These activities 
particularly annoyed Thatcher, since Macfarlane was a frequent golf partner of her 
husband Denis. Macfarlane was not a Minister at this time, but had Heseltine been 
successful there may have been a route back to government office for him. 
Alan Clark's three volumes (1993, 2001, 2003) of amusing diaries, at different times 
mention Monro, Macfarlane, Atkins, and Sproat, usually in a political context. 
However, he saw the Minister for Sport as purely a public relations job, since there 
was no Minister for the navy or many other policy areas. Clark (2001) describes an 
accidental meeting on a train with Macfarlane in 1982: 
I don't especially like Neil Macfarlane and I was offensive to him on the floor 
of the House about two months ago when I questioned him on the subject of 
the World Cup team Logo. When I returned after breakfast there sat 
Macfarlane, his rather common (but painted up) personal secretary and a 
bearded civil servant - who presumably keeps him straight, i.e. progressive, on 
such matters as apartheid in sport (p. 308-9). 
Denis Howell (1990) refers to Macfarlane on a number of occasions in his memoirs. 
He is complimentary about his sporting background, but not his ability as a Sports 
Minister: 
Neil Macfarlane became the Sports Minister in late 1982. [it was actually 
September 1981], succeeding Hector Monro. Macfarlane was a good club 
cricketer and took a passing interest in sports politics but he never really 
understood how sport is governed (p. 258). 
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Like Howell, Macfarlane's ministerial career at Westminster was also over by the 
time his book was published, at the age of 50 in 1986, with no further office after 
sport. He had previously had a career in business, before entering Parliament for 
Sutton and Cheam in 1972. From 1979 to 1981 he was Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
at the Department of Education and Science. He received his knighthood in 1988 and 
left the Commons in 1992 (Who's Who, 1997; Butler and Butler, 2000). 
Richard Tracey became Minister for Sport in 1985, after Neil Macfarlane, and 
remained there until 1987. He is one of the least-known of all the post-holders. 
Houlihan (1991) describes some of his attempts to bring in measures for curbing 
football hooliganism. He notes that, ''the 'partnership' betWeen the government and 
the football authorities was not a mutual one, as the Minister was forcing the issue of 
membership against a background of limited enthusiasm from the clubs" (p. 188). It 
was a difficult time to be a Sports Minister, when football hooliganism and stadium 
disasters were amongst the most significant sporting issues. However, Coghlan (1990) 
thinks that his time as Minister was productive. When appointed, he was: 
A surprise choice as Minister for Sport as he was largely unknown in the 
sports world. He played a quiet supportive role to the governing bodies of 
sport and the CCPR, BOA and Sports Council. He did not attempt to dictate or 
impose his will and in the short time he was given did a useful job for sport in 
and out of Parliament (p. 155). 
Tracey took a strong line against tobacco sponsorship of sports events. Although in 
public he favoured a voluntary code, it was probably about as much as he could 
achieve politically at the time when he spoke in a House of Commons debate on a 
Private Member's Bill to curb the practice (Hansard: House o/Commons Debates, 21 
February 1986, vol. 92, col. 628-45; see also Table 9 in Chapter 4). Neil Macfarlane 
(1986) detected Mrs Thatcher's hand behind Tracey's reluctance to press for an 
outright ban. This may also have been a factor in his attitude towards apartheid in 
sport. Mike Rowbottom (1997) observed that, following Macfarlane's departure: 
Tracey, a supporter of retaining sporting links with South Africa and a 
proponent of capital punishment, was installed as a tougher operator. But 
circumstances worked against him - he was soon complaining that he spent 
only 20 per cent of his working day on sport (p. 30). 
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Richard Tracey was born on 8 February 1943 and educated at Birmingham 
University. He was a magazine and broadcasting journalist (concentrating on 
motoring issues) before entering Parliament for Surbiton in 1983, which he 
represented as a Conservative MP until losing his seat to the Liberal Democrats in 
1997. His only ministerial appointment was that of Minister for Sport (Who's Who, 
1997; Dod's Parliamentary Companion, 1996; Butler and Butler, 2000). 
After Tracey, Colin Moynihan became Minister for Sport from 1987 to 1990. At only 
31 years of age, he was the youngest ever. Houlihan and White (2002) suggest that he 
was an exception to the other Ministers for Sport during the Thatcher years, in that he 
was competent and effective. He, "actively promoted work on sport for people with 
disabilities and those in inner-city areas, which proved to be precursors of later work 
on sports equity" (p. 28). 
When David Pickup took over as head of the Sports Council in 1988, Colin Moynihan 
was the first Minister with whom he had to work. He was apprehensive about meeting 
him for the first time, commenting that, "I had little idea of what the serving minister, 
Colin Moynihan, might be expecting of the Director General" (Pickup, 1996: p. 2). 
Pickup soon went on to forge a close working relationship with Moynihan, whom he 
came to regard highly, in areas such as trying to reduce the sale of school playing 
fields, encouraging sport for the disabled, and drug control. He was also in favour of, 
"Moynihan's sensible decision to reduce the size of the Sports Council from an 
unwieldy 32 to 14" (p. 8). 
John Coghlan (1990) also thought highly of Moynihan from his vantage-point in the 
Sports Council. He saw him working well with Sebastian Coe, who had just been 
appointed as a Vice-Chairman of the Sports Council. He wrote admiringly of him, 
"Britain had a young, dynamic Minister for Sport with the charisma of a silver 
Olympic medal and a knowledge of what it was like at the top of his sport" (p. 155). 
However, Coghlan felt that Moynihan became too bogged down with the issue of the 
proposed football membership and ID scheme, behind which he saw the Prime 
Minister's hand. 
Houlihan (1991) takes a more charitable view of Moynihan's work in drafting the 
Football Spectators' Bill and ID scheme. He observes that progress was slow 
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although, "A Working party, chaired by Moynihan and with representatives of the 
football authorities, produced a report which became the basis of the Football 
Spectators Bill, introduced into the House of Lords in January 1989" (p. 189). 
Houlihan (1991) also praises Moynihan for his work on anti-doping, one of the areas 
where he worked closely with Sebastian Coe. Moynihan argued, "for a strong anti-
doping stand by the governing bodies" (p. 206), and as the Minister responsible gave, 
"strong political support" (p. 208) to the Sports Council on this issue. 
The sprinter, Linford Christie, provides an athlete's view of Moynihan. He describes a 
visit by him to the athletes' village at the 1990 Commonwealth Games in Auckland, 
Australia, in his capacity as Minister for Sport. Christie (1995) writes disapprovingly, 
"I didn't want to meet him and I think a lot of my fellow athletes felt the same. I am 
generally wary of politicians; I think they are always concerned about what's going to 
be good for them" (p. 116). It is interesting that Christie saw him as a politician, rather 
than an Olympic silver medallist. Christie himself had won Olympic silver in 1988 at 
Seoul, followed by gold in 1992 at Barcelona (Wallechinsky, 2004), so he was a 
member of the same elite. 
Colin Moynihan was born in 1955, the son of the 2nd Baron Moynihan. He was 
educated at Oxford University, where he was a rowing "blue" and Olympic silver 
medallist in Moscow 1980. He was MP for Lewisham East from 1983 to 1992, when 
he lost his seat to the Liberal Democrats. Moynihan later succeeded to his father's seat 
in the House of Lords and later still became an "elected hereditary", after an involved 
dispute with his half-brother for the title. After his time as Minister for Sport, he 
moved to energy at the same level of Parliamentary Under-Secretary 1990-92 (Who's 
Who, 1997; House of Lords Information Office; Butler and Butler, 2000). 
In 2003, Moynihan was appointed as the Conservatives' shadow Minister for Sport 
while in the House of Lords, a post he held until 2005. He also worked closely with 
Kate Hoey, with whom he co-chaired the "Independent Sports Review" 2004-05. 
Writing in the The Daily Telegraph in April 2005, Hoey said of him: 
The announcement that Colin Moynihan, the shadow sports minister, has 
stood down from the front bench to devote more time to being chairman of his 
company, will be greeted with sadness by most sports governing bodies (p. 
14). 
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Moynihan certainly did not remove himself from the sports arena In September 2005 
he successfully stood against the former Olympic athlete and 1968 gold-medallist 
David Hemery for the chairmanship of the BOA (Mackay, 2005d). In the months 
following this, he made himself unpopular with the government by urging increased 
funding for sport to ensure greater British success at the 2012 Olympics (Cuff, 2006). 
Moynihan's successor as Minister, Robert Atkins, was in office at the time when sport 
was transferred from the Department of the Environment to the Department of 
Education and Science in 1990, leading to a period of uncertainty over the 
government's priorities. This transfer, according to Pickup (1996): 
came at an unfortunate time in that continuity of a shared understanding was 
fractured. Barely had we adjusted to a new Ministerial personality than we 
found ourselves also required to familiarise ourselves with a totally new 
Department with different traditions and - in comparison with DOE - notably 
archaic ways of conducting business (pp. 64-5). 
Despite this setback, Pickup went on to work well with Atkins, who was a friend of 
the cricket-loving Prime Minister, John Major. It helped that Atkins shared Pickup's 
view of sport's new home in Education. Pickup writes that, "Even Robert Atkins 
complained that DES appeared to be staffed exclusively with superior Oxbridge 
products, all of whom possessed extremely long noses down which they distantly 
regarded him" (p. 65). 
Atkins himself did not go to university, which perhaps explains his disdain for the 
"Oxbridge types" and his friendship with John Major. Alan Clark (2001), ever the 
snob, talks of Atkins' wife being, "extraordinarily plain and common" (p. 292). He 
seems to have had something of an antipathy to Ministers for Sport. After an 
accidental meeting in Pratt's restaurant in 1982, he said of Atkins: 
Of course, we dislike each other quite strongly - a true example of 
"incompatibility". He has an unpleasant, cruel face, and I am certain that he is 
by inclination a subversive. But I must admit that he does have a very fast wit 
(p.292). 
Clark (2001) was convinced that Atkins was on the left of the Conservative Party at 
this time, in 1982, when Thatcherism was at its height. He later recognised (1993), in 
1986, that Atkins had a talent for political gossip with, "a keen political sense of a 
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below-stairs kind" (p. 108). Cecil Parkinson (1992) records that Atkins and a number 
of future Ministers (including John Patten, William Waldegrave, and Douglas Hogg) 
formed the "Blue Chip" dining club in 1979 although he stresses, "in these early days 
the 'Blue Chips' were certainly not Thatcherites" (p. 12). 
As a Minister for Sport, Atkins appeared to have been perfectly competent. Pickup 
(1996) felt that he was, "committed and accessible" (p. 68) without having 
Moynihan's enthusiasm and better knowledge of sport. After the 1992 election, 
Atkins was promoted to Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office from 1992 to 
1994 and at the same level in Environment from 1994 to 1995. Before sport, he had 
been a junior Minister at Trade and Industry from 1987 to 1989 and at Transport from 
1989 to 1990 (Butler and Butler), when Cecil Parkins on became Transport Secretary. 
Parkinson (1992) notes that, "Robert Atkins joined the department with me. He had 
acquired a reputation in Whitehall for being able but idle", though he went on to, "do 
an important job and he did it extremely well" (p. 285). Of all the Ministers for Sport, 
he therefore held the largest number of government jobs. 
Atkins had held his South Ribble seat since 1983, when he lost it to Labour in 1997 
(previously it was Preston from 1979 to 1983). John Major (1999) recalls watching 
the gruesome election results on TV in 1997. He records with some despair, "Robert 
Atkins and Graham Bright, friends for nearly forty years, were out. David Mellor lost 
Putney" (p.724). Atkins was rewarded with a knighthood after leaving the House of 
Commons. He continued with a political career, and at the age of 53 in 1999 was 
elected to the European Parliament, where he is still a Member (Robert Atkins' web 
page, 2005). 
When the Department of National Heritage (DNH) was created after the election in 
April 1992, the Sport and Recreation Division was transferred to it after two years at 
the Education Department. At the same time, says Pickup (1996) Robert Key, "a 
former schoolmaster, bluff and hearty, enthusiastic and well-intentioned" (p. 103), 
was appointed as the new Minister for Sport. The Secretary of State at DNH was 
David MelIor who, according to Pickup, "Immediately made it apparent that he 
intended to involve himself in our affairs to a degree unprecedented by any previous 
Minister of Cabinet status" (Pickup, 1996: p. 103). 
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Mellor lasted for just a few months, and was replaced by Peter Brooke in September 
1992. Brooke took only a little interest in sport at first, and subsequently made a 
single visit to the Sports Council, in January 1993 (Pickup, 1996). Pickup suggests 
that Mellor's removal from the DNH, "deprived it of the dynamic leadership and 
commitment that was so badly needed" (p. 197). 
Robert Key was in post for barely a year and scarcely had time to make a mark. One 
of the few decisions he seems to have taken was to abolish the Children's Play Unit 
from March 1993, which incongruously came under the Sports Council's remit, as 
Pickup (1996) has pointed out. He notes that, "Responsibility for Children's Play had 
been foisted upon a reluctant Sports Council in 1987 by Colin Moynihan, none of 
whose successors had been prepared to take the subject seriously" (p. 129). 
Key departed as Minister for Sport just after this decision was implemented. Before 
sport, he had been a Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Environment Department 
from 1990 to 1992. In this period he was given the unenviable task of coming up with 
an alternative to the poll tax (Crick, 1997).8 He afterwards went to transport from 
1993 to 1994 at the same level (Butler and Butler, 2000). Key, who was born in 1945, 
has been Conservative MP for Salisbury since 1983, a seat he retained at the 2005 
general election (Robert Key's web page, 2005). 
Robert Key was succeeded by the ultra-Thatcherite lain Sproat, whom Pickup did not 
rate very highly at all. Amongst the many criticisms that he made of him, his lack of 
interest in sport is the most consistent. He was fifteen months in office before visiting 
the Sports Council (Pickup, 1996). Pickup observes that, "He was to prove to be the 
least communicative politician responsible for the sport portfolio in my experience" 
(p. 125). This criticism of Sproat's sports knowledge may be somewhat unfair, since 
he produced a whole series of books on cricket from 1980. Indeed he was editor of the 
annual Debretts Cricketers' Who's Who for many years. 
Sproat was the last Minister for Sport with whom Pickup worked directly (he left the 
Sports Council in 1993) although he knew both Kate Hoey and Denis Howell. As a 
Minister, Sproat was not interested in any equity agenda for sport at a time when 
many in Britain were becoming aware of the issue. For instance, he refused to attend 
the Women in Sport Conference in 1994 or endorse the Brighton Declaration, which 
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was intended as a means of widening access for women and promoting their 
participation in sport. When asked about it by Tom Pendry (Labour's sports 
spokesman) in the House of Commons, he said, "I read the declaration: it was 
political correctness in excelsis, but it nevertheless said some useful things" 
(Hansard: House o/Commons Debates, 23 May 1994, vol. 244, cols. 1-8). According 
to Houlihan and White (2002), "It was not until May 1998, on the eve of the second 
world conference in Namibia, that the Labour government adopted it" (p. 65) when 
Tony Banks, gave it his endorsement 
lain Sproat was considered to be on the right of the Conservative Party, by observers 
such as Pickup (1996), and a firm believer in the virtues of the marketplace. This 
commitment to freedom of choice extended to sport. Replying to an adjournment 
debate proposing the abolition of boxing, he said: 
We believe strongly that in a free society, which this country thankfully 
enjoys, individuals should have the freedom to participate in a sport of their 
choice, so long as it is within the law and that they are :fully aware of the risks 
involved (Hansard: House o/Commons Debates, 10 May 1994, vol. 243, col. 
297). 
In September 1981, Sproat was appointed Under-Secretary at Trade and Industry, 
where he remained until 1983. He then spent nine years out of Parliament and one 
year as a backbencher before his only other appointment, which was sport. He was 
fIrst an Under-Secretary from May 1993, and promoted to Minister of State from July 
1995 until the 1997 election. Sproat was born in 1938 and educated at Oxford 
University. He was MP for Aberdeen South from 1910 to 1983 and Harwich from 
1992 to 1991, when he lost his seat in the Labour landslide (Who's Who, 1991; Dod's 
Parliamentary Companion 1995; Butler and Butler, 2000). 
On the subject ofSproat's succession Pickup (1996) observes, "Optimistically a more 
competent and sympathetic politician will replace him" (p. 205). That replacement 
came with the 1991 election. The fIrst Labour Minister for Sport since Denis Howell 
in 1979 turned out to be Tony Banks, appointed in May 1991, a campaigner against 
fox hunting, hare coursing, deer hunting, and other country sports. Mike Rowbottom 
(1997) reviewed the record of all Ministers for Sport up to that point He saw Banks 
as arriving, "In the footsteps of the invisible men". He went on to claim that, "In truth 
Tony Banks does not have many hard acts to follow" (p. 30). 
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As a politician, Banks was regarded as a leftwing firebrand from his days as a 
member of the Greater London Councillor (GLC). Even in his early days as an MP 
(1983-84) he almost brought parliamentary business to a halt by tabling huge numbers 
of questions on London local government after the abolition of the GLC (Ryle and 
Richards, 1988). However, he later accommodated himself well to New Labour and 
was rewarded with the sports portfolio. He was so conformist as a Minister that he 
almost got the Labour nomination as London mayoral candidate in 1999 to oppose 
Ken Livingston. According to Andrew Rawnsley (2002), "Alastair Campbell pushed 
Tony Banks, the jesting Sports Minister, as an acceptable retread from the old GLC" 
(p. 344). But Banks always had something of an image problem. Weaver (2001) 
claimed that the, "dandy Banks was viewed as a witty and talented backbencher" until 
he became a junior Minister. Then he became, "The minister for Stamford Bridge, 
who looked like Reg Varney with a silly coiffure. Little wonder no one took him 
seriously" (p. 26). 
Tony Banks was more of a football Minister than a Sports Minister, with contacts 
such as Ken Bates9 chairman of Chelsea Football Club and with the Football 
Association. Mihir Bose (2001) comments that he was instrumental in 1999 in 
persuading Manchester United to drop out of the FA Cup and play instead in the 
World Club Championship in Brazil to help support the 2006 England World Cup bid. 
He was also heavily involved in the abortive plan to rebuild Wembley as a stadium to 
host the World Cup, but not at all keen for it to be used as a venue for the World 
Athletics Championships in 2005. Referring to his attitude towards Wembley, 
Stephen Robson (2001) claims that: 
It was revealed by the former Minister for Sport, Tony Banks, that he and his 
successor, Kate Hoey, had "not had a conversation" about the project in the six 
months following his departure from the post (p. 113). 
This was at a time when he was the country's "ambassador" for the World Cup bid. 
The Wembley scheme was very much alive, as was its intended use for the 2005 
World Athletics Championships. All three projects failed for one reason or another, 
although Wembley was later revived without Ken Bates. Tom Bower (2003) has 
described Banks' relationship with Bates, who was adamant that football and athletics 
could not co-exist in the same stadium. The grandiose scheme collapsed, following 
which both Bates and Banks ceased to be involved with it. 
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Banks was given no other ministerial office after his departure from sport, nor had he 
held any before. He was born in 1943 and went to York University. After many years 
as a GLC councillor, he entered the Commons as MP for Newham North West in 
1983 and stood down in 2005 (Dod's Parliamentary Companion, 1995; Butler and 
Butler, 2000). Just before leaving the Commons, he described his 22 years' 
constituency work as, "intellectually numbing, and tedious in the extreme" (The 
Sunday Times, 10 April 2005: p. 12). Following the 2005 election he was given a life 
peerage to help bring Labour's representation in the House of Lords up to parity with 
that of the Conservatives' (Hurst, 2005). He thus became the fourth fonner post-
holder to go to the House of Lords, after Denis Howell, Hector Monro, and Colin 
Moynihan. 
Tragically for Banks, his time in the Lords was very brief. While on holiday in Florida 
he suffered a severe stroke on 5 January 2006. He did not recover from this, and died 
in hospital on 8 January 2006 at the age of 62. Many fulsome tributes were paid to 
Banks by obituarists and political writers in the press during the days that followed his 
death. However, the unattributed obituary in The Daily Telegraph hinted that a non-
smoking, vegetarian, fitness regime had not rewarded him well with such an early 
death (9 January 2006). Michael White, political editor of The Guardian, said of him, 
"He was not comfortable in ministerial office and had an uneasy relationship with 
sports journalists who treated him more roughly, he complained, than their political 
counterparts did" (White, 2006: p. 8). This could be explained by the fact that, in 
political tenns, he was relatively unimportant, and therefore not considered worthy of 
attention by serious political reporters. 
As a fonner international high jumper for Northern Ireland, Kate Hoey had experience 
of sport at a relatively high level. When she replaced Banks in 1999, she was widely 
welcomed as the first woman to hold the job, and for her sporting pedigree. Martin 
Lipton (1999) declared that she, "has soared into what is perhaps the highest profile 
non-Cabinet role in government" (p. 90). When Minister for Sport, she made 
headlines at times with the audacity of her statements. For instance, Meek (2003) 
notes that she believed, "it makes good sense for PE teachers to start their working 
days at noon and finish at 7pm. They would be there when children are most likely to 
pursue sporting activities" (p. 16). He goes on to note that this was far too sensible 
and put her at odds with Labour Party thinking on this and other matters. 
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Before her appointment to sport, she had been assiduous in the House of Commons, 
asking many questions on sport and participating in debates on the subject. Although 
it is parliamentary convention to be non-controversial in a maiden speech, she used 
hers to oppose Colin Moynihan's football club ID scheme. She set out her position 
early in the speech: 
The Minister for Sport cannot possibly believe that compulsory identity cards 
will solve the problem of football hooliganism. They will create a nightmare 
of bureaucracy that will do nothing to stop the hooligan element but much to 
prevent the genuine football lover from attending matches (Hansard: House of 
Commons Debates, 27 June 1989, vol. 155 col. 883). 
In the end she was vindicated when the identity card scheme was not implemented. 
Foster (1993) comments that this, "hare-brained idea was firmly put in its place by the 
Taylor enquiry" (p. 20) although the Football Spectators' Bill later became the 
Football Spectators' Act 1989. 
Commenting on her early days as Minister, Charlie Whelan (1999) Gordon Brown's 
former press secretary, expressed the view that Kate Hoey should be in the Cabinet 
because, "Being a woman just adds to the media interest" (p. 7). Indeed, there was a 
great deal of favourable press comment on her performance as Minister. An admiring 
Guardian interview by Jim White (2001a) was published just a few weeks before her 
removal from office in June 2001, describing her as, "a passionate enthusiast for both 
politics and sport" (pp. 16-17). Only a week before she was sacked, Ian Ridley (2001) 
in The Observer was also calling for her to be in the Cabinet. He suggested, "If sport 
is as important to the nation's well-being as the manifestos insist, then it should be at 
the top table" (p. 8). 
However, she did not always attract a favourable press. Just before the 2001 election, 
Neil Drysdale (2001) was saying that she was, "a woman of many words, little action" 
(p. 17). After the 7 June election, she revealed, "her brutal sacking by phone" to 
Patrick Collins (2001) in The Mail on Sunday (pp. 22-23). Nevertheless, in an 
appreciative post-election article, Matthew Norman (2001) in The London Evening 
Standard said she was a bit too independently minded and able. In his view, "She did 
a terrific job in her own right, seeking to represent all sports at all levels instead of 
devoting herself to sucking up to the tunnel visioned misogynists who control 
football" (p. 43). Mihir Bose (2001) identified the issues of fox hunting and 
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reactionary football authorities as being instrumental in her downfall. He also felt: 
Hoey was always a maverick in Labour ranks for her support for unionism in 
Ulster - being a Protestant farmer's girl- and for fox hunting. She returns to 
the back benches comforted by the thought that she was always willing to be 
unpopular even within her own party (p. 8). 
Kate Hoey is a former PE teacher and lecturer. She was born in 1946 and educated at 
the Ulster College of Physical Education and London University~ becoming a Labour 
MP after winning the Vauxhall by-election in 1989. Her only previous ministerial 
appointment before sport was as Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office 1998-
99. After her sacking as Minister for Sport in 2001, she has held no further 
government office (Dod's Parliamentary Companion, 1995; Butler and Butler, 
2000). 
However, Hoey has continued to take a close interest in sport, including co-operating 
with Colin Moynihan, as mentioned earlier, to undertake an independent report on 
British sport that was published in September 2005 (Hoey and Moynihan, 2005; 
McKay, 2005c). She also became chair of the Countryside Alliance in 2005, a group 
formed largely to oppose the ban on fox hunting (Gerard, 2005). 
With the appointment of Richard Caborn to succeed Hoey, Labour has gone full 
circle. Not since Denis Howell has there been a working-class male as Minister for 
Sport. Like Howell, Caborn did not go to university, although he attended Sheffield 
Polytechnic for an engineering course. He is a former steelworker, born in 1943, with 
a long history in Sheffield local government. He was an MEP from 1979 to 1984 and 
MP for Sheffield Central since 1983. Before being appointed as Minister for Sport, 
Caborn had been a Minister of State at Environment 1997-99 and a Minister of State 
at Trade and Industry 1999-2001 (Dod's Parliamentary Companion, 1995; Butler and 
Butler, 2000). James Naughtie (2002) suggests that his friendship with John Prescott 
may have been a factor in his securing various ministerial jobs. He asserts that 
Prescott would not organise a Cabinet revolt against the Prime Minister to get his way 
on policy or appointments but that: 
There have been manoeuvres on regional policy and transport and efforts to 
promote the careers of his loyal friends, Cabom being the most obvious, 
running regional policy at the DETR then becoming trade minister and finally 
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Minister for Sport (p. 113). 
Peter Corrigan (2001) welcomed Richard Cabom as the new Minister, "who has a 
rippling physique, politically speaking at least, and has seen plenty of action in the 
alleys of power both as a trade union official and parliamentarian over the past 20 
years or so" (p. 20). Corrigan also believed that, as a friend of John Prescott, Cabom 
had more political gravitas. Jim White (2001b) interviewed the new Minister, "who 
was brought in by Tony Blair to replace the ambassadorial, populist, committed Hoey 
in order that he might bring some clear-headed strategic thinking to the post" (pp. 14-
15). 
Cabom has generated a great deal of publicity for himself from the beginning, not all 
of it favourable. He appeared on a radio programme in June 2001, and was unable to 
answer a few simple questions on sport, posed by Clare Balding of the BBC. One 
exchange, described by Chris Bunting (2001) of The Times, went as follows: 
Radio 5: Who is the current England cricket coach? 
Cabom: The Aussie? (p. 12) 
The correct answer was Duncan Fletcher, who was actually from Zimbabwe. Cabom . 
also failed to answer correctly three other questions on tennis, horse racing, and golf. 
He complained to Jim White of The Guardian ( 200 1 b) that he was unfairly treated in 
being given the equivalent of a pub quiz. 
While serving as an MEP for the Sheffield area, he had previously been closely 
involved in the World Student Games project of 1991. The Games were a financial 
disaster for Sheffield, though as John Goodbody (2001) points out, "they did provide 
the city with facilities which have continued to be used daily by local people" (p. 15). 
Cabom has since gone on to play a supportive role as Minister for Sport, while still 
managing to make the news for the wrong reasons. Nicholas Watt (2003) reported 
Cabom's displeasure at being ordered back from the rugby World Cup in Australia to 
take part in a vital vote in the Commons on social care, as a result of which, "he made 
no attempt to hide his anger" (p. 5). 
However, his wide political contacts, and unstinting support for the anti-apartheid 
movement have paid dividends. He worked hard on London's successful bid for the 
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2012 Olympics, apparently gaining the support of Nelson Mandela. Duncan Mackay 
(2005) suggested that although Sebastian Coe has played a major part, "It also owes a 
lot to the sports minister, Richard Cabom, a key figure in the anti-apartheid movement 
and a friend ofMr Mandela" (p. 3). 
By 2005, and nearing the end of his political career, Mackay (2005) speculated that 
Cabom had been expected to, "step down after the election" (p. 2). However, Mackay 
tipped him to stay on as Minister after the May 2005 election to ensure continuity at 
the political level in the Olympic bid for 2012. In fact, this continuity was ensured 
when he was reappointed to the job on 9 May 2005. As Mihir Bose (2005) wrote, 
"until Cabom, nobody had matched Howell's record of serving a full parliamentary 
term" in the post, (p. 7). According to Tom Knight (2005), the London bid chairman 
Seb Coe, "went so far as to ask Blair to keep Cabom" in order to signal political 
support at the highest level for the Olympic bid (p. 3). He was reappointed at the 
Minister of State level outside the Cabinet in May 2005 and remained in post until 
June 2007. 
On 27 June 2007, Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as Prime Minister and 
reshuffled his Cabinet, as well as many of the junior Ministers. Cabom retired to the 
backbenches and has therefore continued the tradition of the Minister for Sport never 
achieving Cabinet office in any post. His replacement as Minister for Sport is Gerry 
Sutc1iffe. He was appointed at the lowest ministerial level, Under-Secretary (Kelso, 
2007). At 54 years of age, Sutc1iffe thus continued the tradition of Ministers for Sport 
being male, middle-aged, and quite junior within government. In fact, part of his job 
was even removed, since Tessa Jowell (former Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport) was given responsibility for the 2012 Olympics in a new post within the 
Cabinet Office. As a result, the Minister for Sport job has been doubly downgraded in 
ministerial terms and in terms of responsibilities (Mott, 2007). 
1.8 Conclusion 
This review has demonstrated that government has always been involved in British 
sport from the earliest times to the present. Writers such as Brailsford (1992), Birley 
(1996), Hargreaves (1986), Holt (1989) and others have described the process from 
various perspectives. The extent of involvement has accelerated from the 1960s 
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onwards, with the appointment of the Minister for Sport, the establishment of the 
Sports Council, and in many other ways. These include taxation, promotion of health, 
regulation of fans' behaviour, and national prestige, as discussed by Henry (1993) and 
others. The sport and leisure industry has become bigger than ever as a source of 
employment and wealth, hence ever-growing government interest. This can be traced 
through the parties' election manifestos, where there has been a steady increase in the 
attention given to sport. 
Although there is some disagreement about the nature and extent of the post-war 
consensus (for example Jordan and Richardson (1987) are not convinced of its timing 
and extent), most authors agree that the main parties accepted a broad range of social 
and welfare policies after the Second World War through to the 1970s. Sport was one 
of the beneficiaries of this consensus about the role of the state, in terms of increased 
funding and support. Gamble (1981, 1994), Letwin (1992), and others, date the 
breakdown of the consensus in many areas to the Labour government of 1974-76, 
rather than to Thatcher in 1979. However, as Henry (1993) and Haywood (1995) have 
suggested, sport was not adversely affected at that point, since the consensus in this 
area was largely maintained. 
While the position of the Cabinet is not as powerful as it once was, scholars from 
Mackintosh (1968) to Burch and Holliday (1996) have seen it as one of the most 
significant decision-taking bodies in the country. Others, such as Hennessy (1990, 
2000,2004), have noted the increasingly "presidential" style of Prime Ministers up to 
and including Blair, further diminishing the Cabinet's role. Some observers, including 
Smith (1999) and Dorey (2006), feel that the term "core executive" is a more 
appropriate way of describing where policy-making power lies in government, by 
including senior civil servants, key policy advisers, and other senior people of 
influence in the network. 
Most government Ministers outside the Cabinet aspire to be in it, because it is likely 
to give greater access to people and institutions of great influence. Thus, there have 
been many calls for the Minister for Sport to be in the Cabinet in order to enhance the 
office's stature. As this review has shown, few scholars have written about junior 
Ministers who are outside the Cabinet, such as the Minister for Sport. One of the few 
who did so was Theakston (1985, 1987,1999). 
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Relatively little has been written about the Minister for Sport in academic literature. 
Houlihan (1991, 1997,2002) has done so in various works, as have Holt and Mason 
(2000), Henry (1993) and a few others. Sports administrators, such as Cogblan (1990) 
and Pickup (1996), provide many scattered references. Newspapers have journalistic 
opinions on the Ministers for Sport, rather than factual accounts of what they did. 
There are some mentions in political works, such as the A1an Clarlc diaries (1993, 
2001, 2003). 
Only Denis Howell (1990) and Neil Macfarlane (1996), among former Ministers for 
Sport, have produced personal accounts of their time in office. With such a small 
amount of material, we have only a limited understanding of what they achieved in 
office, what they did in Parliament, or how much of their time was dedicated to sport 
or other activities. This is a gap in the literature that is worth filling. From definitive 
records, such as those provided by Butler and Butler (2000), it can be stated with 
confidence that no Ministers for Sport have ever attained higher office than that of the 
junior Minister level. This is explored further in Chapter 4, as are ministerial 
appointments, the parliamentary activity of Ministers for Sport, and related topics. 
However, before this the methodological and theoretical approaches to this study will 
be discussed in the following two Chapters. 
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Chapter Two: Research Methodology and Research Methods 
2.1 Research Methodology: Introduction 
This study poses the research question: "What is the role of the Minister for Sport in 
the policy-making process for UK. sport?" We have looked at some of the available 
evidence in the literature review as a guide towards ways of answering this question. 
A brief outline of the careers of all the Ministers for Sport from 1964 to 2009 has 
already been provid~ including biographical details of each of the 13 post-holders, 
as part of this project. The study now aims to build on these foundations and provide 
new evidence from which an attempt will be made to answer the research question 
more fully. 
The distinction has first to be drawn between methodology and methods. Both Grix 
(2001) and Burnham et al (2004) are careful to separate the two. According to 
Burnham et al (2004) methodology is, "a study of the principles and theories which 
guide the choice of method" (p. 4), and which are guided in turn by ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Research methods are the techniques for gathering 
evidence. Grix (2001) remarks that the latter, "come in all shapes and sizes, ranging 
from in-depth interviews, statistical inference, discourse analysis and archival 
research of historical documents to participant observation" (p. 30). This section will 
set out the methodological approach, while the next will deal with the actual methods 
of data collection. 
2.2 Research Methodology: Ontological Issues 
Marsh and Furlong (2002) assert, ''Each social scientist's orientation to their subject is 
shaped by their ontological and epistemological position" which is, "a skin, not a 
sweater" (p. 17). In other words, it is something that cannot be taken 0fI: even though 
it is implicit rather than acknowledged for many people. Grix (2002) suggests, 
"Ontology is the starting point of all research, after which one's epistemological and 
methodological positions logically follow" (p. 177). 
According to these writers, and others, the key question is, ''what is out there in the 
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world?" Is there an existence outside of social reality, or are events largely shaped by 
our social interaction with them? For example, are some racial groups more likely to 
produce naturally gifted athletes, or are the attributes of the athletes shaped by the 
societies that nurtured them? Indeed, is there any such thing as racial difference, or 
are we simply referring to socially-constructed difference? 
Grix (2002) identifies the two main ontological perspectives of "objectivism" and 
"constructivism", which may help to address these questions. Objectivism implies that 
the world around us (what is out there) exists quite separately from human influence. 
Bryman (2001) offers the following definition: "Objectivism is an ontological 
position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that 
is independent of social actors" (p. 17). From this point of view athletes would be 
born with innate talent, rather than have it made by their native societies. They would 
be malleable only to a certain extent because of their willingness to endure particular 
training regimes. 
Hay (2002) also places ontology at the beginning of a directional dependency chain. 
In a diagrammatic representation, he sets out the relationship between ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology. An adaptation of this diagram is also used by Grix 
(2002) to illustrate the interrelationship between the various building blocks of 
research. Figure 1 below sets this out in summary form, although it should be noted 
that Bates and Jenkins (2007) argue that the Marsh and FurlonglHay/Grix model is 
not necessarily definitive. In their view, "We do not wish to argue that this 
directionality is wrong. Instead, we wish to argue that this position must be explicitly 
recognised as a contested perspective, rather than a given" (p. 60). They suggest that 
ontology and epistemology are interrelated, rather than one coming before the other. 
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Figure 1: Fundamental Stages in the Research Process 
Ontology 
.. 
What's out there to 
know about? 
Epistemology 
What can we hope to 
know about it? 
Methodology 
How can we go 
about acquiring 
that know led e? 
An example of the objectivist approach is given by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), who 
identify "seven moments", or time phases in the history of qualitative research. In the 
earliest of these (circa 1900-50): 
Researchers wrote "objective" colonising accounts of field experiences that 
were reflective of the positivist scientist paradigm. They were concerned with 
offering valid, reliable, and objective interpretations in their writings (p. 12). 
The second "moment" identified by Denzin and Lincoln (2000) is 1950-1970. They 
describe this as, "the modernist or golden age" when, "Postpositivism functioned as a 
powerful epistemological paradigm" (p. 14). The third stage, 1970-1986, was one of 
"blurred genres" when many theories competed for attention. It was here that, "The 
naturalistic, postpositivist, and constructivist paradigms gained power" (p. 15). They 
describe the fourth stage of 1986-1990 as being a, "crisis of representation" when, 
"new models of truth, method, and representation were sought" (p. 16). 
These "moments" have become progressively shorter, with the fifth or postmodern 
stage of experimental and new ethnographies lasting only from 1990 to 1995. 
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Similarly, the postexperimental inquiry sixth stage spanned 1995-2000. The seventh 
"moment" from 2000 to the present is one of moral discourse, in which such issues as 
class, gender, race, and globalisation are subject to critical analysis. 
At the time of the first "moment" researchers were anxious to emulate the way in 
which natural scientists were thought to carry out their work, and to thereby give 
scientific credibility to it. There was a belief in the timelessness of the phenomena 
which they were observing, and over which human beings have no control. According 
to this way of viewing reality, the scientist is a disinterested observer who records 
what he can see without influencing the given world. 
The objectivist mode of conducting social science research is summarised by Loy and 
Booth (2000). They see the key determinants as a realist ontology, a positivist 
epistemology, a deterministic view of human nature, and a nomothetic (a search for 
large-scale, explanatory theories or laws) methodology. Although Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000) date the "first moment" in modem qualitative research from 1900, Loy and 
Booth (2000) suggest that objectivism was well-established before this time. 
Constructivism (some authors, such as Bryman (2001) use the term constructionism 
as a synonym), on the other hand, suggests that human intervention is all-pervasive 
and unavoidable. The hand of man is everywhere present in determining his own 
consciousness, rather than it being determined by impersonal forces. It was during the 
"third moment" of 1970-1986, as identified by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), that the 
constructivist paradigm became widely accepted. In this view of the world, a 
successful athlete would be the product of his or her society to a large extent. He or 
she would be the beneficiary of particular training methods, coaching, diet, medicine, 
and many other factors. 
In Hay's (2002) view of constructivism, "The social and political world is not a given 
but an inherently intersubjective do.main - a product of social construction" (p. 24). 
The real everyday world that we inhabit is constructed by individuals and 
organisations, which shape reality through their own actions. Schwandt (2000) defines 
this more comprehensively: 
Constructivism means that human beings do not find or discover knowledge 
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so much as we construct or make it. We invent concepts, models, and schemes 
to make sense of experience, and we constantly test and modify these 
constructions in the light of new experience (p. 197). 
In the constructivist paradigm, the researcher unavoidably interacts with the social 
world when looking at how reality is constructed by the people or institutions he is 
studying. Indeed the researcher him or herself is likely to influence events during the 
process of reconstructing the reality he or she is examining, for example, by asking 
particular questions in interviews. Furthermore, the same questions asked by a 
different interviewer might elicit different answers, and thus the reconstruction will 
not be identical. 
A summary of the basic beliefs of various research paradigms is shown in Table 1 
below. The tenn "paradigm" has come into use from the 1960s onwards, following 
the work of Thomas Kuhn (1996, first published in 1962) who used it to denote an 
accepted or standard academic way of looking at a problem. Kuhn believed that each 
era was dominated by a particular "paradigm", amongst those closely involved in a 
field of study. In defining paradigms, Kuhn (1996) says, "These I take to be 
universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems 
and solutions to a community of practitioners" (p. x). 
Table 1: Basic Beliefs of Enquiry Paradigms 
Feature Positivism Post-Positivism Critical Theory et al. Constructivism 
Ontology NaIve realism Critical realism Historical realism, Relativism - local 
shaped by social, and specific 
political. ethnic, constructed realities 
economic, and gender 
values 
Epistemology Objectivist - Modified objectivist - Transactional! Transactional! 
findings true findings probably true subjectivist - value- Subjectivist -
mediated findings created findings 
Methodology Experimental - Modified experimental; Dialogic/dialectical Hermeneutical! 
verification of falsification of dialectical 
hypotheses; hypotheses; may include 
mainly qualitative methods 
quantitative 
methods 
Source: Adapted from Lincoln & Guba (2000), p. 165 
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2.3 Research Methodology: Epistemological Issues 
While an ontological position establishes a particular way of looking at the world, the 
. epistemological stance that follows is concerned with the investigation of knowledge. 
Epistemology looks at how knowledge is acquired and the validity of that knowledge 
as real evidence. It is a way of focusing on the "truth" of data to help answer the 
initial research question. In the words of Marsh and Furlong (2002) epistemology 
asks, "what can we know about the world and how can we know it" (p. 19). 
In the directional relationship shown in Figure 1 above, epistemology is a logical 
progression from ontology, according to Grix (2002) and Hay (2002). Marsh and 
Furlong (2002) also suggest that epistemology follows from ontology and proceed to 
outline the positivist, realist, and interpretivist standpoints. They suggest that, "A 
positivist looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer quantitative analysis and wants 
to produce 'objective' and generalisable findings" (p. 21). They concede that realism 
is more difficult to classify because: 
Realists are looking for causal relationships, but think that many important 
relationships between social phenomena cannot be observed. This means that 
they may use quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data will only 
be appropriate for those relationships that are directly observable. In contrast, 
the unobservable relationships can only be established indirectly (pp. 21-22). 
The positivist epistemological stance, in which social investigation was traditionally 
undertaken, is discussed by Burgess (1993). An "ideal type" approach involving 
problem identification, sampling, data collection, analysis, and report, would be, 
"based heavily on the hypothetico-deductive model that many social researchers 
thought natural scientists always used" (p. 1). But Burgess then suggests that projects 
such as the discovery of DNA, "involves some guesswork, competition, rivalry and 
lucky breaks" (p. 1), in addition to empirical scientific methods. 
With specific reference to sports studies, Gratton and lones (2004) look in detail at 
positivism and interpretivism, which they see as the, "two broad approaches to the 
nature of knowledge" (p. 15). The main features of the positivist epistemology are 
control, replication, and hypothesis testing. Interpretivism is more concerned with 
"rich" descriptions and interpretations, based on direct observations. They use a 
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number of examples from sport to illustrate the contrasting ways in which positivists 
and interpretivists conduct investigations. For instance, they describe a positivist 
study of football fans, using questionnaire survey techniques and an interpretivist 
study of sports sub-cultures where a small number of in-depth interviews were carried 
out. 
The characteristics of athletes were used above to illustrate differing ontological 
positions, in relation to the question, "What is out there?", posed by Grix (2002) and 
Hay (2002). This can be taken a stage further, to help answer their epistemological 
question, "What can we hope to know about the world?" In this case, it would be 
"What can we hope to know about the athlete or athletes in the world?" For example, 
a researcher using a positivist epistemology might measure the athlete's heart rate, 
V02Max, lap times, recovery rate, personal best, race performance, and so on. He or 
she might undertake a quantitative approach using accurate measuring instruments to 
do this, in which the measurements would be reproducible later, by different 
researchers, on the same or on other athletes. It would then be possible to make 
comparisons over time, or between individuals. 
By contrast, someone employing an interpretivist epistemology might argue that there 
is more to a person than just numbers. The athlete's relationship to other athletes 
could be examined, how he felt in training and racing, or the performance in relation 
to the importance of the competition. There can be no absolutes because ever-
changing factors are at work, such as the weather, altitude, drug-taking amongst 
opponents, or the relative poverty of the athlete's country. There are many different 
ways of seeing "success". For example, the UK's performance of a single medal at the 
winter Olympics of February 2006 could be viewed as "good" because Britain has 
few natural advantages in winter sports and only a small number of participants. 
Conversely, the USA's 26 medals (and "only" second place in the table) could be 
seen by them as a failure, given their resources and large number of world-class 
competitors. 
Hay (2002) also looks at the ways in which social enquiry has tried to emulate the 
natural sciences in discovering knowledge. He asserts that the dominant 
epistemological strand in political science is rationalism, which encompasses rational 
choice theory. In his view: 
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Rationalists are positivists, committed not only a unity of method between the 
natural and social sciences (naturalism), but to the idea that the natural 
sciences provide a model of good practice to which the social sciences should 
aspire. In short, they seek to model political analysis upon the natural sciences 
(p.38). 
Although the number-counting and algebraic notations often employed by rationalists 
give the impression of rigorous analysis, Hay (2002) casts doubt as to whether this is 
better than using words to convey knowledge. He suggests that it is not necessarily 
possible, "to render mathematically anything even vaguely approximating the rich 
complexity of political life" (p. 38). The same could also be said of sporting life, 
where the beauty of a performance does not always result in victory. Nevertheless, 
Hay does not discount the use of quantitative methods in political analysis where they 
are appropriate, using a positivist epistemology. 
Hay (2002) discusses what he calls the, "retreat from positivism" (p. 81), particularly 
the influence of Karl Popper in this trend. He goes on to suggest that, "his 
contribution should certainly be seen as a revision rather than a rejection of 
positivism". Popper's work, first published in 1935, spanned the natural and social 
sciences. He turned traditional thinking of the time on its head by asserting that 
theories should be evaluated by their ability to falsify a hypothesis, rather than to 
prove it. Scientific theory could offer only provisional truths, not absolute ones. As 
Popper (2002) himself said: 
In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it 
is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable, or that 
the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the experimental results 
and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance 
of our understanding (p. 28). 
Thomas Kuhn was, according to Gerring (2001) a, "longtime adversary" (p. 15) of 
Popper. Kuhn (1996), who unlike Popper worked exclusively in the natural sciences, 
believed that scientific revolutions occur when a paradigm becomes exhausted or 
substantially revised. When this happens, there is what Grix (2001) calls a, "paradigm 
shift" (p. 138) to a new way oflooking at situations and problems. 
Thus, for many social scientists, there has been a paradigm shift in the period after the 
Second World War to post-positivism, or interpretivism as better ways of discovering 
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new knowledge. Specifically, there was the "second moment" from 1950-70, as 
suggested by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), when, "Postpositivism functions as a 
powerful epistemological paradigm" (p. 14). Indeed, even Popper (2002) observes 
that, "statements of experimental results are always interpretations of the facts 
observed" (p. 90). This is echoed by Denzin and Lincoln (2000) who say, "All 
research is interpretive; it is guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world 
and how it should be understood and studied" (p. 19). Here they are highlighting the 
point that the ultimate analysis of data must be carried out by human beings. This is 
true, whether the data are in numerical form, or derived from interviews, 
questionnaires, experiments, observations, photographs, or in other ways. 
Bryman (2001) sees interpretivism as a means of understanding human behaviour, 
compared with the positivist approach that seeks to explain it. He says that: 
Interpretivism is taken to denote an alternative to the positivist orthodoxy that 
has held sway for decades. It is predicated upon the view that a strategy is 
required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the 
natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the 
subjective meaning of social action (p. 13). 
Whereas a positivist epistemology has been associated with quantitative techniques, 
interpretivism is more likely to use a qualitative approach. Indeed, Cresswell (1994) 
says simply, "qualitative research is interpretative research" (p. 147). He also notes 
that qualitative researchers are interested in the meanings of people's lives, the social 
structures they have created, and the ways in which they interact with each other. 
Marsh and Furlong (2002), in agreement with Bryman (2001), explain this further: 
A researcher from within the interpretist tradition is concerned with 
understanding, not explanation, focuses on the meaning that actions have for 
agents, tends to use qualitative evidence and offers .their results as one 
interpretation of the relationship between the social phenomena studied (p. 
21). 
While Bryman (2001) and Marsh and Furlong (2002) use the term ''understanding'', 
Schwandt (2000) traces the meaning of the equivalent German word verstehen as used 
by German historians and sociologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In its modem sense, to achieve verstehen is to achieve understanding 
through an interpretive process. Bevir and Rhodes (2002) discuss a variety of 
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interpretive theories, including ethnology and henneneutics. They examine criticisms 
of verstehen by some political scientists who remain committed to positivism. 
A summary of the qualitative and quantitative paradigms, as identified by Cresswell 
(1994) is set out in Table 2 following: 
Table 2: Quantitative and Qualitative Paradigm Assumptions 
Assumption Question Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontology What is the nature of Reality is objective and Reality is subjective 
reality? singular, apart from the and multiple, as seen 
researcher by participants in a 
study 
Epistemology What is the relationship Researcher is Researcher interacts 
of the researcher to the independent from the with the research 
researched? research 
Methodology What is the process of Deductive; cause and Inductive; design 
research? effect; context-free; emerging through the 
predictions; research process; 
explanations; accuracy context-bound; 
and reliability through accuracy and reliability 
validity through verification 
Source: Adapted from Cresswell (1994), p. 5 
Sometimes it is possible to use a variety of techniques to study a problem, an 
approach referred to as triangulation. This use of a variety of complementary 
approaches is discussed by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), in tenns of providing a more 
rounded perspective. They observe that, "the use of multiple methods, or 
triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon in question" (p. 5). An example could be checking data collected from 
an interview with a published source such as a reference book or a statistical database 
if appropriate. 
The case for triangulation in both quantitative and qualitative research strategies is 
also set out by Bryman (2001), ''whereby more than one method would be employed 
in the development of measures, resulting in greater confidence in fmdings" (p: 274). 
72 
Although Bryman (2001) dates the use of triangulation in the social sciences from the 
1960s, it has actually been in use in other disciplines, such as cartography and 
geography, for much longer. For example, when Britain was comprehensively 
mapped for the ftrst time in the nineteenth century, a network of "trig points" was 
established. There are thousands of them on hills and mountains all over the country, 
but these have now been superseded for their original purpose because of satellite 
technology which gives a much better overview. However, surveying from 
triangulation pillars did not involve a mixing of methods, but simply looked at the 
same feature from different angles using the same technique. Triangulation in the 
social sciences has come to be associated with using a mixture of different methods, 
including employing quantitative and qualitative methods in combination. 
The combination of methods has been discussed by many scholars, including Burgess 
(1993), Denzin and Lincoln (2000), Bryman (2001), Cresswell (1994), Read and 
Marsh (2002), and Burnham et al (2004), with an emphasis on drawing on the 
strengths of each. Some scholars, such as Burnham et al (2004), caution against the 
combining of methods because these may have different epistemological assumptions. 
Conversely, there are others who show how such combinations can be fruitfully 
employed. For instance, Cresswell (1994) sets out a variety of, "dominant - less 
dominant designs" (p. 179), where the epistemological basis would centre around the 
dominant component. Bryman (2001) takes a similarly flexible view: 
The idea that research methods carry with them ftxed epistemological and 
ontological implications is very difficult to sustain. They are capable of being 
put to a wide variety of tasks (p. 445). 
Just as triangulation is apparently redundant in map-making, some scholars take a 
similar stance towards its use in the social sciences. Richardson (2000) believes that 
an overview, which she terms "crystallization" is a better way of verifying 
knowledge. In her opinion, "We recognise that there are more than 'three sides' to 
approach the world" (p. 934). She is supported by Janesick (2000), who comments 
that crystallization is, "a better lens through which to view qualitative research 
designs and their components" (p. 392). 
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2.4 Methodological Approach 
The third question addressed in Figure 1 was, "How can we go about acquiring that 
knowledge?" This is something that may be answered by the methodological 
approach to a study and will follow from a researcher's ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. It will underpin how the research will actually be 
carried out. For instance, a researcher who is comfortable with a constructivist 
ontology and an interpretivist epistemology will tend towards a qualitative ·approach. 
Conversely, someone favouring an objectivist ontology and a positivist epistemology 
is more likely to utilise quantitative means to investigate a problem. 
The ontological stand taken in this study will be constructivist, since its purpose is to 
look at the actions of human beings who have shaped events in a particular way. An 
objectivist paradigm would be inappropriate, since all the events being studied are the 
result of human actions rather than impersonal, timeless forces. They are not in 
Bryman's (2001) words, "external facts that are beyond our reach" (p. 16) in an 
objectivist sense, but reconstructions of social reality. 
Following from a constructivist ontology, an interpretivist epistemology will be 
adopted in relation to gathering and examining the data, and providing what Bryman 
(2001) describes as, "acceptable knowledge" (p. 10). As illustrated in 'fable 2, an 
interpretivist epistemology assumes that the researcher interacts with the research, 
rather than standing independently apart from it. In the present study, this will largely 
involve interpreting the actions of a small number of individuals who have held a 
particular political office. As such, the study lends itself to the collection of 
qualitative data, rather than quantitative. The data will then be examined to provide 
insights into the contribution individuals made to government and the policy-making 
process. 
Although a broadly constructivist/interpretivist standpoint will be taken, this will be 
complemented by positivist analysis of numerical data. King et al (1994), while 
arguing for a more "scientific" methodology, believe that, "neither quantitative nor 
qualitative research is superior to the other, regardless of the research problem being 
addressed" (pp. 5-6). Burgess (1993) states that, "There is no 'best' method of 
conducting social research" (p. 2). He then goes on to set out a variety of methods, 
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such as case studies, surveys, ethnographies, and experiments, which can follow from 
the research question. Some of these data-collecting techniques will be discussed 
below, as the proposed research methods for this study are set out. 
2.5 Research Methods: Introduction 
The research methods for this study follow from the ontological/epistemological 
viewpoint set out in the previous section. As Grix (2002) states, ''we should guard 
against 'method-led' research, that is allowing ourselves to be led by a particular 
research method rather than 'question-led' research, whereby research questions point 
to the most appropriate research method" (p. 180). Researchers should not use 
convenient and easy data sources, around which research questions can be fitted. 
Thus, this project has used the constructivist/interpretivist paradigm as the basis upon 
which to choose the research methods. It assumes that there is no objective reality that 
we can know about. The real world of government and sports policy is constructed by 
individuals and organisations, the actions of which need to be interpreted for their 
meanings. However, some of the activities of these individuals in the processes of 
government, as distinct from policy-making, can be measured numerically, and it is 
here that positivist insights will be helpful in giving a more rounded picture of events. 
When choosing research methods, from both the quantitative and qualitative 
traditions, there are some that are clearly inappropriate, since they would not be able 
to provide worthwhile new knowledge in an epistemological sense. For example, a 
sample survey of Ministers for Sport would not be suitable, since there have only 
been 13 of them, three of whom are dead. In looking at the behaviour of Ministers, 
participant observation or an ethnographic study would not achieve very much due to 
the problems of access and the fact that only one is currently in office. An 
experimental model of ministerial behaviour, under controlled conditions would 
clearly be impossible. Although Gerring (2001) argues that the experimental method 
is probably the best one for social science analysis he concedes, "the pure experiment 
is rarely applicable to social science problems" (p. 228). 
In the objectivist/positivist paradigm, a researcher would look for indicators of 
behaviour that are tangible, measurable, and reproducible. Someone repeating the 
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work at a later date should be able to produce very similar, if not identical results, as 
is commonly believed to be the case in the natural sciences. Qualitative researchers 
eschew the notion of exact reproducibility, but look instead for verification of data. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) argue that, in the constructivist paradigm: 
Tenns such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability 
replace the usual positivist criteria of internal and external validity, reliability, 
and objectivity (p. 21). 
Methods of data collection which embody these concepts, such as content analysis, 
secondary analysis of material already published, and interviews, have therefore been 
selected as suitable means of gathering new evidence to study the research problem. 
These will now be discussed in turn below. 
2.6 Research Methods: Content Analysis 
A content analysis of Hansard, the parliamentary record, was undertaken. Bryman 
(2001) has described the usefulness of this method from the point of view of being 
systematic and objective. He describes it as being, "firmly rooted in the quantitative 
research strategy" (p. 178). Such a study can be replicated by others, who Bryman 
(2001) considers should be able to produce the same findings: 
The content analyst is simply applying the rules in question. The quality of 
being systematic means that the application of the rules is done in a consistent 
manner so that the bias is again suppressed. As a result of these two qualities, 
anyone could apply the rules and (hopefully) come up with the same result (p. 
178). 
Krippendorff (1980) has observed that content analysis has a long history, beginning 
in eighteenth century Sweden with a collection of ninety hymns. He shows that the 
modem use of this method can be dated to the late nineteenth century USA, with the 
advent of widespread literacy and mass-circulation newspapers. While the 
measurement of text in column inches was :first used by journalists, this method was 
soon taken up by scholars. Writing in the early 1950s, Berelson (195211971) saw 
content analysis as a legitimate way to acquire knowledge, using units such as 
articles, paragraphs, sentences, words, or quantity of text: 
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Thus an analyst may classify an entire news story into a given category, and 
then report the result in terms of column inches. Here the news item is the unit 
of classification and the column inch is the unit of enumeration (p. 136). 
Berelson (1952/1971) believed that such methods have a high degree of validity and 
reliability because, "different coders should produce the same results when they apply 
the same set of categories to the same content" (p. 172). Holsti (1969), on the other 
hand, cautions against using quantitative content analysis when looking for deeper 
meanings in text, while endorsing it for discovering relative proportions, such as the 
amount of newspaper space devoted to nationaVinternational subjects. 
Hansard provides by far the greatest source of what the Ministers for Sport actually 
said. Junior Ministers normally answer oral questions in the House of Commons on 
one day every three or four weeks, but they can also be involved in piloting legislation 
through Parliament, participating in adjournment debates, and answering written 
questions almost every day. In addition, they are likely to be involved in a range of 
committee work (Theakston 1987, 1999). This has produced a massive amount of text 
over the past forty years, all recorded in Hansard and in the public domain. May 
(1993) discusses the use of Hansard and other "official" publications by researchers. 
Whilst he is aware of the shortcomings of such evidence for some purposes, he argues 
that, "They can tell us a great deal about the way in which events were constructed at 
the time" (p. 133). 
This rich source material shows the kind of work that each Minister for Sport has 
been involved in over the years, in addition to sport. For example, Denis Howell was 
initially in the Department of Education and Science. As a result, many of the issues 
he dealt with related to education rather than sport. Similarly, Eldon Griffiths (his 
successor from 1970 to 1974) was in the Department of the Environment, where he 
concentrated mainly on transport. A similar pattern emerged for all the others who 
followed, with sport taking up only a proportion of their time. It was the exact 
proportion which was devoted to sport that remained to be discovered. 
A detailed longitudinal analysis of Hansard 1964-2005 has been carried out, reSUlting 
in the quantification of the time Ministers spent on sport, in terms of column 
centimetres, compared with other duties and what these other duties were. Since the 
entire period has been completely covered, there was no need for sampling techniques 
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to be used, thus avoiding the potential for error noted by Berelson (195211971), Holsti 
(1969), Bryman (2001), and others. 
A coding scheme is something that Bryman (2001) describes as, "a crucial stage in 
doing a content analysis" (p. 186). However, over-elaboration was unnecessary 
because of the way in which the data have been used. It is of no special interest for 
this study whether the non-sport activities fall into particular categories, such as 
transport, environment, or tourism. It is enough to detennine if the Ministers were 
involved in sport or not. Thus, there were only two categories in the coding scheme, 
comprising of sport and non-sport. 
In addition, the actual number of parliamentary questions for each Minister were 
recorded in each session and a figure calculated in terms of their ''productivity'' in 
relation to dealing with sports or non-sports issues. Both the amount of text and the 
number of questions are considered to be suitable "units" in Berelson's (195211971) 
terms. From this data, a series of tables and graphs were produced, summarised in 
Figures 2 and 3 (p. 124 and p. 127), to show what Ministers actually did in 
Parliament, followed by the number and type of debates in which they took part. 
This specific method of measuring text has been used recently by Eastman and 
Billings (2000), who measured the amount of newspaper coverage in the The New 
York Times and USA Today over a period of months to show the gender bias in favour 
of men in terms of sports reporting. In another illustration of recent practice, 
Crompton (2004) used the approach to measure the effectiveness of sports 
sponsorship advertising in the broadcasting and printing media in the USA. 
Both de Vaus (2001) and Bryman (2001) discuss the merits of undertaking a 
longitudinal analysis. This type of design is often used in panel studies of 
interviewees, as described by Moser and Kalton (1971), where changes in people's 
opinions are being sought over a period of months or years. However, there is no 
reason why it should not be applied as part of a content analysis or any other data 
source where a time-series is available. A longitudinal design has also been used for 
the secondary analysis described below. 
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2.7 Research Methods: Secondary Analysis of Published Material 
The possibilities of using secondary analysis are considered by Bryman (2001) who 
looks at the cost advantages, ease of availability, quality of data, and opportunity for 
longitudinal analysis. He suggests, "Secondary analysis of existing data offers the 
prospect of being able to explore research questions of interest to you without having 
to go through the process of collecting the data yourself' (p. 211). Similar views are 
expressed by Burgess (1993) who also suggests that high-quality data can often be 
obtained at relatively modest cost and effort. 
Butler and Butler (2000) have amassed a wealth of information on political parties, 
governments, elections, and many other areas of politics in Britain. Their aim was to 
produce an authoritative source for scholars and others to draw on and cite. They 
describe the amount of effort that they invested in producing definitive lists of 
governments from 1900 to 2000 and emphasise the, "importance of pedantic accuracy 
and clear presentation" (p. xviii) which were necessary in drawing up their lists. 
Accurate tables of Ministers attaining and leaving office were amongst the most time-
consuming and difficult that they compiled. 
The careers of all government Ministers who held office 1964-2005 have been tracked 
to see how many eventually entered the Cabinet, using the tables presented by Butler 
and Butler (2000). These were supplemented by original collection of data from the 
fortnightly tables in Hansard of all government Ministers to take the study up to 
2005, since the Butler and Butler (2000) series ends at 2000. It has thus been possible 
to calculate the true figures for those who have achieved promotion in each 
government and compare this with Ministers for Sport. 
The first ministerial jobs of all junior Ministers (165 individuals) who made it to the 
Cabinet between 1964 and 2005 were also examined to see what offices are more 
likely to lead to the Cabinet. Theakston (1987) suggests that first jobs in the Whips' 
Office or the Treasury are more likely to lead to high office. It may be that some MPs 
are identified early on as high-fliers, and are thus given an early opportunity to shine 
and prepare for promotion. The first jobs of Ministers for Sport can therefore be 
compared with them to see if any were ever in a position to be high-fliers. 
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The careers of a few selected junior Ministers to specific named appointments, 
namely Arts, Defence Procurement, Social Security, and Local Government, were 
also examined to test how likely they were to gain promotion and enter the Cabinet. In 
this way, a comparison has been made with the Ministers for Sport. This may tell us 
something about the quality and the career ambitions of the people appointed to the 
sports portfolio in relation to some of the other junior ministerial offices, and also 
shed some light on the relative esteem with which some ministerial posts are held in 
relation to others. 
2.8 Research Methods: Interviews 
It was felt at the outset of the study that interviews with the politicians who held the 
office of Minister for Sport would provide a unique perspective on their activities, 
since there are only two insider accounts currently available (Macfarlane, 1986; 
Howell, 1990). Interviews would provide a new source of data, and build on the 
limited amount of existing material. Burnham et al (2004) consider the value of such 
interviews and suggest, "The majority of work by political scientists is concerned 
with the study of decision-makers and hence a key research technique for political 
scientists is what is known as elite interviewing" (p. 205). They describe the strengths 
and weaknesses of interviews, the best way of arranging them by gaining access 
through "gatekeepers", preparing interview schedules, conducting the interviews, and 
analysis of the data. 
Interviews have the advantage that the objects of the study can be asked for their own 
views. But, like any method of data collection, they also have their limitations and 
disadvantages. For instance, there may be bias of the interviewer in recording and 
interpreting answers, the rapport established with the respondents during the 
interviews may become too close, and respondents may be unable to recall events or 
be unwilling to provide answers. They may even give misleading or inaccurate 
answers. According to Fontana and Frey (2000), recent trends in interviewing have 
led to a reappraisal of the technique: 
Interviewers are increasingly seen as active participants in interactions with 
respondents, and interviews are seen as negotiated accomplishments of both 
interviewers and respondents that are shaped by the contexts and situations in 
which they take place (p. 663). 
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These issues are probably of more concern to a researcher working within a positivist 
paradigm who seeks reproducibility over a large number of cases, using identical 
standardised questionnaires. In an interpretivist paradigm this is less problematic, 
since the process of interaction is unavoidable. Nevertheless, the researcher must be 
aware of potential bias and guard against it as far as possible in the search for validity 
and reliability. 
Structured interviews rely on having a prepared interview schedule of specific 
questions which may be sent in advance to respondents. Indeed, there may be no need 
to meet at all, since the questionnaires could be sent by post or email.This method has 
the advantage that direct comparisons can be made between each respondent and data 
tabulated over a large number of cases. On the other hand, structured interviews with 
only a small number of respondents are less useful. There is no opportunity for 
supplementary questions to be asked, or for discussion to range more widely to related 
topics which arise in conversation. 
Semi-structured interviews, using broad headings, have been described by a number 
of scholars, including Gratton and Jones (2004) and Marsh and Stoker (2002). This is 
seen as a more flexible approach, by allowing the possibility of asking additional 
questions and to probe more deeply on important issues that arise as the interview 
develops. It also allows for more interaction between interviewer and subj ect. If there 
is good rapport, it is possible to gain deeper insights into the subject's behaviour and 
decisions. Gratton and Jones (2004) also discuss unstructured interviews, in which the 
interviewer has only rough idea of what to ask and therefore lets the discussion roam 
freely. As they note, it is likely, "much of the data will lack focus" (p. 142). 
For the present study, the semi-structured approach proved to be more appropriate in 
practice. Each respondent has taken decisions in a different time-frame from the 
others, dealt with different issues, and contributed different amounts of their time to 
sport. Thus, a highly-structured identical questionnaire administered to each of the 
relatively small number was not suitable. Semi-structured interview schedules or 
questionnaires were therefore devised with some standard questions in each, followed 
by more specific questions tailored to each individual's personal experience. This 
gave some continuity across interviews, yet. allowed for flexibility in probing 
particular policy areas dealt with by the respondents. 
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Interviewing ex~Ministers, and other senior figures, raised problems of access. There 
are "gatekeepers" who see their role as protecting him or her. For example, the civil 
service machine has control over the current Minister's diary and engagements, while 
ex~Ministers may still have a secretary or other staff who perform similar functions. 
Burnham et al (2004) and Bryman (2001) suggest ways in which access can be gained 
through negotiation and by explaining the value of the research as a way for the 
respondents to tell their side of a story which may not have been told before. This 
tactic was used when requesting interviews and many interviewees responded 
positively. 
It was initially intended that the interviews would focus mainly on the politicians who 
have held the office of Minister for Sport. In practice it proved difficult to gain co-
operation from all former Ministers for Sport, and a wider trawl was undertaken to 
include other politicians with knowledge of the subject, sports administrators, civil 
servants, and others who could possibly contribute, based on their knowledge of the 
policy process for sport. 
In the first instance, letters (including stamped addressed envelopes) were sent to 
some ex-Ministers for Sport in September/October 2006, which elicited no response. 
These were followed up by telephone calls and emails where contact details were 
known. When there was still no response, further letters were sent on Loughborough 
University headed paper, but these did not prove fruitful either. However, a letter to 
Mr David Pickup, former Director General of the Sports Council, resulted in the first 
successful interview in Bromley, where he lived, at the end of November 2006. 
Pickup provided contact details for Mr David Macdonald, a former senior civil 
servant who had worked with him, and he in turn was interviewed early in 2007. 
Around this time Sir Neil Macfarlane also agreed to be interviewed. Several of those 
interviewed, such as Mr Macdonald, were contacted at the suggestion of the 
interviewees themselves, Once access was gained to a few, it became much easier to 
approach others in the political and sports communities. 
Due to these breakthroughs, and a decision to contact members of the House of Lords, 
further interviews were quickly achieved. Some of them were carried out in person 
and some by telephone. In practice, many of the respondents preferred to speak on the 
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telephone because this involved committing less of their time and effort. The decision 
to look further than Ministers for Sport proved to be successful, especially in relation 
to fonner MPs who are now in the House of Lords. A number of ex-Cabinet Ministers 
and MPs who are in the Lords were particularly co-operative. 
The main sports representative organisations, such as UK. Sport, Sport England, and 
the CCPR were also very helpful, by allowing visits to their headquarters and 
interviews with relatively senior personnel. At one point it was considered contacting 
some of the governing bodies of sport. However, it quickly became apparent from the 
interviews (especially with ex-Sports Ministers) that individual governing bodies had 
little influence on government sports policy because there were so many of them and 
that they were collectively represented by the CCPR in any case. This approach was 
therefore not pursued because it was felt that little significant data would have been 
yielded. 
A total of 28 interviews were carried out between November 2006 and April 2008. In 
addition, email responses were received from Sir Eldon Griffiths in the USA. The 
respondents have included five fonner Ministers for Sport and five fonner Cabinet 
Ministers, two of whom were responsible for the department dealing with sport (one 
under a Conservative and one under a Labour government: Virginia Bottomley and 
Chris Smith). The Cabinet Minister fonnerly responsible for sport in Scotland, Ms 
Patricia Ferguson, was also interviewed, as were others in the devolved 
administrations. The interviews lasted from around half an hour up to almost two 
hours, (with Mr lain Sproat in London). The ovemlI average was around three-
quarters of an hour. No one actually declined to be interviewed, but some merely 
failed to respond to all forms of communication. A list of the respondents is attached 
as Appendix 5 and the transcripts of five interviews with fonner Ministers for Sport 
are attached as Appendix 6. 
Many of the interviews were recorded, where interviewees agreed and where it was 
possible to do so, while others were written up from notes immediately afterwards. 
The data arising from the interviews were transcribed and interpreted manually. With 
such a small number of cases, there was no need of computer-aided analysis to make 
calculations or carry out cross-tabulations. 
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Although the interviews with politicians were highly productive, they were viewed 
with caution. Politicians are likely to take a particular view of events and issues that 
are most favourable to themselves. Attaining ministerial office of any kind, even at 
the junior level, may enhance their self-importance. Gerald Kaufinan (1997) describes 
this a "ministerialitis". He goes on to illustrate this further: 
The most immediately observable symptom of ministerialitis is a perceptible 
swelling of the head. Ministerialitis may be defined as a preoccupation and 
satisfaction with holding ministerial office to the exclusion of almost all other 
considerations (p. 10). 
Since most former Ministers for Sport have long left office, "ministerialitis" was not 
such a problem. Nevertheless, these interviewees still wanted their own accounts of 
events to reflect well on them. In view of this, Burnham et al (2004) advise that, "The 
key guideline must be not to base any piece of work entirely on elite interviewing" (p. 
206). Therefore, wherever possible, information gained from interviews was cross-
checked against other sources, such as Hansard or newspaper reports. Interviews with 
other leading figures from the sports world (for example the Sports Council, CCPR, 
and civil servants) were also useful as a means of verification of Ministers' versions 
of history. 
It was noted above that some respondents were not been willing to give face-to-face 
interviews but suggested speaking on the telephone instead. While this may not be 
ideal in terms of building up a rapport with the individuals, as Bryman (2001) 
suggests, telephone interviews were carried out because of the need to speak to the 
key people who were contacted. Conversely, Bryman (2001) identified a number of 
advantages of telephone interviewing, including lower cost, speed of administration 
by avoiding travelling, and easier access. He also suggested that, since the interviewer 
and interviewee do not see each other, there is less possibility of bias in terms of 
factors such as social class or ethnicity. 
In practice, the telephone interviews were very successful in that the respondents 
tended to keep to the point and answer the questions which were asked. Face-to-face 
interviews were sometimes much longer, though the content could be less useful since 
respondents often diverged into non-relevant areas of their careers and family lives. 
Some respondents spontaneously replied by telephone to letters, offering to be 
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interviewed right away. These offers were accepted because individual interview 
schedules had been prepared in advance for each person contacted and the interviews 
could take place speedily. 
Utilising email as a means of conducting interviews was not initially considered, 
although it was used for contacting potential interviewees. However, in one case an 
email correspondence was conducted with a respondent (Sir Eldon Griffiths), in the 
USA. Although elderly, this was his preferred means of communication. A short 
questionnaire was sent and returned. A few weeks later, he followed this up with a 
lengthy written account of his time as Minister for Sport, which is likely to be adapted 
for his published memoirs. 
While the use of email is now quite widespread in social research, there is little 
literature as yet available to assess its efficacy as a method of data collection. 
However, Meho (2006) reviews and discusses a number of studies that have used it. 
He concludes that it has similar advantages to telephone interviews, such as low cost, 
easy access, speed of administration, and elimination of social, ethnic, or gender bias. 
It is also similar in a negative sense, in that there is no direct interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee, and it may not be possible to follow up with 
supplementary questions. In the one case where it was used for this study, it was felt 
that the information could not have been provided by any other route, and was well 
worth having. 
2.9 Research Methods: Purpose of the Interviews 
Interviews with senior politicians and civil servants were intended to shed some light 
on the policy-making processes of government generally. Those with Ministers for 
Sport provided more specific data showing how the Ministers were concerned with 
sports policy-making. They also covered the day-to-day work of each post-holder to 
give an insight into what they actually did and how much of their time was spent on 
sport. It was felt to be important that they estimated their own contribution to sport, 
whether or not they made any difference to sports policy, with whom they worked 
closely in terms of a sports policy community, and their own influence on sports 
issues. Interviews with other figures from the sporting world contributed to an 
evaluation of the Minister for Sport's role from a wider perspective. 
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The data obtained from interviews are presented in Chapter 5. It describes the role of 
the civil service, the Prime Minister, and Secretaries of State in British government 
and the policy-making process, as well as the sources of policy. It goes on to discuss 
the contribution they and non-government bodies made to the sports policy-making 
process, and also the sources of sports policy. The contribution made by the devolved 
governments in the UK is also considered. Finally, the role of the Minister for Sport 
in the policy-making process for sport is set out in more detail. illustIated with 
examples of policy-making. 
When evidence is gathered and presented, it must be tested in some way. De Vaus 
(2001) is at pains to emphasise that an analysis, "must be guided by theory" (p. 221) 
and should not simply be an exercise in fact-gathering. The theory can either be 
developed as a result of a case study, or be used as a means of interpretation of a case 
study. In other words, it can be inductive or deductive. He goes on to explain: 
The difference between the theory testing and theory building approaches is 
that in the former we begin with a set of quite specific propositions and then 
see if these work in real life situations. In the theory building model we begin 
with only a question and perhaps a basic proposition, look at real cases and 
end up with a more specific theory or set of propositions as a result of 
examining actual cases (p. 223). 
Thus, in line with de Vaus's (2001) suggestions, relevant theoretical models, such as 
the Rhodes model of a policy community described by Marsh and Rhodes (1992), the 
advocacy coalition framework proposed by Sabatier (1988), and Kingdon's theory of 
multiple streams outlined by Zahariadis (1999), can be used as aids to policy analysis. 
In Chapter 6, some of these theories of the policy-making process are therefore used 
to help analyse the contribution made by Ministers for Sport to the policy-making 
process. A variety of such theoretical models is discussed in more detail in the next 
Chapter. 
2.10 Conclusion 
This study has mainly used a constructivistlinterpretivist paradigm, based on material 
provided from interviews with a range of participants involved in government and the 
policy-making process for sport. However, a minor contribution was made using the 
positivist techniques of content analysis and secondary data analysis to look at 
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Ministers' role in government and in the parliamentary process. Within the context of 
an interpretivist narrative, figures are used to illustrate particular activities, such as the 
amount of time spent by Ministers on sport and the number of junior Ministers who 
gained promotion. But as Ball (2006) observes, "Data does not speak for itself' (p. 4); 
it has to go through a creative process of interpretation. 
This combination of methods has helped to provide a more rounded picture of the 
Ministers' work, by using both insider accounts and outside observations. In looking 
at the wider picture in this way, a process more akin to "crystallization" than 
"triangulation", as suggested by Janesick (2000), has been utilised. The techniques 
used in this research design should, as Burnham et al (2004) suggest, "provide 
complementary data which can strengthen the findings" (p. 31), without 
compromising the epistemological assumptions of an interpretivist methodology. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Approaches: Policy Frameworks and 
Models 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter set out the methodological approach to be used in this study, based 
on a constructivist/interpretivist paradigm. This Chapter looks at a range of theories of 
the policy-making process, some of which may be helpful in analysing sports policy. But 
firstly, however, it is necessary to seek to define policy and to consider how it is related 
to power. 
Richard Rose (1989) offers a fairly simple definition of public policy. He tells us that, 
when studying government, ''public policy concerns what government does rather than 
who governs" (p. 4). Similarly, Birkland (2005) proposes that policy is, "a statement by 
government of what it intends to do or not to do, such as a law, regulation, ruling, 
decision, or order or a combination of these" (p. 139). By contrast, Brian Smith (1978) 
defines policy in a more complex, twofold way. He sees it in general initially as 
aspiration or action, then goes on to define what ''public policy" actually is: 
Policy may be defined as a deliberate course of action or inaction taken by those 
in office under the influence of values and pressures on the way resources 
(expenditure and coercion) are to be used in pursuit of objectives or in pursuit of 
other policies. Public policy is the outcome of decisions about the political 
allocation of resources and is therefore characterised by the use of legal and 
coercive sanctions; by being of general concern; and by the application of 
political values to problem solving (p.15). 
It is notable that both Smith (1978) and BirkIand (2005) consider inaction, or doing 
nothing at all, to be a form of policy in itself. This is a concept considered by many 
writers, including Dorey (2005), Burch and Wood (1995), and Martin J. Smith (1999). 
Steven Lukes (2005), in his study of power, returns to this theme a number of times. He, 
and others, draw heavily on the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1963) to show how issues 
can be kept off the policy agenda. Bachrach and Baratz (1963) suggest that non-decision-
making is: 
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A means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and 
privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or 
kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making 
agenda; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-
implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: p.44). 
For Lukes (2005), it is the exercise of power which determines what issues get on to the 
political agenda and which do not. He looks at the nature of power and sets out three 
models, comprising of one, two, and three dimensions. It is in his three-dimensional 
model that he shows how an acceptance of the existing order can be sustained by 
considering the many ways that issues may be stifled or kept out of the political process. 
Ingrained practices and social forces, or the innate conservatism of government 
bureaucracy can act as agents of power and ensure that non-decisions become the 
accepted norm. Power is necessarily an unequal relationship, in which those with a 
monopoly over, or command of resources seek to dominate those with little access to the 
levers of influence. As he says, "I have defined the concept of power by saying that A 
exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests", although 
he goes on to note that, "the notion of 'interests' is an irreducibly evaluative notion" (p. 
37). By this he means that the outcome of a policy could actually benefit B, though B 
does not necessarily recognise this. 
Brian Smith (1978) was referring to power above when he spoke of, "legal and coercive 
sanctions" (p. 15) to implement policy, instead of keeping issues off the policy agenda. 
Power enables policy to be implemented in a positive sense. Without power, for example 
gained by winning elections, policy is only an aspiration and cannot be action or inaction 
in government. When a party wins office in an election it is then in a position to 
implement policies or to be positively inactive. Inaction in government is very different 
from inaction in opposition, where the party out of office has neither positive nor 
negative power. According to Martin J. Smith (1999), those who possess the most 
resources in government may not be the most powerful; this depends on how these 
resources are used: 
Although some actors have more resources than others - the Prime Minister has 
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more than a single minister - those with the most resources do not necessarily 
have the most power. Resources do not equal power: capabilities in deploying 
resources and the strategic settings are critical to understanding· who influences 
outcomes (p. 31). 
Thus, a political party in office can start to deploy its resources by engaging in a 
programme of policy implementation, or a ''policy process". Many writers have tried to 
understand this by establishing a theoretical basis for the study of policy-making, rather 
than simply describing political events and outcomes. For instance, Burch and Wood 
(1995) dismiss the, "straightforward, factual description of British politics", in favour of 
what they call the, "policy approach" (p. 3). They suggest that: 
There is a deeper, more compelling reason for openly adopting a theoretical 
approach: quite simply there is no choice. We cannot make sense of the political 
universe around us without some prior notion of the scope of that universe and the 
nature of the elements within it (p. 4). 
For Burch and Wood (1995), the ''policy approach" is, "concerned with examining what 
government does (or chooses not to do, or neglects to do) why and with what 
consequences for the citizen" (p. 12). In common with Lukes (2005), they recognise that 
the policy process could result in having a policy of doing very little or nothing at all, and 
that the recipients of such a policy may not recognise its benefits to them or others. 
Many policy-process theories have emerged from a positivist epistemological standpoint. 
However, as Fischer (2003) has observed, "all research is fundamentally interpretive" (p. 
160). He casts doubt on the stand taken by theoreticians who profess to be working in the 
positivist tradition. They may see themselves as neo-positivists, but he still considers 
them to be using an unacknowledged interpretivist paradigm. It is to these theories that 
we now turn, beginning with one of the more traditional models, that of the "policy 
cycle" or, as Sabatier (1999) describes it, the "stages heuristic" (p. 6). 
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3.2 Policy Cycle or Stages Models 
Burch and Wood (1995) view policy-making and decision-taking as part of a "policy 
process", that operates in a "policy cycle", in which they identify three main phases of 
initiation, formulation, and implementation. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the policy process. Their model has nine stages from, 
"deciding to decide" (issue search), issue definition, objective setting, through to 
implementation, evaluation, and beyond. They carry through the analysis to policy 
termination, although as Hogwood (1992) elsewhere notes, "Policy termination in its 
ideal-type form rarely occurs in practice" (p. 19). Hogwood and Gunn (1984) emphasise 
this point more fully by suggesting that, "One thing which does emerge from the 
termination literature is that complete terminations of programmes are rare; i.e. some 
replacement is normally provided" (p. 241). 
Jordan and Richardson (1987) review the Hogwood and Gunn (1984) model favourably, 
and see it as one of the most sophisticated to emerge at the time when they were writing. 
They note that, although the model has nine stages, "The list is not definitive and can be 
adjusted, and that it is not a description of what happens to every issue, hut it is a 
framework for organising what does happen - or does not" (p. 9). 
It was noted by De Leon (1999) that the "stages heuristic" was the conventional wisdom 
up until the 1980s. He himself was one of its main proponents in a previous book 
(Brewer and De Leon, 1983), published in the USA, where much of the early work was 
carried out. Indeed, he acknowledges a debt to Harold Laswell (1951), who set out the 
early foundations of a policy science, and to Brewer (1974) who continued his work on 
policy cycles. 
De Leon (1999) shows how the main challenge to the stages model came from Sabatier 
(1988, 1991), who set out early versions of his advocacy coalition framework. Sabatier 
(1991) described the stages model as having, "outlived its usefulness" (p. 147), because it 
was not a predictive model of policy change and it tended to ignore the role of ideas. It is 
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also criticised by John (1998) because it presents policy-making as a linear, simplistic 
process. According to John (1998) it, "is more relevant for elucidating the presentation of 
policy then in detecting the reality of bargaining" (p. 27). In his view, the complex 
process of negotiation between actors, who may be ever-changing within a policy 
network or community, is not captured in the stages model. 
As a long-term advocate, De Leon (1999) vigorously defends the stages approach. He 
suggests that Sabatier's criticisms are misplaced, since the approach never was, "a 
theoretic model as ascribed by Sabatier" (p.24). It was not intended to be a predictive 
model, capable of hypothesis testing but instead was, "a device (a heuristic, as it were) to 
help dissaggregate an otherwise seamless web of public policy transactions" (p. 24) into a 
more simplified series of stages to help better understand them. Indeed he suggests that 
Sabatier has isolated a particular stage in the policy process, that of policy initiation, "to 
explain how new (or seriously revised) programs are brought into being, sometimes over 
at least a decade" (p. 25), by means of an "advocacy coalition". In other words, Sabatier 
is looking at a fairly narrow part of the entire policy process, which he then analyses by 
means of the advocacy coalition framework model. 
3.3 Policy Communities and Networks 
Some writers have used the concepts of "policy communities" and policy networks" to 
show how partiCUlar issues in the policy cycle are dealt with and how policy is made in 
relation to them. One of the most elaborate conceptualisations is that of Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992), who deVeloped the "Rhodes model" over a number of years. In this 
model they postulate that, "There are five types of networks ranging along a continuum 
from highly integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue networks" (p. 13). 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) emphasise that, "The term "policy network" is used as the 
generic term encompassing all types" (p. 249). At the policy community end of the 
spectrum, there is a limited number of participants with shared aims, high integration, and 
a dominance of professional or economic interests. An issue network is much looser, with 
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a large and fluctuating membership, less agreement over aims, and fewer focussed aims 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). However, as Fischer (2003) notes, ''not everyone agrees on 
the distinction" (p. 32). 
The types of networks or communities that develop in particular policy areas shape the 
outcomes of policy. For instance, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) discuss how the relatively 
tight agricultural policy community, led by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Foods in conjunction with the National Farmers' Union, has been successful in having its 
policies adopted by government, whereas communities or networks in other policy areas 
exhibit less success. Marsh (1998) takes this work forward and uses cross-national 
comparisons and case studies to show how communities operate in different contexts and 
cultures. He also offers a more precise definition of the terms used: 
Policy communities are tight networks with few participants who share basic 
values and exchange resources. They exhibit considerable continuity in 
membership, values and outcomes. In contrast, issue networks are loose networks 
with a large number of members with fluctuating access and significant dispute 
over values. There is little continuity in membership, values or outcomes (Marsh, 
1998: p. 14). 
However, some writers have criticised the Rhodes model for failing to account for how 
policy communities relate to the state, because different sectors of policy have their own 
ways of regulating themselves. Furthermore, it may not be applicable in countries other 
than the UK and the USA, where the model has been mainly developed, because of 
different state traditions. John (1998) illustrates these and other shortcomings, but as he 
points out, "It is possible that the critics expect too much from the policy network 
approach" (p. 89). Rather like the policy cycle/stages model, ''the policy network 
approach can never be a theory of public policy" (p. 89). It cannot explain policy 
fonnation or change, but can only help illustrate the context in which these occur. Others 
commend the model for its use of ideas in cementing the interests of a community, as 
well as shared aims and values. As Fischer (2003) notes, "It assumes that what keeps 
networks functioning are common ideas about solutions to public problems." (p. 32). 
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3.4 Institutional Rational Choice 
The institutional rational choice model stresses the role of institutions, such as 
government departments, agencies, or quangos in shaping policy. The general framework 
was set out by Kiser and Ostrom (1982). Influenced by the basic philosophy of classical 
political economy, actors in any situation are thought to weigh the costs and benefits of 
their actions, together with the likely outcomes. This assumes that participants have full 
knowledge upon which to base their decisions. To have a real choice, as Ostrom (1999) 
suggests, it is essential for actors to have, "complete and well-ordered preferences and 
complete information, and that they maximise the net value of expected returns to 
themselves" (pp. 44-45), although she recognises that this is seldom the case in real-life 
situations. 
Ostrom's theoretical structure follows directly from the work of Herbert Simon (1957) 
and others. Writing initially in the 1940s and 1950s, Simon set out a "rational model" of 
policy-making. This assumed that a decision-maker would gather together all the facts 
about a problem with a completely open mind and identify a range of possible solutions. 
He would then take an objective, rational decision that would translate into the best 
outcome from the alternatives available. Simon (1957) was convinced that too many 
important decisions were based only on guesswork: 
The fact of the matter is that momentous decisions are made every day as to the 
allocation of resources to one or another competing purpose, and that, particularly 
in noncommercial organizations, the decisions are made in an almost complete 
absence of the evidence which would be necessary to validate them (pp. 189-90). 
Simon (1957) uses the term "bounded rationality" to describe what human beings do in 
relation to decisions. The quality of a decision, "will depend on the environment that 
bounds the area of rationality of the person making the decision" (pp. 243-4). Therefore, 
people are not completely free to take the best possible decisions. They are instead often 
hemmed in by realities, such as political or organisational constraints. 
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Ostrom (1999) uses ideas about organisational structures such as these to illustrate how 
the theory can be applied to institutions as well as individuals. She emphasises the use of 
"rules" in defining and analysing action situations, and identifies seven types. These are: 
entry and exit rules, position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, 
information rules, and payoff rules, the effects of which will vary in different situations, 
according to how the trained expert applies them. As she observes, "The same set of rules 
may yield entirely different types of action situations depending upon the types of events 
in the world being acted upon by participants" (p. 54). She goes on to specify three levels 
of rules: operational, collective-choice, and constitutional choice, thereby adding further 
complexity to the structure. 
Fischer (2003) sees rational choice theory as being in the mainstream of the positivist 
tradition. Whilst recognising that interpretivist paradigms are increasingly used in social 
science, he makes the observation, "rational choice is very much on the ascendancy" (p. 
119), using tools borrowed from economics. As a committed interpretivist, he notes 
regretfully that rational choice, "now constitutes one of the leading theoretical 
orientations in political science and sociology" (p. 119). Rational choice theory is viewed 
more favourably, but not uncritically, by John (1998). He believes that, "rational choice 
is good at explaining what actors do once the objectives of a policy are set, but is often 
silent on why decision-makers select a particular course of action" (p. 142), because of its 
focus on institutions rather than people. 
3.5 Multiple Streams 
Kingdon (1995) originally developed the theory of multiple streams, building on the 
work of others, including Simon (1957) on bounded rationality. His approach utilises a 
so-called "garbage can" concept, in which ambiguity is everywhere, participants vary in 
the decision-making process, and the processes of technology in organisations are 
constantly developing. The model assumes three streams, consisting of problems, 
policies, and politics, each with its own operational parameters. As Zahariadis (1999) 
describes it: 
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At critical points in time, the streams are coupled by policy entrepreneurs. The 
combination of all three streams into a single package enhances dramatically the 
chances that an issue will receive serious attention by policymakers (p. 76). 
The policy windows that occurs when all three streams come together may be very 
narrow, but these are the moments when major shifts in policy can take place, such as in 
times of national crisis, or when a new government comes to power. For example, a new 
government in Britain gave independence to the Bank of England in 1997, but did not 
join the Euro then or later. The opportunity to do the latter disappeared, possibly for 
many years until another conjunction of policy streams occurs in a favourable 
combination, or possibly forever. Policy windows open for only a short time. In 
Kingdon's (1995) view, "An idea's time comes, but it also passes. There is no irresistible 
momentum that builds for a given initiative" (p. 169). 
The model is seen by Zahariadis (1999), "as particularly useful because it integrates 
policy communities with broader events" (p. 78), unlike other models which tend to 
ignore the real world. It can also cope with, "agenda setting and policy choice in several 
national settings" (p. 81). Another important concept is that of the "policy entrepreneur", 
someone who is skilled at seizing opportunities for personal gain, and who may invest a 
great deal of time and effort in preparation for a key moment to profit. The idea of a 
"policy entrepreneur" has also been used in other disciplines. For example, Ball (2006) 
uses it in educational studies, where, "The policy entrepreneur is committed to the 
application of certain techniques and solutions to organisations" (p. 61). 
While generally praising the model, Zahariadis (1999) also finds fault with it on several 
grounds. For example, he does not think it is a good predictor of policy change, because 
much policy-making is incremental and does not depend on a combination of steams or 
opening of windows. There are actually only a few situations when sudden policy change 
occurs, during the confluence of the three streams. He suggests, "MS strives for 
understanding and explanation more than prediction" (p. 86), and is thus more clearly in 
the interpretive paradigm. It is more of a descriptive device than a means of falsifying a 
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hypothesis in the sense of the term used by Popper (2002). So far, the theory of multiple 
streams has been mainly used in qualitative studies, but Zahariadis (1999) believes that 
its use in quantitative studies would add more weight to its value for predictability. 
John (1998) also commends the model for its contribution to an understanding of the 
agenda-setting process and for celebrating, "the importance of ideas in public policy" (p. 
174). However, "it concentrates too much on agendas and not enough on how ideas feed 
into the implementation process and back again" (p. 176). While it focuses mainly on the 
US policy-making process, he feels it could be transferred to a European setting, since 
Western societies are becoming more alike in some government programmes, as they are 
in many other aspects of social and economic globalisation. 
3.6 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
The punctuated equilibrium theory has its origins in the work of Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993), who combined political institutions with Simon's (1957) concept of "bounded 
rationality". The theory looks at how issues are defined and how they get on to the policy 
agenda. Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993,2005) postulate that there are long periods 
of stable or incremental policy-making, punctuated by policy leaps in response to 
emerging issues. Each leap is followed by another period of relative calm, in which 
policy-making returns to its evolutionary trend. As True et al (1999) note: 
Punctuated equilibrium theory seeks to explain a simple observation: Political 
processes are often driven by a logic of stability and incrementalism, but 
occasionally they also produce large-scale departures from the past (p. 97). 
Policy change happens within policy communities, networks, or "iron triangles", the last-
named of which is applied to the United States. An "iron triangle" is defined by John 
(1998) as consisting of, "relationships between congressional committees, executive 
agencies and producer groups" (p. 79) in the USA. There may also be other sub-systems 
in which policy is made, but as True et al (1999) comment, "Whatever the name one 
gives to these communities of specialists operating out of the political spotlight, most 
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issues most of the time are treated within such a community of experts" (p. 99). 
There are obvious similarities between the punctuated equilibrium and the multiple 
streams theories. In simple terms, they both suggest that policy-making generally carries 
on in a steady, incremental way until an external shock occurs. A major change then 
takes place, followed by another period of relative tranquility until the next destabalising 
event, and so on. 
The theory thus offers a conservative view of policy-making, which occurs within 
rationally bounded parameters. John (1998) criticises it for being mainly descriptive, for 
viewing policy change as emerging from the bottom up instead of top down, and for 
neglecting implementation processes. He also believes that too often it reaches outside 
the model to explain exceptions. Nevertheless, he sees it as, "an excellent and 
theoretically well informed model" (p. 182). 
3.7 Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The original concept of an advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was developed by 
Sabatier and others over some years from the mid-1980s, when searching for something 
to replace what he called the "stages heuristic" or policy cycle model. Although it was the 
dominant paradigm for many years, according to Sabatier (1991) the stages model had, 
"outlived its usefulness" (p. 147), and needed be superseded by better theories. 
In one of his earliest papers on the subject, Sabatier (1988) used the advocacy coalition 
framework to examine pollution control in American cities. In this conceptualisation, 
policy change could best be understood through, "policy subsystems, that is the 
interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area" (p. 131). These 
subsystems went beyond the "iron triangles" and networks, to include university 
researchers, journalists, and policy analysts. Journalists, "who play important roles in the 
generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas" (p. 131) were seen as 
particularly important. This is reiterated by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), when 
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setting out a more developed version of the theory. In an attempt to make the ACF more 
relevant outside of the USA, Sabatier (1998) has addressed how it can be applied in 
Europe, where countries tend to have parliamentary systems of government. 
A central part of the theory is the importance of "core beliefs" held by the mam 
participants in a coalition. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) feel that early versions of 
their theory were not clear enough about core beliefs. They now suggest that, "the 
principal glue holding a coalition together is agreement over policy core beliefs" (p. 123). 
Core beliefs are very resistant to change, and therefore policy can remain fairly stable 
over a decade or more. It can take a shock from outside the subsystem to change policy, 
since the members of a coalition, and the core beliefs that they hold, tend to remain 
constant over a long period of time. 
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), coalitions come together to alter 
government policy, in order to, "achieve the policy objectives in their respective policy 
cores" (p. 142). Coalitions use a variety of techniques to do this, including influence on 
public opinion, manipulation of the communications media, changing the personnel on 
important committees, boycotts, demonstrations, exchange of information, and so on. 
Another key concept in making these things happen, is that of "policy brokers". These are 
individuals (similar to the "policy entrepreneurs" in the mUltiple streams model) who can 
broker compromises within or between coalitions. 
Fischer (2003) sees the advocacy coalition model as being based firmly on policy 
network foundations. It is also one that purports to be empirical and predictive, by 
claiming to explain policy change. He asserts that it does not actually do this, but instead, 
"it seems better at explaining policy stability" (p. 99). Furthermore, while its authors see 
it as empirical it is, "infused with interpretations" (p. 100). He goes on to observe, "What 
they fail to concede is that their own work remains as much in the realm of interpretation 
as in that of empirical proof' (p. 100). 
The model is also viewed by John (1998) as very much a derivative of network theories. 
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John accuses Sabatier of trying to present a simple concept in a very complex manner, 
whereas, "it boils down to a simple formulation. Policy-making is stable until a large 
socio-economic event changes the coalitional pattern" (p. 172). This is little different in 
essence from older-established network theories, apart from having a wider range of 
potential participants in the coalitions. It is also similar to the multiple streams and 
punctuated equilibrium theories in looking for sudden events as catalysts of change. 
While neither Fischer (2003) nor John (1998) believe that the model actually explains 
policy change, they both see it as an important contribution in trying to move the debate 
forward. It remains an influential theoretical framework, although recent scholars, such as 
Young-Jung and Chul-Young (2008) have looked at how it can be developed to make it 
more effective. 
3.8 Core Executive Framework 
Budge et al (2004) postulate that the most important aspects of policy-making happen in 
the innermost circle around the Prime Minister, which they refer to as the "core 
executive". They describe it in this way: 
Frustrated by endless controversy about whether we have Prime Ministerial or 
Cabinet government, some political scientists have pointed out that both are 
embedded in a wider network of power relations that spread well beyond 
Downing Street and the Cabinet room. Increasingly during the twentieth century, 
and especially under Thatcher and Blair, the power of the political executive has 
been strengthened and centralised, and far from including only the Prime Minister 
and the Cabinet, its tentacles use and control many other influential bodies, 
agencies, committees, and individuals in Whitehall and Westminster. This 
network of power and influence at the apex of government has been termed the 
"Core Executive." (p. 132) 
As well as the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the core executive includes Cabinet 
committees, the most senior Whitehall civil servants, favoured policy advisers, and a few 
other influential people who are often little-known outside of the elite circle. It is a fluid, 
ever-changing network, with constant renewal of personnel and is therefore not easily 
defined as an institution. Nor can its numbers be stated with precision. 
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The literature on the core executive is now quite extensive, with Rhodes and Dunleavy 
(1990, 1995) amongst the earliest to establish a theoretical base as to how issues get on to 
its political agenda. Smith and Marsh (1995) suggest that, within the core executive most 
policy originates in government departments. They assert that, "departments are the key 
policy makers for the majority of policies within British central government" (p. 41). In 
particular, they identify the Treasury as the most significant department, since securing 
finance is the key to effective policy-making, a view shared by Burch and Holliday 
(1996). Smith (1999) builds on this and attributes the dominance of the core executive to 
the growth in state activity over the past hundred years, particularly from the Second 
World War. This growth was only possible because of increasing affluence, higher 
taxation, and thus greater power for the Treasury to control the resources of government. 
Dorey (2005) looks at the key individuals who comprise the core executive. He suggests 
that a tiny elite of Whitehall civil servants are especially influential since, "It is these 
senior civil servants who have long played a major role in the formulation and 
administration of public policy" (pp. 71-2). Hennessy (1990) analyses the role of the civil 
service in great detail and emphasises the hugely important role that civil servants play in 
policy-making. This is a view echoed by John (1998), who looks at how many policy 
ideas originate in Whitehall and how the most senior civil servants have a major impact 
on the policy-making process. In his view, the core executive framework, "is a valid 
attempt to shift the focus of research away from the analysis of the formal working of 
institutions." Instead, it shifts it towards the, "complex processes and alliances within the 
central state" (p. 47), from which government policy emerges. Conversely, Budge et al 
(2004) identify the changing alliances as a weakness in the framework, because the 
composition ofthe core executive may differ on key issues. 
Some of these concepts were examined in Chapter 1 (1.6)j when the role of the Cabinet in 
relation to the Prime Minister was discussed. Although the Prime Minister has control 
over significant resources, Heffeman (2003) asserts that to effectively exercise power, the 
Prime Minister must share these resources with others, especially senior Ministers. He or 
she must recognise that this requires a constant process of bargaining. According to 
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Smith (1994), Mrs Thatcher over-reached herself in 1990 by failing to recognise that she 
was dependent on Cabinet colleagues to govern effectively, and by trying to dominate 
them in a "presidential" style. As Heffeman (2005) observes, Britain does not have a 
presidential system so Mrs Thatcher (or any other British Prime Minister) must retain the 
confidence and trust of key people to stay as head of government in a parliamentary 
democracy. Like Mrs Thatcher, Tony Blair also had a long premiership in which to amass 
resources. In the view of Burch and Holliday (2004) this allowed him to reinforce central 
control without becoming "presidential". He kept in line with British traditions and 
practice of observing the proprieties of Cabinet government, while cleverly working 
around it when it was convenient to him. 
3.9 Interpretivist Theories of the Policy Process 
Fischer (2003) argues that the dominance of the empiricist or neo-positivist paradigm has 
neglected the social meanings of human interaction. Topics of investigation have become 
ever narrower and the use of quantitative techniques ever more common. He suggests that 
a different approach should be tried: 
The constructionist view is not just a new idea about how to reconstruct our 
research methodologies; it provides in fact a better picture - even empirical 
description - of what social scientists already do. By stripping away the outdated 
pretences of empiricism, it makes it easier to deal with social scientific practices 
in a way that is both more cogent and more relevant (p. viii). 
The post-war dominance of Lasswell (1951), Simon (1957), Lindblom (1980), and others 
concerned with "rational" decision-making, is something that Fischer (2003) feels has led 
to an arid way of trying to explain human behaviour. The measurement of costs and 
benefits, following the techniques of economists, are not always appropriate. He feels 
that an analyst should look for the social meaning of events and try to understand the 
significance of particular actions. As he puts it, "interpretive policy analysts seek to 
determine not only 'what' a particular policy means, but 'how' it means" (p. 142). 
However, social interaction with participants is essential, rather than studying an area 
though documentary evidence alone. He sees interpretation as being at the heart of all 
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analysis and comments, "The question then is not whether or not there is interpretation, 
but rather how much interpretation is involved in a particular analysis" (p.160). 
Another scholar working in the field of interpretative policy analysis is Yanow (2000). 
She outlines her way of thinking thus: 
It is not possible for an analyst to stand outside the policy issue being studied, free 
of its values and meanings and of the analyst's own values, beliefs, and feelings. 
The argument assumes that knowledge is acquired through interpretation, which 
necessarily is "subjective". (P6). 
Yanow (2000) states that, " 'interpretation' does not mean 'impressionistic' (p. 93), since 
she asserts that interpretive scholars use systematic and rigorous methods. But it does 
mean that there is no such thing as objective knowledge: all knowledge is socially 
constructed in her view, and cannot be value-free. Nevertheless, Yanow (2000) struggles 
to present a convincing, theoretical method of policy analysis. Her work tends to 
concentrate on data collection (interviews, observations, documents, etc.), which are 
really no different from the empirical methods that she criticises. 
Likewise, Fischer (2003) fails to offer a new theoretical method of interpretive policy 
analysis, contenting himself with the assertion that all theories are essentially interpretive. 
However, he does suggest that storytelling and narrative analysis may be promising 
challenges to empirically-based theories, something that Yanow (2000) also discusses 
and favours. 
3.10 Policy Models for Sport 
The policy-making models that have been set out above are by no means an exhaustive 
list. Others noted by Sabatier (1999) include "arenas of power", "cultural theory", and 
"policy domain framework". What they all have in common is that none of them has been 
devised with sport issues in mind, but have instead been used to examine policy-making 
in fields such as the environment, transport, or education. However, some of them may be 
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adapted to help provide insights into the policy-making process for sport, as might 
observations derived from those looking at the use of power. 
For example, sport has never been high on any government's policy agenda, compared 
with national issues such as defence, education, or welfare. As discussed earlier (3.1), 
power may have been exercised in the way that Lukes (2005) and Dorey (2005) have 
suggested, to keep sport off the agenda and thus avoiding spending much money on it. 
Where sport has made it on to the national policy agenda, for instance with an Olympic 
or World Cup bid, the government has become involved at the highest level of Cabinet 
and Prime Minister. Sport may therefore have suffered by being sidelined as a low 
priority of government, which has the power to set the policy agenda. This illustrates how 
the power to make no decision at all can be utilised effectively by government in relation 
to sport, whereas it cannot ignore foreign policy, agriculture, health, education, welfare, 
and so on, in the same way. 
Few scholars have attempted to look at sport policy-making from a theoretical 
perspective, with Houlihan (1991, 1997, 2005), Bramham (2001), and Green and 
Houlihan (2004), being amongst the rare exceptions. For example, Houlihan (1991) 
applies the Hogwood and Gunn (1984) model of a policy cycle to sport. The nine stages 
of their model are set out, with some specific examples drawn from sport to illustrate how 
the model could be used in this context. For instance, football spectator violence could 
cut across policy community areas and be either a sport or a law and order issue. He 
agrees with Jordan and Richardson (1987) that, ''Not all issues will exhibit all nine 
stages". However, as an analytical tool, Houlihan (1991) suggests, "The framework can 
be used, therefore, within a broader pluralist analysis of society and sits comfortably 
alongside an incrementalist description of the policy process" (p. 159). 
Following this, Houlihan (1991) then applies the concepts of policy communities and 
policy networks to see if these exist for the sport area. The main actors in the sports 
policy community could be local authorities, the governing bodies of sport, voluntary 
organisations, political parties, international organisations, the Minister for Sport, and so 
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on. He then observes, "the range of actual and potential actors with an interest in the 
policy area is obviously enormous" (p. 161). Taking the Minister for Sport, civil servants, 
and the Sports Council as central actors, he shows how there could be a sports policy 
community. An updated model might show the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
the National Lottery, UK Sport, Sport England, and others at the heart of such a 
community. 
Houlihan (1991) also uses a series of case studies on football hooliganism, drug abuse by 
athletes, and school sport to illustrate how these issues get on to the policy agenda and 
move through a policy cycle. He discusses whether or not networks or communities exist 
in these areas. While there may be networks for some individual issue he argues, "In the 
policy area of sport a mature community does not yet exist. Nevertheless some of the 
characteristics of a policy community are evident" (p. 258). He lists some of the 
characteristics, such as a stable membership, involving Ministers, civil servants, and 
voluntary bodies, which show that a community is emerging. On the other hand there are 
missing elements which include, ''weak value consensus" and lack of professional 
guidance, "to help give policy development a clear direction" (p. 258). Networks were 
therefore found for some issues, but not a fully-fledged sports policy community. Despite 
this, "However, it seems that it is possible to have effective networks in the absence of a 
mature policy community "(p. 260). 
While in another work, Houlihan (1997) discusses the policy process for sport, using 
cross-national comparisons with Australia, Ireland, Canada, and the UK, very few other 
writers have taken this issue seriously. Bramham (2001) makes some attempt, but merely 
restates the Hogwood and Gunn (1984) model without giving any examples in relation to 
sport. He then looks at the ideologies of conservatism, liberalism, and New Labour 
without really showing how these affect sport. Bramham (2001) makes the observation 
that: 
New Right ideologies argued that government subsidy in sport was 
inappropriate. Individuals should be free to meet their sporting wants 
through the commercial or voluntary sectors rather than having their 
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sporting needs defmed by distant quangos or central or local government 
(p. 16). 
It was shown already (Chapter 1~ paragraph 1.4) that this view is at variance with that of 
Haywood et al (1995) and Henry (1993), who suggest that post-war British governments 
have not lessened their contribution to sport, and involvement in it, whatever their 
ideological positions. Indeed, there has been a steady encroachment by government into 
almost every aspect of sport in the post-war period, without it being allowed to become 
the focal point of a true sports policy community. 
Houlihan (2005) has now attempted to move the debate forward from the "stages 
heuristic" or policy cycle models by examining the usefulness of other theories to the 
sports policy process. The stages model is compared with institutional analysis (rational 
choice), multiple streams, and the advocacy coalition framework, all of which have been 
described above. He concludes that a modified version of the advocacy coalition, 
"provides a· framework that enables the researcher to acknowledge, and also 
systematically investigate, the complexity and 'messiness' of contemporary sports policy 
making" (p. 182). The advocacy coalition framework recognises the importance of the 
belief systems of policy-makers, has a long-term view (ten years or more), and has been 
widely tested in other policy areas. It also acknowledges the role of the "policy broker", 
which may be a factor in current UK sports policy. 
Green and Houlihan (2004) have tested the advocacy coalition framework in elite sports 
policy change in Canada and Britain and found evidence in the UK of an elite sport 
advocacy coalition, though not one for mass-participation sport. Such coalitions are 
effective, but are constrained by government objectives in terms of what they can 
achieve. As for the effectiveness of the advocacy coalition framework, it "offers a 
sophisticated and powerful tool for an exploration of sport policy change" (p. 481). 
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3.11 Choice of Models 
Despite being the main architect of the advocacy coalition framework,· Sabatier (1999) 
advises that researchers should use a variety of theories in looking at a problem, not just 
one with which he or she is familiar. He stresses the valuable contribution of other 
theories, such as rational choice, to his own work and observes that the use of more than 
one theory, "provides some guarantee against assuming that a particular theory is the 
valid one" (p. 270). No theory can ever claim to be the final word or the "best" at offering 
explanations of behaviour, nor should it be dismissed because it is currently out of 
fashion. John (1998) echoes this advice, when he proposes a framework that combines 
the ACF with policy streams and punctuated equilibrium. This is later taken further by 
John (2003), when he suggests that such a framework could be based on evolutionary 
theory. Burton (2006) also reviews a number of the models discussed here and assesses 
how they can be adapted and used to produce better policies. 
In different situations, different approaches may be appropriate, including the use of the 
stages model. It was discussed earlier (see 3.2) that some scholars, such as De Leon 
(1999), believe the stages model is by no means dead and is one of its strongest 
advocates. Indeed, in the Hogwood and Gunn (1984) stages model, agenda-setting and 
issue search are still worthwhile ways of looking at the first steps in the policy-making 
process. They ask the question, "How and why do some issues get on to the policy 
agenda for discussion and perhaps action, while others do not or, if they do, receive only 
cursory or belated attention?" (p. 67). They then proceed to try to answer the question by 
suggesting six ways in which issues are likely to make it on to a policy agenda. These 
are: when issues have reached crisis proportions; when they have achieved particularity 
(Le. large public awareness); there is an emotive or human interest angle; they are likely 
to have a wide impact; they raise questions of power and legitimacy; or they are 
somehow fashionable (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). It is possible to give examples of how 
issues in sport can fit into these categories and how the above theories can help to 
illuminate them, some of which are discussed below. 
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For example, Hogwood (1987) has looked at how crises can shape the public policy 
agenda, compelling the government to act on an issue that was not previously seen as 
important to it. When the immediate crisis is over, the government may well lose interest 
in the subject until the next crisis arrives. Hogwood (1987) suggests that football 
hooliganism is a classic case of government in the 1980s being forced to act in a crisis: 
Timing and recurrability of crises are important. The Bradford fire disaster in 
1986, coinciding with incidents of football hooliganism in Britain and by British 
fans at the Heysel stadium disaster in Belgium led to an upsurge in political 
interest, including the involvement of the prime minister (p. 37). 
Such an issue could also be fitted in to the multiple streams theory. A window of 
opportunity arose when the three streams of policy, problems, and politics came together, 
and public opinion was demanding action. The government had to act swiftly to deal with 
problems in football in a unique conjunction of circumstances that have not recurred. 
The National Lottery was set up in 1994 after much consideration, with the Sports 
Council appointed as one of the agents to distribute the proceeds. Its advocates had 
achieved particularity, or wide public awareness, by constant lobbying and campaigning. 
According to Pickup (1996), proposals had been around for many years in the sporting 
world as a means of generating more money for grass-roots sport. The football pools had 
tended to benefit only professional football clubs, which were already relatively rich. It 
had been resisted by Mrs Thatcher who, "regarded a Lottery as no more than an 
iniquitous device whereby the undeserving got something for nothing" (p. 66). 
In the years leading up to the establishment of the Lottery, many influential people from 
the charitable, sports, arts, music, and other creative industries had steadily built up a case 
for it. By 1992, the Chairman of the Arts Council (Lord Palumbo) and the Chairman of 
the Sports Council (Peter Yarranton) were vigorous advocates, as was David Menor, the 
newly-appointed Secretary of State for National Heritage. They convinced John Major, 
himself a keen sports fan, of its desirability. Thus, this could be viewed as a success for 
an advocacy coalition, spanning many disciplines, using the methods of publicity, ideas, 
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lobbying, with the type of core beliefs as described by Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1999), 
and with a timescale of a decade or more that they see as optimal. 
A human interest angle is often cultivated by the tabloid press. The Zola Budd affair of 
the 1984 Olympics shows how a publication like The Daily Mail can place an issue on a 
public policy agenda, despite limited involvement of the sports community. The 
seventeen-year-old South African was quickly granted a British passport, and allowed to 
run for the UK, following the intervention of The Daily Mail, which used her story to 
promote sales. The anti-apartheid movement protested vehemently at what they saw as 
means of avoiding the sporting boycott of South Africa. But as Guelke (1986) observes, 
"It was recognised that even if she wore a British vest in the Olympics, the controversy 
had ensured that the whole world would identify her as a South African runner" (p. 140), 
who represented an ostracised regime. Something that began as a human interest story for 
the British press, quickly became embroiled in international politics. 
It is difficult to see how any of the theories set out above can really account for the 
workings of the British tabloid press. The one that comes closest is the advocacy 
coalition theory, which places some emphasis on the ability of journalists to influence 
events. However, Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1999) apparently had in mind the 
dissemination of serious policy ideas by concerned and informed reporters, rather than 
editors picking and choosing random events to sell copies of tabloid newspapers. 
The use of drugs in sport is believed to have a wide impact on performance, without the 
true extent yet being known. According to Houlihan (2003), "Doping in sport is a 
problem that just will not go away" (p. 218). He continues: 
Soon after the end of the war, evidence began to accumulate of the increasingly 
widespread use of synthetic drugs in sport. Dramatic evidence appeared during 
the 1960s, when a series of high-profile fatalities occurred, including that of a 
Danish cyclist at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games who had taken amphetamines 
(p.224). 
Since then, there have been many instances of drugs being implicated in fatalities, such as 
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that of Tom Simpson in the 1967 Tour de France (Fotheringham, 2003). There is believed 
to have been widespread and systematic drug-taking by East German athletes for many 
years, while some athletes who have been caught, including Ben 10hnson at the 1988 
Olympics, may only be the tip of the iceberg (Pound, 2004). 
Network theory could be used to help explain the pervasiveness of drugs in sport. For 
example, there might be a loose network, in terms of the Marsh and Rhodes (1992) 
definition, of coaches, scientists, athletes, suppliers and others, in whose interests drug-
taking persists. On the other hand, there may be a parallel network of administrators, 
testers, scientists, and athletes opposed to drugs in sport. Indeed, there could even be a 
covert advocacy coalition, working to make drug-taking acceptable in sport, or at least so 
widespread as to be ineradicable. 
In 1988, the decision of Colin Moynihan to reduce the size of the Sports Council from 32 
to 14 members raised questions about the power and legitimacy of government to control 
the sports community. The Sports Council had been granted independence though its 
Royal Charter in 1972, placing it nominally outside the control of government and 
therefore responsible for its own organisational structure. It may be argued that the 
government had no power to interfere in this way with an independent body; that it was 
legitimate only for the government to provide it with funds, which the Council would 
then spend on worthy projects as it saw fit and decide on the size and structure of its own 
membership. 
The then newly-appointed head of the Sports Council, David Pickup, was not opposed to 
the reduction. Pickup (1996) even called it a "sensible decision" (p. 8), since the Council 
was unwieldy in its present form. It is possible to view Moynihan's decision in terms of 
the Kiser and Ostrom (1982) model of institutional rational choice. Moynihan had 
attended previous meetings of the Sports Council and observed how the institution did 
not function well as a large forum. Following a rigorous evaluation of the options 
(restructuring, reduction, abolition, and so on), he decided that the most rational course of 
action was a reduction in the numbers to a more manageable figure. 
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Finally, it has beenfashionable at different times over the post-war years to bemoan the 
lack of international success amongst British sports competitors. Before the second world 
war, British sportsmen could win a large number of medals at the Olympics, while the 
English football team were undefeated at Wembley. Holt (1989) illustrates how this has 
changed in the modem age: 
The growing importance of the media, especially radio and television, highlighted 
the relatively poor performance of British sportsmen and women at an 
international level. Britain won one gold medal at the 1952 Olympics and that was 
in an equestrian event (p. 345). 
Interpretative theory could provide some insight into why these perceptions have come 
about. It could, for instance, suggest that observers are looking at things from the wrong 
angle by concentrating on a few relatively unsuccessful sports, such as football or tennis. 
Since the dawn of organised sport in the nineteenth century, Britain has actually been 
successful over a far wider range of disciplines than all but a handful of countries in the 
world. Some countries have great success in a few small areas, such as Kenya with 
runners or Austria with skiers. By contrast, there are very few events in which Britain has 
never been a considerable achiever at some time in the last hundred years, ranging from 
winter sports to golf, rowing, equestrianism, or sailing, though no single one has ever 
dominated the British sporting landscape. 
3.12 Conclusion 
The issues addressed above, amongst others, have found their way on to the policy 
agenda for sport. Rational choice theory is useful in looking at how sporting issues have 
made it on to the policy agenda. For example, national institutions and governing bodies 
now accept that there will be two main stadiums in London, of which one will be for the 
2012 Olympics (and perhaps a World Athletics Championships) and the other the rebuilt 
Wembley for football. It may not be "rational" to end up with this outcome, when 
modem engineering and architecture could have combined to design a single stadium 
capable of coping with a range of sporting events (as in Paris). Indeed, it is planned to 
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modify Hampden Park in Glasgow to include a temporary running track for the proposed 
2014 Commonwealth Games and remove it afterwards. lO However, the politicians and 
sports governing bodies have not been able to compromise on this issue for London and 
the result has been disjointed policy-making. 
Arguably, this example of confused policy-making also reveals the absence of a mature 
policy community, or an advocacy coalition, capable of making "rational" decisions 
about large-scale investment in sport. In this case, network theory or the advocacy 
coalition theory could be used as a means of analysis. A tight-knit policy community 
would surely have made an objective assessment of the policy options and chosen a one-
stadium "rational" solution. This suggests that instead there is a loose "issue network" 
operating in sport, in which the major actors did not closely co-operate. This fits well 
with the "Rhodes model" (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
On the other hand, there may have a relatively closed policy community in football, or a 
strong advocacy coalition, which was determined to get its own stadium, to the exclusion 
of all other sports. No matter how high the cost, the football authorities wanted exclusive 
control over Wembley, even if this proves to be economically crippling to the football 
governing bodies in the long-term. This example of a football policy community also 
appears to conform to the "Rhodes model". 
To take another example from football, the rebuilding of Wembley was initially driven by 
the chairman of Chelsea FC, Ken Bates. He could be viewed as a "policy entrepreneur" 
who took risks and bargained, negotiated between competing factions, and essentially 
pursued a personal agenda. In this sense, he could be fitted into the multiple streams 
model, or described as a "policy broker" in the advocacy coalition framework. Another 
such figure may be Bernie Ecclestone in relation motor racing and tobacco sponsorship, 
or Lord Coe in terms of securing the 2012 Olympics for London. These, and others, have 
held core beliefs over many years, and have used a variety of tactics suggested by the 
advocacy coalition model to hold a coalition together and drive through their aims. The 
outcomes may be ultimate personal triumphs, but they have also been successes for the 
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coalitions that they brokered. 
While these various theoretical models may be useful in examining the larger policy 
picture, they may not be so appropriate when looking at the role of Ministers for Sport in 
policy-making. Ministers have consistently been in relatively junior government offices. 
The opportunities for them to act as policy brokers or entrepreneurs are likely to have 
been fairly limited; so too would their capacities to participate in or cement advocacy 
coalitions. The theories are designed for larger aspects of policy, which would tend to 
ignore the contribution and abilities of junior Ministers who are the focus of this study. 
However, As Sabatier (1999) expressed it, there is, "The need for better theories" (p. 3) 
to help explain relatively low-level policy-making. The core executive theory may 
therefore be the best model for explaining what Ministers for Sport could and, more 
pertinently, could not do. What core executive theory does is show how those with the 
greatest access to the centres of power and resources are the most likely to shape policies. 
This study will try to show where Ministers for Sport were located in relation to the core 
executive, and thus how influential they were. 
Nevertheless, as the above examples have illustrated, a wide range theories can be used to 
help illuminate the policy-making processes relating to particular sporting issues in which 
the Ministers participated. It is therefore intended to follow the advice of John (1998) and 
Sebatier (1999) by using several theories where they are able to shed light on particular 
problems or issues. This is also the view of Ball (2006), who believes that, "in the 
analysis of complex social issues - like policy - two theories are probably better than 
one" (p. 43). None of the theories are truly comprehensive or universally applicable to 
every situation, but by using them in a selective way, it is hoped that the strengths of each 
can be used to best advantage when the data collected for this study are analysed in 
Chapter 6. But firstly, the data itself will be presented in the next two Chapters (Chapters 
4 and 5). 
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Chapter Four: The UK Minister for Sport in Parliament 1964-2005: 
A Quantitative Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter will examine the position of the Minister for Sport in a parliamentary 
context. The office itself will be compared with that of other junior offices and office-
holders. The Chapter will track the careers of all junior Ministers appointed from 1964 to 
2005, with special reference to their first appointments, as a means of determining if there 
are any favourable posts which can lead to higher office. Ministerial appointments in 
each government from 1964 to 2005 will also be explored to see if some administrations 
were more likely to lead to promotion than others, and to ask whether this was true for 
Ministers for Sport. It is hoped that this data will cast some light on where the office of 
Minister for Sport, and its post-holders, are situated in the machinery of British 
government. 
Leading on from this will be an examination of what the Ministers for Sport actually did 
in Parliament. Using a content analysis of the parliamentary record Hansard, data will be 
presented showing what proportion of their work was devoted to sport and what to other 
subjects. To complement this, a similar analysis will be carried out on the number of 
parliamentary questions that each Minister answered, in terms of sport and non-sport 
subjects. A third strand of the parliamentary analysis will look at the debates on sport in 
the 1964-2005 period, of which there were only a relatively small number. 
4.2 Junior Ministers 
Before 1964, almost all junior Ministers carried the generic titles of Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State (PUSS) or Minister of State within their respective departments. With a 
few exceptions (such as Minister of Food, 1939-54) only Cabinet Ministers were given 
titles which clearly identified their offices. Theakston (1987) shows how this changed 
significantly in 1964 when Prime Minister Harold Wilson created various posts which 
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were given a particular title that was directly related to their government jobs. Wilson 
(1971) himself describes it thus: 
Within the field of ministries already in existence, I appointed a number of junior 
ministers with special responsibilities for subjects essential to Britain's economic 
and social development which had not been given an adequate priority in the past 
(p. 10). 
The most significant of Wilson's new appointments were Ministers for Sport, Arts, and 
Overseas Development. These have been followed over the years by many others, 
including the Disabled, Information Technology, Consumer Protection, and Housing, 
some of which have survived whilst others have been abolished. The full range of offices 
is set out by Butler and Butler (2000), the main source that was used for this analysis. 
Wilson also set a trend in significantly increasing the number of junior posts by 40%, 
(Rose, 1975). It has been noted by Budge et al (2004) that the overall number of 
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries increased from 23 in 1945 to 68 in 2003, an important 
factor in the enhancement of the Prime Minister's patronage. With around a hundred 
Ministers of all ranks, plus the Parliamentary Private Secretaries (or PPSs) who support 
senior Ministers, this large "payroll vote" is committed to continuous support for the 
government. 
4.3 Junior Ministers in Named Offices 
It was shown in Chapter 1 (paragraph 1.7) that failure to advance far within the 
parliamentary hierarchy is something that all Ministers for Sport have had to endure. Of 
the 13 Ministers who held the office 1964-2009, none were promoted to the Cabinet. 
Only four Ministers for Sport (Monro, Moynihan, Atkins, and Key), all of whom were 
Conservatives, moved to another government office after Sport. No former Labour 
Ministers for Sport have managed to attain other positions subsequently. While Ministers 
for Sport have generally failed to gain promotion, this may not be unusual for junior 
ministerial offices in general. 
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In order to test this proposition, four named junior ministerial offices have been selected 
to allow for comparison with the Minister for Sport: Arts, Defence Procurement, Local 
Government, and Social Security. These were chosen because they represent a good 
cross-section of government activity, because they have been established for a reasonable 
length of time over several governments, and because they have offered continuity across 
different parties in government. They were all established at junior level, though 
occasionally the Arts Minister was in the Cabinet during the 1979-97 Conservative 
governments. Others were considered but rejected for various reasons. For example, the 
post of Minister for Overseas Development has sometimes been a junior office but was 
predominantly held at Cabinet level. Information Technology lasted only four years 
1983-87, with two Conservative Ministers. The Minister for Women was established in 
1997 and has been in existence only during Labour governments. 
Of the 15 Arts Ministers 1964-2005, it is quite striking that nine of them eventually 
entered the Cabinet (60%). None of them reached the very highest offices (Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, or Home Secretary), but they found themselves in 
ministries as varied as Transport (paul Channon), National Heritage (David Mellor), 
Northern Ireland and National Heritage (Peter Brooke), Health and National Heritage 
(Virginia Bottomley), and Education (Estelle Morris). It seems that the Arts portfolio has 
been a training ground for higher office, and also one with responsibility for sport at 
National Heritage in the cases of Mellor, Brooke, and Bottomley. 
Defence Procurement shows a different pattern from Arts. There were 14 Ministers 
appointed between 1971 and 2005, of whom only four entered the Cabinet (19%). 
However, Norman Lamont reached one of the four highest offices when he became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1990. Ian Gilmour also held high office at Defence and as 
Lord Privy Seal (effectively the Foreign Secretary in the Commons while Lord 
Carrington held the substantive post in the Lords). 
The Minister for Local Government is the most recently established of the four 
comparators chosen, being created in 1979. Its 13 post-holders have been highly-
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successful in achieving promotion. Nine of the holders (70%) have attained Cabinet 
office, with both Kenneth Baker and Michael Howard becoming Home Secretary. The 
latter also became leader of the Conservative Party. Tom King and Michael Portillo were 
both Defence Secretary at different times, and John Gummer held Cabinet offices at 
Agriculture and Environment. 
. The last junior office to be considered in this section is Social Security, to which the first 
appointment was made in 1976. There have since been 12 Ministers, of whom five 
reached the Cabinet (42%). One of these, John Major was the most successful junior 
Minister of all the 66 holders of the five junior offices (including Minister for Sport) 
reviewed here. Major successively became Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and Prime Minister. William Hague became Welsh Secretary and eventually 
leader of the Conservative Party. 
The four junior offices considered above have produced a total of 27 Cabinet Ministers. 
These have included holders of the four highest offices (Prime Minister, Foreign 
Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Home Secretary). While some scholars, such 
as Budge et at (2004), see junior office as a type of apprenticeship for Cabinet, it is quite 
clear that the junior office of Minister for Sport is definitely not in this category. It may 
be that appointment to the first ministerial office is a better guide to who eventually 
reaches the Cabinet. This will be examined next. 
4.4 First Ministerial Appointments 
Table 3 below sets out the first appointments for all 165 junior Ministers who at some 
point in their careers attained Cabinet office between 1964 and 2005, calculated mainly 
from the tables in Butler and Butler (2000). Some departments have been combined into 
logical categories to make the findings more concise. Where appropriate, these are 
indicated in the notes. 
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Table 3 
Junior Ministers who Entered the Cabinet 1964-2005 
Department of First Number Percentage Notes 
Ministerial Appointment of Total 
Whips 35 21 
Treasury 17 10 Includes Economic Affairs 
Defence 15 9 Includes Admiralty & Air Ministry 
Education 10 6 
Energy . 8 5 Includes Power 
Home Office 8 5 
Legal Offices 8 5 Includes Lord Chancellor's 
Northern Ireland 6 3.5 
Social Security 6 3.5 Includes Pensions and National Insurance 
Trade 6 3.5 Includes Board of Trade 
Environment 5 3 Includes Housing & Local Government 
Scottish 5 3 
Health 5 3 
Labour 5 3 Includes Ministry of Works 
Transport 5 3 Includes Aviation 
Foreign 4 2.5 Includes Overseas Department & Commonwealth 
Agriculture 3 2 
Planning 3 2 
Employment 2 1 
Technology 2 1 
Welsh 2 1 
Civil Service 1 0.5 
Post Office 1 0.5 
International Development 1 0.5 
Duchy of Lancaster 1 0.5 
Cabinet Office 1 0.5 
Total 165 100 
Sources: 
Butler, D. & Butler, G. (2000) Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 London; Macmillan 
House of Commons Hansard 1997-2005 
Pickrill, D.A. (1981) Ministers of the Crown London; Routledge & Kegan Paul 
It can be seen that a first appointment in the Whips' Office is considerably more likely to 
lead to a Cabinet post than any other, something that is recognised by ambitious MPs. 
When taking up his first appointment as a whip in 1974, Cecil Parkinson (1992) believed 
Jack Weatherill the Conservatives' deputy Chief Whip when he told him that he would 
receive the "hothouse treatment" (p. 121) and progress easily to the Cabinet. Parkinson 
eventually joined the Cabinet in 1981 as Chairman of the Conservative Party, with the 
title of Paymaster General. 
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Of the Ministers for Sport, only Hector Monro began his ministerial career in the Whips' 
Office. Unfortunately for him this did not translate into anything other than his four 
appointments at PUSS level. The Treasury is the second most significant department in 
which to begin a ministerial career. No Minister for Sport was ever given a job here, or in 
Defence which is the third most significant. 
Denis Howell began his ministerial career as Minister for Sport at Education, which lies 
in fourth place, but still never went beyond junior office. Neil MaCfarlane also started in 
Education, though not as Minister for Sport, while Robert Atkins went to Education when 
Sport was transferred back to that department briefly in 1990-92. The Home Office, in 
sixth place, was"Kate Hoey's only previous job before Minister for Sport. Nine of the 
Ministers for Sport worked at Environment at some point, several of them having their 
first appointments as Minister for Sport. The Environment Department, more than any 
other, seems to be the nadir of political ambitions for Sports Ministers. 
In summary, Ministers for Sport have not begun their ministerial careers in the most 
propitious departments for promotion, particularly the Whips' Office. John Major began 
his ministerial career here and immediately saw its importance for getting on. Major 
(1999) notes that, "once in the Whips' Office I realised that it was one of the main 
engine-rooms of government" (p. 78). He used the opportunity to the full, as did Edward 
Heath, Willie Whitelaw, Cecil Parkinson and many others, though Hector Monro did not. 
None of the other Ministers for Sport gained a first foothold in any of the top three 
departments, thus handicapping their chances of promotion from the outset. 
4.5 Junior Ministerial Appointments 
As noted above (paragraph 4.3), the four junior offices discussed (excluding the Minister 
for Sport) produced 27 Cabinet Ministers out of the 54 office holders, an average success 
rate of 50%. This is actually quite a high rate when the figures are compared with junior 
ministerial appointments in general. Tables 4 and 5 that follow show the details of all 
ministerial appointments from 1964 to 2005. 
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Table 4 
All Ministers Appointed 1964-2005 
Junior Percentage of Ministers who Ministers who Total Cabinet Percentage of 
Ministers who Junior Achieved Joined Cabinet Ministers Ministers 
Achieved no Ministers not Cabinet Office with no Junior Reaching 
Promotion Reaching Ministerial Cabinet 
Cabinet Office 
Total Ministers 643 76% 165 36 201 24% 
1964-2005 
TableS 
Ministerial Appointments 1964-2005 
Junior Percentage of Ministers who Ministers who Total Cabinet Percentage of 
Ministers who Junior Achieved Joined Cabinet Ministers in 
Achieved no Ministers not Cabinet Office with no Junior each 
Promotion Reaching Ministerial Government 
Cabinet Office 
1964-70 114 68% 44 10 54 
1970-74 80 64% 41 4 45 
1974-79 113 75% 33 5 38 
1979-90 154 68% 66 6 72 
1990-97 145 79% 38 0 38 
1997-05 168 77% 33 17 50 
Total 774 72% 255 42 297 
Ministerial 
Appointments 
1964-2005 
Sources: 
Butler, D. & Butler, G. (2000) Twentieth-Centwy British Political Facts 1900-2000 London; MacmilJan 
House of Commons Hansard 1997-2005 
Pickrill, D.A. (1981) Ministers of the Crown London; Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ministers 
Reaching 
Cabinet 
Table 4 sets out the total number of actual Ministers appointed in the 1964-2005 period 
This shows that 76% of all Ministers never went beyond the junior level in any 
government during the period. In many case~ they were junior Ministers in several 
different governments when their parties lost and regained office. 
Table 5 shows the number of individuals appointed in each government This is a larger 
total figure because some Ministers were appointed in several different governments in 
the period. For instance, William Whitelaw was a Cabinet Minister in the two 
governments of 1970-74 and 1979-90 and is therefore counted in each. Using this method 
of calculation, 72% of appointments made were at the junior level. Taken together, both 
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32% 
36% 
25% 
32% 
21% 
23% 
28% 
tables indicate that it is actually quite difficult to gain promotion, something that around 
three-quarters of Ministers never achieve. If the figure was taken as a proportion of all 
MPs, it would show that only around 10% of them actually entered the Cabinet. 
The figures vary somewhat from one government to another. In the Conservative 
government of 1970-74, junior Ministers were a good deal more likely to enter the 
Cabinet than in 1990-97. The government of 1997-2005 showed a relatively low turnover 
of Cabinet Ministers, thus creating fewer opportunities for promotion. An other 
interesting feature is that when a party is out of office for a long time, such as Labour 
during 1979-97, a large number of Ministers go straight to the Cabinet without junior 
ministerial experience. 
It might be expected that when a party has been in office for many years there would be 
more time for junior Ministers, such as Ministers for Sport, to move through the ranks. 
Although it is certainly true for some offices this has never happened for Sports 
Ministers, even with the extended length of Conservative governments 1979-97 or with 
the current government now having been some 12 years in power and with a fourth 
Minister for Sport. 
4.6 Parliamentary Role of Ministers for Sport 
When WaIter Bagehot (1867/1963) wrote The English Constitution at the same time as 
Disraeli was introducing the Second Reform Act, Parliament held a central position in the 
political life of the nation. It has since become much less significant as a forum of 
political decision-making. Hennessy (2000, 2004) Holliday (2000) and others have 
shown how real power has become more concentrated in political elites (both elected and 
non-elected) outside Parliament and in the core executive (as discussed earlier in 1.6 and 
3.8). This is despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that the proceedings of Parliament 
are now more widely reported than ever through radio, television, and the press, as well 
as the traditional record of proceedings, Hansard, which is now available free on the 
Internet. From 1802, William Cobbett published an unofficial record of Parliamentary 
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proceedings, which became fonnalised and printed by the Hansard family from 1812. 
The title of the Parliamentary record still bears the name Hansard to this day (Hansard 
website, 2006). 
Nevertheless, while the broadcasting media tend to concentrate on political personalities 
and elites, Parliament remains an institution of significant political discourse. As 
Richards (1977) observes: 
Much of this discussion, although faithfully recorded in Hansard, is little noticed. 
Just occasionally the Commons becomes the forum for a debate which excites the 
nation or reflects the excitement ofthe nation (p. 9). 
The special occasions when the public notices Parliament are events such as debates on 
proposed wars or the presentation of the annual budget by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. But most of the time it performs important functions quietly in its routine 
way, including the introduction of legislation, scrutiny of bills, examination of Ministers, 
and committee work. All of its everyday work is recorded in Hansard, though it may be 
little appreciated by the public. Ministers (including the Minister for Sport) answer a 
great number of oral and written questions in the Commons every week. In the case of 
Ministers for Sport, these very often have nothing to do with sport, as Howell (1990) and 
Macfarlane (1986) have told us. 
Ministers also participate in debates or involve themselves in committee work, when bills 
are passing through the various legislative stages. Sometimes they are required to appear 
before committees. For example, a whole series of Select Committees of backbench MPs 
has been established since 1979 to examine the work of government departments. The 
Minister for Sport may thus have to appear before the Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Committee to give evidence. This committee has now published many reports on subjects 
such as the National Stadium and the 2012 Olympic bid. On the other hand, the Minister 
for Sport is unlikely to have to pilot legislation through the Commons (unlike other 
departmental junior Ministers) because there is very little legislation on sport. However, 
he or she is required to play a full part in the parliamentary process and help maintain his 
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or her party's majority by voting on the floor and in legislative committees on subjects 
far removed from sport. 
As a way of measuring the Minister for Spo~'s participation in Parliament, a content 
analysis of the House of Commons Hansard for 1964 to 2005 was carried out, as 
described in the methodology. Ministers' participation in debates on the floor of the 
Commons, the answering of oral and written questions, the issuing of statements, and so 
on, were measured in terms of column centimetres of text. The data were classified into 
sport and non-sport subjects to show the relative proportions of each during the period 
from 1964 to 2005. This was devised as a way of discovering and measuring what 
Ministers do with their time. Following from this, three types of analysis were carried to 
show: the amount of text relating to sport, the number of parliamentary questions on 
sport, and debates on sport, 
4.7 Parliamentary Activity of Ministers for Sport 
The first part of the analysis, showing the amount of sport and non-sport activity of each 
Minister on the floor of the Commons, is set out in Figure 2 below. This shows the totals 
for all parliamentary activity studied, that is oral and written questions, adjournment 
debates, written and oral statements, and legislative activity. 
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Figure 2 
Comparison of Sporting and Non-Sporting Issues 
Dealt with in Parliament by Minister for Sport: 
Quantity of Text in Hansard 1964-2005 
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Figure 2 shows that Ministers have differed enormously in their overall level of 
parliamentary activity, as well as in the relative amounts devoted to sport and non-sport 
business. In terms of overall commitment to sport, the most active Ministers have been 
Macfarlane, Sproat, and Caborn, while the least active have been Monro, Tracy, Atkins 
and Key. Eldon Griffiths was a very active parliamentarian, but mainly in relation to his 
transport role when nominally Minister for Sport. Ian Sproat was also very busy with his 
National Heritage role, tourism, the National Lottery, broadcasting, and much else as well 
as sport. Only Robert Atkins, Tony Banks and Kate Hoey have devoted more time to 
sport than to their other duties. 
Ministerial activity was also examined by parliamentary year, full details of which are set 
out in Appendix 3. In some cases, Ministers were appointed in summer (usually in July 
reshuffles). Where this has happened, it has been combined with the remainder of the 
year beginning OctoberlNovember rather than allow this to time stand alone as a ''year'' 
of a few weeks. The lowest yearly sporting activity was recorded by Eldon Griffiths in 
1971-72, when only 5% was devoted to sport. Although low in overall activity for sport, 
Robert Atkins' relative figures showed that he devoted 86% to sport in 1991-92, the 
highest yearly percentage discovered for any Minister. The average figure for all 
Ministers was 23% of their time devoted to sport, and 77% to other activities, thus 
confirming the speculative figure of25% proposed by Houlihan (1991). 
The [mal part of this analysis looks at the figures for each ministerial term in office. Kate 
Hoey ranks in first place for time devoted to sport, with 78%, while Tony Banks is close 
behind with 64%. Of the others, only Robert Atkins at 57%, achieved over half. At the 
bottom end, Richard Tracey managed a mere 10%, the vast amount of his time being 
spent on local government and planning issues. Eldon Griffiths was only slightly better at 
11%, while Denis Howell (1974-79) surprisingly recorded only 18%. In this period he 
was primarily concerned with environmental, sewerage, and water issues, while his 
earlier years (1964-70) were devoted to education, then local government and 
environmental problems. 
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Although Richard Cabom' s overall figure for 2001-05 was 42%, he started off in 2001-
02 with 57% and declined to only 26% by 2004-05. This latter figure brings him back 
towards the average of 23% for the full 1964-2005 analysis. 
4.8 Parliamentary Questions Dealt with by Ministers for Sport 
A sub-set of the data explained above consists of oral and written Parliamentary 
questions. Ministers for Sport have usually answered oral questions roughly once every 
four to six weeks during the 1964-2005 period, depending on when their department has 
appeared on the rota. Written questions have nonnally been answered on several days 
each week during the parliamentary session. Calculations were therefore made for these 
questions, which could act as a cross-check for the data covering combined parliamentary 
work. Figure 3 which follows sets out a summary for parliamentary questions, while the 
complete data are presented in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 3 
Comparison of Sporting and Non-Sporting Issues Dealt 
with in Parliament by Minister for Sport: 
No. of Parliamentary Questions 1964-2005 
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The pattern for parliamentary questions is broadly similar to that for all parliamentary 
work, although Richard Caborn emerges as the Minister who has answered the most 
questions on sport, with 819 overall. Kate Hoey, who served for less than half Caborn's 
time in office is second with 346, while Tony Banks is a close third with 332. It seems 
that the later Ministers have generally devoted more time to sport than their earlier 
predecessors. Robert Key answered a mere 25 sports questions during his single year in 
office, while Denis Howell dealt with a total of 455 over the course of 11 years and two 
separate appointments. Howell actually answered the highest number of non-sports 
questions during his 1974-79 stint, with 1,352, while Colin Moynihan was close behind 
with 1,342. A great many of Moynihan's questions were on water supply, sewerage, 
drainage, and pollution, rather than sport. 
The number of questions answered in each parliamentary year were also calculated. The 
overall average figure of a 23% to 77% split for sport and non-sport is exactly the same 
as that for all parliamentary activity, thus tending to confirm the previous figure. The 
lowest number of sports questions answered in a single year was six, by Eldon Griffiths 
in 1973-74. He also jointly holds the lowest percentage at just nine in 1972-73, together 
with Richard Tracey in 1986-87 and Robert Key in 1992-93. The largest number in a 
single year was 350 in 2001-02 by Richard Cabom, while the highest percentages were 
83% by Tony Banks in 1998-99 and 76% for Kate Hoey in 1999-2000. This again 
confirms the pattern that higher levels of parliamentary activity on sport are paralleled by 
larger numbers of parliamentary questions on sport. 
The combined years for each ministerial term in office were also calculated. As with all 
parliamentary activity, the more recent Labour Ministers have been more likely to answer 
a larger number of sports questions. Kate Hoey is ranked first, with 76% of her 
parliamentary questions being focussed on sport during her term in office. She is closely 
followed by Tony Banks at 70%. The only other Minister to achieve over half was Robert 
Atkins, who managed 55%, while Richard Caborn is fourth with 45%. As with overall 
parliamentary activity, Caborn's number of sports questions steadily declined throughout 
his term in office to only 31 % in 2004-05. 
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At the bottom is Robert Key on 9%, but this placing is probably distorted because Key 
spent only a single year in office. Eldon Griffiths almost matches his 11 % for all 
parliamentary activity with 12% for parliamentary questions, while Richard Tracey is 
only a little better at 13% compared with 10%. 
Two of the most prominent Ministers for Sport, Denis Howell and Colin Moynihan, 
answered relatively few questions on sport. Moynihan managed only 19% overall during 
his three years, while Howell achieved 23% during 1964-70 and 17% in 1974-79. In 
tenns of overall parliamentary activity Moynihan is a little higher at 24%, with Howell 
on 23% for 1964-70 and 18% for 1974-79. It may be that Howell and Moynihan were 
more active in parliamentary debates on sport, a topic which will be pursued in the next 
section. 
4.9 Parliamentary Debates on Sport 
Debates on sport in the House of Commons, with the Minister for Sport participating, are 
relatively rare occurrences. The following series of tables will show that they took place 
on average less than once every two years where sport was the general subject, as distinct 
from single issues such as cycling or bowling. The data were drawn from the study of 
Hansard at the same time as the analysis of text and parliamentary questions. 
According to Borthwick (1977), debates on the floor of the House of Commons are 
dominated by government business. When analysing his own figures he asserts, "Perhaps 
the most striking feature is the substantial place occupied by government legislation" (p. 
57). In addition to government . legislation, he notes that, "another substantial block of 
time is taken by non-legislative debates in government time" (p. 58). Since sport has been 
a low priority subject for governments, and rarely requires legislation, it seldom appears 
at all. Where sport has been debated, this has usually been through the device of 
adjournment debates. 
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Adjournment debates are the means whereby backbench MPs can express an interest in a 
pet subject, or perhaps impress electors in their constituencies by raising a local issue. 
Irwin (1977) describes the process by which Members enter a weekly ballot for the right 
to speak on a subject of their choice. John Garrett (1992), a former Labour MP, has also 
outlined the procedure in a book calling for major reform of Parliament. Until recent 
refonns in parliamentary procedure, adjournment debates of approximately half an hour 
were held at as close as possible to 10 pm. As Irwin (1977) observes, "The normal pattern 
of the daily debate is for the Member raising the issue to speak: for about half the time 
available and for a responsible minister to reply" (p. 81). In the case of sport the reply is 
always made by the Minister for Sport, with very few other Members present or 
speaking. 
Another route for sport to be debated is through the government or Opposition providing 
some of their allocated time. Norton (2000) illustrates how some time may be set aside, 
as part of the process of scrutiny and legitimation in Parliament. Since governments and 
oppostions are reluctant to give much time to such a marginal subject as sport, true 
debates on the subject are uncommon. Finally, sport may come on to the agenda through 
legislation in the Commons. However, there is very little of this required for sport, unless 
it is related to gambling or hooliganism. 
By far the most frequent route for sport to be debated in the Commons is the adjournment 
debate. Table 6 below sets out 51 occasions when sporting subjects have been raised 
through this procedure. Members only have 30 minutes for their subject to be discussed, 
with about half of this to make their speeches initially. They have therefore tended to 
stick to narrow single issues, rather than roam more widely into sport in general. Only 
twice have Members, Neil Macfarlane and Martin M. Brandon-Bravo, attempted to look 
beyond a narrow subject. 
The vast majority of Members to use this procedure have been obscure backbenchers, of 
whom only Jonathan Aitken and Sir George Young went on to be Cabinet Ministers (Jim 
Callaghan is not the former Prime Minister of the same name). Six of them became future 
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Ministers for Sport (Macfarlane, Monro, Moynihan, Banks, Hoey, and Sutcliffe), while 
Philip Noel-Baker, Tom Pendry, George FouIkes, Gerald Kaufinan, and Ian Gibson were 
junior Labour Ministers at times. John Carlisle was well known for his support of 
sporting links with apartheid South Africa, and Ian Duncan Smith went on to be leader of 
the Conservatives from 2001 to 2003. The only MP outside of Labour and the 
Conservatives to lead a debate was Evan Harris of the Liberal Democrats. Debates of this 
kind are for taking note, and votes are not taken. 
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Table 6 
Adjournment Debates on Sport in Which the Minister for Sport Participated 1964-2005 
Date Title Lead MP Length 
15110/69 Chester Committee Report on Football Edward Milne (Lab) 30rnin 
l4I05nO South African Cricket Tour Philip Noel-Baker (Lab) 3 hours 
15107nt Sailing & Boating Rear-Admiral Morgan-GiJes (Con) 30 rnin 
22/03173 Angling Clubs Emle Money (Con) 44 rnin 
17105173 Sports Council Joan Hall (Con) 29rnin 
11I07n5 Cyclists George Young (Con) 28min 
18/02n6 Sport & Recreation Neil Macfarlane (Con) 30min 
12112n8 Sports Council Hector Monro Con) 34 rnin 
15112n8 1980 Olympic Games Eric Moonman (Lab) 34 rnin 
04/06/80 Sport in South Africa John Carlisle (Con) 30min 
19112180 Motor Racing Jonathan Aitken (Con) 36rnin 
03/06/81 Sporting Links with South Africa John Carlisle (Con) 30min 
14/07/81 Sports Council Report on Tennis Arthur Davidson (Lab) 28min 
27/05/82 Sporting Contact with Argentina John Carlisle (Con) 22 rnin 
09/02/83 Sporting Links with South Africa John Carlisle (Con) 27min 
30/06/83 Tobacco Sponsorship George Foulkes (Lab) 30min 
16/12/83 Drug Abuse in Sport Colin Moynihan (Con) 30 rnin 
13/02184 Rugby Tour to South Africa John Carlisle (Con) 30min 
21112/84 Sport in London Tony Banks (Lab) 30 rnin 
22/02/85 Professional Boxing Colin Moynihan (Con) 28min 
19/04/85 Football Hooliganism Tony Banks (Lab) 30rnin 
24/10185 Football Grounds Financial Assistance Tom Pendry (lab) 30min 
10/11187 Sport & Recreation Martin M. Brandon-Bravo (Con) 25min 
16/12188 Sports Council Toby Jessel (Con) 26 rnin 
12/01190 Sports Facilities in London Kate Hoey (Lab) 29 rnin 
17/05190 Playing Field in Manchester Gerald Kaufinan (Lab) 30rnin 
21111190 Sports Funding David Evans (Con) 29min 
20/12/90 Football Tom PendIy (Lab) 43 rnin 
28/02/91 School Sport Tom PendIy (Lab) 30 rnin 
23/05191 Sport Tom PendIy (Lab) 45min 
08/05192 Football Kate Hoey (Lab) 30min 
10/05194 Boxing Injuries Jim Callaghan (Lab) 27min 
20/06/94 Football lan Duncan Smith (Con) 44min 
22/01194 BamsleyFC Eric Wells (Lab) 29min 
30/01195 Football Kate Hoey (Lab) 31 min 
21111196 British Cycle Federation Grants Jon Tricket(Lab) 39 rnin 
29/06/98 Wembley Gerry Sutcliffe (l ab) 32min 
15103/99 Chess as Sport Evan Harris (Lib Dem) 37rnin 
30/11199 Sport Funding Harry Cohen (Lab) 32min 
25101100 Football Safety Bob Blizard (Lab) 27min 
23/01101 Football Transfer Fees Jim Murphy (Lab) 27min 
11112/01 Horse Racing Richard Page (Con) 25min 
13/02102 Community Football Colin Burgon (Lab) 29min 
10/04/02 Horse Racing AIan Meale (Lab) 29min 
09/05102 Paul Edwards (drugs in sport) Andrew Hunter (Con) 25min 
18112/02 Football Head Injuries lan Gibson (Lab) 29min 
31103/03 Disabled Athletes Martin Caton (Lab) 28 rnin 
21110/03 Sport Lottery Bids Stephen Hesford (Lab) 34min 
09/03/04 Rugby Union John Randall (Con) 29min 
23/11104 Disabled Athletes Martin Caton (Lab) 26min 
13/12/04 Crown Green Bowling Helen Jackson (Lab) 38 rnin 
Source: Hansard: House of Commons Debates 1964-2005 
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In all of the debates above, the Minister for Sport replied on behalf of the government to 
the lead MP who initiated each. Almost invariably, there were the only two speakers, 
given the time available and the lateness of the hour. Richard Cabom replied on ten 
occasions, Neil Macfarlane on eight, Denis Howell on six, Ian Sproat on five, Colin 
Moynihan on four, and Robert Atkins also on four. The other five Ministers shared the 
remaining 14 between them. The major exception in terms of the nonnal course of 
adjournment debates was the one on the South African cricket tour to Britain in 1970. 
This lasted a full three hours, with some thirty speakers being involved, including 
Michael Foot, Reginald Maudling, Eric Heffer, Reg Prentice, and many others who were 
prominent at the time. 
Sometimes the government of the day allocates a block of time for a subject to be debated 
in the House. This allows MPs of all parties to participate in debate and use their 
knowledge of a subject to good effect. In the case of sport, it is generally only 
backbenchers who participate, with the Minister for Sport and Opposition spokesman 
also taking part. Cabinet Ministers rarely attend or take part, unless it is a high-profile 
issue such as the 2012 Olympic bid. Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport led a debate on the Olympic bid in January 2003, while her predecessor, Chris 
Smith, attended debates in 1997 and 1998. Votes may be taken, but these are generally 
for endorsing the government's position on an issue. 
The 23 government debates on sport, of which 16 were sponsored by Labour and seven 
by the Conservatives, where the Minister for Sport participated 1964-2005, are shown in 
Table 7 below. This is not a definitive list of all sports debates, since there are some in 
which the Minister has never taken part. The most significant of these was the debate on 
boycotting the 1980 Olympics, held on 17 March 1980, when Hector Momo was not 
allowed to speak. l1 There have been other occasions, such as gambling or Wembley 
stadium where the Ministers for Sport have played no part. 
Debates in this category are much longer than adjournment debates, sometimes lasting 
for up to five hours. There have thus been eleven occasions in the 41 year period studied 
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when genuine debates on sport have been held. The Hansard record shows that over 20 
MPs have sometimes spoken in them. They have given a real chance for wider issues in 
sport to be discussed, with contributors sometimes showing considerable knowledge of 
the subject. Naturally, all have been led by Conservative or Labour members, since no 
other party has held office during this time. 
Table 7 
Government Debates on Sport in Which the Minister for Sport Participated 1964-2005 
Date Title Lead MP or Minister Length 
04/12164 Recreation & Leisure Denis Howell (Lab) 5hr3min 
19/01/68 Sports Facilities Tarn Dalyell (Lab) 1 hr22min 
15/0717l Sport & Recreation Eldon Griffiths (Con) 1 hr35 min 
06/04n7 Sport & Recreation White Paper Denis Howell (Lab) 2hr18min 
05/05n7 Sport & Recreation Denis Howell (Lab) 4hr30min 
29/10n9 Royal Commission on Gambling Willie Whitelaw (Con) 5hrlmin 
09/07/84 Sport & Recreation David Ashby (Con) 2 hr44 min 
08/05/85 Sport & Recreation Facilities John Carlisle (Con) Ihr40min 
30/10/92 Sport Robert Key (Con) 4hr54min 
17/05/93 Sport Simon Coombs (Con) 2 hr55min 
07/06/96 Sport Ian Sproat (Con) 5hr7min 
27/06/97 Sport Chris Smith (Lab) 5hr2min 
05/06/98 Sport Chris Smith (Lab) 5hrOmin 
04/05/00 Sport Kate Hoey (Lab) 2hr59min 
10/ll/OO Sport Chris Smith (Lab) 4hr45min 
22/ll/01 Social Inclusion in Sport Richard Cabom (Lab) 3hrOmin 
11112101 World Athletics Championships Gera1d Kaufinan (Lab) 2hr28min 
30/01/02 Football Club Funding Roger Casale (Lab) I hr30min 
23/04/02 Drugs in Sport Gareth Thomas (Lab) 30min 
26111/02 2012 Olympic Bid Gareth Thomas (Lab) 30min 
14/01/03 2012 Olympic Bid Tessa JoweU (Lab) 3hr2min 
13/01104 Grass-Roots SJ'Ort Andy Reed (Lab) 30min 
02/03/04 London Olympic Bid Clive Betts (Lab) ] hr30min 
Source: Hansard: House of Commons Debates 1964-2005 
If the government is not willing to allocate time to a subject, sometimes the Opposition 
parties will do so. Table 8 below shows 11 occasions when this has happened, of which 
eight were initiated by Labour, two by the Conservatives, and one by the Scottish 
National Party. The Conservatives have been very reluctant to provide time for this 
purpose, allowing only one short debate in over 30 years. Just five of the Opposition 
debates overall could be considered as true debates on sport. 
Only Roy Hattersley in 1990, then shadow Home Secretary, has been a Cabinet minister 
in this group (he was Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection from 1976 to 
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1979). Few serving Cabinet Ministers have attended the debates, unless the subject has 
been a matter of national importance such as football hooliganism or ground safety. 
While some of the debates have been informed discussions on sport, they have all been 
much shorter than government-sponsored ones. Although Labour was been willing to 
give time to sport when in Opposition, they could not control the parliamentary timetable 
the way the government does. Opposition debates on sport have therefore been fewer in 
number and shorter than government ones. 
Table 8 
Opposition Debates on Sport in Which the Minister for Sport Participated 1964-2005 
Date Title Lead MP or Minister Length 
15/07nl Sport & Youth Services Denis Howell (Lab) 2 hr30min 
17/03n5 Sports Council Hector Monro (Con) 1 hr30 min 
24/03/87 Sport Tom Pendry (Lab) 1 hr30min 
08/12/87 Sport Tom Pendry (Lab) 1 hr30min 
12/07/88 Sport Denis Howell (Lab) 3 hrOl min 
30/01190 Football Ground Safety Roy Hattersley (Lab) 2 hr50min 
27/11/91 Sport Denis Howell (Lab) 3 hr 11 min 
26/04/95 Rugby League David Hinchcliffe (Lab) 1 hr29min 
30/10/96 British Academy of Sport Kate Hoey (Lab) 30min 
14/03/01 International Sporting Events Stephen Day (Con) 1 hr30 min 
05/03/03 Horse Racing Alee Salmond (SNP) 34min 
Source: Hansard: House of Commons Debates 1964-2005 
The last category in this analysis, shown in Table 9, consists oflegislative debates. These 
are quite unusual since sport does not generate much direct legislation. There is 
legislation on matters such as competitive tendering, football hooliganism abroad, or 
broadcasting which may have a significant impact on sport. In most cases, however, these 
are not regarded as sporting issues but ones of law and order or foreign policy, where the 
Minister for Sport makes no contribution. The debates have often been fairly lengthy, 
especially those on football. 
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Table 9 
Legislative Debates on Sport in Whkb the Minister for SPOrt Particioated 1964-2005 
Date Title Lead MP or Minister Lerurth 
18/0ln4 Safety of Sports Grounds Bill Mark Carljsle (Con) 4hrJ5min 
19/06nS Safety of Sports Grounds Bill AIex Lyon (Lab) 3hrOmin 
21102186 Tobacco Products (Sports Sponsorship) Bill Roger Sims (Con) J hr40min 
(Private Member's Bill) 
27/06/89 Football Spectators' Bill Nick Ridley (Con) 6hrOmin 
17/07/89 Football Spectators' Bill John Wakeham (Con) 3 hr IS min 
30110/89 Football Spectators' Bill Colin Moynihan (Con) 9hrSmin 
06112189 CCT of Local Government Sport &. Leisure Colin Moynihan (Con) 2br30min 
Facilities (Commencement Order) 
04111193 Sports Grounds (Statutory Instrument) Tom Pendty (Lab) I hr27min 
03/02l9S Protection of Olympic Symbol Bill Nicholas Winterton (Con) 2 hr20min 
!fPrivate Member's Bill) 
08/01104 Horserace Betting & Olympic Lottery Bill Richard Cabom (Lab) 3 hr30min 
02102104 Horserace Betting & Olympic Lottery Bill Richard Cabom (Lab) 2hr ISmin 
Source: Hansard: House of Commons Debates 1964-2005 
Table 9 above sets out the handful of cases where there has been some legislatio~ or 
attempted legislatio~ on sport and the Minister for Sport has had an input It can be seen 
that Ministers from non-sports departments, such as the Home Office are more likely to 
take part, with Mark Carlisle, Alex Lyon, Nicholas Ridley, and John Wakeham being 
examples of Ministers who did so from that department. In the eleven instances sho~ 
only two MPs were never Ministers at any level, namely Roger Sims and Nicholas 
Winterton. There appears to be little room for back bench MPs to have any impact on 
legislatio~ thus confirming the government's control of Parliament and the legislative 
process. 
4.10 Conclusion 
This analysis has shown that only around a quarter of all junior Ministers have been 
promoted to the Cabinet in the 1964-2005 peri~ none of whom have been Ministers for 
Sport. This is a feature that is not replicated with regard to other named junior offices, 
such as the Arts or Defence Procurement, where the success rate has been above 50% in 
some cases. One reason may be that the Ministers for Sport have not usually started their 
political careers in the more favourable departments for leading to promotio~ which 
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were the Whips' Office, Treasury, Defence, or Education. 
The highest proportion of Ministers promoted to Cabinet came in the Conservative 
government of 1970-74, but Ministers for Sport did not benefit from this. The chances of 
Ministers for Sport being promoted were unaffected by the party of government. They 
were not favoured by either Labour or Conservative administrations. 
When performing their duties in Parliament, Ministers for Sport have split their work on 
average in the proportions of 23 % to sport and 77% to non-sporting activities. In 
answering parliamentary questions, these figures were found to be identical. However, 
some Ministers were much more active in sporting activities than others, particularly 
those in the Labour administrations of 1997-2005. On the other hand, some of them did 
very little in the sporting area of their jobs, concentrating instead on tasks such as 
environmental protection, sewerage, water supply, or education. 
Members of Parliament took part in four main types of debate on sporting topics, which 
were adjournment, government-sponsored, opposition-sponsored, and legislative. In total, 
there were found to be 96 debates on sport in these categories where the Minister for 
Sport participated during the 41 years covering 1964 to 2005. Ofthese, 16 were identified 
as comprehensive debates of sufficient duration to allow a number of speakers to take 
part. According to Budge et al (2004) the parliamentary timetable and agenda are 
dominated to such an extent by the executive that it is mainly government business that is 
successfully transacted. Sport is not seen as sufficiently important to warrant the 
allocation of government (or Opposition) time, when compared with health, education, 
defence, or other high-profile subjects. 
In the adjournment debates, the Minister for Sport has always had the chance to give a 
short reply, but these have been held at inconvenient times when few MPs have been 
present. With government and Opposition debates, the Minister has had only limited 
input. However, Labour has been much more likely to provide time for debating sport 
while in both government and Opposition. Debates involving legislation on sport have 
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provided few opportunities for the Ministers to make a contribution. It may be that this 
lack of opportunity to make a mark in parliamentary debate has been an important factor 
in the promotion prospects of the Ministers for Sport. 
However, Ministers for Sport have a life outside of Parliament, in which they interact 
with civil servants, local government officers, quangos, sports governing bodies, and 
many other organisations or individuals having an interest in sport. It is from these 
relationships that the Ministers may have some influence in sports policy-making. As 
stated in the methodology, interviews with key figures from some of these areas have 
been carried out to help evaluate that influence. The findings from these are set out in the 
next Chapter (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter Five: Interviews With Key Individuals and PoIicy-
Makers in Sport and Politics: Data Findings and 
Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws exclusively on data collected from 28 interviews with former 
Secretaries of State, Ministers for Sport, civil servants, administrators, and others 
from the politics and sports communities, as well as one email response. A list of 
these interviewees can be found as Appendix 5. Transcripts of five interviews with 
former Ministers for Sport are attached as Appendix 6. 
In general, the politicians and ex-politicians were happy to speak on the record, 
except in relation to some subjects when they asked not to be quoted. By contrast, the 
civil servants, ex-civil servants, or former civil servants who later held other sports 
offices, spoke mainly under conditions of anonymity, except where they agreed to 
attribution; to protect their identities, they are all described here simply as "civil 
servants". Of the remaining interviewees, some were prepared to be quoted while 
others were not. The wishes of all interviewees have therefore been respected in the 
narrative below. Dates and attributions are given for interview quotes that are on the 
record, while those that are not are indicated with the term "Interview with author". 
This discussion sets out their views on where government policy comes from, the 
sources of sports policy, the role of the Prime Minister, the influence of Secretaries of 
State who dealt with sport, and the role of the Minister for Sport in the policy-making 
process. It shows that the Minister for Sport had quite a limited role in the policy-
making process for sport, offers some reasons as to why this was so, and illustrates it 
with some specific examples. Each of these factors will now be considered in turn. 
5.2 Sources of Government Policy 
A huge number of potential sources of government policy were identified by the 
interviewees when they discussed policy-making. These included the following:-
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• Core Executive 
• Civil Service 
• Prime Minister 
• Prime Minister's Policy Unit 
• Cabinet and Cabinet Ministers 
• Cabinet Committees 
• Cabinet Office 
• Think Tanks (e.g. Centre for Policy Studies) 
• Special Advisers 
• Interest Groups 
• Policy Networks 
• Party Manifestos 
• Europe 
• Local Authorities 
• Select Committees 
• Junior Ministers 
Some of these sources were regarded as being much more influential than others. For 
example, without actually using its academic nomenclature, the "core executive" was 
cited by many as the real centre of policy-making. It comprises the key actors in the 
upper reaches of the civil service, the Treasury, special advisers, senior military 
personnel, and powerful business or media leaders. It is a fluid and ever-changing 
elite, as actors come and go, but at its centre, the "core of the core", are the most 
influential Cabinet Ministers and the Prime Minister. For politicians, membership of 
the Cabinet is the entry point to this exclusive club, though not all Cabinet members 
are part ofit. Lord Hattersley said this about entering the Cabinet in 1976: 
It opens up many more doors the higher you go in government, there's no 
doubt about that. You become more involved in the policy-making process, 
both with your colleagues and with civil servants, because that's just the 
nature of government. A junior Minister is likely to have much less influence 
because he will not usually have to take policy decisions (Interview: 1 May 
2007). 
Lord Rodgers, his Cabinet colleague in the 1970s, also spoke of the real step-change 
resulting from Cabinet membership: 
A member of the Cabinet is expected to play a part in all major issues, and of 
course to make your policy decisions subject to the review of the Cabinet and 
especially the Prime Minister. That's something you don't get at the lower 
levels, since junior Ministers are not supposed to have anything much to do 
with policy outside of their own areas. So yes, you do have more of an input to 
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policy-making in its wider sense, the higher up you go (Interview: 21 March 
2007). 
Rodgers also described in greater detail his experiences in Cabinet, particularly during 
the economic crisis of 1976, when he felt it was a genuine decision-making forum and 
where every Minister's contribution was valued. Lord Smith confirmed the continuing 
importance of Cabinet around 25 years later, despite the tendency for some people to 
believe that it is now more removed from the decision-taking and policy-making role 
that it used to be. He also thought that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
had increased in importance within government, since under him, "We became 
something of an economic player as a department as well as having our traditional 
role in promoting sport and the arts" (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
All interviewees mentioned the significant contribution of the civil service, 
particularly the Permanent Secretaries of each department, whose importance was 
stressed as vital in the policy-making role of government. One former Cabinet 
Minister commented, "Oh you have to rely on the civil servants because it's not 
possible not to" (Interview with author). A small number of senior civil servants were 
seen as the lynchpin of the core executive, providing continuity while others might 
move in and out of the policy-making loop. 
Outside of the Cabinet, junior Ministers were viewed as getting above their station in 
government if they made proposals or recommendations. As one former Cabinet 
Minister put it, "Officials don't like that at all because they think they are going 
beyond their proper place in the scheme of things" (Interview with author). Another 
commented: 
Normally junior Ministers don't get too involved in policy; they tend to do 
what the Secretary of State wants, or at least don't do things to upset the 
Secretary of State. Junior Ministers are not supposed to be too visible because 
that risks upstaging their seniors (Interview with author). 
Further removed from the core executive there are interest groups and loose policy 
networks striving to gain access to government across the whole range of government 
policy areas, such as health, defence, or agriculture. Each area tends to have its own 
powerful pressure group, such as the British Medical Association for health, or the 
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National Farmers' Union for agriculture. 
The party manifestos, while outlining the broad thrust of a government's intentions, 
were not perceived as rich seams of policy to be mined. They were generally seen as 
statements of good intentions, some of which might be implemented as government 
policy if the circumstances were right in the actual realities of office. No one thought 
of them as prescriptive documents to be consulted like reference books on what the 
government should do. 
Likewise, the Select Committees were seen as of little consequence in policy-making 
and their worthy reports were generally ignored. One ex-Cabinet Minister observed, 
"I think it's fair to say that we really didn't take the reports of any select committee 
very seriously at all. The committees were really only created to give awkward 
backbenchers something to do and they had no power whatsoever" (Interview with 
author). Real policy comes by other routes when a party has won an election and has 
gained access to power within the core executive. 
The consensus amongst interviewees was that much government policy came about 
by accident, after a party wins an election and casts around for things to do. The 
whole privatisation programme of the 1980s was seen in this way, as was defence 
policy in response to the Falklands. A former Minister put it this way: 
You see, much of policy is created by personalities and personal relationships 
between Ministers, as opposed to the merits of the case. There is very little in 
the way of rational policy-making, in which careful arguments are set out and 
the best solution chosen. It has always been so in everything I've been 
engaged in (Interview with author). 
Interviewees suggested that policy was often made in response to a crisis, with the 
normal position being one of stability and incrementalism. For example, a terrorist 
attack might be followed by the swift introduction of identity cards for everybody, 
under the direction of a key player (e.g. the Home Secretary). When the initial crisis is 
over, the compulsory use of ID cards may become mainstream policy. This may be 
viewed a "rational" response by some, but it is bounded by what is acceptable to 
society at a given time and what the current technology will allow. 
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5.3 Sources of Sports Policy 
None of the interviewees identified a single powerful pressure group for sport, where 
influence tends to be dissipated too widely to be really effective. They suggested 
instead a wide range of sources of sports policy, some of which (for example the civil 
service) were also generators of policy in many other areas of government business, 
but no single dominant influence. However, the useful distinction was made between 
sports policy as a complete entity in the wider world, and government sports policy as 
a sub-division of this. 
In general, institutions close to the Prime Minister, such as the Policy Unit and the 
Cabinet Office, were not perceived as nonnally producing policy for sport. lain Sproat 
actually found the Prime Minister's Policy Unit obstructive to him and certainly no 
source of sports policy. Staff there acted as gatekeepers to prevent him meeting John 
Major, who was personally committed to his document Raising the Game in 1995. 
They felt that sport was too trivial for the Prime Minister to get involved in, although 
he was, in fact, more committed to sport than any other Prime Minister before or since 
(Interview: 31 May 2007). 
In other words, the core of the core executive did not really have much to do with 
producing sports policy within government. As Sir Neil Macfarlane put it, "We 
sometimes struggled to get recognition and support from the inner-circles of 
government" (Interview: 9 January 2007). If government was viewed as a series of 
concentric circles, the Secretary of State for National Heritage or Culture, Media and 
Sport was seen as several rings from the middle. While it had Cabinet status, the post 
was considered to be on the outer fringes of the core executive and not really part of 
it. Likewise, organisations even further removed from the core executive, such as 
local government were also perceived as having little influence on government policy, 
although they spent a great deal of money on sports facilities. 
There was widespread agreement that the most significant influence on government 
sports policy was the civil service, but at levels below that of Pennanent Secretary, 
such as deputy secretary or under-secretary. One former Minister put it succinctly. In 
his words, "They always had an alternative up their sleeves so nobody was ever stuck 
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for something to put in place" (Interview with author). 
The Select Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, or its previous equivalents, was 
not considered to be a source of sports policy. However, the committee was seen as 
serving a useful function for the main Opposition party as a means of getting 
information from government and from sports representative bodies who were 
summoned to give evidence. According to Hugh Robertson, the Conservatives' 
shadow Sports Minister, the Committee, and also Parliamentary questions, were 
useful ways of getting information from civil servants without approaching them 
directly. It was not considered good practice for the Opposition to have a close . 
relationship with civil servants (Interview: 16 March 2007). Lord Pendry also 
believed that this was the correct way for the Opposition party to behave, since it did 
not risk compromising the integrity and neutrality of the civil service (Interview: 1 
February 2007). 
Although most party election manifestos contained some proposals for sport, these 
were not seen as in any way binding on a future government as a real statement of 
sports policy drafted by the Sports Minister. As one former Cabinet Minister said of 
Denis Howell, "Certainly his views would have been invited but in the end it would 
have been what the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, wanted" (Interview with author). 
However, some manifesto commitments do end up as government policy. Lord 
Pendry claims that, "There was always controversy about selling off school playing 
fields, which it was Labour policy to oppose. I put that in the manifesto for 199T' 
(Interview: 1 February 2007). But in the end, policy is what the government has the 
power to carry out or to keep off the agenda when in office, not what was said might 
be done whilst in Opposition. Playing fields are still being sold off, a policy which 
both major parties claim to oppose. 
The main individuals, institutions, or organisations which were felt to have some 
influence (though sometimes quite small) on sports policy, in government or outside 
of it, were identified as:-
• Prime Minister 
• Cabinet Ministers 
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• Civil Service 
• Special Advisers 
• Sport England 
• UK Sport 
• Devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
• Central Council of Physical Recreation (CCPR) 
• British Olympic Association (BOA) 
• Governing Bodies of Sport 
• Local Government 
• Minister for Sport 
• Party Manifestos 
5.4 Government Sports Policy 
Interviewees' comments suggested that there has actually been very little depth to 
government sports policy, which has comprised only a small number of elements 
since the 1960s. Excluding unusual events for which there was no real policy in the 
sporting domain, such as the 1980 Olympic boycott (foreign policy), football 
hooliganism (law and order), or betting tax (fiscal), only four main strands were 
identified:-
• Encouraging as many people as possible to participate in sport 
• Encouraging excellence at the elite level 
• Encouraging more sport in schools 
• Bidding for major events 
Mihir Warty at Sport England (and many other interviewees) feels that this is a good 
summing up of government sport policy. Mr Warty observed: 
I think you've got it just right there. I agree with your analysis. There's not 
very much substance to the government's sports policies at all. We do the 
"sport for all bit", UK Sport does elite sport, the Education Department deals 
with sport in schools, and the major events (such as the Olympics) tend to be 
sponsored at the highest levels in government as prestige issues (Interview: 7 
February 2008). 
It was felt that these essential parts of a sports policy would have been just as familiar 
to Denis Howell as they would be to Richard Cabom or Gerry Sutcliffe. What has 
changed over the years is the weighting given to any particular one in response to 
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developments in society. Initiatives or schemes have been introduced to encourage 
one or other of the components at any given time, but these are really "padding", 
according to one former Sports Minister (Interview with author). For example, the 
"sport for all" campaign began over thirty years ago as a way of getting more people 
to compete in sport and move through to the top level, while now the government also 
sees it as having health implications. As a senior administrator put it: 
It wouldn't be so bad if competition had been replaced by participation but 
that hasn't happened either. We seem to have had a long, slow decline in 
people taking part at any level, with perhaps more people watching on TV and 
suchlike. We have many people on the fringes of true sport going to gyms and 
doing exercise on machines. That's not competitive sport as some would 
recognise it, though it is exercise. But the overall result seems to have reduced 
the number of people taking part in true competitive sport (Interview with 
author). 
While sport in schools may have been viewed as a "good thing" in the 1960s because 
it built character and team spirit, today it may also contribute to a health agenda, as 
well as producing the occasional elite athlete. Although the encouragement of 
excellence was always implicit in government policy, this became much more 
tangible with funding from the National Lottery in the 1990s. Virginia Bottomley, in 
whose time in office it was introduced, saw it as one of the biggest innovations for 
sport, noting that, "Through the Lottery, sport gained the resource that they needed. 
Our athletes were very successful at Sydney and the credit for that should have gone 
to John Major and the Lottery" (Interview: 29 June 2007). However, the Lottery was 
part of the "padding" that allowed established aspects of policy to be more effectively 
pursued, including the underwriting of bids for major events. 
5.5 The Role of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, and Civil Servants in 
Influencing Government Sports Policy 
Many interviewees thought that John Major was the only Prime Minister who really 
took sport seriously. He became personally involved in sport in a way that no other 
Prime Minister before or since has done. Major was quite unique amongst British 
Prime Ministers in that he actually liked sport, attended events (particularly cricket) 
and used his position to promote sport. A former Conservative Minister said of him: 
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His Cabinet colleagues just could not understand what he was on about with 
sport, or appreciate his passion. I actually think the Lottery was one of his 
greatest achievements as PM with all the money it put into sport. Nobody had 
ever done that before. His support for sport was quite astonishing for a man in 
his position (Interview with author). 
Although he was a serious cricket fan, he also pushed hard on Ian Sproat's policy 
document Raising the Game, giving him great support when Cabinet Ministers and 
some civil servants were indifferent to it. Baroness Bottomley and lain Sproat have 
both confirmed that this was the case. According to Baroness Bottomley John Major 
was a very unusual Prime Minister, in that, "He was mad about sport, absolutely mad. 
He was completely obsessed by it. He deserves eternal credit for really putting sport 
on the map in the UK" (Interview: 29 June 2007). lain Sproat also expressed a high 
regard and his appreciation for Major's support. He said: 
Raising the Game was probably the most important achievement of my time as 
Minister for Sport, and it's something I'm very proud of. It was the first 
statement of sports policy since Denis Howell's White Paper of 1975, a full 
twenty years before. John Major backed me on that (Interview: 31 May 2007). 
Harold Wilson, though not a serious sports fan, had earlier identified the publicity 
value of successful teams. He invited the 1966 World Cup winning team to Downing 
Street and then the 1968 Olympic team. Wilson was the first Prime Minister to 
appoint a Sports Minister and he trusted Denis Howell's opinion and advice on sports 
matters. He also supported his Sports Minister in a way that no other Prime Minister, 
with the exception of Major, has done. According to Lord Donoughue, "Harold 
Wilson was good because Wilson gave him the support from No. 10 that he often 
didn't get from his Secretaries of State" (Interview: 7 March 2007). Tony Blair was 
judged by some interviewees to have performed well in securing the 2012 Olympics 
for London at the International Olympic Committee session on 6 July 2006. In the 
opinion of one sports administrator: 
As for Blair, I loath the guy but he did a brilliant, brilliant job there. He was 
bugger~al1 use until he got there. On a one~to~one basis, Tony is wonderful. 
You walk out thinking he's not that bad and he was very good at the IOC on 
one~to~one with the delegates. He spoke to all the swing voters one by one. 
Goodness knows what he promised or what he said but it certainly had the 
desired effect (Interview with author). 
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Below the level of the Prime Minister, Secretaries of State have direct responsibility 
for sport. Most decisions need the approval of Secretaries of State, rather than 
Ministers for Sport, though the Secretaries of State themselves often know little about 
sport. This constant need to seek approval was something the Sports Ministers found 
very frustrating, according to several interviewees. However, during Virginia 
Bottomley's time at National Heritage, she felt she had quite an inclusive managerial 
style. Decisions were, "Made by the ministerial team as a whole. I think we took 
shared decisions, with me having the ultimate say" (Interview: 29 June 2007). 
The turnover of Secretaries of State has actually been very frequent, indeed much 
more frequent than for Ministers for Sport. From 1964 to 2008, no less than 24 
different Cabinet Ministers were responsible for sport, compared with 13 Ministers 
for Sport at the junior level who reported to them (see Appendix 2). In only six years 
at National Heritage or Culture, Media and Sport, Sir Hayden Phillips worked with 
five different Secretaries of State. In his experience, "It was like starting again each 
time" (Interview: 3 July 2007) in terms of informing them about the job, its 
background, and what was required of them. 
The Cabinet and Prime Minister, although holding enormous power in the machinery 
of government, have not got involved much in sport except on matters of national 
interest, such ~ UK bids for major events, or in times of crises. One former Minister 
commented, ''None of the Secretaries of State I worked with were really interested in 
sport in its wider sense as an activity of government" (Interview with author). One 
former Conservative Minister noted, "There were people such as Norman Tebbitt who 
were not at all keen on the Olympic Games in Britain" (Interview with author). 
Tebbitt was concerned that the government would end up paying for the Games, 
which would only add to public expenditure and taxation. Sir Neil Macfarlane agreed 
that Cabinet Ministers responsible for sport were sometimes not enthusiasts for it. The 
three for whom he worked at sport, Tom King, Patrick Jenkin, and Michael Heseltine 
were, "Not really too interested in sport" (Interview: 9 January 2007), though they 
were not antagonistic to it as Tebbitt was. In fact: 
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I think in some respects the Foreign Secretary was more interested in sport 
because of the situation internationally with apartheid and other matters. Sport 
would always come up to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
which the Prime Minister attended and it would always come up on the 
various agendas whenever the Foreign Secretary travelled to the United 
Nations. I went to the Cabinet two or three times before the World Cup in 
1982 to talk about it, and about tours to South Africa, and when several South 
African teams came here to play rugby. All that caused many problems, and of 
course there was the famous D'Oliveira case some years before (Interview: 9 
January 2007). 
Of the many Secretaries of State responsible for sport, only David MelIor was 
perceived as, "Genuinely keen on sport as well as the arts" (Interview with author), 
according to a civil servant close to him. But Mellor lasted only a few months until he 
had to resign due to a scandal in his personal life, deemed incompatible with the 
government's "back to basics" campaign at the time. David Pickup worked with him 
during his short time at National Heritage and thought highly of him: 
The first Secretary of State at National Heritage, David MelIor, was very good 
for sport, having a personal interest in football. Since it was a new department, 
the civil servants had a more pioneering attitude, setting up new structures, 
and putting sport in a more central position. They were keen to develop sport 
and open to persuasion on the Lottery (Interview: 29 November 2006). 
According to a civil servant, Peter Brooke as National Heritage Secretary was, "A 
lovely civilised man, not interested much in sport apart from cricket," while Stephen 
Dorrell, "Showed no interest at all, though his father had played cricket once at 
county level for Worcestershire". Chris Smith, when Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport, "Was a strange guy who spent much of the time licking the arse of 
Tony Blair. He was not interested in sports policy at all". Another civil servant 
commented that, "Tessa Jowell is not a very powerful figure and was always going to 
do what she was told by the Prime Minister". Going further back, "Peter Shore and 
Tony Crossland were serious politicians who would listen to a serious case from 
Denis Howell" and take decisions based on his advice (Interviews with author). 
Neil Macfarlane illustrated the difficulties of getting Cabinet Ministers interested in 
sport, observing that, "We never really had policy discussions around a table. Policy 
for sport didn't come from Cabinet Ministers at all, at least not when I was in office. 
It was worked out at much lower level, usually with civil servants" (Interview: 9 
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January 2007). Richard Tracey, while agreeing that this was generally true, observed 
that Secretaries of State do need to get involved for the higher-level issues or when 
things matter to them. 
For example, Kenneth Baker and Nicholas Ridley, as Secretaries of State for the 
Environment, became involved in the Birmingham and Manchester Olympic bids for 
1992 and 1996 (in 1985 and 1989 respectively) because these were decisions that 
needed government endorsement at Cabinet level. Nicholas Ridley also took an 
interest in tobacco sponsorship of sport, if only to block the regulation that Tracey 
wanted. One civil servant said that Ridley tried to abolish the Sports Council because 
he did not like quangos. In his recollection, "Ridley was told it was established by 
Royal Charter. He baulked at the idea of going to the Queen to say this body which 
you established by Royal Charter is something we would like to get rid of'. Later on 
the Duke of Edinburgh told him he should have come to him and he would have 
squared it with the Queen, since he hated the Sports Council and much preferred the 
Central Council of Physical Recreation of which he was patron (Interview with 
author). Ridley's feel for sport was not one shared by the majority of people. A 
ministerial colleague said of him: 
He was interested in hunting, shooting, and fishing as the second son of a 
viscount would be. He said he had been to one football match in the whole of 
his life, at St. James's Park in Newcastle. He made no bones about the fact that 
he regarded sport as something for other people if it wasn't hunting, shooting 
and fishing. He had no particular liking for what most people would 
understand by sport (Interview with author). 
Another civil servant was an under-secretary in the sports division of the Department 
of the Environment where sport was located before its current home at DCMS. In the 
early 1980s, he observed little government enthusiasm for sport when the state was 
drawing back from involvement in as many areas of public life as possible under Mrs 
Thatcher, supported by Cabinet Ministers such as Nicholas Ridley, who were not at 
all interested in sport. In his opinion, "I think it would be fair to say that at that time 
sport was not a major feature in the priorities of the Department nor indeed of the 
government. The government's interest in it rose and fell in those days depending on 
the level of football hooliganism" (Interview with author). 
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Many of the interviewees have suggested that it was really civil servants that had the 
most significant impact on government sports policy. For example, a senior sports 
administrator from a national body suggested that, "The overall strategy for sport is a 
political thing that comes from DCMS and its team of civil servants" (Interview with 
author). An administrator from different sports body said: 
The civil servants have the benefit of all the policy details, through years of 
service. The Minister gets a one-page briefing, setting out the pros and cons of 
a case, written by the civil servants. So the civil servants are bound to be very 
influential because they control the information that gets put before the 
Minister (Interview with author). 
A civil servant, while agreeing that the colleagues in his team were quite influential in 
drafting policy details for sport, had a high regard for ministerial input. He expressed 
it this way: 
I feel that the best Ministers steer you in the direction of travel. They will give 
you a very clear steer and let you work out the detail. lain Sproat was very 
good that way - he always knew where he wanted to go and gave a very clear 
steer. He then left it to me and others to flesh out his ideas. It's very much a 
teamwork thing with Ministers interacting with civil servants (Interview with 
author). 
This same civil servant also worked with Richard Caborn and had a very positive 
view of him as a leader. In turn, Mr. Caborn himself was very appreciative of the 
people he worked with: 
There's one thing you have to do and that's to make it very clear what the 
direction of travel is. It's really teamwork and I had a fantastic team working 
for me. We worked towards the achievement of the change agenda, with 
modernisation at the heart of it. We put sport right at the centre of the 
government's agenda. At the end of the day I made the decisions, though I had 
a very good relationship with the civil servants. It was a close and effective 
team we had (Interview: 27 March 2008). 
Most of the former Ministers interviewed had a similar view of the policy process. 
While they could come up with policy ideas themselves, they relied on civil servants 
to make them workable. One of them described the relationship in the following 
terms: 
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In my experience, it was civil servants who mainly got what they wanted 
because they had control over the process of giving out money and they knew 
how to manipulate the levers of government most effectively. Ministers come 
and Ministers go but the civil servants have the benefit of continuity and a 
longer view of things (Interview with author). 
But within the civil service, the greatest contribution was usually made by those at 
levels below that of Permanent Secretary, since they tended to be seen as close to, if 
not part of, the core executive, with higher affairs of state to deal with than mere 
sport. Lord Smith felt that his Permanent Secretary at the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport, Sir Hayden Phillips, was not strong in that area, observing, "I think 
it's probably fair to say that Hayden didn't take a huge interest in sport. He wasn't 
really interested in sports policy at all and left it to more junior officials" (Interview: 
18 June 2007). This was also the view of Baroness Bottomley who said, "I have no 
recollection of Hayden ever becoming involved in sports policy or of sport being his 
first love" (Interview: 29 June 2007), because of his greater appreciation of the arts. 
However, Sir Hayden regards himself as a great sports-lover, especially of football 
and cricket, even if he was not as closely involved in sports policy-making as the 
more junior officials. In fact, he was later asked to become chairman of UK Sport but 
declined the invitation and instead became chairman of the National Theatre 
(Interview: 3 July 2007). Chris Smith thought that Sir Hayden's successor, Sir Robin 
Young, took more of a hands-on interest in sport. He observed that: 
Robin was genuinely keen on looking at how football and other sports were 
developing and what we ought to do in terms of future policy in relation to 
elite sport and so on, though he too left much of it to his under-secretary and 
others. Policy ideas for sport really came from lower down in the civil service 
because neither Hayden nor Robin were specialists in that area, having come 
up through the traditional route of moving between departments (Interview: 18 
June 2007). 
Thus, for most interviewees, the civil service (mainly the DCMS currently, and at 
National Heritage, Education, or Environment where sport has been located in the 
past) was viewed as the key actor in sports policy-making in government, rather than 
the Prime Minister or Cabinet Ministers in most cases. It should be borne in mind 
though that civil servants are rarely experts in sport when they are appointed to deal 
with it. Because of the way the civil service operates, senior staff are moved from one 
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area of policy to another every few years. A civil servant commented that, "It's one of 
the benefits of the civil service that you get to do many different jobs, and I've moved 
in and out of sport several times over the years" (Interview with author). Another 
illustrated it this way: 
I had absolutely no formal qualifications in sport; nor indeed did any of my 
predecessors. It's probably true of my successors as well. I was under-
secretary for the construction industry. The Permanent Secretary simply 
decided that, since I'd been doing it for six years it was time for me to do 
something else. So it was as accidental as that (Interview with author). 
Therefore, although civil servants were generally perceived as the single most 
important engine for producing and driving sports policy, most of those who did this 
were relative juniors in the field. Interviewees in the devolved administrations agreed 
that this was also the case there, with civil servants moving around departments to 
further their careers. When they became thoroughly familiar with the area, they were 
usually moved to a new sector of work somewhere else in the Whitehall, Cardiff, 
Belfast, or Edinburgh machines, perhaps to forestry or transport. They were then 
replaced in the sports divisions by others who knew little of the subject. In fact, some 
of them were quite unsuitable for the positions they held, as one respondent remarked: 
The office was well run by competent heads of department. But the DCMS is 
a dustbin department. If you foul up somewhere else, even the Home Office, 
you get sent to DCMS. It was full of some good people, but also the walking 
wounded that you wouldn't have employed to deliver your Sunday papers. But 
on the whole, they didn't come up with policies or ideas very often. They were 
mostly against everything and advised caution (Interview with author). 
Although civil servants have tended to act in a way that primarily ensures continuity 
and stability, their contribution to sports policy has been vital because of their grip on 
the administrative machinery. However, the "high-fliers" have tended to opt for 
policy sectors that were regarded as more important, such as the Treasury or Defence, 
or they were talent-spotted early on and directed towards those areas. Sport was seen 
as less attractive and not conducive to promotion to the highest levels for either civil 
servants or Ministers. 
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5.6 The Role of Non-Government Bodies in Influencing Government Sports 
Policy 
The government has no significant influence on the governing bodies of the large 
professional sports, such as football, rugby, cricket, golf, or tennis, which mainly 
finance themselves, develop their own policies, and look after their own interests. 
Conversely, since they are not large recipients of government money, they do not seek 
to influence government sports policy in the main, unless they are concerned with 
such issues as betting, taxation, or the free movement of players from abroad. In fact, 
matters of this sort could be seen as not really on the sporting agenda at all, but rather 
as concerns to be dealt with by the Treasury or Home Office. One former Minister for 
Sport commented: 
I tended not to have a great deal to do with them, except when I met some of 
the chairmen or chief executives at sporting events. We had no formal 
arrangements for meetings, though I did sometimes have them into my office. 
This was more likely with football, in response to some crisis or other, or 
incident of hooliganism. I usually went to annual conferences of the Sports 
Council or CCPR, but not often to those of the individual organisations. There 
were far too many of them and, as we've already discussed, I had a lot to do 
besides sport. I did go to some annual dinners of the bigger ones and knew 
most of the main people in an informal sort of way (Interview with author). 
Indeed, sports such as football can largely ignore government or resist it on issues 
where they want to do so, such as football ID cards. As David Pickup said, "The more 
wealthy professional sports could effectively set their own policies and more or less 
ignore the Sports Council and government" (Interview: 29 November 2006). But as 
he also pointed out, they cannot always do so. Recently the Football Association has 
half-heartedly signed up to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) code of 
practice12 in relation to performance-enhancing drugs in order to continue receiving 
funding for grass-roots football, and to have the potential for future UK Olympic 
participation in the game. Richard Caborn felt that most of the top professional sports 
needed to be reformed, but he took a particular interest in football: 
I tried hard to introduce reforms for some of them. For instance, the FA was a 
major target for me. If you look at cricket, rugby league, boxing, swimming 
and others, they all needed to be reformed. But football was one of the 
toughest nuts to crack because they were so insular. I got the Bums' report on 
them, and eventually, after two and a half years, they agreed to an independent 
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chairman (Interview: 27 March 2008). 
The numerous governing bodies of the mass-participation sports, which are largely 
amateur, have their own policies for cycling, athletics, ice hockey, basketball, and so 
on. According to David Pickup they were, "more reliant on Sports Council funding 
and therefore more amenable to Sports Council influence on issues like doping 
control" (Interview: 29 November 2006). It was felt by some that the number of 
governing bodies was excessive, often overlapping with each other at times. For 
instance, a former Sports Minister said: 
There are too many governing bodies for the Minister to deal with. They need 
to cut down the bureaucracy in the governing bodies and stop so much overlap 
with them. Some sports have more than one body, such as football with the 
League, the FA, etc. That pattern is repeated throughout sport, much of which 
is still basically amateur. It really needs reforming and professionalized 
(Interview with author). 
Their representative umbrella body, the Central Council of Physical Recreation 
(CCPR), sees itself as the upholder of all these organisations' policies in the sporting 
world and as their representative in discussions with government. Dame Mary Glen 
Haig, a senior office-holder there for many years, described it as: 
A wonderful organisation. I have always preferred it to the Sports Council. I 
think sport is best left to run itself. That's really what the CCPR wants and has 
always wanted. It wants the least possible government interference (Interview: 
10 May 2007). 
However, Dame Mary went on to remark that: 
You just can't expect the government to put money into sport and then go 
away and leave it alone. The government has always expected to have some 
influence in return and that was through the Sports Council and the bodies that 
followed it (Interview: 10 May 2007). 
The CCPR has undergone a review recently, with the aIm of refocussing its 
campaigning and consciousness-raising activities for the 270 member organisations. It 
has quietly gone about lobbying government and has had some success in influencing 
policies. Ben Andersen-Tuffuell and Richard Tacon provided some good examples, 
including the exemption of sports organisations from the requirements of tighter laws 
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on stewards and bouncers. These were originally intended to affect places such as 
pubs and night-clubs, but inadvertently caught up small sports clubs. Successful 
lobbying by the CCPR has mitigated the impact. 
With a staff of only 22, the CCPR tends to think it can punch above its weight in 
terms of policy influence because it is not financed directly by government grant (this 
is really a fiction, since the bulk of its finance comes indirectly via Sport England) 
and has more freedom to lobby than those which are. One civil servant took a 
different view of the CCPR, which he described as having, "minimal influence in 
sports policy so far as we are concerned. For many years they were seen as a bit of an 
irritant" (Interview with author). Nevertheless, he did agree that the current strong 
leadership at the organisation was making it more effective and influential. 
Most interviewees felt the amount of public money going into sport before the 
National Lottery was really quite small, a sentiment actually supported by the Queen. 
One civil servant reported a conversation at a Buckingham Palace reception: 
We were all introduced to the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh, and the 
Queen clearly who didn't know a great deal about it, when introduced to me 
said, "How much money does my government give to the Sports Council?" 
So I said, "About £40 million ma'am." To which she replied, "That sounds 
incredibly mean, given the number of people in the country who are 
passionately interested in sport. We need to provide more sporting facilities 
for children. I do find that a very small amount of money that my government 
gives" (Interview with author). 
Although the government may exercise some influence on the representative bodies 
because it provides finance through UK Sport, Sport England, the National Lottery, 
and in other ways, it must always respect their independence because these 
organisations can resist the government when they want to. For instance, when the 
government wanted them to boycott the 1980 Olympics, it could not count on their 
support. The BOA, and many governing bodies, simply would not do what the 
government told them to do and went to the Games despite the government's wishes. 
Almost all the interviewees in this study supported the decision to attend the 1980 
Olympics, as this comment from a politician illustrates: 
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I went because I argued that I was going to Olympia. I didn't go to Russia. I 
arrived when the Olympic flag was up and I left before it came down. It's a bit 
like the Vatican; Olympia is separate wherever it is and becomes almost a 
mini-state for the duration of the Games. I had all the trappings of the leader of 
the country. I had the official Union Jack, I had the car, the interpreter, and I 
did very well out of it. I saw Seb Coe get his gold, as well as the others like 
Wells and Thompson (Interview with author). 
The BOA's response was to protect its own interests for the longer term by attending 
the Olympics, though it was pointed out by the BOA spokesman in his interview that 
nowadays the government could easily withdraw funding for elite athletes. This 
would be a very powerful tool in getting the governing bodies to comply with the 
government's wishes, something not available to them in 1980 (Interview with 
author). 
Generally, the BOA was seen as very good at looking after its own niche area of elite 
Olympic sport, with only 35 member organisations. A typical comment, in this case 
from a former Cabinet Minister, was, "The British Olympic Association did an 
excellent job for Olympic sports, which of course is only a small part of sport in 
general. It's the elite end" (Interview with author). Interviewees did not feel that the 
BOA had much ongoing influence on government sports policy, with the possible 
exception of drug testing. The BOA considers the recent decision to establish an 
independent drug-testing agency, separate from UK Sport, as a very big result for 
them, something they have been lobbying for over many years (Interview with 
author). 
The role of outside bodies, such as the Sports Council (and its later manifestations), 
the CCPR, and the BOA on influencing government policies was actually viewed as 
quite limited on the whole, being mainly concerned with developing their own 
policies. While they often thought they were influential on government, and liked to 
believe that this was the case, their views were frequently just noted rather than 
implemented. Nevertheless, one in particular, UK Sport, was seen as a small but 
outstanding body. A civil servant described it as being, "Excellent, with very clear 
objectives and good leadership" (Interview with author). He went on to say that: 
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It's no coincidence that UK Sport and the Youth Sport Trust are both headed 
by Sue Campbell. Sue is probably the most influential person in British sport 
in the past ten years, I'd say without any hesitation. She's an absolute force for 
good, gives really strong leadership, and the two organisations she chairs are 
very efficient, lean, and well-regarded (Interview with author). 
UK Sport has a very narrow focus for the elite end of around 40 sports. By contrast, 
Sport England and the former Sports Council have had a much wider remit over many 
more sports. One former Minister for Sport regarded the Sports Council as, "A 
terrible organisation to work with. They were very unhelpful to me and tried to fight 
against government policy all the time". He went on to say that, "The Sports Council 
and the CCPR probably thought that they drove sports policy in Britain, but they 
really didn't (Interview with author). 
Patrick Cheney, an adviser to Howell and Hoey, had a similar view of the Sports 
Council. He said: 
The Sports Council was always a pain in the arse, from the time of Howell and 
Macfarlane, through to all the others. The Tories mistakenly and wrongly for 
political reasons gave it executive powers. We had always said it should have 
advisory powers; they should advise the Minister and the Minister take the 
decisions. When they became independent they were always double-checking 
what we were doing and we were checking what they were doing, so it created 
an awful lot of extra work for no added benefit. As far as policy was 
concerned they didn't seem to contribute much at all. It fell into the hands of 
Tory cronies who were barristers and such like, and people like Brasher, and 
we fought them all the way (Interview with author). 
It was felt by some interviewees that the influence of the Sports Council on 
government seems to have become diluted in recent years, after its transformation into 
the English Sport Council then Sport England in the mid-1990s. For instance, as 
Mihir Warty put it: 
I think we've moved on from being the government's main adviser. The 
Sports Council in Denis Howell's time was unique - there was only one main 
body in the UK. Now we have us in Sport England, UK Sport, the devolved 
bodies, and so on (Interview: 7 February 2008). 
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Since the larger bodies representing the UK or England have already been discussed, 
the contribution made by the regional organisations and governments will now be 
considered. 
5.7 The Role of the Devolved Administrations and Sports Bodies in 
Influencing Government Sports Policy 
Although the government receives advice from an increasing number of sources, there 
was no support at all for the idea of networks or coalitions driving policy because 
these do not work together in a co-ordinated way. It was felt that policy emerged in a 
very diffuse manner from them. As one former Minister said, "There was certainly no 
coherent British sports policy with all these organisations" (Interview with author). 
Indeed, some interviewees felt that there was too much dilution of effort because of 
the large number of competing and overlapping bodies, each with their own sports 
policies. According to Dame Mary Glen Haig: 
You know the worst thing that's happened to British sport? With all these 
bodies like UK Sport and Sport England, and so on, it's the fragmentation into 
too many bodies trying to administer it, or help it, or interfere with it. It's the 
England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales divisions that are the worst. They all have 
their own sports councils and Sports Ministers. It's just ridiculous and it 
dilutes the effort at the national level. It's very bad. Of course, with a name 
like mine and a mother whose name was Bannochie I think I can say that the 
Scots are probably the worst of all and the least helpful. They are far too 
insular and inward looking. You can cope with what the Welsh and the Irish 
don't like, but not the Scots (Interview: 10 May 2007). 
David Pickup, formerly of the Sports Council, takes a similarly robust view of the 
devolved bodies. He thought they were, "Always poking their noses in. They saw the 
UK Minister as English, and who represented only England, though this was not true" 
(Interview: 29 November 2006). This view was shared by many interviewees, as a 
typical comment from a civil servant illustrates: 
Time was often wasted. It was spent in an interminable dance between the 
English, Welsh, Scottish, and Northern Irish Sports Councils and their 
relationship with the UK Sports Council. The national jealousies versus the 
UK's overall interests took up a lot of time to manage and handle (Interview 
with author). 
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According to Lords Hattersley and Rodgers, Denis Howell definitely did not hold the 
view that he was just the English Sports Minister. They felt that he was a man of great 
integrity who saw it as his duty to represent the whole of the United Kingdom. All the 
former Ministers for Sport interviewed also saw themselves as Ministers for Britain in 
its entirety, despite having difficulties convincing the regional bodies that this was the 
case. 
However, Patricia Ferguson, the former Scottish Sports Minister, had no problem with 
Richard Caborn as the UK. Minister for Sport. She felt that he was inclusive, 
consensual, and very sensitive to the needs of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
The establishment of a "sports cabinet" in 1998 to bring them all together on a six-
monthly basis in London, Cardiff, Belfast, and Edinburgh helped to overcome the 
regional problems, at least on some occasions. It made it easier to resolve policy 
issues that affected the whole of the UK. For example, she recalls that: 
One of the very early things we did was getting all the home nations signed up 
for the Glasgow Commonwealth Games bid for 2014. So it meant we could 
announce that we had the home nations in agreement for the Glasgow bid and 
it meant we could tie in their votes more or less (Interview: 24 August 2007). 
A significant reason for this apparent consensus in the "sports cabinet" may be the 
way in which it operated. Eric Saunders, Chairman of Sport Northern Ireland, who 
has attended every meeting since 2000, agreed that the main meetings were usually 
harmonious and without controversy. This was largely achieved because: 
The UK Secretary of State chairs a meeting the night before and I suspect that 
they've carved up everything there at that. So there isn't an awful lot of 
controversy at the actual meetings themselves (Interview: 1 October 2007). 
This view is supported by Peter Smith at UK. Sport, whose chair, Sue Campbell, 
attends all meetings. In his opinion, "Not much seems to come out of it in terms of 
decisions. I don't see many outputs from where I am, I have to admit" (Interview: 23 
November 2007). According to sources in Wales, its main function was to bring 
Ministers and senior civil servants together to discuss current issues in sport, rather 
than take policy decisions (Interviews with author). This is a view shared by an 
English civil servant, who went on to suggest that: 
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I really don't see it having much impact. If it didn't happen you would not 
notice any difference. It's in no sense a policy-making forum. Its useful 
purpose is to share knowledge, ideas, and information. If Ministers were really 
passionate about it, then it would happen more often (Interview with author). 
Before the innovation of the "sports cabinet", the situation of tensions between the 
"home countries" and England gave David Pickup endless problems and certainly did 
not lead to coherent policy networks. While there might be temporary coalitions on 
specific and limited issues, such as lobbying for a Birmingham Olympic bid in the 
1980s (local authorities, Sports Council, MPs, BOA, etc.), or a Commonwealth 
Games bid as illustrated by Patricia Ferguson for 2014, there was little evidence of 
these in the longer term. David Pickup noted that: 
In terms of making policy, there were no discernible networks as such. 
Ministers met with us, the CCPR, and the BOA at different times, but not 
together. I think policy was made pretty much on the hoof - we had ideas 
which we put to the Minister from time to time, and he sometimes took them 
up. Otherwise, they responded to events and made up policy in a crisis 
(Interview: 29 November 2006). 
This view was echoed by a senior civil servant, who worked closely with Pickup 
throughout his time at the Sports Council: 
In my experience, sports policy largely happened by accident according to 
who the people were and how they acted in particular situations. Of course 
there were bits and pieces coming from all over, including the Sports Council, 
the CCPR, Ministers, governing bodies, and others. Naturally, people whose 
whole life was sports administration of one sort or another had ideas and plans 
for sport. But there was no great scheme of things to fit them all together in a 
policy programme (Interview with author). 
Sir Hayden Phillips had a slightly different view of sports policy-making. He felt that 
it was an interrelationship of Ministers and civil servants on the one side, while on the 
other were the quangos that were funded by government (that is Sport England and 
UK Sport primarily), together with the governing bodies of the sports themselves, 
represented by the CCPR. Into this mix were then thrown all the devolved bodies to 
muddy the waters even further. As one who was new to sports politics, he discovered 
it to be a much more complicated area than he had originally thought, although the 
BOA did not play a significant part in any kind of coalition or network across sport in 
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his opinion (Interview: 3 July 2007). 
The most recently retired Minister for SPOI4 Richard Cabom, also saw sports policy 
as something that was continuously evolving, with influences coming from all around 
the regions and devolved administrations of the UK. He illustrated it thus in 
describing where sports policy comes from: 
It comes from all over, actually. Ideas come from the civil servants, the 
governing bodies, the Sports Minister, the bodies like UK Sport and Sport 
England, plus those in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. There's no 
single source. It's a mixture of all these things. To be absolutely honest, it's a 
question of who is the stronger at any time. You will find that not much comes 
from the Secretary of State, but that the Secretary of State has the 
responsibility for it. If they don't do anything the civil servants will do it. It's 
about people and it's about people with convictions who can make things 
happen. I had a very clear view of where I wanted to go and what I wanted to 
do. We used to discuss things round a table and get contributions from 
everybody, so there's often no single clear source of where a policy comes 
from. Lots of people throw their ideas in and what emerges is policy 
(Interview: 27 March 2008). 
As this comment indicates, Mr Caborn did not claim that he was a major source of 
sports policy when he was Minister, being merely one cog in a much larger wheel. 
The contribution that he and other Ministers for Sport made to government sports 
policy will now be discussed below. 
5.8 The Role of the Minister for Sport in Influencing Sports Policy 
It was generally agreed amongst interviewees that Ministers for Sport have had only a 
limited part to play in the government's policy-making process for SPOI4 by giving 
general guidance and direction during their, often, brief tenure. As a civil servant put 
it: 
Some new Ministers want to make their mark by doing something radical, 
though rarely in sport. However, the difficulty with Ministers in my 
experience is getting them to think long-term. They realise that they will 
probably only be there for two or three years so are anxious to do something 
that sets them out from the others. Ifs not always appropriate for long-term 
policy thinking (Interview with author). 
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Interviewees mainly felt the civil service had the major input to everyday policy 
decisions, because they were able to see things over a much longer time-span. 
Additionally, the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers had the ultimate say on the 
more important decisions even if they were not usually interested in sport. 
Thus, there seemed to be something of a paradox in sports policy-making. Secretaries 
of State had to take decisions on sports policy, while knowing relatively little about it. 
Conversely, the Ministers for Sport, who apparently knew the subject well, could not 
take many decisions or influence policy to any great extent. However, Ministers for 
Sport did try to take decisions when they could, sometimes without result. Patrick 
Cheney provided an example in relation to Kate Hoey: 
She was very good on policy. She would always say, "Why don't we do this 
for this reason or not do it for that reason". She tried to take policy decisions 
when she could but it was not always possible at her level. Ultimately, she 
needed the go-ahead of the Secretary of State, who was frightened to take 
policy decisions much of the time. It was her policy to encourage more sport 
in schools, but it was not really Education's, and Chris Smith certainly didn't 
care, so not much progress was made there (Interview: 18 January 2007). 
Other interviewees have argued that trying to get too involved in sports policy was 
probably the most significant factor in Kate Hoey losing office after the 2001 election. 
In one senior administrator's view, "Kate Hoey tried to do too much when she came 
in and very quickly got slapped down for too much policy involvement" (Interview 
with author). She was sacked as Minister for Sport because she tried to take policy 
decisions for which she had no authority at her level in government. For instance, she 
became closely involved in decisions to give the Wembley consortium £120 million 
of Sports Council money for its rebuilding, and then promoting the Pickett's Lock 
scheme as a rival venue for the World Athletics Championships in 2005. These were 
policy issues deemed to be much beyond her status, and she paid the ultimate price by 
being removed from government completely. 
One former Minister commented, "I would say that at my level of government 
(parliamentary Under-Secretary of State) there is relatively little scope to introduce 
new policies or influence them significantly" (Interview with author). This is a 
sentiment shared by most of the interviewees in this study, including those who held 
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the office. The office was seen more as a vehicle for raising the profile of sport, 
encouraging participation, acting as the government's public face for sport, and being 
an advocate for the government's sports policies if such existed at the time. For 
instance, Sir Neil Macfarlane had a very pragmatic view of policy-making. He said: 
Policy was never a strong point for us anyway. We tended just to go about 
things in a commonsense way. Each of the individual sports and governing 
bodies had their own policies and it was not for us to interfere too much. Of 
course there was policy in the sense that we would support this sport or that 
sport but not to tell them how to run their businesses (Interview: 9 January 
2007). 
He was echoing a theme that emerged throughout the interviews; the government did 
not want to run sport, merely to assist it where possible, and at a modest cost until 
large sums became available through the Lottery. In addition, an unexpressed 
government policy of doing nothing effectively saved money (such as by not bidding 
for major events). There was therefore a broad consensus that the Minister for Sport 
has had a fairly limited role in the policy-making process for five main reasons, the 
first of which is confirmed from the quantitative data on parliamentary performance 
presented in Chapter 4 :-
• They have had too many other duties to perform outside of sport and have 
therefore not able to give sufficient time to it 
• They have been too junior within the government machine (i.e. they have always 
been outside Cabinet and usually at the Parliamentary Under-Secretary level) 
• The office is not highly regarded by other Ministers, inside and outside of the 
Cabinet, nor by civil servants 
• Successive governments have not considered sport to be high on their order of 
priorities and the status of the office has suffered as a result 
• The particular personalities of the office-holders have been a factor in limiting 
their effectiveness 
These five factors are not totally separate or mutually exclusive, because there is 
necessarily some overlap between them. (For example, it can sometimes be difficult 
to separate the perception of the office itself from the Minister who held it at any 
164 
given time.) Nevertheless, they provide a series of broad themes with which to view 
the subject and understand it more easily. Each of these will now be considered in 
turn. 
Ca). The Duties of a Minister for Sport 
Earlier calculations using Hansard, presented in Chapter 4, have shown that Ministers 
spent on average only around a quarter of their time on sport. When this suggestion 
was put to Sir Neil Macfarlane he remarked, "Absolutely spot-on. Absolutely right" 
(Interview: 9 January 2007). He described in some detail the whole range of issues he 
dealt with, including Gypsies, planning, ancient monuments, sites of special scientific 
interest, national heritage, zoos, national parks, Royal Parks, nature conservation, land 
reclamation, and much else, which he also wrote about in his account of his time as a 
Minister. He observed that no other Sports Minister in the world had such a range of 
duties as he had at the time. As a result, "I did not spend as much time on sport as I 
would have liked, especially the planning of it and the liaising of it as 1 could have 
done" (Interview: 9 January 2007). Indeed, a civil servant who worked closely with 
him later recounted a three-day trip to the south west of England to look at reservoirs, 
where sport was never discussed at all (Interview with author). 
After the Conservatives won the 1970 election, Eldon Griffiths waited by the 
telephone hoping to be appointed to a post with some bearing on international 
relations, a subject he felt he knew well. He describes what happened when the call 
came from Mr Heath, the Prime Minister: 
"There followed one of the shortest phone conversations 1 ever had in government." 
P .M. "I would like you to serve in my government." 
E.G. "Yes, Prime Minister." 
P.M. "I want you to take on Sport." 
E.G. "Sport?" 
P.M. "I attach a great deal of importance to Sport." 
E.G. "Yes, Prime Minister." 
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P .M. "I will also be refonning the government in a few months' time to do a better 
job on cleaning up the air and waste so you can help us with that too." 
E.G. "Yes, Prime Minister." 
"Did I hesitate? Not for a second." (Email communication: 29 July 2007). 
Sir Eldon then went on to devote the vast majority of his time to the second part of the 
Prime Minister's brief, by working extensively on local government and 
environmental issues. The parliamentary data indicates that almost 90% of his work 
was in this area. All the former Ministers concerned with sport (at every level, 
including Secretary of State) felt that this division of duties could only be a handicap. 
One fonner Sports Minister said: 
Yes, it certainly was a disadvantage most of the time I was there. From the 
sporting point of view it would obviously have been much better to have 
concentrated only on sport, but that was a luxury 1 didn't have. It was always 
envisaged that the Sports Minister doing just sport would not have enough to 
do! I know it sounds silly, but it's true. I certainly could have filled my days 
with only sport, though I think other Ministers would have felt it was just like 
me being on holiday all the time (Interview with author). 
Each Minister for Sport, from 1964 to the present, has in turn been allocated a very 
wide brief, depending on the department where the post has been located in 
government. From the start, Denis Howell had an enonnous workload, which 
inevitably reduced the time he could focus on sport. The bulk of his job at Education 
had absolutely nothing to do with sport in his earliest days. After the 1970 election, 
sport was moved from Education to Environment, where he was also burdened with a 
huge portfolio of non-sports work from 1974 to 1979. Lord Hattersley, a close 
colleague and friend who was in government with him at the time, said "He had a 
great range of things to handle in local government. 1 don't know how he did it all" 
(Interview: 1 May 2007). 
As already noted, Howell was succeeded in 1970 by Eldon Griffiths, who has 
confinned that he devoted even less time to sport than Howell. Only a small 
proportion of his job was actually given over to sport, and that mainly involved 
attending events, perfonning opening ceremonies or going to meetings with civil 
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servants in the Department of the Environment. His main sports policy decision, as he 
saw it, was to give independence by Royal Charter to the Sports Council in 1972, 
something which cost virtually no money. This may be a rare example of "rational" 
policy-making in sport, since it had been planned in Opposition for a long time and 
chosen from a number of possible options (e.g. abolition, reform, merger with CCPR), 
rather than done as a response to a crisis. The vast majority of his time was spent on 
subjects such as roads, motorways, harbours, road safety, railways, rivers, and the 
Local Government Reorganisation Act of 1973 (Email communications: 16 February 
2007 and 29 July 2007). 
This process is repeated for all Ministers up to the creation of the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport in 1997. For instance, Richard Tracey dealt at length with 
regeneration and new towns, as well as his somewhat subsidiary interest of sport. He 
commented, "So you'll understand that, in a Tory government, we were really 
expected to do a lot of other things as well as sport" (Interview: 11 April 2007). Even 
with the creation of National Heritage in 1992, Ministers had very diverse interests. 
lain Sproat agreed that he had a long list of duties, including libraries, museums, film, 
TV, broadcasting, and much else, which was a big disadvantage in terms of the time 
he could give to sport. He spoke regretfully of this: 
Ministers at National Heritage had to multi-task, whereas I think those at the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport now have a very cosy time. 
However, it is not apparent to me that they have done more for sport than I did 
with much less time to do it (Interview: 31 May 2007). 
With the establishment of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport by Chris 
Smith in 1997, Ministers have been able to concentrate more effort on sport, though 
not exclusively so. Kate Hoey's policy adviser, Partick Cheney, suggested that she 
spent around 60% of her time on sport, with the rest on the Lottery, open spaces, TV 
licenses, and other things (Interview: 18 January 2007). This probably understates the 
proportion, since the figures in Chapter 4 show that more than three-quarters of her 
parliamentary activity was concerned with sport. 
Lord Smith felt that Tony Banks did not want to do only sport because he, "was very 
clear that he wanted the heritage and historic buildings aspects of the portfolio as well 
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as sport because that was something that he really enjoyed" (Interview: 18 June 
2007). However, he was careful not to overload him with these other duties, so that he 
could give more emphasis to sport than his predecessors. On the other hand, he felt 
that Kate Hoey would have been happy dealing only with sport, though it was still not 
possible, given the departmental organisation, the number of junior Ministers at his 
disposal, and the responsibilities of the DCMS (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
Even the more recent Ministers are not able to give as much concentrated attention to 
sport as they might wish. For instance, a civil servant has described how an entire 
week of the Minister's time was devoted to licensing and gambling, although the 
focus of the job lies in sport and, "It's what they are mostly interested in" (Interview 
with author). When Richard Cabom was the Minister, he too did much more than just 
sport. He observed, "I had other things to do as well as sport. I did gambling, tourism, 
and other things. But I worked hard. I used to do fifteen or sixteen hours day" 
(Interview: 27 March 2008). 
The general view of the interviewees has been that Ministers for Sport have certainly 
been handicapped because of the many other, not necessarily enjoyable things, they 
have had to do. In a former Cabinet Minister's words, "They took aspects of the 
government's responsibilities which no one else was very keen to have and they gave 
it to the Sports Minister" (Interview with author). None has been able to give full 
attention to sport. To be more involved in the policy-making process they would have 
had to be wholly committed to the subject. Instead, they have had to deal with many 
different sets of civil servants on a daily basis, the very group from which policy tends 
to evolve. This was illustrated by Sir Eldon Griffiths: 
I got two sets of offices, and two lots of private secretaries. This reflected my 
two jobs - as Minister for Sport, a role that Peter Walker told me to "handle as 
you think fit" and as Graham Page's number two in charge of local 
government (Email communication: 29 July 2007). 
Sir Neil Macfarlane felt that it was sometimes difficult to separate out all the different 
activities and read up on the briefs provided by civil servants (Interview: 9 January 
2007), a problem not encountered by a Minister dealing with education or taxation 
exclusively. Nevertheless, all Ministers for Sport have had to give much of their time 
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to activities outside sport, including those in the devolved administrations of the UK. 
Patricia Ferguson, for example, observed that, when she was Scottish Sports Minister, 
"I had the tourism and culture bits as well as sport, and I also had international 
development, architecture, heritage, and that kind of thing. So it was quite a wide 
brief in the same way that the UK Ministers have had" (Interview: 24 August 2007). 
This pattern is repeated in the other devolved areas of the UK. The Welsh Minister 
has heritage, tourism, ancient monuments, and the Welsh language as part of his job, 
while in Northern Ireland the Minister dealing with sport also has to cover a wide 
brief. According to Eric Saunders: 
I think that within his remit there's something like twelve different activities 
he does in the Department for Culture, Arts and Leisure. The two major ones 
are sport and the arts. It's up to the Minister really to decide which way he 
wants to go (Interview: 1 October 2007). 
In reality, while all the Ministers in the UK and devolved governments do have some 
discretion according to their own particular interests, they are fairly circumscribed as 
to how they exercise this. They are all given a portfolio of duties, of which sport is 
invariably just one part. Since they are normally at the lowest level in government, 
they are not in a position to pick and choose or delegate the things that they do not 
want. The senior Ministers, in fact, delegate administrative tasks to them, though not 
usually the significant policy-making functions which they keep to themselves. This 
will now be examined in the next section. 
Cb). The Seniority of a Minister for Sport 
The office of Minister for Sport has always been held at a junior ministerial level of 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary or Minister of State. Junior Ministers are very much 
the dogs-bodies in any government department, as many commentators have 
suggested. Sir John Nott said, "I was a junior Minister at the Treasury during the 
Heath government and I think junior Ministers have a very rough time. They are not 
usually appointed by the Secretary of State but are foisted on them by the Prime 
Minister or the Whips" (Interview: 5 June 2007). Conversely, Lord Smith felt that 
junior Ministers at the Treasury, "might carrY some weight" (Interview: 18 June 
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2007) compared with other departments, but these were rare exceptions. Ministers for 
Sport were always in departments far removed from the Treasury, which was 
regarded as close to the centre of government power. 
All the Ministers for Sport seem to have been appointed in a similar way to that 
described by Sir John Nott and Sir Eldon Griffiths, with little or no say from the 
relevant Secretary of State who would have direct control OVer them. For instance, 
Lord Smith confirmed that this was the case for his two Ministers for Sport. He 
claimed that, "Both Tony Banks and Kate Hoey, the two Ministers who worked with 
me over four years in government, were appointed by the Prime Minister. Now this 
came completely out of the blue for me" (Interview: 18 June 2007). To his regret, he 
had no say in their appointment, though he generally worked well with them. In the 
case of Banks, "I enthusiastically welcomed the appointment. He was a character with 
a capital C" (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
When Hoey stepped down in June 2001, Richard Caborn took her place immediately. 
He described how he had discussed sport many times over the years with Alastair 
Campbell, and that it was Campbell who, "set the ball rolling. Then I got a call from 
No. 10 after the 2001 election asking me if I wanted to do the sports job" (Interview: 
27 March 2008). He accepted out of love for sport, because this was a sideways move 
in terms of seniority as a Minister of State, which was his current level. 
lain Sproat had been a junior Minister at Trade and Industry for two years from 1981 
to 1983. He then lost his seat in 1983, which set back his political career, until he 
returned to Parliament in 1992. In May 1993 he got a call from the Prime Minister's 
office, asking him to go to 10 Downing Street. He describes the experience thus: 
I went, not knowing what to expect, and there was John sitting on his own at 
the long Cabinet table. The first thing he said to me was, "What are we going 
to do about England?" and I replied, "Well, I think it's a bit much asking Alex 
Stewart to be captain and also be the opening batsman, so that needs to be 
changed." Then he said to me, "No, no. I meant what are we going to do about 
the country, the economy and all that? It's all a bit of a mess" (Interview: 31 
May 2007). 
While lain Sproat was unable to offer an immediate solution to the economIC 
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difficulties, John Major offered him the job of Minister for Sport at Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary level, which he was pleased to accept. Although he would have liked 
a Cabinet-level position, the nine years' absence from Parliament had probably made 
it impossible at his age. Two years later he was promoted to Minister of State, still not 
making the Cabinet, although he is the only Conservative Sports Minister out of eight 
to have been given this rank (Interview: 31 May 2007). 
Lord Rodgers felt that that being a junior Minister was undoubtedly a disadvantage 
for Denis Howell, who was claimed by many interviewees as probably the most 
influential of all the Ministers for Sport. In addition, the subject area itself was viewed 
as being at the fringes of government, according to Lord Rodgers: 
Sport was seen as a peripheral issue and I think that because Denis became a 
Minister for other things that must have reduced what he could do for sport. 
It's the same in any government job; the lower down you are the less you can 
do on your own initiative. The Secretaries of' State may have delegated, but 
they were only delegating the things they didn't want to do themselves. I don't 
remember any ofthem as being especially interested in sport and I'm sure they 
didn't take it particularly seriously. They would have been quite happy to 
leave it to Denis because it wasn't seen as important (Interview: 21 March 
2007). 
Lord Donoughue takes a similar view to that of Bill Rodgers, suggesting that Howell 
was handicapped in being outside of the Cabinet. He was constantly striving to get 
things done, to get money for sport, and to raise its profile, often with little support 
from his Secretary of State. In fact he sometimes went over the head of his Secretary 
of State and appealed directly to the Prime Minister for support. Donoughue provides 
a valuable insight from his position as head of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit in the 
1970s: 
Certainly, a problem he had as a junior Minister was that he was always 
dependent on the Secretary of State that he worked with. Someone like Tony 
Crosland, who was brilliant man, wasn't really interested in sport. So Denis 
had difficulty mobilising support above him politically and that's why Harold 
Wilson was good because Wilson gave him the support from No. 10 that he 
often didn't get from his Secretaries of State. Gordon Walker wasn't interested 
in sport and Ted Short wasn't really, although Ted understood about local 
authorities. So that's why he often needed the Prime Minister. In the seventies, 
when I was in there, he and I met regularly and he used me as a channel to get 
through to Wilson to try to get him to be interested. If Wilson was interested, 
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then the Secretaries of State had to be interested. If the Prime Minister gave a 
lead they had to follow (Interview: 7 March 2007). 
Donoughue also confirms that he saw HoweIl as Cabinet material. When head of the 
Prime Minister's Policy Unit in 1978 he advised James Callaghan to bring Howell 
into the Cabinet as Minister for Transport or Chief Whip. Unfortunately for Howell, 
the "Winter of Discontent" came along in 1978-79. Callaghan did not reshuffie his 
Cabinet and Howell was therefore left out. Callaghan wanted stability at that time and 
it suited him to leave Howell in a job he did well (Interview: 7 March 2007). 
The Westminster model of a junior Minister reporting to a Cabinet Minister has not 
been adopted in the devolved governments of the UK, largely because there are not 
enough members in the regional assemblies or parliaments to permit this. Before the 
May 2007 election, the Scottish Cabinet was composed of around ten members, only 
some of whom had deputies. Patricia Ferguson did not have a deputy to help her cover 
her wide range of duties. As she said, "I didn't have one and I was all on my own" 
(Interview: 24 August 2007). However, she was more senior in the Scottish 
government than a comparable UK Minister would be at Westminster. Had Labour 
won that election, and the bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games been successful, it 
was intended that she would have become a Cabinet Minister dealing only with sport. 
Since the Scottish National Party narrowly won the 2007 election, the importance of 
sport within the government has actually declined. They have reduced the Cabinet to 
only six members, with sport being part of a much wider brief. 
When Labour lost its majority in Wales after the June 2007 election, the party entered 
a coalition with Plaid Cymru, giving the Welsh Nationalists three Cabinet seats out of 
ten. Interviewees in Wales noted that this included the one which covered sport. The 
post went to Rhodri Glyn Thomas, who became Minister for Heritage. Like his 
Labour predecessor, Alun Pugh (Minister for Culture, Welsh Language, and Sport 
2003-07), his brief is a wide one, but more at the centre of the devolved government 
than would be the case in Westminster. As one respondent observed, "I think it is 
regarded more highly here in Wales because of the way it is organised. The post is 
held at a more senior level than in England, because it is at the Cabinet level" 
(Interview with author). There are no junior Ministers as such in the Welsh Assembly 
172 
government. While there are deputies for some posts, as in Scotland, Heritage does 
not have one. 
Eric Saunders agreed that the position has generally been similar in Northern Ireland, 
with an all-purpose Minister at a more senior level than Westminster. However, their 
position in the policy-making hierarchy is still quite limited in two ways: they are 
junior within the Northern Ireland system and they have the additional hurdle of 
Westminster in the background. He described it like this: 
Let's face it, if there was a major policy decision it would be the First Minister 
in each of the home countries who would bring this to the attention of the 
Prime Minister. It wouldn't be the Sports Minister. It would have to be a fairly 
high level policy decision. Otherwise, policy decisions are made within the 
home countries (Interview: 1 October 2007). 
David Pickup could see how the Westminster government worked from the vantage 
point of the Sports Council in Great Britain. As an outside observer he was able to 
give an realistic assessment of how much influence Sports Ministers really had. In his 
OpInIOn: 
Ministers could influence policy in many relatively small ways, for example 
doping control, disability sport, encouraging participation by women, blacks, 
etc, establishing a playing fields register as Moynihan did, approving 
expenditure up to a certain level (I think it was £250,000 when I was there). 
But because their position in government is at the bottom end they could not 
take high-level policy decisions. If it was a case of major expenditure, the 
Secretary of State would be involved, and probably the Treasury as well, so 
the Minister was rather boxed in (Interview: 29 November 2006). 
Civil servants were seen as being very astute at working out who was important in 
government. Their first loyalty is generally to their Secretary of State. They presume 
that he or she is the only one really able to introduce new policies or take decisions. 
One former Sports Minister said, "I felt like I was reporting to the Permanent 
Secretary, who in turn reported to the Secretary of State. There's a subtle distinction 
there, in that I was seen as not really having direct access to the Secretary of State" 
(Interview with author). Another former Minister for Sport had this to say about civil 
servants: 
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The civil servants were actually more obstructive on policy initiatives than the 
Secretaries of State were. They always wanted things to go through them for 
referral upwards to get a decision. They assumed that a junior Minister 
couldn't take decisions, since these were for the Secretary of State to do. They 
were invariably bright, able, lively people to work with but always bound up 
with civil service norms and traditional ways of working (Interview with 
author). 
Even under the later structures of National Heritage and the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport, the position of junior Ministers has not changed. lain Sproat, and 
almost all the other interviewees, felt that the job would never be in the Cabinet 
because that could not be justified. As a result, "My job was really too junior to 
change things, even with the backing of the Prime Minister on some occasions" 
(Interview: 31 May 2007). Chris Smith's two Ministers for Sport had a similar 
experience. He noted that: 
As junior Ministers their policy-making role is very limited. They need the full 
support of the Secretary of State in order to get somewhere because the 
Whitehall machine will not move for them. The same would be true in any 
department of government, not just sport. Although there are some 
departments where being a junior Minister can still carry a bit of clout, it was 
not really true of DCMS. I would defmitely say that having little input to 
policy-making is something that happens to junior Ministers generally. It's not 
a criticism of them, just the reality of how the system works (Interview: 18 
June 2007). 
Following Banks and Hoey, Richard Caborn was a Minister of State and a Privy 
Councillor. This was something rare, since only Howell had held this distinction 
before as Minister for Sport (Sproat was latterly a Minister of State but not a Privy 
Councillor). Although Caborn brought this rank with him from Trade and Industry, it 
gave him a little more clout, according to one civil servant: 
Richard Caborn was a very experienced Minister and worked with Gordon 
Brown in the Labour Party. He was very pally with John Prescott. He really 
could tap into the most senior levels of government because of his 
background. The fact that he wasn't at the most senior level in Cabinet 
sometimes didn't matter because of his influence in other ways (Interview 
with author). 
It seems as if Caborn was able to penetrate the deep roots of the Labour movement in 
a similar way to Denis Howell, though this was somewhat unusual for a junior 
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Minister. Cabom himself put it this way: "A Minister is in a very powerful position. I 
think at times I didn't realise just how powerful the job was. I found that if you really 
want to make things happen you can do so" (Interview: 27 March 2008). There was a 
great deal of admiration from a number of interviewees about the quiet and tenacious 
way Cabom worked as a Minister for Sport, with many rating him as good as, or 
better than, Howell. 
However, Cabom was something of an exception because, as John Nott confirmed, 
even a junior Minister in the Treasury struggles to get his voice heard (Interview: 5 
June 2007). The junior Ministers who have held the sports portfolio have barely had a 
voice at all in terms of operating successfully within the Whitehall machine. It is not 
just their lack of seniority that has been a disadvantage; the way in which the office is 
perceived by other key actors in government and sport has also had an impact on their 
effectiveness. 
(c). Perceptions of the Office of Minister for Sport 
The ministerial office is often viewed as not being a serious one, when set against the 
core services provided by government. Indeed, some observers see it as entirely 
frivolous, according to many of the interviewees in this study. A senior civil servant, 
for example, described it as, "A sort of niche market job, not thought to be a central 
political role, and therefore not thought to be hugely important" (Interview with 
author). On the other hand, Lord Smith was a great supporter of the post, which he 
believed could be very enjoyable and worthwhile for the holders. For instance Tony 
Banks said to him, "It's as if I'd died and gone to heaven without having to die first" 
(Interview: 18 June 2007). Nevertheless, Smith was able to see how others have 
viewed it critically within the core executive: 
It is probably true to say that the junior Sports Minister post is regarded too 
readily by the rest of Whitehall as being a bit out on a limb. They see it as not 
really being part of the centrality of government (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
Sir Neil Macfarlane had a similar view. He felt that sport was not really seen as a 
main activity of government, something which necessarily reduced his impact as the 
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Minister for Sport. This was a particular problem in negotiations with other 
departments because sport cut across many departmental interests in Environment, 
Education, the Home Office and even the Foreign Office at times (such as when 
repatriating jailed football hooligans from abroad). He comments, "Then of course I 
had the problem with the cricket teams and rugby teams going to South Africa" 
(Interview: 9 January 2007). In addition, the perception of sport was that it was a very 
tiny part of the government machine, with few resources. According to Macfarlane, 
"The budget was always very small" (Interview: 9 January 2007). 
This latter point about size of budget is crucial in British government, because the 
large spending departments automatically have a more significant profile. They tend 
to be more highly regarded and are more sought after by high-flying civil servants. 
Policy for its own sake is not something that attracts the highest calibre of civil 
servants, as distinct from policy which is related to spending large amounts of 
government money. For example a common theme for Sports Ministers was the 
difficulty in working with the Education Department. This seldom involved spending 
money, but could often centre on policy for the organisation of school sport. 
Education itself was the recipient of vast amounts of public money ~d they deeply 
resented any other department having the slightest influence on them, even though it 
was policy at the highest level (Le. Prime Minister) to seek "joined-up government" in 
New Labour parlance. As a low spending part of a different department, National 
Heritage had little impact on the Education Department. lain Sproat is deeply critical 
of the latter: 
They were a quite dreadful department with no feel for sport at all. They had 
no interest in sport in schools and they did not care either. They did not pay 
any heed to the wider government agenda of health, sport, fighting obesity, 
and so on. We at National Heritage saw school sport as the first vital step in 
getting young people interested, then through them to local sports clubs. Those 
ideas were built into my report Raising the Game in 1995. We used to have 
inter-departmental meetings with them and I kept bringing up these issues 
(Interview: 31 May 2007). 
But Education would not have sport included in the national curriculum, nor alter 
their policies at the request of a junior Minister from another department. There was 
in no sense an inter-departmental coalition for developing school sports policies, nor a 
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rational choice evaluation of what was the best option for school sport across the 
range of government programmes. However, education policy-makers may have 
taken what they believed to be rational decisions for education as an activity in its 
own right, to exclude marginal activities, such as sport, and concentrate on what they 
saw as core "academic" subjects. They were thus able to exercise power in a negative 
way by keeping sport off the education agenda as much as possible. 
This was a problem in other parts of the UK as well. Eric Saunders was a member of 
education community projects in Northern Ireland which tried to encourage dual use 
of school facilities, a concept which he agreed dated back at least to the time of Denis 
Howell in the 1960s. These projects met with little success, due to the deeply-
entrenched civil service views towards their "own" departments. In his view: 
One of the problems of all government in Britain actually is that people talk 
about there should be inter-departmental working. In practice they all protect 
their own patches. Now we obviously in sport must have close connections 
with the Education Department because in fact we are actually helping to 
promote their objectives which they don't pay for. We are also doing that for 
health (Interview: 1 October 2007). 
From a UK Sports Council perspective, David Pickup confirms the analysis of the 
Education Department, offered by Sproat, Saunders, and many others. The sports 
portfolio was located there for two years until the 1992 election. He says that: 
When sport was in the Education Department, this was the hardest time for us. 
The civil servants had a very strange mindset. They really had no vision for 
sport at all. Sport was an imposition, since it was generally played by those 
who were not intellectual, while they themselves were often Oxbridge 
graduates who saw themselves as highly educated and above sport. Sport was 
tolerated, but low on their list of priorities. Where there could have been a 
policy focus, school sport, was sadly neglected - they seemed to have no 
policy at all for school sport (Interview: 29 November 2006). 
By the time the Department for Culture, Media and Sport was established in 1997, 
some progress was made in trying to have a more "joined-up" sports policy. Chris 
Smith encouraged co-operation with Education to try to get more sport in schools and 
to stop the sale of playing fields. He says that, "Kate Hoey did some useful work on 
that" (Interview: 18 June 2007) by drawing on her background as a teacher before 
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entering politics. However, one former Conservative Minister blamed the sale of 
playing fields mostly on Labour authorities, which tended to dominate in local 
government at that time (Interview with author). 
Inter-departmental working really does seem to have improved in recent times, but 
not across the board. Co-operation between DCMS and Education is now much better. 
A civil servant who worked with both Conservative and Labour governments 
confirmed this: 
lain Sproat battled very hard with Cheryl Gillan [a junior Education Minister] 
to get sport higher up the agenda in schools but she just wasn't receptive. We 
had a degree of support from No. lOon that but we just didn't win it. I think it 
really was just a change of government that made the difference and it took 
three years of this government to really get it moving and put sport higher up 
the agenda in schools (Interview with author). 
This interviewee thought that battles fought between junior Ministers in rival 
departments were always going to be inconclusive because the individuals were not 
seen as important enough to lead to changes in policy. When the leadership at the top 
changed, and the likes of Estelle Morris and Charles Clarke became the Secretaries of 
State at Education, they were much more receptive to sport in schools. The respective 
junior Ministers in the Education Department and at sport were then knocking at an 
open door and the perception of them as being relatively unimportant did not matter. 
However, with regard to other departments, such as Health, there has been little or no 
change in their attitude to interdepartmental co-operation. The same civil servant 
commented that: 
It's a different situation with Health. It has been very, very difficult to get the 
Department of Health to take responsibility for getting the nation more active. 
We are obviously responsible for getting more people into sport but they are 
not responsible for getting more people to walk or cycle to work or use the 
stairs rather than lifts as they should be. That's really Department of Health 
territory because it has nothing to do with sport, yet they won't take leadership 
or ownership for it (Interview with author). 
The Minister for Sport has not been able to make an impact on health policy, although 
Richard Cabom has tried. He saw this as one of his key aims during his time as 
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Minister, particularly getting people to take personal responsibility for their own 
health and fitness (Interview: 27 March 2008). According to interviewees, there has 
been a tendency to see health as a highly-technical policy area, really only understood 
by privileged and competent insiders. Sport, by contrast, is perceived as something 
that anyone can have a relevant view on, whether an expert in the area or not. Sports 
Ministers have therefore found it difficult to have their views taken seriously in the 
health policy area. 
There were some positive comments from the devolved jurisdictions about close co-
operation. Since the departments are relatively small compared with those at 
Westminster, the civil servants tend to work more easily with those at similar levels in 
other departments. They are recruited from much smaller pools and are therefore 
more self-contained, thus facilitating easier networking and communication. For 
example, there is a close connection between public health and sport in Wales, where 
the civil servants work in the same bUilding. Nevertheless, the Minister's post is not 
seen as one of the more important ones, compared with the economic and 
regeneration portfolios, according to a civil servant in Cardiff (Interview with author). 
Interviewees in this study have generally commented that civil servants, Cabinet 
Ministers and other Ministers have tended to denigrate the contribution of the 
Minister for Sport. Some have also cast doubt as to whether the post will survive in 
the longer term. It has thus made it more difficult for Ministers for Sport to be taken 
seriously and has therefore reduced their effectiveness in government. The next 
section will look at how the office has actually been treated by governments, rather 
than just perceived by those working in and around the government machine. 
(d). Governments' Treatment of the Office of Minister for Sport 
While there is a great deal of continuity in the location of the long-established offices, 
the post of Minister for Sport has been moved across departments on a number of 
occasions. It started out with Denis Howell at Education and Science in 1964, was 
transferred with him to Housing and Local Government in 1969, then to Environment 
under Eldon Griffiths in 1970. There was a long period of stability until 1990, when it 
was moved back to Education with Robert Atkins as Minister, but only two years later 
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it was relocated in the new National Heritage Department (see Appendix 2). David 
Pickup found this constant change to three different departments during his time at the 
Sports Council very disruptive: 
There really was a different ethos in each department and it made a difference 
to the way in which we worked. The DoE was more focussed on regeneration 
of inner-cities, especially under Heseltine. When sport was in Education that 
was the hardest time for us. National Heritage was altogether much better 
(Interview: 29 November 2006). 
Sport remained at National Heritage when Labour won the election in 1997, though 
this was rebranded after a few months as the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport. With a new government, and Secretary of State, the character of the revamped 
department necessarily changed again, with more of an arts and creative industries 
focus. As Lord Smith said: 
It would be fair to say I was not involved in sport quite as much as the arts and 
broadcasting and the media, but there was still a really strong involvement on 
my part (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
Thus, the office of Minister for Sport has been treated by successive governments as 
something that can be moved around as a matter of expediency to suit administrative 
arrangements and has not always been highly regarded by them, although solid 
foundations were initially laid by Denis Howell in 1964. Roy Hattersley was a great 
admirer of what Howell did to establish the post in government and to have it treated 
as a serious office: 
I think he changed the atmosphere. When Harold Wilson appointed him in 
1964 there was a good deal of criticism and cynicism, I have to say me 
included, about whether sport should be in the government at all. Denis 
Howell demonstrated that it was a proper thing for the government to do. I 
think he was one of the few politicians that has actually changed the political 
climate in his own area. Denis convinced people that sport was a proper area 
for government behaviour and involvement (Interview: 1 May 2007). 
According to many commentators, Howell was really the only holder of the post with 
the stature to maintain its position of visibility in the government because of his long 
association with senior Labour figures in the 1950s and 1960s in the Campaign for 
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Democratic Socialism. Some believed that Richard Caborn played a similar role in the 
Labour Party more recently, but in a more understated way. In Howell's time, sport 
was not fully acknowledged as an area of important government policy. Nor was the 
role thought of as a potential Cabinet post, despite his own endeavours to raise its 
profile. Lord Rodgers observed that in the Wilson and Callaghan administrations: 
Sport was seen as a peripheral issue in my day. There was never any 
suggestion that it would have gone to the Cabinet in its own right (Interview: 
21 March 2007). 
Some interviewees felt that the treatment of the office of Minister for Sport fluctuated 
according to who the Secretary of State or Prime Minister was at the time, or if a 
crisis arose. Such crises usually related to football in the 1970s and 1980s. Eldon 
Griffiths describes how he became aware of the Ibrox disaster in January 1971, which 
nobody in the government machine bothered to inform him of: 
As I was helping my 17 year old son skin a rabbit he had shot, I learned from a 
BBC broadcast that an overcrowded stand 13 had collapsed in the final minute 
of a Rangers versus Celtic football match in Glasgow. Sixty-six spectators had 
been crushed to death and hundreds injured in a headlong stampede for the 
exits (Email communication: 29 July 2007). 
Griffiths had had little contact with Edward Heath until then and not much thereafter. 
However, Heath took time out from preparing to attend a Commonwealth heads of 
government meeting in Singapore to deal with the matter, gave Griffiths a rare 
invitation to the Cabinet, and sought his views there on what to do. Before the 
meeting, sources in Number 10 let Griffiths know quietly that a public enquiry was 
preferred by Heath and the Secretary of State for Scotland (Gordon Campbell). 
However, Griffiths took an independent line: 
My advice was that a public enquiry would take too long but that we should 
ask the Football Association to check standards. It was agreed that local 
authorities, the fire service, and the police were responsible for the safety of 
buildings in their districts. It was not for national government to over-ride or 
second guess them. Lord Wheatley, several months later, made some practical 
recommendations which were eventually included in a Safety of Sports 
Grounds Bill (Email communication: 29 July 2007). 
Apart from this incident, the office of Minister for Sport was not given a significant 
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profile during Mr Heath's time, and it certainly was not by the next leader of the 
Conservative Party when she became Prime Minister. Hector Monro played little part 
in the 1980 Olympic boycott attempt, when he should have been closely involved. 
Although Mrs Thatcher respected Hector Monro as loyal Minister, she did not 
consider that the office of Minister for Sport was in any way suitable to deal with an 
issue of such importance, to the extent that she totally sidelined Monro and did not 
allow him to speak in Parliament on the issue. She saw the matter as one of foreign 
policy, for which sport could be used as a weapon. Sir Neil Macfarlane confirms that 
Monro nearly resigned over it: 
He was almost forced to go over the Olympics because he was extremely 
bras sed off over that. The problem was that Margaret just did not consult. It 
was Carter who got everyone round the table and said, "What are we going to 
do" and the boycott was the result. Well that was that anyway and they agreed 
to do it but I think it was a great pity. It hurt him badly and he was on the 
verge of resignation (Interview: 9 January 2007). 
In the event Monro went along with the policy only to be sacked and replaced by 
Macfarlane the following year (Interview: 9 January 2007). Sir Eldon Griffiths 
thought that one of the greatest mistakes the Conservatives made was, "to pressure the 
BOA to cancel the appearance at the Moscow Olympics" (Email communication: 16 
February 2007), instead of senior figures and backbenchers opposing the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet's decision. He took this view despite his own strong anti-
Soviet views because he could see that sport was being singled out as a weapon, while 
the government continued to trade and interact as normal with the Soviet Union in 
almost every other respect. 
According to Neil Macfarlane, Mrs Thatcher called him to Number 10 to deal with 
incidents such as the Heysel Stadium disaster in 1985, but otherwise ignored him and 
the office he occupied. She was actually a friend of Mac far lane, who played golfwith 
her husband Denis, something that continued even after Macfarlane resigned later in 
1985. He recalled that, "We stayed very good friends and I played a lot of golf with 
Denis Thatcher subsequently" (Interview: 9 January 2007). It was not because she had 
no confidence in Macfarlane that she had little to do with him, but because she had a 
clearly defined sense of the hierarchy of government. The post of Minister for Sport 
was not regarded as being of real significance to her. 
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She treated Macfarlane's successor, Richard Tracey, in much the same way. Tracey 
describes her attitude thus: 
One thing that Mrs Thatcher was very keen on, and I don't know who put the 
idea to her, was all-ticketed matches, membership schemes, ID cards, and all 
that kind of thing. I was never very keen on them though. The FA and the 
Football League saw them as very difficult to administer. So I think over time 
with the FA and the Football League feeding in their information, and the 
Police too, that idea was dropped. I think it wasn't finally dropped until my 
successor, Colin Moynihan, who took over as Minister after me, did so 
(Interview: 11 April 2007). 
As Tracey noted, the ID scheme was not abandoned because Mrs Thatcher valued the 
Sports Minister's advice. The real reason was that the Home Office and the Home 
Secretary were much more significant politically. Civil servants could see how this 
process was repeated over a number of years. In the words of one who was closely 
involved at the time: 
Mrs Thatcher's interest in sport fluctuated, not because she had any real 
interest in it, but because she was passionate about stamping out football 
hooliganism. Moynihan, Ridley, and I were on occasions summoned to 
Number 10 to explain to her exactly what we were doing and what we weren't 
doing, and why. That was a totally erratic interest depending on the level of 
problems that were happening every Saturday at football matches (Interview 
with author). 
As we have already seen, Mrs Thatcher's successor as Prime Minister was genuinely 
interested in sport and had a higher regard for the office of Minister for Sport. Major 
gave better access to lain Sproat than any post-holder had enjoyed since Denis 
Howell, though Sproat described battling against gatekeepers to gain it at times. It 
was Major who promoted lain Sproat to Minister of State, the only Conservative 
Sports Minister to hold that rank. A senior civil servant who worked closely with him 
viewed the ups and downs of how the office was treated and was impressed by 
Major's attitude, commenting: 
The problem was that it got sidelined in terms of being a central political issue 
unless it happens that the Prime Minister of the day or another senior Minister 
of the day was particularly interested in it. During the years that I worked in 
the DCMS and National Heritage of course that was the case with John Major 
and the National Lottery. It was a sort of golden period of opportunity from 
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that point of view which I think, on the whole, was reasonably well-taken 
(Interview with author). 
The office of Minister for Sport may well have had its high point during the Major 
administration, in terms of its importance to government. In the BlairlBrown 
premierships, three out of the four post-holders have operated at the Under-Secretary 
level, while Cabom was already at Minister of State level when he was transferred. 
None of them has had easy access to the Prime Minister and there seems to have been 
no particular crises of hooliganism that required that they be summoned to Downing 
Street. While the importance of sport may be high on the agenda, given the 2012 
Olympics and the 2018 World Cup bid, the Minister for Sport is still not seen as an 
important player in these matters. As Chris Smith put it: 
It is probably true to say that the junior Sports Minister post is regarded too 
readily by the rest of Whitehall as being a bit out on a limb. They see it as not 
really being part of the centrality of government (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
Indeed, part on the office's remit was removed by Gordon Brown when he appointed 
Gerry Sutcliffe as the new Minister for Sport in June 2007, as an Under-Secretary. 
Responsibility for the 2012 Olympics was taken away and given to Tessa 10well in a 
new post, further downgrading the importance of the office. Although a dedicated 
Olympics Minister could be justified on the grounds of the importance of the task, 
demoting the Minister of Sport's rank cannot have been as a result of the performance 
of Gerry Sutcliffe as Minister. It can only be seen as a conscious decision to diminish 
its importance in government. Richard Cabom also took the view that this 
development was unhelpful and unwelcome: 
I am disappointed with that. I think it was a mistake, and it gives all the wrong 
signals. After ten years as a Minister I can see what the seniority of a Minister 
of State means. I think it was a bad mistake to put it back to Under-Secretary 
level and it gives all the wrong vibes (Interview: 27 March 2008). 
Nevertheless, it may be that the effectiveness of the post-holders themselves have 
been influential in how the office has been perceived over the years, as distinct from 
the various governments' attitude to the office. The individuals who have held the 
post will therefore be considered next. 
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(e). The Holders of the Office of Minister for Sport 
There have been 13 post-holders so far, from October 1964 up to Gerry Sutcliffe who 
was the last to be appointed in June 2007. In the nature of things, some have been 
more effective than others, depending on their personality traits and abilities. David 
Pickup put it this way: 
It depended on the personality of Ministers what they were prepared to do and 
how receptive to ideas they were. In terms of major policy decisions, they 
were likely to be out ofthe loop. For instance, they could not decide to make a 
bid for a major event - that was a much more complex process involving large 
expenditure, governing body agreement, negotiations with local authorities, 
and a whole lot more. A junior Minister just can't decide to do that (Interview: 
29 November 2006). 
The post-holders have been almost all male (Kate Hoey being the only exception); 
older than most other junior Ministers (eolin Moynihan being the only exception); 
relatively inexperienced in other offices (Robert Atkins being the only exception); not 
seen as high fliers (no exceptions); and sometimes staying in the office for far longer 
than average (Howell and Cabom particularly). According to Chris Smith: 
It's not seen as a clever career move for an aspiring MP because none of them 
have ever really gone any further. So from that point of view it's not sensible. 
I think that for certain types on MPs, who would perhaps not go to the highest 
levels of government, or who have a particular interest in sport, or who are not 
young and ambitious, it's a really nice job (Interview: 18 June 2007). 
Lord Smith feels that the job was actually quite a coveted one because it could be 
enjoyable going to sporting events at public expense and having no real policy 
commitments to worry about, so long as the post-holders had few expectations of 
advancement in government. lain Sproat acknowledged that this was the case, after 
having been out of Parliament 1983-92. He said, "By the time I got back it was too 
late for the Cabinet. When I was at sport 1993-97 I didn't really expect to move on to 
the Cabinet at that time because my opportunity had really gone" (Interview: 31 May 
2007). 
Dennis Howell's colleagues and friends, Lords Hattersley, Rodgers, and Donoughue 
all thought that he had remained at sport too long, and thus lost his opportunity for 
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advancement in government. For example, Bill Rodgers said this of him: 
If I had ever been a Minister for Sport I would have got out of it before too 
long. I might have enjoyed it. It's what I call a "boy scout game". Mine was at 
one stage when I was a Minister of State at the Board of Trade and I spent a 
lot of time at civil aviation which I enjoyed. I went around lighthouses and 
other things and I enjoyed it very much. I think, in my view, that's why Denis 
didn't get away from what he enjoyed doing to move to a much harder, 
tougher job when he really should have done. He liked sport too much for his 
own good in terms of career (Interview: 21 March 2007). 
Almost everyone who mentioned Denis Howell in this study, including 
Conservatives, had the highest regard for him as the best ever Minister for Sport. 
Dame Mary Glen Haig, who knew him well, commented, "There was only ever one 
Minister who was worth his salt and that was Denis Howell. He was absolutely first 
class" (Interview: 10 May 2007). Although Howell was a junior Minister, Lord 
Hattersley felt that, "Denis Howell was a special case. I think he was regarded as a 
very special junior Minister. He probably had more influence as ajunior Minister than 
any other I have known" (Interview: 1 May 2007). As such, he got things done that 
others would have been unable to, according to Hattersley and others, by sheer force 
of personality. 
For example, the 1975 White Paper on Sport and Recreation was unusual, in that there 
has never been one before or since on the subject. In normal circumstances, a White 
Paper is intended to lead to legislation. Nevertheless, as Lord Donoughue said of it, 
"Sport is not usually an area that generates legislation" (Interview: 7 March 2007). 
Instead of legislation, for which there was little parliamentary time in hard-pressed 
Labour governments, Howell pushed the Paper through as an end in itself. Many of its 
proposals, such as on youth sport, disabled sport, community facilities, assistance for 
gifted sportsmen and women, and so on, have been incorporated into the mainstream 
of government sport policy over the years by other routes. By raising the profile of 
these issues, and pushing for implementation, he was able to achieve things without 
direct legislation that other junior Ministers could not do. 
Civil servants also had a high regard for Colin Moynihan. One who worked closely 
with him at the Department of the Environment said that, in his view, "Although 
Colin, was very young and very junior, his enthusiasm persuaded even a hard-nosed, 
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monetarist, Thatcherite Secretary of State, Ridley, to put a bit more money into sport" 
(Interview with author). Moynihan co-operated with Sebastian Coe on drugs policy, 
set up a playing fields register, and championed disabled sport. He finally became 
bogged down on the issue of football ID cards, which he pushed for although he did 
not agree with them, but Mrs Thatcher did. Although it was government policy, 
Moynihan had no say on it whatsoever. He either had to help to introduce the scheme 
or resign from government, so he chose the former course and the policy was finally 
abandoned by the Home Office. 
Apart from Howell and Moynihan, and possibly Sproat whose report Raising the 
Game was relatively influential, the others have not imposed their personalities on a 
job that requires charisma more than anything in its profile-raising role. In the words 
of one policy adviser, "Robert Key was just a nothing really; a shadow of John Major 
and another one just grateful for a job", while Richard Caborn was, "Lucky to get the 
job thanks to Prescott. When you get to be deputy Prime Minister you get to push a 
few jobs to your mates and that's what he did" (Interview with author). This comment 
does not accord with Mr. Caborn's own account of how he was appointed, since he 
felt that Alastair Campbell was more influential (Interview: 27 March 2008). Kate 
Hoey aroused antagonism in some because she seemed to be driving a personal 
agenda to raise her own profile rather than that of sport. Robert Atkins was viewed as 
able but lazy by those who knew him and were prepared to comment (Interviews with 
author). 
There was only one dissenting view in relation to the claim that Howell was the best 
ever Sports Minister. A civil servant had this to say about him: 
I know people say Howell was the best but what is Howell best remembered 
for? It was really the weather more than anything, though he did the 1975 
White Paper on sport. I think people look back on Denis uncritically without 
really knowing what it was he did. I certainly don't think he achieved as much 
as Caborn (Interview with author). 
This interviewee has worked closely with Richard Cabom in an age when there has 
been a great deal of money going into sport, compared with Howell's day. As he also 
said, "Any of the previous Ministers, such as Howell, Sproat, Atkins, or Key would 
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have died to have a fraction of the money that there is now" (Interview with author). 
Nevertheless, with great respect to the other Sports Ministers who have kindly 
contributed to this study (and those who did not) they have not had the same level of 
drive and commitment as Denis Howell had for sport. In addition, they may have had 
personal characteristics that limited their effectiveness as Ministers. For instance, 
Patrick Cheney says this of El don Griffiths: 
Eldon Griffiths was fighting against Stalin and he saw sport as being in the 
front line of all these things. He didn't want or like socialists because he 
thought they were red-hot communists. He saw everything in terms of 
communism and it became a political obsession. He was nutty, but a nice guy 
anyway. Griffiths was a Cold War warrior. If you asked him something over a 
cup of tea he would give you a lecture on Soviet missiles (Interview: 18 
January 2007). 
When Tom Pendry was not appointed as Minister for Sport in 1997, after having 
shadowed it for five years, he was very disappointed. Nor was he given an alternative 
job in government. Tony Banks was appointed to the sports portfolio instead, and 
Pendry had this to say, "Tony Banks got the job I wanted and he was not very good at 
it or very effective. He was only there for two years and didn't do very much. I don't 
really know why he got it" (Interview: 1 February 2007). This is a very common 
sentiment in relation to Banks: many regard him as the worst Minister for Sport ever. 
David Pickup said that, "He was a very unfortunate choice as the first Sports Minister 
in the new Labour government" (Interview: 29 November 2006). 
Some interviewees had a similar view of other Ministers for Sport. For instance, the 
following comments exemplify how several of them were perceived: 
I remember Hector Monro shaking his head and mumbling in a vague, upper 
class way sort of way. He had the good of sport at heart and did his best for it, 
but he was no more than a competent Minister (Interview with author). 
Neil Macfarlane I knew slightly. He was similar to Monro in many ways, 
wanting to do the best for sport, but never a high-flier (Interview with author). 
Richard Tracey was a very straightforward kind of bloke. He was only there 
for a short time and got on with things in a quiet way He was a nice guy. 
(Interview with author). 
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Atkins was a decent enough Minister and quite amiable. However, he was lazy 
and had no particularly original ideas for sport (Interview with author). 
Key was Minister for just one year, and I can remember no obvious 
achievement in that time. Key was quite a right wing Thatcherite who 
probably believed in non-intervention. He seemed to take it to the extreme by 
have no ideas either (Interview with author). 
This section has looked at how Ministers for Sport have performed in office or have 
been perceived in general terms. It is now followed by an examination of their 
contribution to the policy-making process in particular areas by using examples of 
policy-making in sport. 
5.9 The Policy Role of the Minister for Sport in Key Policy Areas 
In paragraph 5.4 four main themes were identified as comprising the main elements of 
government sports policy. These are: sport for all, sport for the elite, sport in schools, 
and bringing major events to the country. They provide a useful way of interpreting 
how Ministers for Sport have contributed to the policy-making process for sport in 
specific areas, building on their general role as set out in paragraph 5.8. This approach 
necessarily overlaps with, and reconsiders, some of the issues already touched on. 
Each of the four themes will now be considered in turn. 
Ca) Sport For All 
The data collected for this study show that one of the greatest early contributions 
made to "sport for all" was the establishment of the Sports Council in 1965 by Denis 
Howell before the term itself was actually widely used. As the first Minister for Sport 
in the UK, Howell was able to exploit his unique position to set his own agenda. His 
Secretaries of State at Education and Science (see Appendix 2) were Michael Stewart 
(for only three months) and Anthony Crosland (for nearly three years). According to 
Lords Hattersley, Rodgers, and Donoughue, these were men with whom he had 
worked for many years in the Labour movement. They knew him well, trusted him, 
and allowed him freedom to develop his role. But interviewees have suggested that 
this was because they did not think of sport as being very important, that it was at the 
fringes of government, away from the core executive where no harm could be done by 
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giving him relatively free rein. He gradually helped to change this perception, as Lord 
Hattersley observed: 
Denis convinced people that sport was a proper area for government behaviour 
and involvement. But it was a new area for government and the civil servants 
were learning along with him. So policies were developed as they went along 
by both Denis and the civil servants. It was a mutual thing. He had to be 
closely involved because government had not done that sort of thing before 
(Interview: 1 May 2007). 
Howell also had a heavy workload of non-sport activity at Education and 
Environment in his two periods in office. Analysis of the parliamentary data shows 
that he spent only 23% and 18% of his effort on sport in 1964-70 and 1974-79 
respectively. Nevertheless, interviewees for this study gave examples of the range of 
policy decisions that he took in promoting "sport for all", such as establishing the 
Regional Sports Councils, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust, the Sports Aid 
Foundation, and producing the 1975 White Paper. These were decisions that cost little 
or no government money, or were of minimal interest to Cabinet Ministers in the core 
executive. 
Like the other Ministers for Sport, Eldon Griffiths was a junior Minister well outside 
the core executive. As such, he gave little concern to his Secretaries of State for the 
Environment (Peter Walker, 1970-72 and Geoffrey Rippon, 1972-74) by promoting 
"sport for all" because he spent very little time on sport. In his four years as a Minister 
the data indicate that only 11 % of his parliamentary time was given to sport. He 
removed himself as chairman of the Sports Council and made it independent, so that 
politicians would have less influence over it. He believed that: 
Politicians had no business trying to manage sport. The role of government 
should be confined to opening up public owned land and water for sports 
activities, encouraging local authorities to provide new facilities, and 
persuading Parliament to appropriate funds (Email communication: 29 July 
2007). 
Griffiths saw his main contribution as encouraging mass participation, evangelising 
the benefits of sport, and helping governing bodies and local authorities where 
possible. This largely confined his sports role to performing opening ceremonies for 
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many of the new local government facilities that were coming on stream at the time 
and attending numerous events. He particularly enjoyed this part of his job, observing 
that, "One of the privileges of the Minister for Sport was to be invited to virtually 
every major sporting event in the country, where the hospitality was prodigious" 
(Email communication: 29 July 2007). 
When Neil Macfarlane was Minister for Sport, his three Secretaries of State allowed 
him to promote "sport for all" because they saw that as the limit of the sporting 
aspects of his job. They did not envisage him becoming involved in policy-making as 
a junior Minister in a minor role. They were more concerned with the other parts of 
his portfolio, such as town and country planning, power stations, by-passes, and a 
range of environmental matters, which took up some 77% of his parliamentary time 
according to the data. He felt that his main sports policy achievements in relation to 
"sport for all" were confined to bringing together the governing bodies, working more 
closely with them, enhancing the profile of the Sports Council and Regional Sports 
Councils, and encouraging competitive sports. 
Macfarlane's successor, Richard Tracey, had a similar experience in the post. He 
spent only about 10% of his time on sport, as the parliamentary data indicate, and his 
Secretaries of State Kenneth Baker and Nicholas Ridley were happy to let him pursue 
a modest "sport for all" agenda. Tracey confined his sports activities to areas from 
which Secretaries of State normally kept away. For instance, "One area of policy I did 
get involved in as Minister was with the Sports Council. I had a lot to do with the 
Sports Council" (Interview: 11 April 2007). 
A civil servant who worked with some of these Ministers, felt that the "sport for all" 
area was where they could make some small impression on policy for sport. In his 
realistic assessment: 
The Sports Minister job was regarded as suitable for a chap who was 
enthusiastic about sport but who didn't preoccupy any of the Secretaries of 
State at all, except in a crisis. The political heads of the Department in my 
time were just not interested in sport (Interview with author). 
He agreed that it was very difficult for a junior Minister to have any effect beyond the 
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level of profile-raising for sport, while keeping out of policy-making elsewhere in the . 
job. As he said, "You don't want to be too visible and get up the nose of your boss, 
while you are a relatively small cog in the machinery of government" (Interview with 
author). 
lain Sproat had a good deal of support in government from the Prime Minister, John 
Major, and benign non-interference from his three Secretaries of State, including 
Virginia Bottomley 1995-97. She said, "I always had a great deal of confidence in his 
contributions, so I generally left him to get on with it. I made the decision not to 
meddle" (Interview: 29 June 2007). As with most of the other Ministers, the data 
show that lain Sproat's time devoted to sport was fairly small, at 21% of 
parliamentary activity. He agreed that he would have preferred to spend more time on 
sporting issues, and asserted that his policy document Raising the Game was about 
much more than just "sport for all". As a document, it certainly showed a number of 
pathways to excellence through clubs, school, and higher education. However, none 
of this was considered as being of much consequence by his Secretaries of State, who 
regarded it as a harmless enough diversion that caused them little bother. 
Since coming to power in 1997, there have been four Labour Ministers for Sport. The 
interview data suggest that their influence on sports policy has been patchy, and 
largely confined to the "sport for all" end of the spectrum. This is somewhat 
paradoxical, since the data from the parliamentary analysis suggest they have spent a 
good deal more time on sport than their predecessors. For example, the figure for 
Tony Banks was 64% overall and for Kate Hoey it was 78%. Richard Cabom began 
with 57% in his first year, 2001-02, a figure that declined to 45% (2002-03), 35% 
(2003-04), and 26% (2004-05). 
Banks was seen by many interviewees, as was Hoey, to be pursuing a personal agenda 
and really not having much influence on sports policy. As noted earlier, he endorsed 
the Brighton Declaration on women in sport in 1998 and strongly supported the ban 
on fox hunting, both likely to endear him to the Labour spirit of the time. He also 
pursued campaigns, such as the bid for the 2006 World Cup, which would do him no 
harm with a wider public. 
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Patrick Cheney, an adviser to Hoey (and also Howell many years before), claimed 
that Hoey tried to take policy decisions but was prevented from doing so by Chris 
Smith. He felt that, because Smith was, "frightened to take policy decisions much of 
the time, not much progress was made" (Interview: 18 January 2007). However, as an 
ex-athlete and an outgoing character, she was able to enthuse people by visiting 
schools and clubs to spread the message of "sport for all." She also took up popular 
causes, such as the demand for the reintroduction of terraces in football stadia. 
Neither she nor Banks had access to the inner-circles of Blair's policy-making elite in 
the core executive. 
A civil servant who worked with Sproat, Banks, Hoey, and others, thought that they 
were quite marginalised from the centres of policy-making apart from "sport for all" 
type activities. In his words: 
The key role for Ministers there was to encourage the quangos to make things 
happen. And that was really quite a frustrating process because you couldn't 
easily order them to do things. I'd say two things about what was achieved 
during this time was to really try to make the governing bodies of sport, 
including things like the English and UK Sports Councils more efficient and 
effective (Interview with author). 
Another civil servant had a different view of Richard Caborn, seeing him as the only 
Minister who could achieve things beyond a narrow "sport for all" perspective 
because of his close connections with the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott and 
other leading Labour figures. He said in his interview: 
Richard Caborn was excellent, and probably the best. He set the agenda for 
where we are now. The fact that he was there for over six years gave him a 
chance to do that. I think his immediate Labour predecessors made him stand 
out as well. He was very clear in what he wanted and stuck at it. He used his 
contacts very well (Interview with author). 
Caborn himself felt that his effectiveness went beyond a narrow "sport for all" remit, 
and he concerned himself with all aspects of sports policy because it could contribute 
to so many parts of the government's agenda. These included high achievement in 
sport for its own sake, health, social inclusion, regeneration, and education. He 
believed that these aims could be pursued by a variety of means: 
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I wanted to see reforms to the structure of sport because there are so many 
benefits from sport in so many different ways. It comes through from the 
grass-roots, the schools, into the clubs, and then the elite end. There's a 
continuum there that you have to foster and encourage all the way through 
(Interview: 27 March 2008). 
Although he was clearly not a part of it, he had some access to the core executive that 
others Ministers for Sport did not enjoy, and his long service allowed him to build up 
a series of influential contacts in the sporting community both at home and abroad. 
These advantages will be discussed later. 
Cb). Elite Sport 
Data collected for this study through the interviews show relatively little involvement 
of the earlier Sports Ministers in developing elite sport, although they enthusiastically 
welcomed British victories in world-class events. Most of the interviewees saw the 
primary role of Ministers for Sport in terms of "sport for all". An analysis of the 
parliamentary data, however, reveals that they did sometimes speak on elite sport in 
the Commons and answered many questions on international sporting issues, such as 
the World Cup, the Olympic Games, or sports tours to South Africa. Howell was seen 
by some as instrumental in drafting the Gleneagles Agreement in 1977 to discourage 
competition with South Africa. Conversely, one respondent believed it was really a 
foreign policy issue and was the work of David Owen, the Foreign Secretary. 
Lord Hattersley (formerly MP for Birmingham Sparkbrook) thOUght that Denis 
Howell could be somewhat parochial, despite his later attempts to get the Olympics 
for Birmingham. Even this was a bid for his own city, rather than more a realistic 
option such as London. In Lord Hattersley's words: 
Something he strongly believed in was the local aspect of sport on the ground, 
promoting it locally and encouraging mass participation. It was not at the first 
division level of football as it was, or the Premiership as it is now. It was with 
lads playing football in the local parks. And I think the fact that he had a local 
government background and responsibility helped him to promote the local 
idea of sport which he believed in very strongly. He wanted sport to go out to 
people, which is what a Minister ought to want. Having a local government 
connection I think helped him with that because he understood what was 
needed at the local level. (Interview: 1 May 2007) 
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Developing elite sport or providing resources for it did not concern Eldon Griffiths 
either. He had a non-interventionist approach, based on an assumption that those 
aiming for the highest level could well look after themselves. Since government 
assistance for sport was likely to be quite small in his day, it was best directed at, 
"mass-participation in sport by people of all ages" (Email communication: 29 July 
2007), rather than at a tiny minority aiming for the highest level or already there. 
When asked about his achievements, Neil Macfarlane mentioned mainly domestic 
issues, such as sale of school playing fields, tobacco sponsorship, closer co-operation 
with the governing bodies, and enhancing the role of the Regional Sports Councils. 
While acknowledging the range of successful international golfers, athletes, and rugby 
players in his day, he took no credit for their success, although he jokingly pointed out 
that, "When I was in office we won the Ashes twice!" (Interview: 9 January 2007). 
Like Griffiths, he believed that elite competitors would continue to pursue their quest 
to reach the top and would reap the rewards due to them without much government 
support. 
According to civil servants, Colin Moynihan was aware of the shortcomings of 
support for aspiring elite athletes. As a former Olympian himself, he was able to see 
at first hand the financial and career sacrifices made by fellow competitors 
(Interviews with author). His predecessor, Richard Tracey, was very keen on a lottery 
to help address this problem and had regular discussions with the chairman of the 
Sports Council without making any progress at the time. He expanded on this: 
I was always impressed with the idea. So after my time as Sports Minister I 
got involved in the campaigns in the House to get the National Lottery going. 
We never really got far with Mrs Thatcher because she always saw it as an 
area of gambling. But we did make progress when John Major became Prime 
Minister (Interview: 11 April 2007). 
David Pickup was also conscious that the needs of elite athletes were not being well 
catered for under the Sports Council in his time there. He was a tireless advocate of 
the Lottery, along with Moynihan, and pushed hard for a restructuring of the Sports 
Council with Robert Atkins, Moynihan's successor. He felt that both these reforms 
were inextricably linked: 
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We saw the need for UK Sport to represent the needs of elite sportsmen and 
women, especially with access to the Lottery funding we were lobbying for to 
finance them. We tried to take the Minister along this route, something I think 
we achieved with the Atkins' Report (Interview: 29 November 2001). 
This growing awareness of the need to support elite athletes was starting to take root 
in government and the civil service by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s. The Atkins' Report was amended and implemented after lain Sproat became 
Minister in 1993 and his Raising the Game report was another component in the 
changes to sports policy around that time, taking the focus away from a 
predominantly "sport for all" ethos. Sproat explained his views: 
We saw the whole thing as a continuum from schools and clubs at the bottom, 
through to elite sport and the British Academy at the top. Running beside this, 
there was great potential for sport in the universities and colleges, as there is in 
the USA, providing another route to top class sport for young people leaving 
school. All of this was to be developed by a variety of agencies, the private 
sector, Sports Council, UK. Sport, partnerships, coaches, and others. It wasn't 
for the government to run sport, but to make sure there was an appropriate 
framework for it to run itself with government backing (Interview: 31 May 
2007). 
Many of these changes described by Sproat came about through the establishment of 
the Department of National Heritage (DNH) in 1992, with the strong leadership of its 
first Secretary of State, David Melior. A civil servant described him as, "a fantastic, 
charismatic leader and an excellent choice for DNH. It really was an inspired choice 
by John Major and a pity he had to go after only a few months" (Interview with 
author). This was also David Pickup's view, especially of the role of the Prime 
Minister which was touched on earlier: 
John Major was excellent in his support of sport, for the Lottery, national 
institute for sport and Raising the Game That was a major policy statement on 
sport which came out after my time in 1995, but I think Major was behind it 
rather than Sproat (Interview: 29 November 2001). 
Virginia Bottomley became Secretary of State at DNH in 1995, just as many 
important changes were taking place for the support of elite athletes. She confirmed 
John Major's contribution to this process: 
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Our athletes were very successful at Sydney and the credit for that should have 
gone to John Major and the Lottery. All the work that we did in tenns of 
establishing the foundations of the training programmes for our Olympic 
athletes was vital. So I think that sport was given a tremendous focus at that 
time. Not just providing Lottery funds but also, protecting the Lottery money 
for sport was very significant. There were always others who felt there 
shouldn't be masses of Lottery money made available to sport. The view from 
John Major downwards was that there should be (Interview: 29 June 2007). 
Funding for elite athletes was therefore very finnly on the agenda for Conservative 
and then Labour governments after just a few years of prominence. Chris Smith, as 
successor to Virginia Bottomley, felt that during his time at the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport, working with Tony Banks and Kate Hoey, "Securing the 
funding for elite sport was probably the most important achievement while I was 
there" (Interview: 18 June 2007). A civil servant closely involved had a similar view, 
observing that, "We tried to make sure that the use of Lottery money was well-
focussed on the elite sport end" (Interview with author). 
One civil servant who worked with Richard Caborn said, "There's much more 
accountability now than a few years ago and you just can't throw money at elite 
athletes. UK Sport is very efficient at getting that from the governing bodies" 
(Interview with author). This is an area where Richard Caborn also thought he had 
made an impact, observing that, "I wanted delivery on a proper contractual basis and I 
went out and did that" (Interview: 27 March 2008). Nevertheless, the mechanisms for 
the support of elite athletes (Lottery funding, UK Sport, National Institute of Sport) 
were well-established before Mr Caborn's time, as a result of policy decisions taken at 
a much higher level in government than that of Minister for Sport. As a result, 
Ministers for Sport could no longer concentrate only on the "sport for all" aspects of 
the job. They also had responsibility for the elite side of it, though they had done very 
little to bring the changes about. 
(c). Sport in Schools 
All the Ministers for Sport certainly wanted more sport in schools, according to what 
they said in Parliament and in the interviews for this study. The data from Hansard 
confinn that they answered parliamentary questions on sport in schools on a regular 
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basis, specifically on issues such a PE, school swimming, outward bound trips, 
sharing of facilities with the community, sports days, competition, sale of playing 
fields, and so forth. The sale of playing fields became an increasingly common topic 
in latter years as concern grew that sport was declining in schools, although much 
more sport and games activity was taking place in purpose-built indoor sports halls 
than outdoors. 
A number of interviewees have described how they struggled to raise the position of 
sport in schools. Those working in the departments of the Environment, Education, 
DNH, or DCMS, came up against a largely unsympathetic Education department on 
which they were unable to make an impact. Sport was dropping down the agenda, 
teachers were not doing after-school sport, and "competition" came to be seen as dirty 
word. When the government's sport unit was briefly located in the Education 
Department in 1990-92 (as noted earlier) it was not a welcoming place for Sports 
Ministers or the Sports Council. Indeed, in David Pickup's view, "they saw us as 
some kind of alien implant" (Interview: 29 November 2006). 
Education Secretaries of State were generally not much interested in sport, and some 
were actually antagonistic. There was a whole succession from Thatcher onwards 
(1970-74), including Keith Joseph (1981-86), Kenneth Baker (1986-89), John 
MacGregor (1989-90), Kenneth Clarke (1990-92), John Patten (1992-94), and Gillian 
Shephard (1994-97) for whom sport did not feature as an important part of school life. 
Ministers for Sport had great difficulty making any impact on them, according to 
interviewees. For example, Denis Howell had a passion for making the best use of 
school facilities by the wider public outside school hours and he pursued the topic 
endlessly. One civil servant recounted an episode he witnessed involving Denis 
Howell and Shirley Williams, who was Education Secretary from 1976 to 1979. This 
demonstrates the limited influence of a junior Minister compared with that of a 
Secretary of State and Prime Minister. 
When I was doing local government finance in the late 1970s I was having 
negotiations with the head of public expenditure in the Department of 
Education and Denis called me to ask when we were going to get agreement 
on his proposal on sharing facilities. I had to say, "I'm afraid Minister, that it's 
not going to happen". And he said, "Why do you say that?" I said "I've been 
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having meetings with the Education Department and I know that when you 
make your proposals you will be overruled by the Prime Minister and the 
Secretary of State. Shirley Williams is going to fight it." He responded, 
"Shirley's my friend! She won't!" And I said, "I'm sorry Minister. I have to 
tell you the reality. You are not going to win." And he said, "You're a fucking 
idiot!" I said, "With respect Minister, why do you say that?" He said, "You've 
been taken in by those halfwits in the Department of Education. Don't forget, I 
was there, I know them. They don't know what they're talking about!" But in 
the event Shirley Williams overruled him and he didn't get his way (Interview 
with author). 
Both Neil Macfarlane and Richard Tracey also talked about the frustrations of inter-
departmental working, particularly with Education and Health. They felt that, at their 
level of Under-Secretary, it was very difficult to have an impact on policy in their 
own departments. It was even harder to have any effect on another department, since 
each department jealously guards its own area (Interviews: 9 January 2007 and 11 
April 2007). In a civil servant's opinion, "They were very territorial, but then all 
departments are" (Interview with author). 
One Minister for Sport had little regard for Education as a department, and especially 
for the Secretaries of State in charge of it at different times. He saw them as unhelpful 
and obstructive when it came to initiatives for enhancing the position of sport in 
schools: 
Gillian Shepherd was the Secretary of State there for part of the time and she 
was a very unhelpful person in relation to sport in schools. She was just not 
interested, especially as a core subject for inspection. Before her we had John 
Patten at Education and he was no different. We tried to build bridges but they 
did not want to (Interview with author). 
When lain Sproat was drafting Raising the Game, he had consultations with 
Education, since sport in schools was to be a key part of the overall strategy, but 
found a lack of understanding of the value of sport in education: 
For instance, they wanted to put things in Raising the Game that had nothing 
to do with sport in my view, such as pastoral care. I had no idea what they 
meant by that. I thought that was something we should stay well clear of. 
Sport and religion do not mix very well as we see in Northern Ireland or 
Glasgow (Interview: 31 May 2007). 
Mr Sproat had a traditional view of sport, which emphasised the virtues of 
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competition, fair-play, teamwork, and respect for authority. These values were shared 
by John Major, who helped make sure that school sport was a significant part of 
Raising the Game. He also had the support of his Secretary of State, Virginia 
Bottomley, who observed that, "It's never easy to get different departments to agree 
anything whatever" (Interview: 29 June 2007). She felt that Major had a huge 
influence on sports policy generally, and that he was crucial in changing attitudes to 
sport in schools. 
Labour came to power in 1997 with an agenda to foster ''joined-up government", 
which should have favoured a more effective sport/education dialogue. Although 
Tony Blair was interested in sport as part of his education priorities, this was not 
necessarily shared by his first Education Secretary, David Blunkett (1997-2001), or 
Sports Minister, Tony Banks. Blunkett was an unfortunate choice, according to some 
interviewees, because he had no feel for sport at all. As for Banks, one respondent (a 
civil servant) said, "Most people thought it would have been sensible to appoint Hoey 
in the first place" (Interview with author) because of her knowledge of education and 
sport as a former PE teacher. 
Nevertheless, Chris Smith as head of DCMS did his best to cement the changes that 
were underway and used Kate Hoey to do this when Banks left in 1999. He believed 
in developing relationships with Education to encourage more sport in schools, and 
thought that Kate Hoey had some effect. Hoey's policy adviser, Partick Cheney, also 
takes this view, though he felt that not much had really changed at Education: 
School sport was a big thing for her and she was always trying to encourage 
more sports in schools. It was not easy working across departments and 
Education didn't really see it as a serious issue. Their big thing was raising 
school standards, and sport just took up valuable time that could be devoted to 
improving schools' position in the league tables (Interview: 18 January 2007). 
Interviewees commented that the Secretaries of State responsible for education were 
more receptive to having a greater emphasis on sport in schools after 2001. A civil 
servant observed that, "It really took three or four years of this government to get it 
moving and put sport higher up the agenda in schools. David Blunkett was not really 
interested and nor was Tony Banks" (Interview with author). Blunkett was followed 
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by Estelle Morris (2001-02) and Charles Clarke (2002-04) who tried to ensure that 
sport had a higher status in schools. Morris fought for Exchequer funding for school 
sport and endorsed the National School Sport Strategy for 2003, something that 
Richard Caborn greatly appreciated. He noted that: 
It wasn't difficult working with Education while I was there. Estelle Morris 
was superb - she gave me £40 million a year for sport and was very 
supportive. But you have to prove your case. I went to every conference of 
schools sporting bodies. I worked closely with the schools and education 
bodies. We put in place the National School Sport Strategy in 2003 and set up 
a network of school sport partnerships. I saw quite a major change with the 
schools heads. I went round a lot of schools in the country and talked to people 
there and what convinced the heads was that where sport was used properly 
you got better discipline, less exclusion, less truancy, and better academic 
attainment (Interview: 27 March 2008). 
A civil servant said of Morris and Clarke, "They were really keen on sport and helped 
make a difference" (Interview with author). He also thought that Richard Caborn, the 
Minister for Sport during much of the time since 2001, was quietly effective, while 
still needing the assistance of Cabinet Ministers to effect real change. For example, 
the commitment of two hours of good quality sport a week in schools, now largely 
achieved, has been followed by an aspiration for five hours. That is something that 
will need serious political commitment at the highest levels, not least to provide the 
resources. 
(d). Attracting Major Events to the UK 
The Ministers for Sport interviewed for this study, as well as most other interviewees, 
have generally been supportive of bids for major events. From the parliamentary data, 
numerous examples can be found of the Ministers answering questions on potential 
bids and invariably giving support to them. For instance, in the 1997-98 session of 
Parliament, Tony Banks answered three oral questions and seven written questions on 
the 2006 World Cup bid" two written questions on a future Olympic bid, and one 
question on the principle of major bids. 
There is evidence from the interview data that some Sports Ministers, with the 
exception of Eldon Griffiths, played a part in bids for events, as well as offering 
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general endorsement. Griffiths has no recollection of being involved in bids, though 
he described his attendance at the 1970 Commonwealth Games and 1972 Olympic 
Games. Sir Neil Macfarlane was keen to link bids for events to the tourism benefits, 
as was Tom Pendry. Lord Pendry had responsibility for both sport and tourism when 
Labour were in Opposition 1992-97. In his opinion, "The two go together quite well, 
since people come to this country as tourists to see sporting events, to fish, play golf, 
and all sorts of other things as well" (Interview: 1 February 2007). Sir Neil 
Macfarlane described sitting on Cabinet committees with Lord Young in the chair 
where, "I used to make the point that you cannot isolate tourism from big sporting 
events like the World Cup or Olympics" (Interview: 9 January 2007). When he knew 
of any potential bids, he alerted the regional tourist boards and Sports Councils in the 
areas likely to be hosts, so that they could have an input to the process. 
Macfarlane said he was, "Delighted about the Olympic Games coming here in 2012" 
(Interview: 9 January 2007). After visiting the 1984 Olympics as Minister for Sport, 
he was convinced that Britain should bid for a future Games. Although some Cabinet 
Ministers were supportive, the majority were not. As observed earlier, they tried to 
keep it off the policy agenda for various reasons. He cites this as the main reason why 
he resigned in 1985, because, "I didn't like the rejection out of hand of the Olympic 
Games and the Little Englander attitude" (Interview: 9 January 2007). This is a good 
illustration of the limits of a junior Minister's influence; he was outside the core 
executive and unable to make an impact on policy. 
Nevertheless, a bid was being mounted in 1985 on behalf of Birmingham for 1992 in 
which Neil Macfarlane confirms he had limited involvement. There were also later 
bids (1988-89) for Birmingham or Manchester to become the candidate city for 1996. 
Some interviewees believe that the government was quite happy for these bids to take 
place because they knew they could not succeed. Roy Hattersley, himself a 
Birmingham MP, felt that, "The bids were always doomed, I think" (Interview: 1 May 
2007). He took this view, partly because he thOUght the government was not 
supportive and partly because Denis Howell was leading the Birmingham bids, some 
years after leaving office. Although he had great authority in the UK sporting 
establishment, Howell did not always endear himself to international bodies. The IOC 
delegates expected lavish hospitality and gifts from bidding cities, whereas: 
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Denis was never prepared to do any of that. He was far too straightforward to 
even contemplate doing anything of that sort, and it therefore put Birmingham 
at a big disadvantage. His way of working and networking didn't suit the IOC 
and he was never part of that international, semi-aristocratic, old boys' 
network which wins you friends and bids. He was an ordinary, honest, decent 
sort of bloke, though he was leader of the Birmingham bid. He was very 
closely connected to Birmingham local government, having come up by that 
route and knew lots of people there. That was where he was most at home, not 
mixing with the IOC. In the end, of course, we didn't win the bid (Interview: 1 
May 2007). 
Roy Hattersley gave his support to the bid out of loyalty to Denis Howell and 
Birmingham, rather than a belief that Birmingham would win it. He cannot remember 
Neil Macfarlane, Richard Tracey, or Colin Moynihan, the three Sports Ministers in 
office at the time of the two bids, having any involvement. Neither can he recall 
Patrick Jenkin, Kenneth Baker, or Nicholas Ridley, the Secretaries of State for the 
Environment, having any role. In fact, "I don't remember anybody from the national 
political side at alP' (Interview: 1 May 2007). However, Richard Tracey reports that, 
"I did get involved, partly because I'm from Warwickshire and partly because Denis 
Howell asked me" (Interview: 11 April 2007). He confirmed that he attended some 
events, including the IOC congress where the bid was lost in 1985. This was early in 
his time in office, so it is unlikely he could have had any influence. 
When Manchester won the right to bid for the 2000 Olympics, this was seen as a 
golden opportunity to regenerate the city. A civil servant closely involved felt that, 
"In the unlikely event that we would win, the City of Manchester would still benefit 
from a great deal of government regeneration which would not otherwise have gone 
in." (Interview with author) The bid team was thinking ahead to the alternative of 
hosting the 2002 Commonwealth Games, so that much of the infrastructure was 
already in place or in the pipeline for a later bid that would be successful. This civil 
servant does not recollect the Ministers for Sport (Robert Atkins and Robert Key) 
being much involved in the bid. He observed that John Gummer as Secretary of State 
was, "passionately interested in regeneration" (Interview with author) but not in sport, 
something that could also be said of his predecessors Michael Howard and Michael 
Heseltine. At this time sport in government was located in the Education Department, 
where Kenneth Clarke was the Secretary of State. He was not perceived to have had 
any input to the bid either. When the decision was made, and sport was in National 
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Heritage, lain Sproat was very new to office. Although he confinns he was involved 
in the bid, he had little opportunity to make any impression. 
As Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, certainly did not get involved in supporting any UK 
bids by attending IOC congresses. John Major's attitude was entirely different and 
supportive, as David Pickup recalls: 
I remember Chris Patten [then Environment Secretary] attending an laC 
meeting in Tokyo in 1989 to push Manchester's 1996 Olympic bid. It was 
mainly attended by heads of state, so he felt relatively junior. He came back 
with the message to John Major [then Foreign Secretary] that he must go to 
the final decision-making session, which he duly did. Unfortunately for 
Manchester they still lost. We had less credibility with the African nations at 
that time because they thought Britain was soft on South Africa and lost most 
oftheir votes. Major himself was excellent (Interview: 29 November 2006). 
Virginia Bottomley felt that the climate of opinion to support bids was changing 
under John Major. The government was more inclined to endorse them because 
Lottery funding meant less would need to be paid from public funds. She traced a 
direct line from the governments of John Major to the successful London 2012 bid: 
We've now won the Olympics for London in 2012 but we've won them 
because there was a means to finance it, albeit that the cost appears to be 
escalating. I think that pre-National Lottery no one had a real sense of 
knowing how we could deliver on our ambitions. I'm sure it's an area where 
there will always be disappointments. Frequently you can learn from failure 
and next time you no longer make the same mistakes. At Euro 96 everybody 
regarded it as a great event and brilliant advert for the country. So I think the 
failed bids for the Olympics, and a successful Euro 96, taught us a few lessons 
about how we could get it right the next time, which we did (Interview: 29 
June 2007). 
When Labour entered government in 1997, they were keen to give their backing to 
both a bid for the football World Cup and the Olympics. Chris Smith knew that his 
first Minister for Sport, Tony Banks, wanted to bid for the World Cup, though not 
necessarily the Olympics and he felt it worthwhile to support him. He was, "sorry to 
see him leave office to front up the bid" (Interview: 18 June 2007). Not everyone had 
such regard for Banks. As a fonner Cabinet Minister said, "We had no chance of 
getting the World Cup with Banks. He could really rub people up the wrong way and 
had very little clout in government. I don't think he could open up any doors the way 
204 
Seb Coe could" (Interview with author). Lord Coe had an outstanding international 
reputation in sport and carried a great deal of respect and influence in heading the 
2012 bid. He also had the advantage of being a fonner Conservative MP, and brought 
with him some understanding of how politics worked. 
Some interviewees thought that Kate Hoey was out of her depth on too many issues 
relating to major events happening at the same time. During her short tenn in office, 
"She was associated with several failed projects, including Pickett's Lock, the World 
Athletics Championships, Wembley, and the World Cup bid" (Interview with author). 
This interviewee was a civil servant, who suggested that this was an indication of her 
lack of influence in government and the main reason why she was removed. He felt 
that her true milieu was the "sport for all" and sport in schools areas, where she could 
be inspirational. To make headway on the international front requires seniority in 
government, and the confidence of Cabinet Ministers, neither of which she possessed. 
Richard Caborn held office at the more senior Minister of State level, though still 
outside the Cabinet and the core executive. As already suggested, several interviewees 
thought that he was the most influential Sports Minister since Denis Howell because 
of his lifetime commitment to the Labour Party and experience of government. He 
was also working in a much more favourable environment, in which the senior levels 
of government actively supported bids for major events. Since leaving office, he says 
he has been, "Deeply involved in England's bid to host the 2018 World Cup" 
(Interview: 27 March 2008). Two successful bids for the 2012 Olympics and 2014 
Commonwealth Games were made during Caborn's time in office, for which he has 
been given some credit. Because of his, "ability to open doors at international level", 
according to a civil servant, (Interview with author) and his wide range of connections 
in international bodies, it has been suggested that he actually did make a difference. 
This interviewee also said, "Caborn has done quite well for sport overall, especially in 
his role to secure the Olympics for London" (Interview with author). 
At the IOC Congress of July 2005, London achieved victory by a very slender margin. 
According to a few interviewees, if Caborn persuaded just one or two to vote for 
London, this would have made the vital difference, though it is not possible to prove 
this conclusively. He modestly played down his own influence by saying, "I didn't 
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win the Games for London. It was a team effort and I played my part through the 
contacts I had in the sporting world and in politics" (Interview: 27 March 2008). 
Whether or not he tipped the balance in London's favour, it is certainly true that he 
was Sports Minister at a time when the most successful bid was won, whereas other 
Ministers for Sport have not been so fortunate. He also had the backing of Tony Blair, 
who played a very significant role in persuading IOC delegates to support London 
during the final bidding process, as noted earlier. 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at where government sports policy comes from and what 
bodies and individuals have the most significant influence on it. It has been argued 
that the greatest single source of influence is civil servants working in the government 
departments that have had responsibility for sport at different times (see Appendix 2). 
The overall impression of civil servants is that they were very motivated and driven at 
the senior level, while not knowing much about sport. Further down the hierarchy, 
they tended to be less able, knew a little more about sport, but were unlikely to come 
up with anything really new. Their policy focus was incremental, rather than 
innovative. 
In the view of most of the interviewees, government sports policy is really quite 
limited in scope and is often made by accident. It is comprised of only the four key 
elements discussed in 5.9 above. These are fleshed out for day-to-day implementation 
and dressed up as policies. Although a high proportion of this is generated by civil 
servants, in more recent years the government has made much greater use of outside 
advisers and consultants who can also have an input to the policy process. One senior 
administrator from a national body had this to say about the random and accidental 
nature of policy-making: 
I think A Sporting Future For All was actually co-written with the No. 10 
Strategy Unit. I heard that some of the stuff that went in there about social 
exclusion came from the consultant who happened to be around at the time. 
Then it becomes sort of holy writ and gets accepted and repeated again and 
again and people forget where it comes from originally (Interview with 
author). 
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A Sporting Future For All was produced while Kate Hoey was Minister for Sport in 
March 2001. It was the New Labour government's ftrst major policy statement on 
sport, after four years in office. Following the election three months later she was 
replaced by Richard Cabom, who took over ownership of this plan for sport as 
established policy. 
Labour had accepted that there would be minimal change to the government's policy 
for sport when they won the 1997 election, including the essential structure of 
National Heritage as it was transformed into Culture, Media and Sport. By his own 
admission, Lord Smith changed very little, apart from the name (Interview: 18 June 
2007). Both Tom Pendry and lain Sproat have said that they agreed about a great deal 
and got on very well as champions for sport, despite their political differences 
(Interviews: 1 February 2007 and 31 May 2007). In lain Sproat's opinion, "We 
worked very closely together and had an excellent personal relationship" (Interview: 
31 May 2007). 
Tom Pendry was shadow sports spokesman 1992-97 in Opposition, where he tried to 
develop Labour's sports policies, as well as writing the relevant part of the 1997 
election manifesto, although was not appointed as Minister for Sport in 1997 as noted 
earlier. When all the post-war Labour and Conservative Party manifestos were 
examined in Chapter 1 (1.5) the lack of a left or right ideological position was noted. 
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 1 (1.4) there seemed to be a broad consensus 
between the parties on sports policy which continued, even although this consensus 
broke down in other areas of social and economic policy. 
The 12 individuals who held the post of Minister for Sport from 1964 to 2007 varied 
greatly in their abilities and commitment to the job, though none was able to use it to 
make a breakthrough politically and achieve Cabinet office. While Denis Howell was 
viewed by many of the interviewees as being in a league of his own, most of the 
others are seen as insubstantial at driving a policy agenda. Colin Moynihan was 
commonly regarded as coming second to Howell in terms of effectiveness. Most of 
the others were seen as decent, honourable individuals who had the best interests of 
sport at heart, without necessarily having the drive and commitment to take up a 
policy agenda and see it through, nor the seniority to make it possible. 
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Along the way there have been other shadow spokesmen on sport, none of whom has 
attained the office in government apart from Denis Howell in 1974. For example, 
Eldon Griffiths was appointed in 1970 instead of Charles Morrison who had 
shadowed sport 1966-70. The shadow Minister for Sport job is currently held by 
Hugh Roberston for the Conservatives, who are going through a policy review in all 
areas. However, in terms of sports policy, there is still a large amount of consensus. In 
Robertson's dealings with Richard Caborn he observed, "We do try to agree as much 
as possible" (Interview: 16 March 2007). As far as the policy review is concerned, Mr 
Robertson commented, "We didn't think there was a great point in reinventing the 
wheel" (Interview: 16 March 2007), so it is expected that government sports policy 
will remain much as it is now if the Conservatives win the next election. The main 
difference seems to be centred on how to most efficiently deliver the 2012 Olympic 
project at the best value to the taxpayer. There are no great philosophical differences 
in sports policy as there sometimes have been in party approaches to other areas of 
government activity. 
While this Chapter has tried to establish where government sports policies come from 
and who has influence on them, the next Chapter will use various theoretical 
frameworks to help interpret this process. Although these frameworks were not 
developed specifically for sport, it is hoped that they can help to further our 
understanding of the policy process for sport and assist in answering the main 
research question. 
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Chapter Six: Analysis of Data 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter will examine how some of the theories and frameworks of the policy 
process can help to make sense of the data presented in the previous Chapters. Four of 
those outlined in Chapter 3 seem to offer the best prospects for analysis: the multiple 
streams theory (3.5); the punctuated equilibrium theory (3.6); the advocacy coalition 
framework (3.7); and the core executive framework (3.8). These appear to be more 
useful than the others in trying to explain policy-making in sport and in helping to 
answer the research question. To discuss the theories and frameworks, this analysis 
will use the four themes set out in Chapter 5 and discussed at length in 5.9. It will also 
refer where relevant to the literature review in Chapter 1, and to data presented in 
Chapter 4 relating to the parliamentary performance of the Ministers for Sport. 
6.2 Sport for All 
According to Coghlan (1990), the "sport for all" movement has its ongms m 
continental Europe in the mid-1960s. Its basic assumptions are that people of all ages 
and abilities should be able to take part in sport and develop their talents to whatever 
level they are able to or choose to. It was primarily intended as a way of encouraging 
more people to stay in sport, or return to sport, who would otherwise have abandoned 
it after leaving school. However, in Britain there was never a complete split from this 
route as a path to excellence at the elite level, because it was thought that greater 
numbers of people in sport would help to provide a critical mass from which top-class 
competitors would emerge. 
In 1972, under the chairmanship of Roger Bannister, the Sports Council launched a 
campaign to spread awareness of "sport for all" in the UK and change a common 
perception of sport as an elite pursuit to one of inclusiveness and mass participation. 
This strategy included the encouragement of local authorities to build more and better 
sports venues, to which many of them responded in one of the greatest periods of 
facility construction ever. Holt and Mason (2000) detail the provision of new sports 
facilities, by the new and larger local authorities, endorsed and often supported by the 
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Sports Council in its first decade of 1965-75. 
Reviews of the policy in the 1970s later identified many target groups that were not 
being reached, including women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and those from 
socially-deprived backgrounds. Through the Sports Council, central government 
therefore directed more resources towards these groups as part of a regeneration 
strategy in the inner-cities. This was also in response to inner-city rioting, since it was 
believed this could help to provide diversionary activities for disaffected youth. 
Houlihan (1991) suggests that because of this, " 'sport for all' slowly became 'sport 
for the disadvantaged' and 'sport for inner city youth' " He also observes that, "It is 
doubtful if' Sport for All' ever became more than a slogan" (p. 99). 
If it was just a slogan, it has proved to be an extremely resilient one. In 2001, the 
government's plan for sport was entitled A Sporting Future for All, which suggests a 
direct lineage from a campaign that began some 30 years before. The report itself 
acknowledged this by endorsing a comprehensive strategy for sport at all levels in 
education, in the community, and at the elite level. Moving on from this, the term 
"sport for all" is now more loosely used to refer to the ideals still espoused by Sport 
England, as confirmed by Mihir Warty (Interview: 7 February" 2008). Its broad remit 
is to promote mass-participation sport, while sport for the elite is sponsored by UK 
Sport and the British Olympic Association. Therefore, in the context of this study, 
"sport for all" will be taken in its broadest sense to mean mass-participation sport, not 
just a Sports Council campaign which lasted for many years. 
According to most interviewees for this study, as discussed in Chapter 5, it was in 
"sport for all" type of activities that Ministers for Sport were able to establish an 
appropriate niche for themselves. Data in Chapter 4 also show that much of their 
parliamentary work on sport was concentrated in this area, with adjournment and 
other debates tending to be focused on this type of activity. They were best suited to 
encourage participation, raise sport's profile, act as ambassadors for sport, or work 
with the Sports Council to spread the benefits of an active sporting way of life. Since 
there was very little parliamentary legislation on sport much of their time there was 
spent on other parts of their ministerial portfolios, although some Sports Ministers 
focused more on sport that others. However, they were rarely effective at introducing 
new policies for sport because their location in government was a long way from a 
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central position where policies are normally made, and which recent observers and 
scholars have come to call the "core executive." 
The concept of the "core executive" was discussed Chapter 3 (3.8). It is, in the words 
of Budge et al (2004) "useful in directing attention to the wide network of power and 
influence at the highest levels of government" (p. l34). Smith (1999, 2003) argues 
that policy-making power is spread amongst key institutions and actors at the heart of 
government, rather than any single one holding a monopoly of it. Each of them 
controls significant resources, and is dependent on many of the others to make things 
happen though a process of bargaining and trading of resources. There is a complex 
web of interrelationships that make it futile to try to identify a single source of power, 
even that of the Prime Minister. Likewise, it is rarely possible to pinpoint the true 
origins of any government policy; in Kingdon's (1995) view, polices emerge from the 
mysterious melting pot containing the "policy primeval soup" (p. 116). Policy 
entrepreneurs seek opportunities to pluck policies from this "primeval soup" and 
attach them to problems at appropriate times, when a "window of opportunity" 
(p. 65) opens. 
Respondents in this study have argued that sports policy-making decisions tend to be 
made away from the centre of government, usually in government departments, by 
Secretaries of State and senior civil servants. The core executive has not normally 
been interested in everyday sport, and if the Minister for Sport can have any influence 
at all on sports policy, it is more likely to be in this ("sport for all") sector of activity. 
But even here, Sports Ministers tend to be side lined in policy-making because of their 
junior status. Core executive theory thus helps to explain this process, since the 
Minister for Sport has always been located in one of the outer concentric circles 
identified by Burch and Holliday (1996), some distance from the real centre of power. 
Dorey (2005) observes that there may be some role for ambitious and able junior 
Ministers in the core executive, but this is rare. As already noted in Chapter 5, Lord 
Smith (Interview: 18 June 2007) felt that some junior Treasury Ministers could be 
influential because the Treasury is all-powerful in government, but he did not believe 
that junior Ministers would have much influence in other departments. Occasionally, 
those earmarked for rapid promotion can have an influence in the policy-making 
process, though it is significant that Ministers for Sport have never fallen into this 
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category. It was shown in Chapter 4 (pp. 117-19) that Ministers for Sport have usually 
begun their ministerial careers in departments where promotion is unlikely. Table 3 
(p. 118) ranks the departments that are more likely to lead to Cabinet office, and it can 
be seen that Ministers for Sport barely feature in the principal ones. Within the 
Cabinet, it is really the prerogative of Secretaries of State to initiate policy, in 
conjunction with their Permanent Secretaries in the civil service and key policy 
advisers who are usually political appointments to the core executive. 
It is thus at the level of "sport for all" that the Ministers for Sport may have had any 
impact at all, in the view of most of the interviewees. Unable to access the core 
executive, a problem that the Ministers for Sport have confIrmed themselves, their 
main role had been an "ambassadorial" one, as Theakston (1987) defInes it. 
Macfarlane (Interview: 9 January 2007), Tracey (Interview: 11 April 2007), and 
Sproat (Interview: 31 May 2007) all agreed that the bulk of their sports-related work 
was concentrated on encouraging participation, raising the profIle of sport, attending 
events, or meeting with leading sports fIgures and administrators, rather than in 
policy-making. Eldon GriffIths (Email communications: 16 February 2007 and 29 
July 2007) confined himself almost entirely to this role in the small amount of the 
working time he spent on sport, while Richard Caborn (Interview; 27 March 2008) 
effectively agreed that this was his primary contribution. Even in the devolved 
administrations of the UK, the pattern was similar, as Patricia Ferguson confirmed 
(Interview; 24 August 2007). An examination of the parliamentary data for the UK 
Minister, presented in Chapter 4, shows that most Ministers spent only about 23% of 
their time on sport on average, and much of this involved the routine, "sport for all" 
type of activity. 
lain Sproat was a good distance from the core executive and, by his own account 
(Interview: 31 May 2007), when he wanted to discuss sport with the Prime Minister, 
the "core of the core" as Smith (1999: p.71) describes it, Major's gatekeepers in the 
Policy Unit tried to exclude him from gaining entrance. They preferred him to restrict 
his activities to the profIle-raising and encouragement of participation activities 
associated with "sport for all", in keeping with their narrow view of sport. His 
successors, Tony Banks and Kate Hoey, likewise had little access to the real centre of 
power, although there is some evidence from interviews that Richard Caborn may 
have had slightly more influence. The latest holder of the post, Gerry Sutcliffe, is 
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again situated at the most junior ministerial level in government and has therefore 
reverted to the position held by most occupants of the post over the past 40 years or 
so. 
Other interviewees have confirmed that, as junior Ministers, and operating outside the 
Cabinet, the Ministers for Sport could not expect to play much part in the policy-
making process. As Burch and Holliday (1996) suggest, the rank of Cabinet Minister 
can confer enormous policy-making power to the holder, even though the Cabinet 
itself rarely makes policy while acting as a body. Policy comes from government 
departments, as Smith (2003) and Burch and Holliday (1996) have shown, because it 
is departments that have the expertise and experience of the permanent officials, so 
necessary to Secretaries of State who move regularly from one department to another. 
The status of their position is highly significant for Cabinet Ministers, as many 
interviewees have illustrated, even if the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport (and their predecessors, such as the Secretary of State for the Environment) is 
generally excluded from the core executive. It endows senior Ministers with resources 
for trading and bargaining with other central actors in the policy process, which 
Ministers for Sport do not have. Theakston (1987), Rhodes (1995), Burch and 
Holliday (1996), Smith (1999, 2003), and Holliday (2000) see the vast majority of 
junior Ministers as barely touching on the policy-making process, a view confirmed in 
interviews for this study. Unlike Cabinet Ministers or the Prime Minister, they have 
few resources to trade, such as patronage, authority, or control of policy networks in 
government. Consequently, the core executive model would suggest that their ability 
to influence policy-making is negligible. 
A good example of the limits of the Minister for Sport's ability to influence sports 
policy decisions was given by Mihir Warty of Sport England. The organisation has 
recently been going through a re-examination of its role in terms of sponsoring 
competitive, mass-participation sport, or in pursuing a health agenda. Derek Mapp 
resigned as chairman in November 2007 because of his avowed preference for the 
latter. The then Secretary of State at DCMS, James Purnell, was strongly in favour of 
a repositioning back to a traditional sponsoring of competitive sport. Mihir Warty 
agreed that it was the Secretary of State's influence, both in public and private, that 
forced Mapp to leave (Interview: 7 February 2008). The Minister for Sport, Gerry 
213 
Sutcliffe, had little or nothing to do with the change of policy, nor with Sport 
England's decision to fill the vacant post of Director of Sport. The post was left 
unfilled for years because Sport England was moving away from competitive sport. 
The new appointee will be expected to work closely with the governing bodies in 
encouraging competition, a change in direction very much encouraged by the new 
Secretary of State, Andy Burnham. (Lisa O'Keefe, a former Regional Director, was 
appointed at the end of 2008.) However, the Minister for Sport has been effectively 
side lined throughout this process. 
Thus, the key factor in policy-making for Ministers, according to most interviewees, 
seems to be that a high level of seniority in government is needed. Ministers also need 
to be able to devote their full time to their subject areas, to be in respected posts that 
are taken seriously by other Ministers and civil servants, and to have an assertive 
personality to get things done. Sports Ministers have not generally possessed these 
attributes and have therefore been limited in what they have been able to do for sport. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, they have been spread thinly across a range of 
duties, in junior posts which have not always been treated seriously by senior figures 
in the core executive. 
Core executive theory therefore offers a good explanation of what they could not do, 
in that they were relatively far removed from the centres of influence where policy-
making and policy change take place, with few resources to trade or bargain with. 
Evidence from the data presented here shows that the Ministers for Sport did try to 
influence policy, as will be discussed below, but with limited effect due to the 
weakness of their positions. 
6.3 Elite sport 
Although they alluded to sport in their manifestos during the 1950s and 1960s, (as 
reported in Chapter 1) the Labour and Conservative parties did not develop policies 
for it, as they would do for subjects such as defence or education. With the 
publication of the Wolfenden Report (1960), and the establishment of the Sports 
Council in 1965, both major parties accepted sport as a valid concern of government 
and moved towards introducing policies for its promotion. Lord Hattersley (Interview: 
1 May 2007) and Lord Donoughue (Interview: 7 March 2007) explained how Denis 
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Howell contributed significantly to this process, as discussed in Chapter 5 (paragraph 
5.8). 
However, most government effort went towards mass-participation sport and 
recreation through encouragement of "sport for all". An examination of the 
parliamentary data confmned that, although Sports Ministers sometimes spoke on 
international sport and answered questions on it, they made relatively little impression 
on elite sport, apart from expressing views on performance at Olympic or other world-
class events. As Holt and Mason (2000) point out, government involvement at the top 
end of sport was largely confined to giving out knighthoods and other honours, or 
inviting successful sports men and women to Downing Street for publicity value. 
Successive governments had no real policy for elite sport, leaving it mainly to the 
BOA for amateur sport and the individual bodies of professional sports, such as the 
FA. Although it was not really part of their original remit, the Sports Council filled 
the gap almost by default, giving grants to competitors for Olympic preparation, 
assistance with travel costs, access to coaching, and other supportive activities almost 
from its inception onwards. By the early 1990s, the Sports Council had a whole range 
of schemes to support elite sport including coaching, medical assistance, drug-testing, 
bursaries for competitors, and development of facilities (Howell: 1990; Sports 
Council: 1969,1996; Pickup: Interview: 29 November 2006). 
Within government and the Sports Council itself, there was a perceived need for a 
dedicated body to better meet the requirements of elite sport. Pickup (Interview: 29 
November 2006) described the debate within the Sports Council and government over 
a number of years, leading to the Atkins' Report in 1994 for the restructuring of the 
Sports Council, fmally undertaken by a later Minister for Sport, lain Sproat in 1996 
(Interview: 31 May 2007). There was also the promise of a National Institute of Sport 
to complement this. The subsequent introduction of the Lottery in the early 1990s 
acted as another catalyst for change, effectively directing resources towards elite 
sport. As Green (2007) points out, government involvement in supporting and 
financing elite sports development is relatively recent. 
The establishment of the National Lottery was the first major step at this time in 
providing sufficient fmance to support elite athletes. A sustained campaign over many 
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years to introduce a Lottery could be seen as an example of success for an advocacy 
coalition, deflned by Sabatier and Jenkins-Srriith (1999) as, "actors from a wide 
variety of institutions who share policy core beliefs and coordinate their behaviour in 
a variety of ways" (p. 130). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish between "deep 
core beliefs" (p. 121) and "policy core beliefs" (p. 122). The former consist of 
ontological assumptions and values that actors have in viewing the world, based on a 
lifetime of acquiring knowledge and forming opinions. The latter are beliefs relating 
to a particular situation which are shared with others in any coalition that comes 
together to pursue speciflc policy aims. They suggest that, "the principal glue holding 
a coalition together is agreement over policy core beliefs" (p. 123). 
Coalitions can take years to be constructed as awareness of a problem develops, or 
may occur quickly due to some ''watershed event" (p.136). A watershed event in sport 
could be a coalition formed to introduce football ID cards, or conversely to oppose 
them. Coalitions taking both of these positions were, in fact, formed in the 1980s, in 
the view of civil servants and Ministers interviewed, with the opposition coalition 
being ultimately successful. The coalition from the worlds of sports, arts, heritage, 
and so on to introduce a Lottery was quietly assembled over a decade, according to 
David Pickup (Interview: 29 November 2006). This is the kind of timeframe that 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) see as optimal for policy core beliefs to take root 
in successful advocacy coalitions and in society beyond them, because coalitions seek 
to influence public opinion in the wider world. 
The Lottery was a policy initiated by the Sports Council and taken up by Richard 
Tracey in 1985-87 when he was Minister for Sport. Both David Pickup (1996 and 
Interview: 29 November 2006) and Richard Tracey (Interview: 11 April 2007) talked 
of the bridges they tried to build in government departments and other organisations 
to make it a reality. When it fmally happened, the creation of the National Lottery in 
1994 at last guaranteed that serious amounts of money would go towards elite sports 
development for the flrst time, as one civil servant pointed out (Interview with 
author). It was not introduced until a Conservative government led by John Major was 
receptive to it in the 1990s. The advocacy coalition flnally achieved its aim because it 
was also embraced by charities and cultural organisations, with John Major acting as 
an effective "policy broker" to reach a compromise between competing views. 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) believe that the role of the "policy broker" (p.122) 
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can be vital in helping to reach an accord between rival coalitions in a policy sub-
system. Interviewees for this study have repeatedly mentioned Major's influence in 
sports policy, and he was certainly seen as someone who would seek consensus on 
this and most other issues. Although Major had a significant influence, Ministers for 
Sport were really only able to play a minor role in the coalition, which Richard Tracey 
continued to do even after he ceased being a Minister (Interview: 11 April 2007). 
The National Lottery was quickly followed in 1996 by UK Sport, established as the 
main funding body for elite sport, which had access to Lottery money. It was created 
to deal with the needs of elite competitors at the national level, while Sports England 
(and the bodies for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) J4 concentrated primarily 
on mass participation sport. The burst of innovation within the space of a few years, 
comprising the Department of National Heritage in 1992, the Lottery in 1994, and the 
UK Sport/Sport England split in 1996 was quite unprecedented in British sport. These 
emerged as substantial events after a long process of incremental policy-making, with 
the incremental approach returning thereafter. At the new, higher level, there is now a 
well-run organisation looking after elite sport (UK Sport), a great deal more money at 
the elite end, and a government department at the heart of it. 
... . 
On the whole, Sport Ministers were generally content to let policy drift along for 
many years, with few changes. According to the punctuated equilibrium model 
developed by Ba1JIDgartner and Jones (1993) this is true of most policy, most of the 
time, with policy change coming in sudden bursts before a return to a new 
incrementalism. They see "issue definition" and "agenda setting" (p. 16) as the two 
main driving forces in policy change in a political system. Change can come quite 
rapidly as, "Political ideas become popular quickly and diffuse throughout large areas 
of the political system until they have replaced many old ones" (pp. 16-17). In this 
instance, the agenda for change was effectively set by a successful advocacy coalition 
that resulted in providing a great deal more money for sport. The election of a 
Conservative government in 1992 that actively promoted sport, and the reform of the 
institutions that governed it were critical factors. Until the early 1990s, policy change 
for sport was incremental, while British success at international level, especially the 
Olympics, was regarded as modest. There was a perceived need for change, and the 
establishment of the Department of National Heritage in 1992 hastened progress 
under David Mellor as Secretary of State. It put sport much higher up the policy 
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agenda, with a Secretary of State in Cabinet who saw sport as an important part of his 
remit. 
It is quite unusual for sports policy changes to emerge from the highest levels, since 
sport is not normally associated with the core executive. In the core executive model 
outlined by Rhodes and Dunleavy (1995), most policy comes from government 
departments where policy expertise lies, as already discussed. This is dominated by 
the most powerful departments, such as the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and the 
Home Office. The Departments of National Heritage or Culture, Media and Sport 
were seen by all interviewees in this study as being nowhere near the centre of power 
and low down the pecking order in Cabinet. In fact, the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport is currently ranked seventeenth in importance in Cabinet out of 
twenty-two members (UK Parliament web page, 2008). John Major bypassed the 
normal policy-making processes for sport by investing his own authority in something 
in which he believed, although some of his colleagues were mystified by this, 
according to Virginia Bottomley (Interview: 29 June 2007). 
John Major adopted the role of what Baumgartner and Jones (1993) call a "policy 
entrepreneur" (p. 85). Such individuals, "take advantage of favorable public attention 
and quickly move to ensure a quick assignment to government officials to an 
encouraging institutional venue" (p. 84). But Major did more than just assign his ideas 
to an existing government department. He actually created the new Department of 
National Heritage to implement the policies, with David MelIor as Secretary of State 
at first overseeing the key changes to sports policy. They were thus able to exploit the 
"window of opportunity" (p. 144) that opened after winning the 1992 election. This 
gave the government new authority to carry through the changes within the space of a 
few years. 
Interviewees have suggested that the Ministers for Sport were relatively minor players 
in this regard, being carried along by events but unable to have much impact. Robert 
Atkins, for example, was operating at a low level as a junior Minister in the Education 
Department, where sport was located 1990-92. In the view of interviewees for this 
study, the Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Clarke, was not sympathetic to 
sport. His public image was one of cigar-smoking and beer-drinking in smoky jazz 
clubs, quite at odds with the ideals of sport. Atkins was followed by Robert Key 
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(1992-93), who was largely invisible and completely ineffective, according to 
interviewees. By the time a more effective Minister came along in the person of lain 
Sproat (1993-97), who may have been able to make a difference, the most significant 
changes had already been made or were well underway from 1992 onwards, promoted 
by more senior political figures. It was only when sport moved further up the political 
agenda under Mellor, with huge support from Major, that sudden change was 
possible, and having occurred, this change endured. 
The Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theory thus offers a plausible explanation of sports 
policy change over a short to medium period, with stability being largely maintained 
over the longer term since those events took place. Any change since then has again 
been incremental, as their theory would predict. There have been no further major 
changes in sports policy, and the move from National Heritage to Culture, Media and 
Sport was in reality only a renaming exercise in the opinion of its first Secretary of 
State, Chris Smith (Interview: 18 June 2007). He agreed that his contribution was to 
provide continuity and stability after a period of significant upheaval, rather than seek 
further reforms, though he felt he was instrumental in securing more funding for elite 
sport. His three successors (fessa Jowell, James Purnell, and Andy Bumham) have all 
been consolidators, according to interviewees, rather than innovators. 
6.4 Sport in Schools 
Sport has a long history in British schools, particularly in the independent sector. The 
nineteenth century model of the English public school, encapsulated by Thomas 
Hughes (185611973) in the Rugby School of Tom Brown's Schooldays, shows a fierce 
attachment to sport as a means of promoting ''muscular Christianity". According to 
Kirk (2003), sport was widespread in the public schools, "since at least the 1850s" (p. 
144). Holt (1989) observes that sports and games were probably played in public 
schools well before this, since the Eton Wall Game was banned from 1821 to 1836, 
while there were inter-school rowing and cross-country races at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. 
As Kirk (2003) notes, there was a gradual expansion of sports and games into the state 
schools in the 1860-80 period. Legislation to make education compulsory, such as the 
1870 Education Act for elementary schools was followed by other Acts to extend 
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education to the secondary level and progressively raise the school-leaving age 
throughout the twentieth century. Sport was not always accepted as a legitimate 
subject for schools. According to Kirk (2003)t its position in state schools (though not 
generally in public schools) was always, "a contested concept" (p. 145) and the 
position of PE and games teachers devalued in the post-war period, particularly in the 
1960s and 1970st until a reappraisal in the late 1980s. Data from the parliamentary 
analysis show that Ministers for Sport were well aware of sport being marginalised in 
schools. All of them dealt with a number of questions on matters such as sport on the 
school curriculum, loss of playing fields, and decline of competitive sport in schools. 
However, from this data, there is no evidence of them offering any consistent policy 
solution to reverse the decline. 
The changing status of sport from the 1980s is examined by Houlihan and Green 
(2006). They also look at how regard for sport, games, and PE in state schools 
fluctuated in the years leading up to this when they were not as highly valued as other' 
"core" subjects, such as mathematics or history. The inclusion of PE as a core subject 
on the National Curriculum in 1991 helped encourage its revival, under a more 
sympathetic Conservative government headed by John Major. The Labour 
government of 1997 cemented this process, with another Prime Minister who valued 
both sport and education. Various other influential peoplet who were effective policy 
entrepreneurs, also had a significant role. 
Major (2007) himself is characteristically downbeat about his achievements. He 
thought that, as Prime Minister: 
I did less than I should have done. I should have acted more comprehensively 
to restore sport to schools when I had the power to do so, and I know it now 
with all the clarity that comes to those who review their mistakes with honesty 
(p.392). 
Despite his modestyt he did help to make PE a subject worthy of the core curriculum 
and push it much further up the agenda in schools again after years of decline. It was 
felt by a number of interviewees that the situation was becoming better at this time 
because it was being taken more seriously at a higher level in the core executive 
where John Major invested his personal authority in it. Interviewees for this study 
have confirmed the valuable contribution made by John Major, Sue Campbell, and 
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others in promoting school sport. But according to a nmnber of Ministers and civil 
servants, real change only came about when Labour won power in 1997, despite the 
seeds being sown before this under Major. 
Sport in schools is an area that lends itself to interpretation by Kingdon's (1995) 
multiple streams theory. He identifies, firstly, a problem stream, when an issue 
emerges on to the policy agenda. This may happen because an issue gradually enters 
public consciousness as a cause for concern, such as a perceived lack of success in 
top-class sport or perhaps the alleged declining health and fitness of young people. It 
can also occur in response to a crisis, as he Suggests: 
To make an item from a less visible arena move up on a governmental agenda, 
something must happen, and that something often is a real crisis - the sort of 
thing government decision makers cannot ignore (p. 95). 
In the case of school sport, it was not so much a crisis, but more a gradual awakening 
to the consequences of the situation. The subject had almost dropped off the school 
curriculum, and this was perceived by some as a cause for anxiety. Interviewees for 
this study have commented that there was real concern at senior levels in national 
sports organisations and elsewhere at what was happening because of the reduced 
numbers of young people taking up sport in school and carrying it through to high 
standards. It also began to emerge in other policy areas, such as education and health, 
that there could be real benefits from encouraging school sport. Thus, the problem of 
lack of sport in schools was recognised for all sorts of reasons in and out of 
government (e.g. health, fitness, obesity, competition, next generation of sporting 
talent, etc.). 
The second stream in Kingdon's (1995) theory is the policy one. He suggests that 
there is always likely to be a policy somewhere in the "primeval soup" (p. 116) to 
attach to problems. It is likely that "policy entrepreneurs" (p. 165) will have spent a 
great deal of their time for years developing policies, trying repeatedly to attach these 
to problems, and looking for opportunities to promote them. When a suitable moment 
arrives, they will be able to offer up a potential solution, which is what happened after 
the election of a Labour government in 1997. Tony Blair saw education as the main 
priority of his government, and the policy of more sport in schools was encouraged to 
overcome some of the problems identified as having been caused by the decline in 
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school sport. 
Kingdon's (1995) final stream is that of politics. He suggests that this, "flows along 
according to its own dynamics and its own rules" (p. 162). However, he sees it as the 
most important stream because it determines which items reach the policy agenda and 
what solutions can be employed and attached to problems. This may alter rapidly 
because of elections, a change in national mood, or for other reasons. With the 
election of Labour in 1997, the politics stream was a favourable one in determining 
how the other streams flowed. The politics of New Labour, which espoused ''joined-
up government", was particularly sympathetic to co-operation across departments, 
such as Health, Education, and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, allowing 
the three streams to come together. For Kingdon (1995), the merging of the streams is 
the most salient event in the whole process. It may be a rare occurrence for all three 
streams to appear together at a similar time. Therefore a successful policy 
entrepreneur must recognise this potential confluence and seize the moment to 
achieve a joining of the streams in a "policy window" (p. 165). 
Houlihan and Green (2006) also see the multiple streams theory as a good explanation 
of policy change in sport and education, while identifying the merits of the advocacy 
coalition framework in certain respects. As well as recognising the roles played by 
Charles Clarke, Estelle Morris, and Tony Blair as policy entrepreneurs, they identify 
Sue Campbell as a highly effective, independent policy entrepreneur from outside 
government, a view shared by a number of interviewees in this study. Others, such as 
Lord Smith (Interview: 18 June 2007) and Patrick Cheney (Interview: 18 January 
2007), have suggested that Kate Hoey may have had a minor role in the process of 
promoting school sport. But she could not be described as a policy entrepreneur in 
any meaningful sense, compared with two committed Education Secretaries (Estelle 
Morris and Charles Clarke). 
Other interviewees, for example Baroness Bottomley (Interview: 29 June 2007) and 
some of the civil servants who were interviewed, also identified the contribution of 
lain Sproat's policy document, Raising the Game, which placed school sport in a 
central position. However, they recognised his limited influence in effecting real 
change as a junior Minister operating in a different department, in comparison with 
the enormous potential power of the Prime Minister, John Major. Major was seen by 
222 
many interviewees as being central to an important raft of sports policy changes in the 
early to mid-1990s, that came about from his role as the kind of policy entrepreneur 
identified in Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) punctuated equilibrium theory which has 
already been discussed above (paragraph 6.3). 
Some interviewees identified barriers to change under Labour when they were first 
elected in 1997. Its first Education Secretary, David Blunkett, did not regard school 
sport as a high priority. Indeed, Blunkett's (2006) 850 pages of memoirs fail to 
mention school sport once, with 266 pages given over to his time as Education 
Secretary. Similarly, the Minister for Sport, Tony Banks, did little to promote school 
sport. When Blunkett and Banks were removed, the changes already underway before 
Labour came to office were cemented, with Hoey's support. Richard Cabom 
(Interview: 27 March 2008) spoke of his huge commitment to sport in education and 
of how he spent a great deal of time visiting schools encouraging it. He believed that 
school sport had a number of important benefits in addition to health, fitness, and 
competition. These included improved school performance in league tables because of 
the all-round discipline and work ethic that sport can instill at formative periods in the 
lives of young people. 
However, the key factors seem to be a level of seniority in government, together with 
being situated in the department where they want to effect policy change. As noted 
earlier, Smith (1999) suggests that it is from government departments that policies 
emerge. Smith et al (1995) recognise the sense of identity that each government 
department has, and assert that, "departments are the key policy makers for the 
majority of policies within British central government" (p. 41). Sports Ministers had 
neither of these attributes of seniority or departmental location. They have not 
normally been located in the Education Department, with the recent and ineffective 
exception of Atkins (1990-92), and have been quite junior in government. They have 
therefore been limited in what they were able to do to promote school sport. 
Civil servants in this study confirmed that it was their first duty to pursue the policies 
of their own departments and the aims of their own Secretaries of State. It was 
regarded as normal to effectively frustrate or delay initiatives from other departments, 
even at the most senior level, since these were not part of their own fundamental 
departmental objectives. Junior Ministers from other departments had even less 
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chance of success. The evidence from the data presented here shows that although the 
Ministers for Sport did try to influence policy for school sport they were unable to 
achieve much due to the weakness of their positions. However, Richard Caborn 
claimed that he lobbied extensively to encourage school sport and maintain its 
importance on the school curriculum (Interview: 27 March 2008) and in this respect 
may have had more success than his predecessors due to his length of time in office, 
his network of contacts, and his relative seniority in government. Nevertheless, real 
change at inter-departmental level is only possible through co-operation between the 
Secretaries of State who head the departments, rather than at the junior Minister level. 
6.5 Attracting Major Events to the UK 
The UK has long been a major destination for world-class sports events. The Culture 
Media and Sport Select Committee (1999) examined Britain's record in hosting major 
events and found an impressive record. Since World War Two, the UK has hosted the 
Olympic Games in 1948 and has had a successful bid for 2012 accepted. In football, 
there have been the 1966 World Cup and European Championships of 1996, as well 
as several European club cup finals. The Cricket World Cup and the Rugby World 
Cup were both held in 1999. The Commonwealth Games have been in the UK four 
times (Cardiff, 1958; Edinburgh, 1970 and 1986; Manchester, 2002), with Glasgow 
due to host a fifth in 2014. In 1991, Sheffield hosted the World Student Games, the 
largest multi-sports event in the world outside of the Olympics. The country has also 
hosted a large number of less important events, such as the World Cross-Country 
Championships, World Judo Championships, World Amateur Boxing Championships 
and many others. In addition there are numerous world-class events which have their 
home in Britain, such as Wimbledon, the Open Golf Championship, or the Fastnet 
Race in sailing. 
From an examination of the parliamentary data, Ministers for Sport have consistently 
supported bids for major events, both before and after they have been initiated. They 
have spoken in the Commons in favour of bids for the Olympics, the football World 
Cup, Commonwealth Games, and many others, especially from the 1990s onwards. 
However, none have taken the lead in launching such bids, many of which have been 
unsuccessful. As previously discussed, these include the Birmingham and Manchester 
bids for the 1992, 1996, and 2000 Olympics, an English bid for the 2006 football 
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World Cup, (promoted but certainly not launched by Tony Banks), and a 
ScottishlIrish bid for football's 2008 European Championships. The athletics World 
Championships of 2005 had to be moved to Sweden because of the impossibility of 
providing a stadium in London to stage them. 
On the other hand, the government has not always been keen on hosting major events, 
even if the Sports Ministers have. Indeed, there has been opposition from some 
members of the Cabinet to Olympic bids because of the cost, traffic congestion, and 
even the threat of terrorism, as some former Ministers and civil servants pointed out 
in their interviews, and discussed earlier (paragraph 5.5). Their comments provide 
good examples of how government power can be used in the negative sense that 
Lukes (2005) postulates. Lukes suggests that keeping policies off the agenda is in 
itself a policy decision not to proceed with a specific course of action. For example, 
some Cabinet Ministers, such as Norman Tebbit, tried to keep bids for Olympic 
Games off the agenda, according to a civil servant (Interview with author) and 
ensured that a non-decision actually became a policy. During the Thatcher period, it 
was felt that sport was given a relatively low priority, if not removed from the agenda, 
certainly very low down in importance as an activity of government. As a result, 
successful advocacy coalitions had little opportunity to develop. 
Attitudes have changed since the heyday of the Thatcher administrations and the 
benefits of sport are more widely recognised. Central government, many of the larger 
local authorities, and the devolved administrations, are increasingly keen to host 
events, for a variety of reasons, including national prestige, economic benefits, home 
advantage, legacy of facilities, and generally raising the profile of sport in the region 
or country for long-term benefits. Some organisations have created specialised units 
to attract major events, including UK Sport and the Scottish government. UK Sport 
has commissioned a number of reports from Sheffield Hallam University over the past 
ten years, one of which (2004) recommended that, "There is compelling evidence for 
UK Sport's World Class Events Programme to continue supporting major events in 
the UK" (p. 5). As Richard Cabom, Patricia Ferguson, civil servants, and others have 
indicated (Interviews with author: 12 March 2008; 24 August 2007), bids for the 1991 
World Student Games in Sheffield, the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, and 
the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester, were won as a result of years of 
carefully building up local and national alliances. These alliances spread across local 
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authorities, sports bodies, journalists, politicians and many others in the kind of broad, 
decade-old, advocacy coalitions defined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). 
Sabatier (1988) initially identified the time-scale of at least a decade as being 
necessary for successful coalitions to consolidate, though some coalitions can develop 
quickly as a result of a crisis. 
Following from these, the main bidding success in recent years has undoubtedly been 
winning the right to host the 2012 London Olympics, which the advocacy coalition 
framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) offers one way of explaining. There 
was a powerful coalition in government, local government, the communications 
media, and sports bodies, holding "policy core beliefs", built up over a decade or 
more, that the Olympics should be held in London. There was a much deeper level of 
commitment to London, compared with that shown towards either Birmingham or 
Manchester, according to many of those who were interviewed. In relation to the 
advocacy coalition framework, it can be argued that there existed a "deep core belief' 
that London was the only possible UK city that could win a bid for the Olympics. The 
bid was led by the charismatic ex-sportsman Sebastian Coe as a policy broker, in the 
advocacy coalition's terminology. In July 2005, at the final award meeting, the Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, also acted as a powerful policy broker in his consensual 
dealings with IOC delegates, and may well have made a critical difference, according 
to interviewees for this study. Richard Caborn also had an influence in a more 
understated role, as he and other interviewees suggested and discussed earlier, though 
not as a significant policy broker of the same stature as Coe or Blair. 
The advocacy coalition for London was able to take advantage of what Sabatier 
(1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) call "policy-oriented learning". In other 
words, they could learn from mistakes made in the earlier Olympic bids from 
Birmingham and Manchester. They were also able to adjust their behaviour in the 
light of new information generated by a highly professional bidding campaign for 
London, that was far more effective than the ones which previously failed. For 
example, the early leader of the bid, Barbara Cassani, was removed when she seemed 
to have insufficient stature in world sports circles, something that Coe had in 
abundance. Lord Hattersley (Interview: 1 May 2007) also spoke of the somewhat 
ascetic and frugal campaigns for Birmingham (particularly in the final stages of the 
bid for 1992), which he felt had little chance of success, as discussed earlier 
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(paragraph 5.9). 
A similar concept to policy-oriented learning, observed by Kingdon (1995), is the role 
of ideas in public policy. He sees them as "integral parts of decision making in and 
around government" (p. 125) in terms of persuasion, marshalling evidence, and 
making a case for a policy. The use and discussion of ideas is part of the advocacy 
process that made the London bid ultimately successful because its advocates were 
able to recycle, reuse, or reject ideas from previous bids for Birmingham and 
Manchester, as well as the flawed bid for the 2006 football World Cup. 
The advocacy coalition theory is best at helping to explain single events like these, 
rather than the everyday world of low-level sports policy-making which Ministers for 
Sport normally inhabit. Ministers for Sport have only had a very minor role to play in 
coalitions of this kind, or others such as that directed towards the banning of tobacco 
advertising in sport. Both Neil Macfarlane (Interview (9 January 2007) and Richard 
Tracey (Interview: 11 April 2007) recalled the minimal influence they had in trying to 
change government policy at their junior level in government. Policy change was 
finally possible when the issue of smoking was taken up by a powerful and long-
established health coalition and at a higher level in government, championed there by 
Secretaries of State for Health. 
However, as with the enhanced status of school sport, the multiple streams theory can 
also help to explain the success of the Olympic bid. Kingdon (1995), sees policy 
change occurring when the problem, policy, and politics, relating to an issue all 
combine at the same time to make this possible. The problem of backing a particular 
city was solved because the only realistic applicant, London, was willing and able to 
bid. Previous bids for Birmingham and Manchester had little realistic chance of 
success in the closed, elite, community of the IOC, which was always likely to favour 
the charms of a global world city such as London. Previous efforts to promote London 
failed because of the lack of a city-wide government, something that was overcome 
from 1999 when the city was granted its own true London mayor, and a supportive 
assembly for the first time. 
The policy of bidding had widespread support in the country as well as at the DCMS, 
and had made it on to the national agenda over a long time period. The benefits of 
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holding major events were recognised from the examples of Barcelona and Sydney, 
together with the successful Commonwealth Games in Manchester in 2002. There 
was really no need to dip into the "primeval soup" to select a policy, since the 
alternatives were in reality to bid or not to bid for a third London Olympics. 
When the advocacy coalition for London was formulating a bid, they were fortunate 
in that the UK politics were right. Labour was willing to back a bid and to underwrite 
the finance, which previous governments would not do. Only when these factors came 
together at the right time, with the powerful presence of Coe and Blair acting as 
policy brokers could the bid succeed. Timing was critical, because a "policy window" 
had opened in terms of Kingdon's (1995) framework, in which the three steams could 
be joined. There are only around 100 IOC delegates, and the final decision rested on a 
knife-edge, at which point the Minister for Sport may have had some small part to 
play, according to Richard Caborn (Interview: 27 March 2007) and other 
interviewees, as previously discussed. Such a window might not open again for many 
years, if ever, because the bidding cycle for an Olympics and the political situation in 
the UK rarely coincide. It may be possible for the problem and related policy streams 
to coincide in the future, but for these do so when it is Europe's turn to host the 
Games again, and when there is a sympathetic UK government in power, is relatively 
unlikely. With many more potential bidders for the Olympics now in each cycle, the 
chances of a successful bid may become less and less. 
Generally, the Minister for Sport has not been seen as a person who can make a 
difference to events such as these. Denis Howell used his authority as a kind of elder 
statesman in sport (although after some years out of office) to support Birmingham's 
bids for the 1992 and 1996 Olympics, but it was nowhere near sufficient to be critical. 
Tony Banks's leadership of the campaign for the 2006 World Cup was viewed as 
disastrous. He just did not carry enough clout politically and had no recorded sporting 
achievement, unlike Lord Coe. However, as has been noted before, it was felt by 
some interviewees that Richard Caborn was extremely well connected in the 
international sports world and could open many doors. He was also a significant 
figure in the anti-apartheid movement in the 19705 and 1980s, and had become a 
friend of Nelson Mandela. If this relationship only swung one or two African 
delegates London's way, this could have made the difference between success and 
failure. But these were unusual circumstances. The normal location for a Minister for 
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Sport has been outside of the core executive, and thus some way distant from forums 
where critical decisions are made. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The four theories used in this analysis have all been helpful in trying to understand 
where the Ministers for Sport are situated in government and how effective they have 
been as a result. The advocacy coalition framework, the multiple streams theory and 
the punctuated equilibrium theory have helped to show how influence on the policy 
process is more likely to come with seniority in government, whereas the role of 
junior Ministers in policy change is unlikely to be a major one. 
The advocacy coalition framework is good at explaining how single issues such as 
banning tobacco sponsorship or establishing the National Lottery emerge on to the 
policy agenda and how they are dealt with. It is less useful when it comes to 
understanding how a large number of disparate bodies or individuals can make their 
views known in any systematic way in broad policy areas, such as sport. Likewise, the 
multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories are more useful in examining 
policy changes involving single events or narrow subject areas, rather than the 
influence of individuals on those changes, unless the individual is a highly-significant 
political actor, such as a head of government. 
The core executive framework developed by Rhodes and Dunleavy (1995) Smith 
(1999), and others, discussed above, was found to offer the best explanation of what 
Ministers for Sport could not do, in that they were relatively far removed from the 
centres of influence where policy-making and policy change take place. It is therefore 
the most useful theory for placing the Ministers for Sport in context within 
government and in the policy process for sport. While they may have tried to 
influence policy for school sport, elite sport, bidding for major events, and at the 
"sport for all" level, they were unable to achieve much because of their place in 
government. They could hope to contribute most, albeit in small ways, at the "sport 
for all" level where initiatives cost little and where senior political or civil service 
figures would not be concerned at what they were doing, Because of the way the 
office and the individuals were regarded it was felt that anything they did would have 
only a marginal impact on government and would be unlikely to be harmful. 
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Conclusion 
It is now possible to draw together the main themes of the research. Firstly, the 
limitations of the data are considered. This discussion is followed by a summary of 
the findings, which are addressed in the context of the relevant literature and the 
theoretical approaches examined earlier, some of which are better than others at 
making sense of the data. Some recommendations are then made for future research, 
with suggestions as to how the data can be built upon. Finally, an attempt is made to 
answer the research question that was originally posed. 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that a constructivistlinterpretivist standpoint would be 
taken for this study. Because the majority of the data came from interviews with 
individuals, rather than numerical data as with a positivist approach, exact 
reproducibility could never be achieved. It is unlikely that another researcher would 
gain access to precisely the same group of individuals and obtain the same responses 
from them. Thus, the terms that Denzin and Lincoln (2000) identified of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability (p. 21) were seen as more realistic 
criteria by which to judge the data. 
It is felt that the data from the interviews are credible because the respondents were 
all educated, intelligent, literate, and articulate people. They were very familiar with 
their subject areas, having dedicated their lives to their specialisms, in politics, sports 
administration, the civil service, and so on, and were happy to share their knowledge 
with the researcher. While many of the answers given to questions were specific to an 
individual, such as a previous Minister for Sport, it was clear that these would also 
apply to other Ministers for Sport. For example, when asking about Minister for 
Sport/Secretary of State relations, it was always assumed that power lay with the 
latter. Thus, the data possessed transferability, inasmuch as they made it possible to 
generalise about Ministers for Sport who were not interviewed. 
The interviewees were all extremely helpful in providing information. They generally 
had no discernible reason to distort their replies, although politicians, particularly the 
ex-Sports Ministers, tended to have a slightly more elevated view of their own 
importance to policy-making than other observers who spoke about them. For 
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example, civil servants felt that as junior Ministers they had little input to the policy 
process, while the Ministers themselves preferred to believe that they contributed to 
the policy-making process in some way. Nevertheless, Ministers and civil servants 
often corroborated each other in accounts of particular meetings (e.g. with the Queen 
at a sports reception or Mrs Thatcher on football hooliganism), or on wider issues 
(e.g. establishing the Lottery or cross-departmental working). As a result, they 
generally came across as dependable witnesses whose testimonies could be trusted. 
It was often possible to ask different interviewees broadly similar questions and 
receive similar types of answers, for example in relation to the source of government 
policies. There was a consensus that, while there were a number of potential sources, 
they were predominantly shaped and implemented by the civil servants, rather than 
Ministers. Therefore, the data had confirmability from a number of verbal sources as 
well, and were also cross-checked in written accounts where possible. 
The range of respondents also permitted confidence in the findings. Amongst the 
interviewees were some very senior politicians and civil servants, all of them with 
access to, or contacts in, the top echelons of government, the "core executive". These 
were joined by a number of interviewees who were not at the pinnacle of their 
professions (although some were very clearly on the way there), This meant that the 
interviews covered a wide span of seniority. A particular limitation was that, 
reflecting the vast majority of senior jobs in these areas, most of the respondents were 
malels• Unfortunately, the only female former UK Minister for Sport, Kate Hoey, was 
not interviewed, although Patricia Ferguson from the Scottish government was. 
The political split of the MPs or former MPs (several of them now in the House of 
Lords) was very even. Seven were Conservatives and seven were Labour. No Liberals 
or MPs from other parties were approached at the UK level, since only Labour and 
Conservative MPs have ever held the office. In Northern Ireland, Michael 
McGimpsey (Ulster Unionist Party) was asked for an interview but did not reply, nor 
did Rhordi Glyn Thomas (Plaid Cymru) in Wales. 
A wide range of organisations were also represented in the survey, including all the 
main umbrella bodies covering sport in Britain, such as the BOA, CCPR, Sport 
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England, and UK Sport. Each of these organisations was visited in the research, as 
was DCMS and the House of Commons. This area of the research was strengthened 
by talking to other respondents in the civil service who had experience of DCMS, 
National Heritage, Education, and Environment. These are the government 
departments where sport has been located at one time or another. As was discussed in 
the Research Methods (2.8), governing bodies of individual sports were not 
approached since they are all represented by the CCPR. Furthermore, former Sports 
Ministers and other interviewees believed that the governing bodies had little 
influence on government sports policy. 
Interviewees from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were included in the study 
to help broaden the approach, although the regional dimension was not a main focus 
of the study. These interviews helped to provide some confirmability that the pattern 
in the devolved administrations was actually very similar to that in UK central 
government. 
Only five former Ministers for Sport were interviewed or responded by email.This is 
clearly a limitation, although the figure does represent over 50% of the nine who are 
still alive. It was because of the initial lack of co-operation from former Ministers for 
Sport that the study was broadened to include many others from the worlds of politics 
and sport. This proved to be an advantage in many ways, not least by giving insights 
into aspects of policy-making and government that the Ministers for Sport could not 
have provided, even if they had all been interviewed. Another limitation is that there 
was only one ethnic minority respondent in the study (excluding the Welsh and 
Scots). However, this reflected the low representation of ethnic minority groups in the 
professions involved, and certainly at the upper levels. 
It was decided to stop interviewing after all the possibilities of meeting former 
Ministers for Sport had been exhausted. By this time, a great deal of data had been 
generated from other respondents and it showed quite clear patterns. It is unlikely that 
by substantially increasing the number of interviews, different conclusions would 
have been reached. There was a general consensus amongst respondents about the 
limits of Sports Ministers' power. No one suggested that any of them had ready 
access to the core executive where policies are really made. It is hard to believe that 
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any other potential respondent would have argued otherwise. 
The data generated from the study of Ministers in Parliament were designed to 
complement the interview material. Most of this data could be reproduced by another 
researcher using the same rules. This approach proved a good way of measuring the 
output of Ministers for Sport in Parliament, resulting in findings with which the 
Ministers themselves agreed when asked. The approach also gave a flavour of the 
subject areas covered by Ministers in sports debates or in answering questions in the 
House, and acted as an excellent guide to producing interview schedules for 
discussion with the Ministers. However, this data had its limitations in that it could 
not stand alone as a representation of the Ministers' views; it was necessary to 
supplement this evidence with interviews to probe more deeply and interpret what 
particular events meant at particular times. For example, Richard Tracey answered a 
number of questions in Parliament that appeared to offer support for a ban on tobacco 
sponsorship in sport. In his interview, he confided that this was actually quite unlikely 
at the time because of Mrs Thatcher's opposition to such a ban. 
In Chapter 4 it was shown that the Ministers for Sport dedicated around only a quarter 
of their parliamentary activity to sport. When they did answer questions on sport in 
Parliament, it was also found that just a quarter of parliamentary questions were on 
this subject. Three-quarters were on the other diverse matters that they covered over 
the years, such as the environment, transport, or planning. Their main contribution to 
the debating process was participating in adjournment debates, rather than legislation, 
while full-scale debates on sport were really quite rare. The Ministers for Sport 
normally began their ministerial careers in offices that did not usually lead to 
promotion, thus severely reducing their chances of attaining senior positions In 
government with influence on the policy-making process. 
The data show that Ministers for Sport have contributed to the policy-making process, 
but usually in small ways that do not cost money. For example, Denis Howell was 
seen by some respondents as an initiator of the Gleneagles Declaration in 1977, which 
set out a policy for dealing with South Africa. In 1998, Tony Banks endorsed the 
Brighton Declaration, a policy statement about women in sport. During his time in 
office (1981-85), Neil Macfarlane, followed by Richard Tracey, tried to establish a 
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policy on tobacco sponsorship. This met with repeated opposition from Mrs Thatcher, 
who used her power to successfully keep it off the policy agenda. It was only when 
the issue of smoking and health moved up the political agenda beyond sport in the 
1990s that action was taken, a development that may be explicable by reference to the 
advocacy coalition framework, the multiple streams theory of the policy process, or 
both. However, in the interviews with former Ministers for Sport, it is significant that 
they all found it difficult to cite substantive policies to which they contributed. 
When Theakston (1987) studied a number of junior Ministers, including those for the 
Arts, Sport, and the Disabled, he identified their main role as being "ambassadorial". 
The office-holders worked on behalf of their respective subject areas to promote their 
standing and image, while the policy-making aspects were left to civil servants and 
Secretaries of State. The evidence gathered for this study reveals that the Minister for 
Sport fits that profile well. This was certainly their main role until the early 1990s, 
when the needs of elite sport moved further up the policy agenda. The splitting of the 
Sports Council into two bodies, the establishment of the Lottery for funding sport as 
one of the "good causes", and the transfer of sport to the Department of National 
Heritage were events upon which Ministers for Sport had little impact. These were 
serious policy issues that were dealt with by more senior Ministers of Cabinet rank. 
Similarly, it was really a change of personnel at Secretary of State level in the 
Education Department in 2001 that raised the importance of school sport, even though 
most Ministers for Sport had tried to achieve this for many years. The Ministers for 
Sport worked at the lowest levels in government, where they found it impossible to 
make headway with their opposite numbers in the Education Department. It was only 
when the issues were dealt with at Cabinet Minister level that real progress was made. 
Finally, the evidence from the interviews shows that Sports Ministers had little 
influence on bids for major events. It is inconceivable that any of them could have 
independently launched a bid for a major event, and when it came to the bidding 
processes, they had minimal control over the outcome. 
It was shown in the previous chapter how the punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) can help explain policy change for elite sport and bids 
for major events, while the multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 1995) can be applied to 
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policy on school sport, although, neither of these are useful theories for explaining the 
contribution of junior Ministers in such situations. However, the core executive 
framework (Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995 and Smith, 1999) has proved to be the most 
useful tool of analysis for showing how the role of the Minister for Sport is situated at 
some distance from the most influential parts of government where real policy-
making takes place. Burnham et al (2004), in discussing the concept of "Occam's 
Razor"16 suggest that, "The simplest theory that fits the facts of a problem is the one 
that should be selected" (p. 4). The core executive framework performs this task very 
well. 
While this study has looked at the role of Ministers for Sport, there is very little 
evidence in the literature regarding other junior Ministers. Theakston (1985, 1987, 
1999) is the only scholar who has examined the subject in any depth, by tracing their 
historical background of the offices, their position in government, and the office 
holders. There is clearly a need to examine in detail a number of junior ministerial 
offices to see how these compare with that of the Minister for Sport. It may be, for 
example, that a Treasury junior Minister can be quite influential, as some respondents 
in the interviews have suggested. Therefore, a cross-departmental study of a few 
selected junior Ministers would be very valuable, using the interview techniques and 
analysis of parliamentary performance undertaken here. 
The Minister for Sport is not a unique British office and therefore it would also be 
useful to engage in a cross-national study of Sports Ministers to compare how they are 
treated in terms of seniority, position in government, potential influence in policy-
making, and so on, in other parts of the world. Since this may be too ambitious, an 
initial starting point would be an examination and comparison of Ministers in the 
devolved governments of the UK. The latter have now been established for nearly a 
decade, over three electoral cycles. The offices have also been held outside the 
traditional Labour/Conservative dominance of Westminster (Scottish National Party, 
Plaid Cymru, Ulster Unionist), which may offer some interesting perspectives for 
comparison and analysis. 
This research was carried out to fill gaps in our knowledge as to what Ministers for 
Sport existed for, what they did, and how they contributed to the policy-making 
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process for sport. These gaps were set out fully in the Introduction to the thesis, as 
was the main research question and subsidiary questions. This research has indeed 
helped to fill some of those gaps in our knowledge by the collection and analysis of 
original data. It has done so by identifying and focussing on the four main elements of 
sports policy which were set out in the analysis (Chapter 6), a conceptualization 
which is in itself an original contribution to the study ofUK sports policy. The impact 
of the Ministers for Sport in the policy process for sport has generally been limited 
because their position in government has been outside the core executive where policy 
decisions are normally made. The Ministers for Sport could make the greatest impact 
on "sport for all" type of issues, where access to the core executive was not usually 
necessary. This helps to explain the limits of their influence and their need to 
concentrate on issues where they might make a difference in terms of raising the 
profile of sport and encouraging mass participation. However, they have not made a 
significant contribution to government sports policy across the range of issues that 
were identified in the analysis of the data. 
Because sport has traditionally not been a large spender of public money, it has been 
very hard for the Minister for Sport to make a greater impact. More recently, larger 
sums have been involved, but the Minister for Sport has been sidelined. For example, 
in relation to the Lottery and the 2012 Olympics, they have been sub-contracted 
respectively to other institutions such as UK Sport, and to a dedicated Olympics 
Minister with Cabinet status (Tessa Jowell). Furthermore, policy decisions on 
important issues are ultimately taken by Secretaries of State, or even by the Cabinet 
and Prime Minister on really important ones such as the possibility of boycotting the 
1980 Olympics or bidding for the 2012 Olympics. Thus, the Minister for Sport is 
squeezed in both directions in terms of policy: he or she can only really influence 
policy in small ways, rather than initiate it; and when it comes to large issues, the 
decisions are taken by more senior politicians who are sometimes ill-informed about 
sport. 
At the beginning of this thesis it was suggested that Lord Hailsham and Denis Howell, 
the first two Ministers for Sport, seemed to play a relatively small part in sports 
policy-making. In Hailsham's case it was because he was too senior in government 
and was also not much interested in sport. In relation to Howell, he was too junior and 
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too busy with a multitude of other issues to make a significant contribution. The thesis 
has gone on to examine the role of all the Ministers for Sport who followed them and 
has concluded that the main research question: "What is the role of the Minister for 
Sport in the policy-making process for UK sport?n has been substantially answered. It 
is clear that the contribution of the Minister for Sport to sports policy-making has 
been relatively small, and that their main role has been to act as "ambassadors" for 
sport. 
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Appendices 
A d· 1 UK Min· t fi S rt 19642009 ~ppen IX . IS er or ipO 
-
. 
Name Designation Dates Length of Department 
Tenure 
Denis Howell Under-Secretary of State 20 Oct64- 5 years & 8 Education & Science 
20 Oct 64 - 13 Oct 69; 18 Jun 70 months 20 Oct 64 - 13 Oct 69; 
Minister of State 13 Oct Housing & Local 
69 -18 Jun 70 Government 
13 Oct 69 - 18 Jun 70 
Eldon Griffiths Under-Secretary of State 18 Jun 70- 3 years & 8 Housing & Local 
4 Mar 74 months Government 
18 Jun 70 - 15 Oct 70; 
Environment 
15 Oct 70 - 4 Mar 74 
Denis Howell Minister of State 7Mar74- 5 years &2 Environment 
4 May 79 months 
Hector Monro Under-Secretary of State 4May79- 2 years &4 Environment 
15 Sep 81 months 
Neil Macfarlane Under-Secretary of State 15 Sep 81 - 4 years Environment 
2 Sep 85 
Richard Tracey Under-Secretary of State 2 Sep 85- 1 year & 10 Environment 
13 Jun87 months 
Colin Moynihan Under-Secretary of State 13 Jun 87- 3 years & 1 Environment 
26 Jul90 month 
Robert Atkins Under-Secretary of State 26 Ju190- 1 year & 9 Environment 
14 Apr92 months 26 Jul 90 - 28 Nov 90; 
Education & Science 
28 Nov 90 - 14 Apr 92 
RobertKey Under-Secretary of State 14 Apr92- 1 year & 1 National Heritage 
27 May 93 month 
lain Sproat Under-Secretary of State 27 May 93 - 3 years & 11 National Heritage 
27 May 93 - 6 Jul 95; 1 May 97 months 
Minister of State 
6 Jul 95 - 1 May 97 
TonyBanks Under-Secretary of State 1 May 97 - 2years&3 National Heritage 
29 Jul99 months 1 May 97 -11 Jul97; 
Culture Media & Sport 
11 Jul 97 - 29 Ju199 
Kate Hoey Under-Secretary of State 29 Ju199- 1 year & 10 Culture Media & Sport 
11 JunOl months 
Richard Cabom Minister of State 11 JunOl- 6 years & 1 Culture Media & Sport 
29 Jun07 month 
Gerry SutclitTe Under-Secretary of State 29 Jun07- Culture Media & Sport 
present 
. . .. Sources: 1. Butler, D & Butler, G. (2000) Twentieth-Centmy Bntish PolItical Facts 1900-2000 
(Sth edition, London; Palgrave Macmillan); Table derived from pages 30-50 & 65-66 
2. Hansard: House of Commons Debates (1999-2008) London: HMSO 
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Appendix 2: Departmental Responsibility for Sport 1964-2009 
Secretary of Dates Department Minister for Dates 
State Sport 
Michael Stewart 18 Oct 64-22 Jan 65 Education & Denis Howell 20 Oct 64-13 Oct 69 
Science 
Anthony Crosland 22 Jan 65-29 Aug 67 Education & Denis Howell 20 Oct 64-13 Oct 69 
Science 
Patrick Gordon- 29 Aug 67-6 April 68 Education & Denis Howell 20 Oct 64-13 Oct 69 
Walker Science 
Edward Short 6 Apr 68-20 June 70 Education & Denis Howell 20 Oct 64-13 Oct 69 
Science 
Anthony 11 Aug 66-31 May 70 Housing & Local Denis Howell 13 Oct 69-18 Jun 70 
Greenwood Government 
Robert Mellish 31 May 70-18 June 70 Housing & Local Denis Howell 13 Oct 69-18 Jun 70 
Government 
Peter Walker 18 June 70-15 Oct 70 Housing & Local Eldon Griffiths 18 Jun 70-15 Oct 70 
Government 
Peter Walker 15 Oct 70-5 Nov 72 Environment Eldon Griffiths 15 Oct 70-4 Mar 74 
Geoffrey Rippon 5 Nov 72-4 March 74 Environment Eldon Griffiths 15 Oct 70-4 Mar 74 
Anthony Crosland 5 Mar 74-8 April 76 Environment Denis Howell 7 Mar 74-4 May 79 
Peter Shore 8 Apr 76-5 May 79 Environment Denis Howell 7 Mar 74-4 Mav 79 
Michael Heseltine 5 May 79-6 Jan 83 Environment Hector Monro 4 May 79-15 Sep 81 
Michael Heseltine 5 May 79-6 Jan 83 Environment Neil Macfarlane 15 SeD 81-2 SeD 85 
Tom King 6 Jan 83-11 Jun 83 Environment Neil Macfarlane 15 Sep 81-2 Sep 85 
Patrick Jenkin 11 Jun 83-2 Sep 85 Environment, Neil Macfarlane 15 SeD 81-2 Sep 85 
Kenneth Baker 2 Sep 85-21 May 86 Environment Richard Tracey 2 Sep 85-13 Jun 87 
Nicholas Ridley 21 May 86-24 June 89 Environment Richard Tracey 2 SeD 85-13 Jun 87 
Nicholas Ridley 21 May 86-24 June 89 Environment Colin Moynihan 13 Jun 87-26 July 90 
Chris Patten 24 Jun 89-28 Nov 90 Environment Colin Moynihan 13 Jun 87-26 Julv 90 
Chris Patten 24 Jun 89-28 Nov 90 Environment Robert Atkins 26 Jul 90-28 Nov 90 
Kenneth Clarke 2 Nov 90-14 Apr 92 Education & Robert Atkins 28 Nov 90-14 Apr 92 
Science 
David MelIor 11 Apr 92-24 Sep 92 National RobertKey 14 Apr 92-27 May 93 
Heritage 
Peter Brooke 24 Sep 92-20 July 94 National RobertKey 14 Apr 92-27 May 93 
Heritage 
Peter Brooke 24 Sep 92-20 July 94 National lain Sproat 27 May 93-1 May 97 
Heritage 
Stephen Dorrell 20 Jul 94-5 Jul95 National lain Sproat 27 May 93-1 May 97 
Heritage 
Virginia 5 July 95-1 May 97 National lain Sproat 27 May 93-1 May 97 
Bottomley Heritage 
Chris Smith 1 May 97-11 Jul97 National TonyBanks 1 May 97-29 Jul99 
Heritage 
Chris Smith 11 Jul97-11 Jun 01 Culture, Media TonyBanks 1 May 97-29 Jul 99 
& Sport 
Chris Smith 11 Jul97-11 Jun 01 Culture, Media KateHoey 29 July 99-11 Jun 01 
& Sport 
Tessa JowelI 11 Jun 01-29 June 07 Culture, Media Richard Cabom 11 Jun 01-29 Jun 07 
& Sport 
James Pumell 29 Jun 07-18 Jan 08 Culture, Media Gerry SutclifIe 29 Jun 07-present 
& Sport 
AndyBurnham 18 Jan 08-present Culture, Media Gerry SutclifIe 29 Jun 07-present 
& Sport 
. . .. Sources: 1. Butler, D & Butler, G. (2000) Twentieth-Century Bntish Political Facts 1900-2000 
(8th edition, London; Palgrave Macmillan); Table derived from pages 30-50 & 65-66 
2. Hansard: House of Commons Debates (1999-2008) London: HMSO 
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Appendix 3: Quantity of Text in Hansard 1964-2005 by_ Minister for Sport 
Dennis Howell1964-70 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm CoL % Cm CoL % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1964-65 458 49% 461 51% 59 34% 116 66% 517 47% 577 53% 
1965-66 49 48% 54 52% 36 26% 104 74% 85 35% 158 65% 
1966-67 52 8% 577 92% 174 59% 120 41% 226 25% 697 75% 
1967-68 407 37% 693 63% 131 26% 367 74% 538 34% 1060 66% 
1968-69 229 35% 433 65% 112 29% 280 71% 341 32% 713 68% 
1969-70 183 9% 1809 91% 127 7% 1620 93% 310 8% 3429 92% 
Total 1378 4027 639 2607 2017 6634 
Average 25% 75% 20% 80% 23% 77% 
Eldon Griffiths 1970-74 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1970-71 641 15% 3779 85% 226 23% 767 77% 867 16% 4546 84% 
1971-72 66 2% 4168 98% 220 15% 1266 85% 286 5% 5434 95% 
1972-73 312 7% 4282 93% 83 6% 1364 94% 395 7% 5646 93% 
1973-74 368 54% 314 46% 9 7% 129 93% 377 46% 443 54% 
Total 1387 12543 538 3526 1925 16069 
Average 10% 90% 13% 87% 11% 89% 
Dennis Howell1974-79 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1974-75 578 16% 3022 84% 241 10% 2084 90% 819 14% 5106 86% 
1975-76 146 6% 2180 94% 422 22% 1539 78% 568 13% 3719 87% 
1976-77 670 46% 773 54% 164 16% 833 84% 834 34% 1606 66% 
1977-78 20 5% 397 95% 355 26% 1017 74% 375 21% 1414 79% 
1978-79 233 18% 1054 82% 154 17% 771 83% 387 18% 1825 82% 
Total 1647 7426 1336 6244 2983 13670 
Average 18% 82% 18% 82% 18% 82% 
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Hector Monro 1979-81 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. 0/0 Cm CoL % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1979-80 406 20% 1579 80% 291 24% 930 76% 697 22% 2509 78% 
1980-81 395 19% 1675 81% 127 17% 641 83% 522 18% 2316 82% 
Total 801 3254 418 1571 1219 4825 
Average 20% 80% 21% 79% 20% 80% 
Neil Macfarlane 1981-85 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues CoL % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1981-82 249 15% 1432 85% 273 32% 583 68% 522 21% 2015 79% 
1982-83 269 31% 593 69% 830 61% 537 39% 1099 49% 1130 51% 
1983-84 767 20% 3082 80% 431 16% 2222 84% 1198 18% 5304 82% 
1984-85 816 35% 1498 65% 824 28% 2173 72% 1640 29% 3671 71% 
Total 2101 6605 2358 5515 4459 12120 
Average 24% 76% 30% 70% 27% 73% 
Richard Tracey 1985-87 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1985-86 274 15% 1613 85% 420 11% 3416 89% 694 12% 5029 85% 
1986-87 151 11% 1274 89% 231 6% 3437 94% 382 8% 4711 92% 
Total 425 2887 651 6853 1076 9740 
Average 13% 87% 9% 91% 10% 90% 
Colin Moynihan 1987-90 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues CoL % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1987-88 1030 30% 2374 70% 807 12% 5852 88% 1837 18% 8226 82% 
1988-89 957 38% 1547 62% 752 33% 1518 67% 1709 36% 3065 64% 
1989-90 466 75% 157 25% 161 10% 1464 90% 627 28% 1621 72% 
Total 2453 4078 1720 8834 4173 12912 
Average 38% 62% 16% 84% 24% 76% 
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Robert Atkins 1990-92 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1990-91 485 64% 270 36% 240 27% 636 73% 725 44% 906 56% 
1991-92 367 97% 10 3% 202 72% 80 28% 569 86% 90 14% 
Total 852 280 442 716 1294 996 
Average 75% 25% 38% 62% 57% 43% 
Robert Key 1992-93 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1992-93 916 29% 2293 71% 60 4% 1296 96% 976 21% 3589 79% 
Total 916 2293 60 1296 976 3589 
Average 29% 71% 4% 96% 21% 79% 
lain Sproat 1993-97 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm CoL % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1993-94 780 28% 1724 72% 148 5% 2755 95% 928 17% 4479 83% 
1994-95 1231 48% 1358 52% 436 25% 1311 75% 1667 38% 2669 62% 
1995-96 552 21% 2066 79% 696 14% 4337 86% 1248 16% 6403 84% 
1996-97 311 19% 1300 81% 851 28% 2148 72% 1162 25% 3448 75% 
Total 2874 6448 2131 10551 5005 16999 
Average 31% 69% 17% 83% 23% 77% 
Tony Banks 1997-99 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm CoL % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1997-98 856 63% 513 37% 1479 53% 1337 47% 2335 56% 1850 44% 
1998-99 448 93% 34 7% 1108 81% 256 19% 1556 84% 290 16% 
Total 1304 547 2587 1593 3891 2140 
Average 70% 30% 62% 38% 64% 36% 
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Kate Hoey 1999-2001 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
1999-00 1081 97% 39 3% 2229 75% 759 25% 3310 81% 798 19% 
2000-01 354 65% 193 35% 299 69% 134 31% 653 67% 327 33% 
Total 1435 232 2528 893 3963 1125 
Average 86% 14% 74% 26% 78% 22% 
Richard Cabom 2001-05 
Year Oral Questions & Debates Written Questions Combined, Oral, Written & 
Debates 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues Col. % Issues Issues 
Cm Col. % Cm Col. % Cm Col. % 
Cm Cm Cm 
2001-02 1390 54% 1175 59% 2797 59% 1940 41% 4187 57% 3115 43% 
2002-03 793 42% 1111 58% 1759 47% 2006 53% 2552 45% 3117 55% 
2003-04 1081 56% 861 44% 1247 26% 3503 74% 2328 35% 4364 65% 
2004-05 442 56% 341 44% 730 20% 2977 80% 1172 26% 3318 74% 
Total 3706 3488 6533 10426 10239 13914 
Average 52% 48% 39% 61% 42% 58% 
Total for all Ministers for Sport 1964-2005 
Total 21279 54108 21941 60625 43220 114733 
Average 28% 72% 27% 73% 27% 73% 
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Dennis Howe1l1964-70 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. 0/0 Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1964-65 10 37% 17 63% 12 31% 27 69% 22 33% 44 67% 
1965-66 6 33% 12 67% 6 38% 17 74% 12 29% 29 71% 
1966-67 6 15% 35 85% 28 44% 35 56% 34 33% 70 67% 
1967-68 4 25% 12 75% 30 34% 58 66% 34 33% 70 67% 
1968-69 13 39% 20 61% 32 34% 63 66% 45 35% 83 65% 
1969-70 4 9% 40 91% 35 11% 276 89% 39 11% 316 89% 
Total 43 136 143 476 186 612 
Average 24% 76% 23% 77% 23% 77% 
Eldon Griffiths 1970-74 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1970-71 11 21% 42 79% 60 15% 339 85% 71 16% 381 84% 
1971-72 8 16% 42 84% 40 9% 406 91% 48 10% 448 90% 
1972-73 6 25% 18 75% 21 8% 244 92% 27 9% 262 91% 
1973-74 2 50% 2 50% 4 11% 33 89% 6 15% 35 85% 
Total 27 104 125 1022 152 1126 
Average 21% 79% 11% 89% 12% 88% 
Dennis Howell1974-79 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1974-75 3 14% 18 86% 77 15% 444 85% 80 15% 462 85% 
1975-76 1 11% 8 89% 82 20% 335 80% 83 19% 343 81% 
1976-77 0 0% 4 100% 20 10% 177 90% 20 10% 181 90% 
1977-78 2 18% 9 82% 51 21% 194 79% 53 21% 203 79% 
1978-79 1 7% 13 93% 32 18% 150 82% 33 17% 163 83% 
Total 7 52 262 1300 269 1352 
Average 12% 88% 17% 83% 17% 83% 
Hector Monro 1979-81 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1979-80 10 62% 6 38% 73 25% 217 75% 83 27% 223 73% 
1980-81 7 87% 1 13% 31 20% 121 80% 38 24% 122 76% 
Total 17 7 104 338 121 345 
Average 71% 29% 24% 76% 26% 74% 
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Neil Macfarlane 1981-85 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1981-82 12 67% 6 33% 75 34% 144 66% 87 37% 150 63% 
1982-83 13 100% 0 0% 28 25% 85 75% 41 33% 85 67% 
1983-84 8 31% 18 69% 98 22% 355 78% 106 22% 373 78% 
1984-85 6 37% 10 63% 62 14% 380 86% 68 15% 390 85% 
Total 39 34 263 964 302 998 
Average 53% 47% 21% 79% 23% 77% 
Richard Tracey 1985-87 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1985-86 4 25% 12 75% 86 16% 459 84% 90 16% 471 84% 
1986-87 3 43% 4 57% 33 8% 370 92% 36 9% 374 91% 
Total 7 16 119 829 126 845 
Average 30% 70% 13% 87% 13% 87% 
Colin Moynihan 1987-90 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1987-88 12 35% 22 65% 144 13% 831 77% 156 15% 853 85% 
1988-89 5 56% 4 44% 118 30% 282 70% 123 30% 286 70% 
1989-90 4 67% 2 33% 39 16% 201 84% 43 17% 203 83% 
Total 21 28 301 1314 322 1342 
Average 43% 57% 19% 81% 19% 81% 
Robert Atkins 1990-92 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1990-91 1 100% 0 0% 60 50% 61 50% 61 50% 61 50% 
1991-92 2 67% 1 33% 37 64% 21 36% 39 64% 22 36% 
Total 3 1 97 82 100 83 
Average 75% 25% 54% 46% 55% 45% 
261 
;------------------------------ - - --- ----
Robert Key 1992-93 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1992-93 6 12% 43 88% 19 9% 204 91% 25 9% 247 91% 
Total 6 43 19 204 25 247 
Average 12% 88% 9% 91% 9% 91% 
lain Sproat 1993-97 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1993-94 18 28% 46 72% 39 11% 301 89% 57 14% 347 86% 
1994-95 25 47% 28 53% 65 28% 167 72% 90 32% 195 68% 
1995-96 19 44% 24 56% 81 15% 452 85% 100 17% 476 83% 
1996-97 7 35% 13 65% 67 24% 209 76% 74 25% 222 75% 
Total 69 111 252 1129 321 1240 
Average 38% 62% 18% 82% 21% 79% 
Tony Banks 1997-99 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. 0/0 Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1997-98 22 79% 6 21% 189 63% 113 37% 211 64% 119 36% 
1998-99 14 78% 2 12% 107 82% 23 18% 121 83% 25 17% 
Total 36 8 296 136 332 144 
Average 82% 18% 69% 31% 70% 30% 
Kate Hoey 1999-2001 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
1999-00 18 90% 2 10% 256 75% 84 25% 274 76% 86 24% 
2000-01 11 100% 0 0% 61 72% 24 28% 72 75% 24 25% 
Total 29 2 317 108 346 110 
Average 94% 6% 75% 25% 76% 24% 
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Richard Cabom 2001-05 
Year Oral Questions Written Questions Combined Oral & Written 
Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non- Sports Sports Non- Non-
Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports Issues Issues Sports Sports 
No. % Issues Issues No. 0/0 Issues Issues No. % Issues Issues 
No. % No. % No. % 
2001-02 22 76% 7 24% 328 58% 234 42% 350 59% 241 41% 
2002-03 16 47% 18 53% 200 50% 203 50% 216 49% 221 51% 
2003-04 17 61% 11 39% 147 30% 344 70% 164 32% 355 68% 
2004-05 12 86% 2 14% 77 28% 195 72% 89 31% 197 69% 
Total 67 38 752 976 819 1014 
Average 64% 36% 44% 56% 45% 55% 
Total for all Ministers for Sport 1964-2005 
Total 371 580 3050 8878 3421 9458 
Average 39% 61% 26% 74% 27% 73% 
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Appendix 5: List of People Interviewed on Role of Minister for Sport and Dates of 
Interview 
1. Mr Ben Andersen-Tuffnell (9 January 2008): Policy Officer at the Central Council 
of Physical Recreation (2005-08) 
2. Baroness Bottomley of Nettlestone (29 June 2007): former Conservative MP (as 
Mrs Virginia Bottomley, 1984-2001); Secretary of State for National Heritage (5 July 
1995-1 to May1997) 
3. The Rt. Hon. Richard Cabom (27 March 2008): Labour MP for Sheffield Central 
(1983-present), Minister for Sport (11 June 2001 to 29 June 2007) 
4. Mr Patrick Cheney (18 January 2007): current policy adviser to Kate Hoey (Minister 
for Sport 29 July 1999 to 11 June 2001) and former policy adviser to Denis Howell 
(Minister for Sport 20 October 1964 to 18 June 1970 & 7 Mach 1974 to 4 May 1979) 
5. Lord Donoughue of Ashton (7 March 2007): former Under-Secretary of State at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food (1997-99) and former Head of Harold 
Wilson's and James Callagan's No. 10 Downing Street Policy Unit (as Dr Bemard 
Donoughue, 1974-79) 
6. Dr Patrick Duffy (27 March 2008 & 15 April 2008): Chief Executive of Sports 
Coach UK (The National Coaching Foundation) (2005-present) 
7. Ms Patricia Ferguson (24 August 2007): Member of the Scottish Parliament (1999-
present), Scottish Minister for Tourism, Culture, and Sport (4 October 2004 to 3 May 
2007) 
8. Dame Mary Glen Haig (10 May 2007 & 16 July 2007): Olympic Fencer (1948, 
1952, 1956, 1960), Member of Sports Council (1966-82); CCPR Vice-Chair 1982-
2008), IOC Delegate 1982-present) 
9. Sir Eldon Griffiths (16 February 2007 & 29 July 2007): former Conservative MP 
(1964-92), Minister for Sport (18 June 1970 to 4 March 1974) 
10. Lord Hattersley (1 May 2007): former Labour MP (as Mr Roy Hattersley, 1964-97), 
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party (1983-92), Secretary of State for Prices & 
Consumer Protection (1976-79) 
11. Mr Paul Heron (25 February 2008): Head of Sport at the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport (2003-present); former Private Secretary to Neil Macfarlane (1983-
85), Richard Tracey (1985-87), Colin Moynihan (1987-88) 
12. Dr Rachel Hughes (10 December 2007): Research and Evaluation Manager at Sports 
Council Wales (2005-present) 
13. Mr Richard Lewis (18 January 2008): Policy Officer in Department of Culture, 
Welsh Language and Sport of the Welsh Assembly Government (2005-present) 
14. Mr David Macdonald (5 February 2007): former Deputy Secretary at the 
Department of the Environment as Head of Sport and former senior civil servant in 
other government departments (1970-95) 
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15. Sir Neil Macfarlane (9 January 2007): fonner Conservative MP (1972-92), Minister 
for Sport (19 September 1981 to 2 September 1985) 
16. Sir John Nott (5 June 2007); former Conservative MP (1966-83), Secretary of State 
for Defence (1981-83) 
17. Lord Pendry (1 February 2007): former Labour MP (as Mr Tom Pendry, 1970-
2001), fonner government Whip (1974-77) and Under-Secretary of State at the 
Northern Ireland Office (1977-79), Shadow Minister for Sport (14 April 1992 to 1 
May 1997) 
18. Sir Hayden Phillips (3 July 2007): fonner Permanent Secretary at the Department for 
National Heritage (1992-97) & Department for Culture, Media and Sport (1997-98) 
19. Mr David Pickup (29 November 2006): former Director General of the Sports 
Council (1988-93) and fonner senior civil servant (1955-85) 
20. Mr Hugh Robertson (16 March 2007): Conservative MP for Faversham (2001-
present), Conservative Party Shadow Minister for Sport (2005-present) 
21. Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank (21 March 2007): fonner Labour MP (as Mr William 
Rodgers, 1959-83) and Secretary of State for Transport (1976-79) 
22. Professor Eric Saunders (1 October 2007): Chairman of Sport Northern Ireland 
(2000-present); member of Northern Ireland Sports Council (1996-present); member 
ofUK Sport (2000-present) 
23. Lord Smith of Finsbury (18 June 2007): former Labour MP (as Dr Coos Smith, 
1983-2005); Secretary of State for National Heritage (1 May to 11 July 1997) and 
Culture, Media & Sport (11 July 1997 to 11 June 2001) 
24. Mr Peter Smith (23 November 2007): Policy Manager at UK Sport (2002-present) 
and former senior civil servant in the Home Office and other departments (1977-97) 
25. Mr lain Sproat (31 May 2007): former Conservative MP (1970-83 & 1992-97), 
Minister for Sport (27 May 1993 to 1 May 1997) 
26. Mr Richard Tacon (9 January 2008): Research and Evidence Officer at the Central 
Council of Physical Recreation (2006-present) 
27. Mr Richard Tracey (11 April 2007): fonner Conservative MP (1983-97), Minister 
for Sport (2 September 1985 to 13 June 1987) 
28. Mr Mihir Warty (7 February 2008): Director of Policy and Performance at Sport 
England (2006-present) 
29. Mr Neil West (31 January 2008): Chief Operating Officer of the British Olympic 
Association (2007-present); former businessman in oil industry; former international 
rower and canoeist (Commonwealth Games gold medallist in rowing 2002) 
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Appendix 6: Interview Transcripts 
Introduction 
Presented below, in alphabetical order, are the transcripts of five interviews with former 
Ministers for Sport to give a flavour of the kind of questions that were asked and the data that 
were collected. Four were former Ministers at the UK level and one was in Scotland. Most of 
the other interviewees spoke on condition of anonymity and it was felt that to attach the 
transcripts for them would have breached that confidence. Since the Ministers for Sport were 
the primary focus of the research, it was thought appropriate to select just them for inclusion 
here. 
The questions asked of individuals not included here, such as civil servants and other 
Ministers, were on broadly similar themes to those for Sports Ministers. They related to the 
origins of sports policy, the role of the Ministers for Sport, junior Minister-Cabinet Minister 
relationships, the contributions made by representative organisations and governing bodies, 
and so forth. 
The only former Minister for Sport who co-operated, and whose response is not included 
here, is Sir Eldon Griffiths. He sent a draft chapter from his forthcoming memoirs, which he 
emphasised was not finished or polished to his satisfaction. Sir Eldon therefore requested that 
it not be reproduced in the public domain until he had published his book, although he agreed 
to a few selective quotes. This has been respected. 
All the former Ministers for Sport, and most of the other interviewees, at various points in 
their interviews observed that they were now speaking "off the record". They provided 
confidential information and expressed views that they did not want attributed to them in any 
way because these may be controversial, embarrassing, or relate to someone who was still 
alive. In such cases, these passages have been omitted from the transcripts reproduced here. 
Interviewee Page 
Mr Richard Cabom 267 
Ms Patricia Ferguson 272 
Sir Neil Macfarlane 277 
Mr lain Sproat 288 
Mr Richard Tracey 299 
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1. Mr Richard Cabom (27 March 2008) 
A.McM. - Could you please tell me about the circumstances that led to your 
appointment, after two years at Environment (1997-99) and two years at Trade & 
Industry (1999-2001)? Was it a surprise to you when you got the job? 
RC. - Well, there's a story there. For many years I was friendly with Alastair Campbell, long 
before we came into government and we had worked together on many things. He was also a 
great Burnley supporter. When Burnley played at Bramall Lane I used to go and pick up his 
sons in my car and drop them back at the station. Just coming in to 2001, I was talking to him 
about what needed to be done for sport. I told him we needed fundamental changes, and so 
on, and so forth, really giving him a piece of my mind. Then within about three months things 
happened. 
[Interruption - Patrick Duffy, Chief Executive of Sports Coach UK comes into the House of 
Commons lounge with two other people, one of whom is Tony Cunningham (MP for 
Workington). RC. introduces P.D. to AMcM. Then P.D. gives him his card, chats for a few 
minutes, and invites him to call him up. He says he did his PhD on Irish sports policy. RC. 
tells P.D. that he is fine, having just come back from Paris to see England play crap against 
France, where they lost 1-0 at football.] 
RC. - Tony Cunningham is my supplier of New Balance running shoes. He's a fell runner 
and has just done a 36 mile run at the weekend. His constituency has got a New Balance 
factory in it, so he can get some good deals. 
RC. - Now where was I before Paddy came in. Oh yes, it was Alastair Campbell who set the 
ball rolling for me to get the sports job. The guy I worked for flrst was John Prescott at DTLR 
as it then was when I was an Environment Minister. Then I got a call from No. 10 after the 
2001 election asking me if I wanted to do the sports job and of course I did. It was Campbell 
who pushed for me. [A.McM. - I have his diaries, but haven't read them yet.] It's in there 
- he does mention it. So that's how I came to be appointed. It wasn't really a surprise because 
I did have an inkling from my conversations with Campbell. 
A.McM. - I read through all of your speeches and replies to parliamentary questions in 
Hansard and made some calculations. Although you spent more time on sport than 
most of your predecessors, (42%/58% sport/non-sport; while the average was 27%173% 
for all Sports Ministers) you still could not concentrate only on sport. Was it difficult 
having so many other things to do, as well as sport? 
RC. - I think I did actually give it as much attention as I could. You've always got to 
remember, that with a Minister, you are an agent for change. And as long as you know what 
you are doing, where you want to get to, give leadership to the civil servants and sports 
bodies, you can make it work. A Minister is in a very powerful position. I think at times I 
didn't really realise just how powerful the job was. I found that if you really want to make 
things happen you can do so. 
R.C. - There's one thing you have to do and that's to make it very clear that want to do and 
what the direction of travel is. You need to explain to people why you are doing things and 
then you'll get them on board. It's really team work and I had a fantastic team working for 
me and I treated them as co-equals. I had a very open door policy on that. At the end of the 
day I made the decisions, though I had a very good relationship with the civil servants. We 
worked towards the achievement of the change agenda. Could I have done more? I don't 
think so. Could I have done things differently? Yes, I think so. 
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R.C. - Of course I had other things to do as well as sport. I did gambling, tourism, and other 
things. But I worked hard. I used to do 15 or 16 hours day. I had very good staff and civil 
servants, like Paul Heron who had worked with Moynihan, the lot, and who worked long 
hours with me. It was a close and effective team we had. I used to go out running in the 
countryside up in Sheffield at weekends and think through ideas. I'd come back with ideas 
that I discussed with them back in London. I think we all enjoyed working in that atmosphere 
where we knocked ideas around. We moved the agenda significantly, with modernisation at 
the heart of it. We put sport right at the centre of the government's agenda. 
R.C. - As I said in my speech celebrating being the longest serving Minister for Sport at one 
stint, I wanted to see reforms to the structure of sport because there are so many benefits from 
sport in so many different ways. It comes through from the grass-roots, the schools, into the 
clubs, and then the elite end. There's a continuum there that you have to foster and encourage 
all the way through. 
A.McM. - How involved were you in influencing sports policy, for example the 2012 
Olympic bid? One or two people have said to me that you made a key difference in 
securing the bid. 
R.C. - Going back, I've been involved in a number of bids, including the World Student 
Games in 1991, the Commonwealth Games in Manchester 2002, and so on. What drove me 
on was the potential for major games to contribute towards regeneration in Sheffield and 
Manchester. I saw it as a powerful tool for that. In 1997, when the Manchester programme 
was being put together, I was involved in the regional development agency in my very first 
government portfolio. I knew that in London, the same would be true also and I wanted 
regeneration to come to run-down parts of London's East End. 
R.C. - As Minister for Sport. I went round the world and I spoke to a lot of people. I went to 
Munich, Moscow, Sydney, Barcelona, and so on. I asked simple questions about what we had 
to do to get the Olympics in London. In Sydney, I met people for two days, and they very, 
very generous with their time. They gave me lots of good advice as to what we should do to 
win the bid. I was on the road for about a year. I went to see many people, including Nelson 
Mandela who gave it his blessing. I know many people in the IOC, including Sam 
RamSammy the vice-president from South Africa who supported the bid strongly. But I 
didn't win the Games for London. It was a team effort and I played my part through the 
contacts I had in the sporting world and in politics. I saw some of these people last night in 
Paris at the football [France v England], including Francois Latour the French Minister who 
was the guy that lost out when London won. I was on the World Anti-Doping Committee 
with some of them as well. It was a fascinating exercise. 
R.C. - I am now deeply involved in England's bid to host the 2018 World Cup. That's 
decided in March 2011. [A.McM. - Isn't there the problem of rotation of continents?] No, 
that's gone now, so that's not a barrier. I have a lot of work on doing that now. And I also 
have a lot of work getting the FA to understand that they haven't got the skills to win the bid. 
They buggered us up for 2006 with a terrible, arrogant presentation. They said all the wrong 
things and pressed all the wrong buttons. It's come to the point where we can set up a 
company, I think, to make the bid. I'll be on it, so will Gerry Sutcliffe, and we'll have a chief 
executive as we did for 2012. 
A.McM. - Having looked at what governments have done for sport over the years, there 
seems to be four main elements to sports policy - sport for all; elite sport; sport in 
schools; and attracting major events. Do you think that's about right? 
R.C. - When I first came into this job, after two years at Environment and two years at Trade 
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& Industry I spoke to Tony Blair. He said to me that he thought sport had been under-utilised 
in delivering the government's policies. We're talking about social inclusion, education, and 
health. These are very important aspects of policy. He said that basically he wanted a root and 
branch reform. I set off then, for the next six years, to do this. I knew that you had to get sport 
right. There are many benefits from sport, but it has to be fit for purpose. To be absolutely 
honest, it wasn't fit for purpose at that time. There was no overall direction from a 
government perspective, there was no integrated policy, and there were no consistent delivery 
mechanisms. 
RC. - I started by looking at my own area where there were things where I could have some 
control. That was Sport England mainly, with grass-roots sport. With UK Sport, and 
investment into schools, I could influence to a lesser extent. I began by trying to restructure 
Sport England and UK Sport, then turned to the governing bodies. We had spent three-
quarters of a billion pounds in the last five years to increase participation in sport by only one 
per cent and that was unacceptable. I wanted delivery on a proper contractual basis and that 
was my broad remit which I took up and I went out and did that. I also firmly believed in 
coaching and I took that up through Sports Coach UK. Paddy Duffy, the guy we've just 
spoken to, now heads it up. 
RC. - I tried to devolve power to the regions, to the Regional Sports Councils, because I'm a 
regionalist and devolutionist by nature. I do believe that if you empower people to do things 
you're more likely to get results in a coherent way. I wanted the small sports clubs to engage 
with the larger economic stage in their regions who could benefit from sport, such as the 
regional development agencies, the universities, local authorities, the private sector, and so 
on. I left the regional strategy to all those bodies out of enlightened self-interest because I 
thought it was best ifI did not tell them what to do. 
RC. - When I started, I used to argue that the sports budget was quite small, but that the 
number of people who could benefit from sport was huge. The competitiveness and 
productivity of our nation could be improved if people were more active. There was also the 
aspect of crime reduction and the cost of keeping young people in secure accommodation -
it's over a thousand pounds a week to do that. And a lot of those were at the bottom of the 
economic ladder. Many kids will respond to sport if they don't want to go into academia and 
suchlike. If you can keep them in society via sport you can save the country a lot of money. 
That was broadly my remit - to get the fundamentals right. To achieve a sustainable, long-
term sports strategy was how I approached it. 
RC. - And of course, bidding for major events has been a passion of mine, as you can see 
with my record going back to the World Student Games and latterly the Olympics which we 
talked about earlier. So I suppose the four parts you've suggested kind of wrap it all up quite 
well. 
A.McM. - In your speech celebrating 5 years & 9 months as Minister for Sport, the 
longest ever, you identified improving school sport as a key achievement. Was it made 
easier when Estelle Morris (2001-02) then Charles Clarke (2002-04) became Secretaries 
of State after David Blunkett? 
R.C. - Schools were my first port of call in getting the strategy right. If you're going to 
change the sporting culture, you do it first by getting through to the next generation. I pushed 
that very hard, and I'm very pleased with the outcome. When I started in 2001, less than 25% 
of kids in school, from 5 to 16, were doing two hours of quality sports and PE a week. When 
I left, six years later, over 85% were doing it. Now that means over three million hours more 
sport every week. I saw that as such an important building block to getting people into sport. 
We then have to build on that to keep them in sport and give them the facilities beyond the 
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school gate. That's why we're building more teams up from school onwards. We have to 
change the culture, change people's mindsets, and you have to start from schools. 
RC. - It wasn't difficult working with Education while I was there. Estelle Morris was superb 
- she gave me £40 million a year for sport and was very supportive. But you have to prove 
your case. I went to every conference of schools sporting bodies. I worked closely with the 
schools and education bodies. We put in place the National School Sport Strategy in 2003 
and set up a network of school sport partnerships. I saw quite a major change with the schools 
heads. I went round a lot of schools in the country and talked to people there and what 
convinced the heads was that where sport was used properly you got better discipline, less 
exclusion, less truancy, and better academic attainment 
R.C. - There were in business to educate kids, but by using sport they could actually further 
their fundamental education aims. It was the power of the argument and the delivery of 
results that convinced them. When they looked at the statistics showing less disruption in the 
schools and better attainment they were convinced and I was very pleased too. Once you've 
won the argument the whole thing moved forward. Of all the specialist colleges, for art or 
mathematics, and so on, sports colleges have been by far the most successful and most cost-
effective. 
A.McM. - You worked with Tessa Jowell as Secretary of State. Did she become much 
involved in sports policy (e.g. negotiating at Cabinet Minister level for school sport), or 
leave it to you? 
RC. - Tessa and I worked together very well. She knew bugger-all about sport actually. 
She's a lovely woman and I got on fantastically well with her. Any problems, I could go to 
her for help. I'd call her and she would call me on a regular basis. She took the lead on the 
Olympics and left me to do the rest of it. She was quite a non-interventionist as far as I was 
concerned. 
A.McM. - How did you perceive and work with the national governing bodies of sport? 
RC. - I tried hard to introduce reforms for some of them. For instance, the FA was a major 
target for me. If you look at cricket, rugby league, boxing, swimming and others, they all 
needed to be reformed. But football was one of the toughest nuts to crack because they were 
so insular. I got the Burns' report on them, and eventually, after two and a half years, they 
agreed to an independent chairman. They had a shortlist for it, and I was on it, but for all sorts 
of political reasons I couldn't do it. Nevertheless, I am very proud that I did something to 
reform the FA, the biggest and wealthiest of the governing bodies, but one of the most badly 
run until recently_ 
A.McM. - Civil servants had a high regard for you, but some people 'have told me they 
are the biggest source of sports policy. Do you think that is true? If not, where does 
sports policy mainly come from? 
RC. - It comes from all over, actually. Ideas come from the civil servants, the governing 
bodies, the Sports Minister, the bodies like UK. Sport and Sport England, plus those in 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. There's no single source. It's a mixture of all these 
things. To be absolutely honest, it's a question of who is the stronger at any time. You will 
find that not much comes from the Secretary of State, but that the Secretary of State has the 
responsibility for it. If they don't do anything the civil servants will do it. It's about people 
and it's about people with convictions who can make things happen. I had a very clear view 
of where I wanted to go and what I wanted to do. We used to discuss things round a table and 
get contributions from everybody, so there's often no single clear source of where a policy 
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comes from. Lots of people throw their ideas in and what emerges is policy. 
A.McM. - You left office when Tony Blair retired in June 2007. You were the second-
longest serving Sports Minister at over six years, but the longest-serving in a single stint 
(Denis Howell did five and a half years then five years). Were there things you still 
wanted to do for sport? 
R.C. - I didn't expect to be there that long, and I think it was too long, though it did give me 
the benefit of continuity. The reason I left after 6 years is that you need to freshen things up 
and change the management. After four years it was the election in May 2005 and the 
Olympic bid was in July and Blair wanted me to stay for that. Then he said would I stay on 
afterwards to set the whole structure up, take the bill through Parliament, establish_the_ 
Olympic Delivery Authority, etc. All that took another two years, then it was time for me to 
go. 
A.McM. - You've done other things since stepping down as a Minister, such as the 
review of the FA and appointment of an independent chairman. Can you achieve as 
much for sport now you are no longer a Minister? 
R.C. - I enjoyed every minute of being Minister for Sport. It was fantastic and was the best 
job I've had and I was lucky to get out on a high. I got some great feedback from what I've 
done. The PM said to me would I do the job for the World Cup so I did. [A.McM. - It's been 
downgraded since you left. Do you think that was sensible?] I am disappointed with that. I 
think it was a mistake, and it gives all the wrong signals. After ten years as a Minister I can 
see what the seniority of a Minister of State means. I think it was a bad mistake to put it back 
to Under-Secretary level and it gives all the wrong vibes. I've got to go now because I have 
another meeting. Sorry I can't give you any longer. 
A.McM. - Thank you very much for your assistance. Can I quote you in my 
dissertation? 
R.C. - Certainly you can. And please send me a copy of your thesis when it's finished. I 
would love to read it. [A.McM. - You're not going to the Emirates stadium today to see 
Sarkozy with the PM?] Oh no, it's just a bloody jamboree. I never go to things like that 
unless I'm forced to. If they tell me I have to then I'll go, but in this case it was not necessary 
for me to go, now I'm out of government, so I didn't. I can show you the way out now 
through the Central Hall. It was a pleasure to talk to you. 
A.McM - Do you think Patrick Duffy would speak to me if I call him up? 
R.C. - I'm sure Paddy would. He gave you his number, so give him a call. 
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2. Ms Patricia Ferguson (24 August 2007) 
A.McM. - You were Minister for Tourism, Culture, & Sport 2004-07 in Scotland. Did 
you have a lifelong interest in sport? 
P.F. - Oh yes, I certainly did. But I was no athlete. I was one of those kids who tried to do 
every sport possible to try and find one that I was good at. I had a father who was very, very 
keen sportsman back to his army days, where he was a PT instructor. He always encouraged 
me to at least maintain the interest because he reckoned that an educated spectator was a 
valuable thing too, so that stood me in good stead for later on because I was pretty good at 
knowing the rules for many sports. [A.McM. - I noticed from your website that you had 
an interest in hillwalking too.] Yes I do - it's the kind of thing that doesn't really need a lot 
of co-ordination, compared with most sports. And of course you can fit it in occasionally at 
weekends when you get the chance or travelling to other engagements. 
A.McM. - Could you tell me something about what the job entailed on a day-to-day 
basis? Most UK Ministers for Sport spend a lot of time on other things. Did you find 
that was the case? 
P.F. - Well, I had the tourism and culture bits as well as sport, and I also had international 
development, architecture, heritage, and that kind of thing. So it was quite a wide brief in the 
same way that the UK Ministers have had. But I think if you asked any Minister if they had 
enough time to give to the things they most liked to do, and the issues they most wanted to 
concentrate on, they would say that they didn't. 
P.F. - But what I found very useful was that we had the opportunity to work across the three 
main portfolios because there's a lot of cross-over between culture and sport, and between 
tourism and sport. I found it was quite useful to look at it that way. 
P.F. - One of the big things that we were involved in was trying to make Scotland a major 
events destination. A lot of the major events that you can actually bring in to the country are 
sporting events, so it was very useful from that point of view. It had its challenges - it was a 
very events-driven portfolio, so it was a case of spending a lot of evenings and weekends 
either at sporting events or at cultural events. I am very interested in sport and very interested 
in culture, so I would probably have done a lot of it anyway, but not necessarily as much as I 
ended up doing. 
A.McM. - When I was in Glasgow recently I noticed a great deal of publicity for the 
2014 Commonwealth Games bid. Was that a major part of your work, and did it pose a 
challenge trying to adapt Hampden back to having a running track for the athletics? 
P.F. - Yes, the Commonwealth Games bid was an issue we worked on extensively. What will 
actually happen is that the level of the playing field in Hampden will be raised a metre and 
there will be two rows of seats taken out. That will give them enough room to put in a track 
and that will be returned to its normal condition afterwards, so it won't be a permanent track. 
But we're going to have a new indoor arena in Glasgow and that will be the legacy. It will be 
better than the indoor arena at Kelvin Hall because it will have a velodrome and all sorts of 
other things as well. That was the sort of balance that we came to. We couldn't have a 
permanent track at Hampden because there would be no long-term need for it. There are other 
permanent track facilities in Glasgow, like Scotstoun. 
P.F. - We also felt that because we also have Ibrox and Parkhead in Glasgow, in addition to 
Hampden, three major stadia, we felt that would try to use all of them, and that's in the bid. 
We would use Celtic Park, Parkhead, for the opening ceremony so that we didn't have the 
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bother of dismantling everything in time for the athletics starting. We would use Hampden, of 
course, for the athletics and we would use Ibrox for the rugby. We would also extend the 
existing national aquatics centre at Tollcross for the swimming and diving events and other 
watersports. 
A.McM. - The UK "Sports Cabinet" was set up in 1998 and had been running for six 
years when you joined. Did you fmd it useful? 
P.F. - It was very useful indeed. It allowed us to exchange good ideas that we might have had 
individually. It also allowed us all to input to UK Sport because it's a nationwide body and to 
receive reports about what it was doing. I used to meet with its head, Sue Campbell, about 
every six months, just to make sure we were up to speed with what was happening. She also 
had a very good relationship with the chair of Sports Scotland as well, as I did. So we had 
lots of connections in different ways which were really helpful in giving us the overall picture 
of sport throughout Britain. 
P.F. - However, it was good to do it formally at a ministerial level as well. Another good 
thing was that it allowed us to meet as Ministers informally. We usually did that the night 
before at a working dinner amongst us all and to chat informally about the things that we 
didn't want to raise formally. 
P.F. - From our point of view we often did that. One of the very early things we did was 
getting all of the home nations signed up for the Glasgow Commonwealth Games bid. So it 
meant we could announce that we had the home nations in agreement for the Glasgow bid 
and it meant we could tie in their votes more or less. We would always have hoped to have 
got them anyway. But it gave us a good start to be able to say that all the home countries 
were backing us and giving us their votes. So I would say that overall it was a very good 
forum for getting us all together. 
A.McM. - How often did it meet? 
P.F. - It was supposed to be every six months, though sometimes it got knocked off track a 
little bit by unexpected events, but we usually tried to get the meeting rescheduled for another 
date within a month or so of the original one. So it was by and large about every six months. 
A.McM. - Where did it meet? For example, did it rotate to each of the four locations of 
London, Belfast, Edinburgh, and Cardiff! 
P.F. - Yes it did rotate to all the capital cities of the UK. We tried to meet in each of 
respective capitals in turn to give everybody a shot at hosting it. 
A.McM. - Did all four UK Ministers turn up for every meeting (Richard Caborn, 
Michael McGimpsey, Alun Pugh, and yourself, even Tessa JoweD)? 
P.F. - Oh yes they all did turn up, or they sent someone if they couldn't make it personally, 
and so did Angela Eagle, another Labour MP. There was always representation from all of us. 
It was also good, for example, because we were always thinking about a new velodrome in 
Scotland and when we were down in Cardiffwe got the opportunity to go to Newport to see 
theirs and how it all worked. So it was a chance to see that in practice, when you may not 
have made the trip just to do it on its own. 
A.McM. - Could you take any kind of policy decisions, or was it a discussion forum? 
P.F. - It was used mainly for discussion if there were areas of concern or major issues then we 
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could raise them there. Because a lot of it is devolved to the four home countries it was good 
just to make sure that we were all on the same wavelength and that we didn't have the kind of 
difficulties that could arise if we didn't meet to talk about them regularly. Though we all did 
that informally anyway by lifting the phone, it was always good to have the formal structure 
too. 
A.McM. - Was the UK Minister (Richard Caborn in your time) dominant or was Tessa 
Jowell? Did he (or she) see himself as leader? 
P.F. - I think we all had quite a good relationship with Dick and with each other. He did come 
as the UK Minister for Sport, despite the fact that we all had responsibility for it in our own 
countries. He didn't try to dominate things, really. He was very inclusive certainly from my 
point of view. When I was in Melbourne last year for the Commonwealth Games he said to 
me that he had been round all these guys doing the lobbying for the Olympics and asked if 
there was anyone at all he could introduce me to or any doors he could open for me, or 
anything at all he could do for me then just to tell him. He really wanted to help our bid for 
2014 Commonwealth Games. He was very helpful in that way. 
A.McM. - He was seen as very influential in the successful London bid for the 2012 
Olympics. Do you think that was true? 
P.F. - Yes, certainly he was. He was very passionate about it and it's a shame he won't be 
seeing it through, but that's politics. He's off to do the World Cup bid for England in 2014 or 
2018, whichever is possible. He was very helpful in that regard for getting the Olympics, as 
were other colleagues too. When they had connections and knowledge they would be happy 
to use those for you too, as I mentioned about us getting the Commonwealth Games. 
A.McM. - Did he (or Tessa Jowell) try to influence policy in Scotland and make it the 
same as for the whole of the UK? 
P.F. - No, they didn't actually interfere too much at all. I think the devolution process has 
worked quite well because obviously while we have athletes who compete on the world stage 
at the Olympics as part of team GB we also have athletes who compete for Scotland and 
locally as well. So it's good to have that kind of mix because the athletes like competing at 
the different levels. It's good for them, and it's appropriate also I think for politicians to 
mirror that by representing the UK on the one hand and their home countries on the other 
when the need arises. 
A.McM. - Were there arguments over the authority of the home countries in terms of 
funding, resources, etc. amongst all the Ministers or UK Sport? 
P.F. - No, not really, because we had our own sources of finance and it was up to us to 
disburse money as we thought best for sport in Scotland. What we did want to do though was 
make sure that as many Scottish athletes as possible got the opportunity to be on the World 
Class Performance Programme and to make sure that they had a level playing field for all of 
them. This was something that everybody wanted to achieve. You have to remember that 
those balances have to be seen to be fair as well throughout Britain. That was something that 
everybody was quite keen on wherever they came from in the country. 
A.McM. - I know that Alex Salmond of the SNP is talking about a separate Scottish 
Olympics team. Is there a serious debate about this or is he making a political point? 
P.F. - No, there is no demand for that at all in Scotland from amongst the competitors. It's not 
something the athletes want and it's not something the governing bodies want either. It's not 
274 
something we would have supported when we were in government. There are all sorts of 
reasons why it shouldn't happen. For instance, the IOC constitution would not allow it in any 
case, but also because our athletes don't want it. They have the best of both worlds by 
competing for Team Scotland in the Commonwealth Games or other events and also compete 
for Team GB. 
P.F. - Many of our athletes have won gold and other medals as part of a British team -
Shirley Robertson in sailing for example has won British team medals, and Chris Hoy in 
cycling has won sprint medals as part of a GB team. People like that are much recognised for 
being part of a national team and this has actually helped their careers rather than anything 
else. It wouldn't have been possible otherwise. 
A.McM. - What were your main achievements for sport in Scotland? 
P.F. - I suppose I would say my job was a shared achievement because I got a lot of support 
and help from the First Minister who's passionate about it too, but also from other ministerial 
colleagues from whom I used to get money occasionally. I got other kinds of support from 
health and education, for example, because we had shared agendas across government in 
Scotland. So it was all done with a lot of support from them. I suppose getting the 
Commonwealth Games bid up and running was the major thing I did during that time when I 
was in office. 
A.McM. - Is it a job you would like to do again if Labour get back into power in 
Edinburgh? 
P.F. - I've no idea if I would get the job again because politics is a funny old game, but I 
would love to if I was offered the chance. We had actually said in our manifesto that if we 
won the Commonwealth Games bid, for Glasgow, which we'll know in November, we would 
then have a dedicated Minister for Sport and I would have loved to have done that. That 
would have been a Cabinet-level job doing just sport. 
A.McM. - There's been a debate in England for many years about what level the 
Minister for Sport should be, for instance in Cabinet. There seems to be a similar one 
going on in Scotland, though the Westminster model of a junior Minister reporting to a 
Secretary of State is not the same is it? 
P.F. - Well I was a Cabinet Minister you know but not doing only sport because I did a whole 
lot more. Unfortunately that's not now the case because the SNP has reorganised the 
functions. The Minister for Sport now also has responsibility for housing and communities 
and isn't a Cabinet level Minister any more. I think that's actually unhelpful. 
P.F. - However, It's a bit like the Westminster system because most Ministers had a deputy 
when we were in, though I didn't have one and I was all on my own. But I was at Cabinet-
level rather than just being at the deputy level. At the moment the numbers in the Cabinet are 
greatly reduced to about six - previously there were about ten or eleven of us. This was partly 
because we were in coalition and had more members to draw on and we had to have 
representatives of both parties. The SNP doesn't have as many members as we did in 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats, so they've had to change things to suit what they've 
got. 
A.McM. - Thank you very much for your assistance. Can I quote you in my 
dissertation? 
P.F. - Yes, certainly you can. 
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A.MeM. -Do you think AIun Pugh would speak to me? 
P.F. - I think he would. The last time I spoke to him just after the election in June he was still 
trying to make up his mind about what to do next. I'm not sure if he's actually managed to 
find ajob yet. I'm sure you could get in touch through the Welsh Assembly because they still 
keep in contact with him and send mail on. 
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3. Sir Neil Macfarlane (9 January 2007) 
A.MeM. - Could you please tell me about the circumstances that led to your 
appointment as Minister for Sport? 
N.M. - I got a telephone call from Michael Heseltine, when he was Secretary of State for the 
Environment. Sport was with Environment at that time before Heritage and Culture, Media 
and Sport were set up. I had been at Education for two years since the election and it was 
time for a change. 
A.MeM. - I read in your book that Michael Heseltine said to you "You do like sport, 
don't you?" when he was appointing you. Did you have a background in sport? 
N .M. - Yes 1 did indeed. 1 played good club hockey in Essex and 1 played minor counties 
cricket for Essex as well, and 1 played a lot of rugby. Although I'm a Scotsman like my 
father, my mother was a Welsh hockey international and my grandfather was a Welsh rugby 
international many, many, many moons ago. 
A.MeM. - So you had a long pedigree in sport, going back many years? 
N.M. - Well we were steeped in it and I'm a member of the MCC and Essex Cricket Club, 
and various golf clubs. 1 played sport, 1 played cricket for as long as 1 could, even when 1 was 
a Member of Parliament. Then 1 found that nothing worked quite as well as it used to. My 
only exercise now is on the golf course. I'm looking forward to a week or ten days in March 
in Scotland. 
A.MeM. - Are you playing golf there? 
N.M. - Yes, 1 am playing golf on the east coast at St Andrew's. My father was born in Ayr 
and I have known that coastline very well over the years, including Troon, Prestwick and 
Turnberry I still make it my business to go back whenever possible. Then 1 am going to the 
Open in July at Camoustie, hoping for a Scottish win. It's been a long time coming. 
A.MeM. - You said in your book that being Sports Minister also involved dealing with 
Gypsies and gems, national parks, zoos, planning, and so on. Did you actually spend 
much time on sport? 
N.M. - I did not spend as much time on sport as 1 would have liked, especially the planning of 
it and the liaising of it as I could have done. The town and country planning aspects took up a 
lot of my time, as you would expect, dealing with things from power stations to bypasses and 
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, SSSIs, ancient monuments, minerals and planning and 
land legislation or reclamation that we took through. Then there were of course the Gpysies, 
the zoos, national parks, Royal Parks, and nature conservation. Also we did the big Bill 
which I took through, which was the main heritage bill that we had never had before. All that 
took a lot of my time, and in terms of sport, 1 think there's no doubt at that time we were 
dominated by football. 
N.M. - As you will have read, there were the problems at Luton, and then we had the tragedy 
at the Heysel Stadium. 1 think 1 found the most difficult thing was dealing with the Football 
Association and the European Football Association because my officials and I pleaded with 
them not to have that final match at the Heysel but they went ahead and did it. 1 remember 
Margaret Thatcher saying to me, "I cannot understand why you cannot go to watch a sporting 
event without having to kill people, having to battle hooliganism on the streets, why you 
couldn't just enjoy the spectacle". I used to say to her well it doesn't happen at rugby, it 
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doesn't happen anywhere else. 
A.McM. - It's better now than it used to be though because of the all-seater stadiums 
and other factors, isn't it? 
N.M. - Exactly, and my successor, Colin Moynihan, had a terrible time with the Sheffield 
disaster. I think that we probably asked far too much of our Police. I think the Police at that 
stage were not well organised in trying to find out who the perpetrators were. They certainly 
weren't interested in sport, they were just interested in the bloodlust. 
A.McM. - The post was well-established by the time you held office. Do you think it was 
seen as an important one in government? 
N.M. - Not necessarily. We sometimes struggled to get recognition and support from the 
inner-circles of government .. The budget was always very small. I think at that time we were 
also trying to do our level best to implement initiatives with the Education Department and 
with the local education authorities because the prime purpose of sport is to make certain that 
the breeding grounds are good in schools. So we tried to do that as well though it wasn't 
always easy. That was quite a difficult problem. 
N .M. - We cut across the work of other departments quite a lot, such as the Home Office, 
Education, and Trade and Industry for tourism. Then of course I had the problem with the 
cricket teams and the rugby teams going to South Africa. 
A.MeM. - I was actually going to ask you about that. Reading through Hansard, as I 
have done, I have got an impression of the things you said and did, as well as for all the 
other Sports Ministers over the last forty years, and South Africa was clearly a 
prominent issue throughout. 
N.M. - How interesting. [A.McM - It was a very interesting exercise and it took me over a 
year to read through it all for every Sports Minister.] One of the problems I found was 
that 1 had more problems with the Conservative backbenchers than 1 did with the Labour 
Party on the Gleneagles declaration. 1 think that if you said to me that in my lifetime we 
would see Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa that would have seemed a long way 
away in 1985. It's amazing how it happened so quickly, but 1 personally was delighted 
because 1 played a lot of cricket with Graeme Pollock in the early 1960s. We played club 
cricket in Surrey and 1 was just delighted. 1 saw him many years later in Newlands in South 
Africa when 1 went out there with my wife and there he was sitting alongside all the coloured 
players, West Indian players, Sri Lankan players. But of course he just said, "1 could never 
have believed this possible". 
N.M. - 1 think the Gleneagles problem was very difficult because of our commitment to the 
United Nations anti-apartheid committee. That was paramount of course and it brought me 
into conflict with a lot of myoid friends from rugby and cricket, especially the governing 
bodies. Myoid friend Graham Gooch took a team to South Africa with a lot of other players 
that 1 had known and played with many years before. It made life very difficult and 
uncomfortable for me for me. However, one overcomes these things. 
A.MeM. - After reading through Hansard I did a calculation for each Sports Minister, 
looking at the issues you dealt with in sport in comparison with other matters and I 
came up with a calculation which indicated 23% of your time was spent on sport and 
77% on other matters. Would that seem about right in your view? 
N.M. - Absolutely spot-on. Absolutely right. I think you were right with your calculation, 
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which might have been eighty/twenty or seventy-five/twenty five from my memory. That's 
very interesting. It's a fascinating bit of research. 
N.M. - And it's always a difficult question to know to what extent a government has a right to 
interfere in sport. It's best left to be run by the governing bodies though government still has 
to provide the funding. Of course sport is still a national voice that can generate a lot of 
national pride. When your sports teams are doing well, as you and I know. North of the 
border when our rugby team is doing well we all feel good. [A.MeM. - and our various 
British football teams too, whieh doesn't happen a lot nowadays.] It doesn't happen a 
great deal, no, unfortunately. 
A.McM. - What I also did was a sub-analysis looking at the issues in sport and trying to 
define what was a policy issue and what was not policy. I've come up with 34% policy 
and 66% non-policy for yourself. In other words about a third of your time devoted to 
sport was on sports policy and the other two thirds to operational matters in sport. 
N.M. - Yes - how interesting! I've never done the calculation, but again it seems about right. 
Policy was never a strong point for us anyway. We tended just to go about things in a 
comrnonsense way. Each of the individual sports and governing bodies had their own policies 
and it was not for us to interfere too much. Of course there was policy in the sense that we 
would support this sport or that sport but not to tell them how to run their businesses. 
A.McM. - What I found with the later Sports Ministers, particularly from when the 
Department of National Heritage was set up in 1992 by John Major, was that they have 
tended to devote more time to sport and to sports policy. 
N.M. - I think that's right, and undoubtedly having a Prime Minister like John Major who 
was himself devoted to sport was a help. I know that when he was a Whip on the government 
benches and I was a Minister he used to pass me messages. We used to test each other on 
how many left-handed batsmen there were in a team of England eleven, and who was top of 
the averages in 1966, all that sort of thing. So when he got in as Prime Minister he 
undoubtedly acknowledged that sport should play a higher profile as it does in some other 
countries. And I think they got it right, and I think it's a good system they have now. 
N.M. - Later Sports Ministers seem to have less to do with water, or planning, or transport 
that those in my time and that's all to the good. I always wanted to see the Minister at a 
higher level, the Minister of State level, though perhaps not Cabinet, and that has actually 
happened. Perhaps they interfere more in policy than we did, particularly if the government is 
giving out a lot more money. 
A.McM. - Do you think the funding provided by the National Lottery has made a 
significant impact, set up as it was by Mr Major's government? 
N.M. - It certainly does, and what you've got it a Secretary of State at the Cabinet table. 
When I was there I worked for Kenneth Baker, Patrick Jenkin, and Michael Heseltine and 
they were not really too interested in sport. I think in some respects the Foreign Secretary was 
more interested in sport because of the situation internationally with apartheid and other 
matters. Sport would always come up to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
which the Prime Minister attended and it would always come up on the various agendas 
whenever the Foreign Secretary travelled to the United Nations. I went to the Cabinet two or 
three times before the World Cup in 1982 to talk about it, and about tours to South Africa, 
and when several South African teams came here to play rugby. All that caused many 
problems, and of course there was the famous D'Oliveira case some years before. 
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A.MeM. - When I looked through Hansard, I identified a number of issues that you 
have already mentioned, such as football hooliganism, apartheid, and Gleneagles. What 
do you think the other main sports policy issues were that you dealt with during your 
time in offiee? 
N.M. - There were quite a few, but I think the main ones were Zola Budd; sponsorship of 
sport, especially tobacco; sale of school playing fields; sporting contact with Argentina, 
because there was a move to boycott them due to the Falklands dispute by people such as 
Tam Dalyell and Denis Howell; saving the Grand National course for the nation; drugs in 
sport; and possible Olympic bids for London and Manchester. 
N.M. - The Zola Budd thing I thought was appalling at the time. I very nearly resigned over it 
because I felt that the newspaper, the Daily Mail, were just running it because they thought it 
was an interesting story which would help England or Britain to win a gold medal and 
nobody knew how good the runner was. In actual fact she wasn't any good at all. It was run 
by the Home Office who were terrified of the power of the Daily Mail. They asked for my 
views, and I said, "Look, you would not ask my views of the medical condition of somebody, 
so why do you think I would say someone should run for Britain or not". I would not tell the 
England cricket selectors who to choose for their cricket team, although I might have an idea 
or two at the moment! 
A.McM. - Do you think you were able to influence policy on any of these issues, or did 
the Secretary of State have the major input? 
N .M. - Well I think we never really had policy discussions around a table. Policy for sport 
didn't come from Cabinet Ministers at all, at least not when I was in office. It was worked out 
a much lower level, usually with civil servants. The points I did make were more and more at 
Cabinet committees involving other departments, for example working with Trade and 
Industry. I have sat on a couple of Cabinet committees dealing with tourism and they were 
chaired by Lord Young, or David Young as he was before, and I used to make the point that 
you cannot isolate tourism from big sporting events like the World Cup or Olympics. If you 
had World Cups, if you had big events, if you had the Olympic Games, and if you were 
hosting a number of other international sporting activities, Wimbledon, tours by rugby teams, 
various events around football, cycling, swimming, or whatever, they would by their very 
nature fill hotel bedrooms. There would be a benefit to tourism. 
N.M. - I used to make the point that you cannot isolate tourism from big sporting events like 
the World Cup or Olympics. I always used to make certain that any tourist board reporting to 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry had made close contact with the Regional Sports 
Councils so they could work together to find out where the big sporting events were likely to 
be. 
A.McM. - You also mentioned in your book that Denis Howell was writing his own job 
description for a Cabinet Minister in terms of bringing sport, tourism, and "quality of 
life" issues together in the way you've just described. 
N.M. - Yes, absolutely! All of us used to think at one stage that really was what was needed, 
and Denis certainly did. If you want to have policy arguments you need to have more than a 
junior Minister at the table. And I think that the Labour Party have done that. I think that the 
Conservative Party in 1992 got off to a bad start with the Department of National Heritage 
because David Mellor had publicity for all the wrong reasons. It was a major distraction 
(though I can't use the word "major" because he might not like it!). There were huge 
distractions at that time and it never got off the ground. I think Blair picked that up quite 
quickly. Blair has associated himself with quite a lot of policy-making for sport. 
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A.McM. - Melior was only the Secretary of State for a few months before Peter Brooke 
came in, wasn't he? 
N.M. - Peter Brooke or Virginia BottomIey, I can't quite remember. 
A.McM. - It was Peter Brooke after David Melior. He didn't seem to be much interested 
in sport, though perhaps you had a different impression? 
N.M. - He was a keen cricketer. He played lot and once took a very good slip catch off me. 
Those were the days before we had wobbly hips! 
A.McM. - The other Secretary of State you worked with was Tom King. Did he have an 
interest in sport? 
N.M. - Yes I did work with him! I had forgotten Tom. He was very interested in sport, more 
so than Michael Heseltine, or Ken Baker, or Patrick Jenkin. But that was in the run-up to the 
1983 election and there wasn't too much about sport at that time. He was only there for a few 
months. 
A.McM. - Did you have close relationships with the Sports Council, the CCPR, and the 
British Olympic Association? 
N.M. - I always enjoyed working with them very much. We had Dicky Jeeps as chainnan of 
the Sports Council, then John Smith. Sadly I had to ask Dicky Jeeps to leave because he had 
been there a long time and I had to ask him to step aside. That was a very difficult business, 
but anyway he went. 
N.M. - The CCPR were a very good organisation with Mary Glen-Haig and Keith Mitchell as 
chairmen and Peter Lawson as secretary. I liked dealing with them because they brought 
together all the governing bodies of sport. A fme organisation who knew their stuff. 
N.M. - The BOA was run by Dennis Follows as chairman and Dick Palmer as secretary. I 
always used to get on very well with them both when we went to events or met up at 
meetings. 
A.McM. - Was it easier to work through the representative bodies rather than the 
individual governing bodies, since it could be difficult to get round them all? 
N.M. - Yes absolutely! It was much easier to go to them and their annual meeting in January 
which was always in Bournemouth for two or three days. And the Sports Council I think was 
October or November. You could always meet 20 or 30 of the key governing bodies of sport 
at these gatherings. I found that most encouraging, and entertaining, and stimulating. They 
were a good audience and they understood it. I think they all used to bemoan the fact that you 
couldn't ever elevate sport within the Cabinet and the government. Anyway that's all in the 
past, it's all changed now. 
A.MeM. - How did you meet with the individual national governing bodies? Were there 
regular arrangements? 
N.M. - We used to have one-on-one meetings, Many would request to come and see me and I 
always agreed. I never missed a chance to support them at weekend functions. I spent an 
awful lot of time at weekend events such as Wimbledon, rugby, cricket, watching cycling, 
other championships, all that sort of thing, basketball, netball, hockey. There was always 
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something on most weekends to go to, either a conference, a competition, or something. I 
would go to watch club rugby or international rugby, and I would always try and entertain 
any visiting dignitaries from France or Australia or Samoa or Fiji. I would always try to meet 
all the visiting representatives. It was a labour of love. I always made it my business to go to 
watch Scotland play whenever I could, having to try to be impartial. When we beat Wales in 
Cardiff once by 29 points to 6 I could scarcely contain myself. [A.McM. - That must be 
quite some time ago?] Yes it was some years now, I don't remember how many, but it was 
wonderful when it happened. 
N.M. - I enjoyed dealing with governing bodies. There were many governing bodies of sport 
who were very well organised and I certainly made it my duty to try to introduce as many 
sportsman and sportswomen into the business of running the Regional Sports Councils, 
people like Bemard Gallaher, Mark Nicholas, Bill Beaumont, and Clive Lloyd. People like 
that I got in to help run regional sport. One of the best things I ever did was to bring in Bobby 
Charlton to be chainnan of the North West Sports Council. In fact I wanted him to be 
chainnan of the Sports Council and I also wanted Coos Chataway to be chainnan of the 
Sports Council but they both declined it. Chataway was too busy. Then he became a member 
of the BBC and he turned me down. 
N.M. - There are also the friendships I have developed with some sportspeople. For example, 
there's Ken Schofield the golfer. I hadn't met him but he wrote to me around 1981-82. He 
wanted to come and talk to me about golf. It was a friendship that went on and still goes on. I 
still see him and play with him. That was largely to do with the importance of the Ryder Cup 
and how golf could become more involved in the lives of young people. How could we help 
young people take up golf? As you and I know in Scotland, there is a presumption in favour 
of junior golf, and in England it's a totally different matter, it's more elitist. When my own 
young sons wanted to play in the 1970s they were frowned on. Whereas there are signs up 
around Gullane and Leven and St Andrew's that only the under 14 years olds may play here 
at certain times. It's wonderful, it's part of the natural culture. 
N.M. - That was good, and I managed to quite a lot of things to help young people and 
improve access such as pay as you play. I would meet the governing bodies of golf whenever 
I could. I thoroughly enjoyed it and I used to enjoy meeting them more when I was preferably 
at a weekend event and not likely to be interrupted by some problem in government or some 
Parliamentary question on the Royal Parks, ancient monuments, historic buildings or what 
have you. So a good time to meet the governing bodies was informally at weekends, rather 
than structured arrangements during the week. 
A.McM. - Was there a select committee at the time you were in office? 
N.M. - No there wasn't one that dealt only with sport. It used to cut across the work of other 
select committees, and I think in the main I was usually summoned by the Home Office 
Select Committee to answer questions on football hooliganism and violence. I used to 
accompany a Home Office Minister and they would want to quiz me about my relationships 
with the Football Association and the Football League. It was quite useful having colleagues 
there that I knew, even from other parties. There was a Labour MP called Jack Dunnett who 
was the chairman ofNotts County and he was president of the Football League and so it was 
quite useful having him in the House of Commons because he was the MP of one of the 
Nottingham seats and I could often talk to him in the corridors and say, "Look Jack, what are 
we going to do about something or other", and he would always be very helpful and very 
constructive. 
A.McM. - How would you describe your relationships with civil servants? 
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N.M. - We had our own sports and recreation division, called SARD at the Department of the 
Environment, where our relationships were always excellent. Happily the people who dealt 
with sport had a big interest in it anyway. They were very motivated by sport and usually 
came from a sporting background. They had a two or three year tour of that particular 
department. They were full of ideas and I suppose you could say that's where the policies 
were developed, especially when they went out to talk to governing bodies. They used to do 
sport all the time, whereas I had to split my time doing many other things. 
A.MeM. - Were there different sets of eivil servants for sport and for your other, non-
sports duties? 
N.M. - Yes indeed, and it was sometimes difficult to separate all the different activities. 
Certainly you had to read up pretty quickly at weekends on documents they gave you when 
dealing with sizeable planning applications or coal mines applications. 
A.MeM. - What do you think your main achievements were for sport? 
N.M. - I think the main achievements were:-
N.M. - Bringing together so many of the governing bodies, something that had not been done 
before. We were able to work more closely together, and meet more frequently on many 
informal occasions, as well as the few formal meetings we had. 
N.M. - I think also the thing that I hope we did was to enhance the role of the Sports Council 
in the regions of the country by gaining a bigger profile and by having a proper chairman 
who was a sportsman or sportswoman together with officials in the regions who were co-
ordinating the sport there. 
N.M. - I was also determined not to isolate or outlaw tobacco alongside all the other pressures 
we were coming up against in sport because it undoubtedly had not been isolated or outlawed 
by the Department of Health. I said you can't do this to tobacco because it means an awful lot 
to cricket and golf. And I know that most people in sport are not encouraged to smoke just 
because they see the Benson and Hedges Trophy, or tobacco advertising in golf, rugby, 
cricket, or whatever. It was putting a lot of money into sport. The day when the Department 
of Health comes and says it is going to outlaw tobacco is when we would do it as well. You 
don't use sport as a whipping boy. I used to resist that year, after year, after year. I always 
had a steady ally in Denis Thatcher because he was a heavy smoker. 
N .M. - I used to argue that it was no good telling me to stop sports people going to South 
Africa if we didn't stop English business people going to South Africa or to Zimbabwe. It 
should come as a whole package, rather than just trying to penalise sport. That was my 
attitude to the 1980 Olympic boycott too. 
N.M. - I think those are a few of the successful policy initiatives that I look back on, although 
none were what you might call major policies. Though you know it all goes so quickly and I 
had a lot of fun at the time. 
A.McM. - How do you think the profile and definition of sport has changed over time 
for the Minister? For instance, is there now more of an emphasis on health and fitness, 
rather than competitive sport? 
N.M. - I think a lot has changed. In my day there were probably about 25 to 30 governing 
bodies of the main sports, whereas there are probably about 60 now. Certainly the world of 
athletics was the most successful at that time, 1981 to 1985. We had Coe and Ovett, Steve 
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Cram, Daley Thompson, a whole raft of winners. I was joking the other day with a friend of 
mine at the golf club that I can't understand the problem. When I was in power we won the 
Ashes twice! That was just a good thing for me being around at the right time. But you can 
see the point I am making. There are just more governing bodies of sport around now than 
there were, and there are so many more of what are minority sports than when I was a 
Minister, at which we are successful. 
N.M. - There is absolutely the problem we have with less emphasis on competitive sports, 
perhaps reducing the pool of talent we have at the highest levels. I can't understand what's 
going wrong with our football because we have rely on so many imports to make the league 
work. I still can't quite work out whether or not we are producing enough sportsmen, enough 
soccer players from our own backyard, or whether or not we are just a nation of spectators. 
When I was watching all the cricket over the last few weeks, all those thousands of people 
who go and watch I couldn't bear doing that as a youngster, I'd want to be participating. I've 
got the feeling that maybe we're more spectators now than 40 years ago. 
N.M. - Though there is now more access than ever for things such as skiing, fencing, 
swimming, running, cycling, and the facilities are so much better than when you and I were 
youngsters, this doesn't necessarily translate into international success because much of it is 
non-competitive. I think there are more facilities and people are more aware now. You read 
all the newspapers on sport and you just realise how many fixtures and events that are going 
on, just how many there are throughout the country. 
N.M. - In 1948 at the Olympic Games they had about 12 or 14 events, but now there are at 
least 30 or 40. I remember when Colin [Moynihan1 and I went to the Olympic Games in 
1984 in Los Angeles I spent most of my time watching the hockey because I understood that 
and we won a silver medal. The best player was Sean Curley who scored lots of goals. I 
preferred to go and watch that than some of the other things such as shooting. You can't 
really watch shooting. And I didn't understand the bows and arrows stuff because it wasn't 
something I found interesting, and I wasn't much good with that. The swimming I found 
interesting, but I didn't enjoy that silly stuff, what do you call it. [A.McM. - sycnchronised 
swimming?] Yes that was it! Clive James once called it formation drowning. 
N.M. - I understood the hockey and I loved going to the Olympic Games stadium to watch 
the track events but the 100 metres you couldn't really see because it was all over in about 9 
point something seconds with Carl Lewis. You could watch Backley throwing the javelin and 
Tessa Sanderson. It was tremendous watching that and the high jump, but the other ones were 
over in 9 seconds or 22 or 44 seconds and I didn't fmd them all that entertaining. Whereas 
watching the hockey with the Indians and the Germans and the Dutch and the Australians and 
the British team was absolutely outstanding with the speed of the play. Watching the three-
day eventing was interesting too. 
N.M. - I think nowadays you'll probably fmd with the Olympic Games in 2012 there will be 
about 45 events going on. Incidentally, I am delighted about the Olympic Games coming here 
in 2012, which I hope will be successful and I'm sure it will be. I was keen to have them 
many years before but it wasn't very popular at that time because of terrorism and Ulster and 
other things. Seb Coe has done an absolutely outstanding job. You see that's the importance 
of having somebody who understands sport. 
A.McM. - Seb Coe didn't actually go far in politics because his time in Parliament was 
cut short when he lost his seat. Do you think that Minister for Sport would have been a 
career he would have chosen? 
N.M. - Well I think he might have eventually been Secretary of State covering sport if he 
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hadn't lost his seat and we had won the election. His ambitions were probably higher than 
junior Minister. In many ways he is probably better off where he is running the Olympic 
Games or organising it because he understands the Olympic movement. He understands 
Olympic politics as much as Princess Anne does because they've been on the IOC for all 
these years and at the same time he's one of our greatest athletes ever. 
N.M. - My guess is he would have been disappointed losing his seat and not going much 
further in government. Some of us did plead with him not to go down to Falmouth with all 
the Liberal territory and some of said you would be much better off looking for a seat in 
Surrey or Hampshire or Sussex. But anyway he went off down to Falmouth and it was very 
sad when he lost it because he could have done an awful lot if he had stayed on and we had 
won but we've been in Opposition since 97. If a Conservative government ever came back in, 
which I hope it does in the not too distant future the possibility is that he could be a Minister 
from the House of Lords. He could well be Lord Coe as Minister for Sport or Secretary of 
State and it might be a good thing to put it up there in the Lords. 
N.M. - That reminds of Chris Chataway again. He was in my office one day, the same day 
that Seb Coe was coming up see me. They met in the corridor and they both said, "I've 
always wanted to meet you". I said, "Don't you know each other" and they said, "No, we've 
never met". And I said, "How unforgivable of me. I should have introduced you. If I had 
known you didn't know each other I would have brought you together for a drink". Chris 
Chataway, said, "I've always wanted to meet you" and Seb Coe said, "You're my hero". 
Chataway was a wonderful athlete who trained on 10 cigarettes a day. Unthinkable now. 
A.McM. - In your book you seem to suggest that Labour and Conservative polices for 
sport were very similar. Was there a consensus in sport policy, compared with the 
ideological differences on most other issues? 
N .M. - Yes I think there was a broad measure of agreement on many aspects of sports policy. 
Indeed I relied on the Labour Party for quite a lot of support, particularly when it came to the 
Gleneagles declaration. I found myself being criticised from people behind me. John Carlisle 
was always very vociferous and there were some others in my own party. I had to rely upon 
Denis Howell and Neil Kinnock very often to speak in support of what I was trying to do. 
A.McM. - Did you know any of the other Ministers for Sport before or after you and 
could you comment on them? 
N.M. - Well, I'll comment a little on some of them, if I can remember. A good man Denis 
Howell was and always very helpful to me. I knew him well and we agreed on most things to 
do with sport. 
N.M. - Eldon Griffiths was in the House at my time and he in fact used to do quite a lot for 
paraplegic sport. He organised the first Olympic Games for paraplegics which he held in this 
country about 1984 or 85 I think but he's now living in California I haven't seen or heard of 
him for years. 
N.M. - My dear friend Hector Monro died recently. He was a very good friend of mine, a 
lovely man, and I succeeded him. [A.McM. - He nearly resigned over the Olympic boycott 
in 1980?] Yes he did, he was almost forced to go over the Olympics because he was 
extremely brassed off over that. The problem was that Margaret just did not consult. It was 
Carter who got everyone round the table and said, "What are we going to do" and the boycott 
was the result. Well that was that anyway and they agreed to do it but I think it was a great 
pity. It hurt him badly and he was on the verge of resignation. 
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N.M. - I knew Richard Tracy because he was neighbour of mine in our parliamentary seats. I 
didn't know him very well and he wasn't there a long time. I don't think he enjoyed it very 
much. 
N.M. - Colin Moynihan was a pretty good friend of mine. His parents lived in myoid 
constituency of Sutton and Cheam, so we had a lot of contact and he came out to canvass for 
me when he was still a schoolboy in the 1970s. I played golf with him and I always got on 
very well with him. A very, very good man. I liked him a lot. 
N.M. - I never knew Robert Atkins very well. Our paths didn't seem to cross much. Of 
course I knew of him in the House of Commons but by that time I had retired from 
Parliament and become chainnan of Sec uric or. Were there others? 
[A.MeM. - lain Sproat?] Golly yes, I'd forgotten about lain. I went to see him once after I'd 
retired when he was a Minister and somebody asked me if I knew him, but I've forgotten 
what it was about. Somebody asked me to do it. He was a very keen cricketer, lain, and wrote 
a very good book on cricket. I think he was under John Major wasn't he? [A.McM. - Yes he 
was and so was Robert Key.] 
N.M. - Robert Key? Was Robert Minister for Sport? [A.McM. - He was Minister for just a 
year but reshuffled because of a financial scandal concerning other MPs.] Oh yes, I 
remember now. I think it was something to do with Al Fayeed, wasn't it. But I don't 
remember him as Minister for Sport, perhaps because of the short time he was there. 
N.M. - Cabom's been there some time now. Must be one of the longest serving. Don't really 
know him though. 
N.M. - Tony Banks I do remember, but not much, and Kate Hoey I don't know. I can't really 
comment on them. 
A.MeM. - Why did you leave office? In your book you mention that around the middle 
of 1985 you had almost had enough because of the "Little Englander" attitude towards 
hosting the Olympics in the UK. Was that a factor? 
N.M. - Exactly, it was the main reason I went. I didn't like the rejection out of hand of the 
Olympic Games and the Little Englander attitude. Also, I realised that I had been a junior 
Minister for six or seven years overall, including at Education before sport. I was getting 
close to fifty and my daughter was going to university so I just got a bit bored with what I'd 
been doing. I felt that I couldn't go anywhere else, so I offered to resign and Margaret 
Thatcher accepted it. We stayed very good friends and I played a lot of golf with Denis 
Thatcher subsequently and supported the government fully. But I didn't like the rejection out 
of hand of the Olympic Games bids and the "Little Englander" attitude. I felt that an awful lot 
of the things that had happened in the last year or two with the Bradford fire, and the Heysel, 
and so on were very bad. I felt that the Home Office and the Police and the Football 
Association and League were not doing enough to police the game better. It took a lot of time 
organising that and I didn't miss it. I was happy to move away. 
A.McM. - Was there any possibility of a comeback under Michael Heseitine, whom you 
supported for the leadership of the Party in 1990? 
N.M. - By that time I had become chainnan of a couple of companies and I made it quite 
clear that I wasn't interested in a comeback. Once I had made up my mind to leave politics, I 
always said I was doing this because I had known him for a very long time. During his 
election campaign for the leadership I made it quite clear to him that he owed me nothing and 
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that I was quite happy to do other things. I promised my wife I wouldn't go back to doing it. 
Also my children were growing up and I hadn't seen much of them, So I wanted to see more 
of them now that they had started to become late teenagers and that I was enjoying the work 
that I was doing. I knew that I was going to give up the House of Commons at the next 
election anyway. So it was all good fun, it was interesting. 
A.MeM. - Thank you very mueh Sir Neil. I am very grateful to you. 
N.M. - I'm delighted you contacted me. I was pleased to get your letter and know that 
someone is interested in what we did all those years ago. 
A.MeM. - Would it be possible to quote you in my dissertation? 
N.M. - Certainly you can. I have no objection at all. 
A.MeM. - Do you think any of the other former Sports Ministers would talk to me? 
N.M. - Try Colin Moynihan - he's probably your best bet. 
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4. Mr lain Sproat (31 May 2007) 
A.M.eM. - Hello Mr Sproat. Thank you very much for agreeing to talk to me. 
I.S. - I was very glad to. I actually come up here to London about once a week now. I have 
plenty of time now that I'm retired, and my time's my own. Have you been up in London 
long today? [A.McM. - I came up this morning and went to the Queen Mother Sports 
Centre. I went running there, then swimming before coming here.] I used to live near 
there when I was an MP, in Dolphin Square actually. Funnily enough, I never went in to the 
sports centre. Perhaps it was something to do with being a Minister - I was too busy. 
Anyway, what did you want to talk to me about? 
A.MeM. - You were one of the longest-serving Conservative Ministers for Sport at 
almost four years, just behind Neil Maefarlane. Could you please tell me about the 
circumstances that led to your appointment. 
I.S. - It was quite involved actually, and went back a long way, but I'll tell you some of how 
it came about. I was a special advisor to the Prime Minister at the time of the 1987 election, 
when I was out of Parliament. John Major was at that time, I think, at Social Security and we 
had barely spoken. I met him by chance and he was under a lot of pressure with the job and 
not very happy in it. I'm sure he hoped for a change after the election. As I recall he became 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury then. We started talking about cricket because he was a 
fanatic for it. He was worried that his son was taking too much of an interest in football and 
asked me to send some of my books on cricket to try to get him more involved in that. I was 
happy to do it, so I sent a few, but I don't know if it made any difference. 
I.S. - I was out of Parliament from 1983 to 1992, then I got back for Harwich. When it came 
to the first reshuftle after the 1992 election I got a call from 10 Downing Street asking me to 
go there and see the PM. I went, not knowing what to expect, and there was John sitting on 
his own at the long Cabinet table. The first thing he said to me was, "What are we going to do 
about England?" and I replied, "Well, I think it's a bit much asking Alex Stewart to be 
captain and also be the opening batsman, so that needs to be changed." Then he said to me, 
''No, no. I meant what are we going to do about the country, the economy and all that? It's all 
a bit of a mess." 
I.S. - I had no answer for that, but I don't think he had a job in mind for me along those lines 
anyway, although I had been at Trade and Industry from September 1981 to June 1983. I 
think he remembered me from our discussions on cricket, so he offered me the Sports 
Minister job, and of course I accepted it. Certainly, I would have liked a Cabinet-level job, 
but my nine years out of Parliament put me right out of the picture, and it was nice to get 
back in at any level. 
I.S. - But actually, there was another reason which I would prefer it if you would keep quiet 
about for now. Apparently, Jeffrey Archer was desperate for the job and John wanted to keep 
him out. Archer had just got his peerage and really wanted to be in government but there was 
no way John Major would have him. [A.McM. - He was a good sprinter, running at the 
same time as Menzies Campbell in the sixties, wasn't he?] Yes, but I don't think he would 
have been a good Minister and John knew that. John had a serious agenda for sport, as we 
will no doubt discuss, and he couldn't have Archer in there. Archer's agenda was just for 
himself. 
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A.McM. - When you became Minister for Sport did you continue writing books on 
cricket? 
I.S. - Yes I did. I got special dispensation from my Secretary of State to carry on doing them 
because they didn't conflict with my job. I've always been interested in writing and 
publishing. I'm now part-time chairman of a small publishing house, We are just putting out 
the complete works of Alexander Pushkin in an English translation. 
A.McM. - You seemed to do a great deal on matters other than sport, such as tourism, 
ancient monuments, libraries, museums, listed buildings, Royal Parks, National Lottery, 
fIlm, TV, broadcasting, and so on. Could you tell me something about what the job 
entailed on a day-to-day basis? 
I.S. - That's a fair old list. How did you compile it? [A.McM. - I read every one of your 
speeches and Parliamentary questions in Hansard, as I did for all the other Sports 
Ministers. I calculated that you spent only around 21% of your Parliamentary time on 
sport. Did I? I had no idea of the figure really. But yes, there was all that and more. I was one 
of the last Ministers for Sport who has so much to do. When DCMS was set up after 1997, 
the Ministers could concentrate much more on sport than I, or my predecessors, were ever 
able to do. 
I.S. - Overall, the figure of 21 % on sport may be accurate, and I have no reason to doubt it, 
but it did not quite work out like that in practice. Sometimes sport was right at the front 
taking all my time and sometimes it was other things. For example, there could be days when 
I would work only on libraries or museums. I remember one document called Reading: the 
Future, which was a paper on libraries. I had to spend days on that to get it from first draft to 
something useful. At other times it was all sport and little else, especially in a crisis, such as 
an episode of football hooliganism. It depended very much on circumstances what I was 
involved in at any particular time. 
I.S. - In terms of sport, there were always sporting events to attend in the evenings and at 
weekends. There were meetings with sports governing bodies or the Sports Council, 
committees, conferences and the like. Sometimes it could be an annual conference of the 
CCPR or an overseas event, such as the 1996 Olympics or Euro 96 at home. There was just 
so much to do and never enough time to give to sport. 
I.S. - I did quite a bit for the arts and heritage as well, you know, sometimes as a result of 
sport. I remember attending a rugby league game up north in a mining constituency in County 
Durham. I was taken round a colliery by some miners when I said I had never been down a 
pit and would quite like to do it. First they showed me round the buildings, where I saw a 
picture on the wall of an eighteen inch coal seam being worked by a miner on his side. I 
misread the date as 1881, when it was really 1981. I couldn't believe it! Men were still doing 
that kind of work so late in the twentieth century. 
1.8. - Anyway, they took me down the pit and I saw lots of old tools left lying around, some 
very ancient. I actually used one to knock out a lump of coal which I still have. I told them 
the tools should be in their museum. They said they didn't have one, so I arranged for a grant 
of £500,000 to set one up. It's still there and thriving. Last year was the tenth anniversary, to 
which I was invited. The pits in that area have all closed now of course, having been there 
since 1797. 
I.S. - There was a great deal of inter-departmental work involved, for example with 
Environment. John Selwyn Gummer was in charge of it all the time I was Sports Minister and 
I didn't like him at all. We had to deal a lot with local government because much of sport is 
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done at that level, and of course Environment is the department responsible. Gummer did not 
appreciate sport or what local government did for it. However, his junior Minister, David 
Curry was very good to work with. 
I.S. - Another department we had to work closely with was Education. Gillian Shepherd was 
the Secretary of State there for part of the time and she was a very unhelpful person in 
relation to sport in schools. She was just not interested, especially as a core subject for 
inspection. Before her we had John Patten at Education and he was no different. We tried to 
build bridges but they did not want to. When they did it was just plain stupid. For instance, 
they wanted to put things in Raising the Game that had nothing to do with sport in my view, 
such as pastoral care. I had no idea what they meant by that. There have been people in sport 
from a religious background, like David Shepherd in cricket who went on to be the Bishop of 
Liverpool. But he had no particular religious brief in cricket and I thought that was something 
we should stay well clear of. Sport and religion do not mix very well as we see in Northern 
Ireland or Glasgow. 
I.S. - They were very protective of their own area and did not want interference. You see 
that's the problem with sport - it cuts across so many other departmental interests in 
Education, Environment, Health, and so on. There's was very little co-ordination and no 
incentive for departments to co-operate with each other. 
A.McM. - Was it a big handicap having to deal with so many subjects outside sport, 
because it must have severely limited the time you could devote to sport? 
I.S. - Yes, it certainly was a disadvantage most of the time I was there. From the sporting 
point of view it would obviously have been much better to have concentrated only on sport, 
but that was a luxury I didn't have. It was just not possible at that time with the departmental 
set up the way it was. It was always envisaged that the Sports Minister doing just sport would 
not have enough to do! I know it sounds silly, but it's true. I certainly could have filled my 
days with only sport, though I think other Ministers would have felt it was just like me being 
on holiday all the time. Ministers at National Heritage had to multi-task, whereas I think 
those at DCMS now have a very cosy time. However, it's not apparent to me that they have 
done more for sport than I did with much less time to do it. 
A.McM. - What were the main sports policy issues that you dealt with during your time 
in office? 
I.S. - Oh, there were so many of them. For example there was the issue of drugs in sport, 
because doping was a longstanding problem. Sports grounds safety came up a lot too, with 
the Taylor Report around at that time. There was always something about football going on 
like transfers, Euro 96, hooliganism, or reform of league structures. Football to me is now 
tainted with disrespect for the rules, cheating, lack of ethics, and far too much money for its 
own good. The standards of play are not even very high and are getting worse, despite the 
money. Or is it because of it? Sometimes I don't really know. Other things at the time were 
tobacco sponsorship, bids for international events, the Olympic bid for Manchester 2000. 
That would that be a fair list, wouldn't it? 
A.McM. -You focussed a lot on school sport, didn't you? It was one of the main 
elements of Raising the Game 
I.S. - Yes I did indeed. Schools sport was one of my main areas of interest, as was the sale of 
playing fields and the encouragement of team sports in schools. We spent a lot of time trying 
to stop the sale of school playing fields. You see, it was mainly Labour authorities who were 
doing it, not the Tories. Sometimes it wasn't as bad as it seems because it would be the sale 
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of a redundant school and fields where a new one had been built. There was not necessarily a 
net loss of playing fields in that case because there was some replacement, though where 
there was a real potential loss we tried to stop it. 
I.s. - The biggest barrier from the National Heritage point of view was the Department of 
Education. They were a quite dreadful department with no feel so sport at all. They had no 
interest in sport in schools and they did not care either. They did not pay any heed to the 
wider government agenda of health, sport, fighting obesity, and so on. We at National 
Heritage saw school sport as the first vital step in getting young people interested, then 
through them to local sports clubs. Those ideas were built into my report Raising the Game in 
1995. We used to have inter-departmental meetings with them and I kept bringing up these 
issues. 
I.S. - For instance, we in National Heritage wanted sport included in the national curriculum 
but they would not have it. I suggested that the schools inspectors should also inspect schools 
for sporting excellence and was told it was not possible because the inspectors finished at 
3.30 when school fmished. Since many sporting activities took place after school the 
inspectors could not therefore inspect them. It left me utterly dumfounded and frustrated. I 
just couldn't believe it. 
I.S. - I was very keen on team sports, which I wanted much more of in schools. I happen to 
think it builds all the virtues of teamwork, fair-play, and respect for authority that I value. Of 
course there are the added benefits of health and fitness, as well as the seed corn of sporting 
excellence for the future. I never really made much headway with schools until I got John 
Major's personal authority and endorsement behind Raising the Game. 
A.McM. - Raising the Game came out in July 1995, with the Parliamentary debate in 
June 1996. You also instituted the Sports Council restructuring, which was going on at 
the same time, or just before. In the background was the National Lottery, which made 
a lot more things possible. Would you say those were your main achievements? 
I.S. - Raising the Game was probably the most important achievement of my time as Minister 
for Sport, and it's something I'm very proud of. It was the first statement of sports policy 
since Denis Howell's White Paper of 1975, a full twenty years before. John Major backed me 
on that. I actually wrote it all myself, though John Major insisted on putting in a long 
foreword on the benefits of the Lottery, sport in schools, and the British Academy of Sport. 
The Academy was something I was very keen on indeed, based on the Australian model 
which proved to be so successful in the Sydney Olympics of 2000. We didn't want the 
government to run it, but only to facilitate and encourage it. 
I.S. - The Academy was at the top end. Below that, we wanted to develop sport through the 
schools and community clubs. There was great potential in developing links between local 
clubs and schools, using Lottery money for facilities and so on. In the schools we put forward 
the proposal for two hours of good quality sport and games per week, although the education 
people resisted this constantly. John Major backed me on that and now it's considered the 
bare minimum, though it's hardly a lot really. In reality, I doubt if they even do as much in 
the majority of schools. 
I.S. - We saw the whole thing as a continuum from schools and clubs at the bottom, through 
to elite sport and the British Academy at the top. Running beside this, there was great 
potential for sport in the universities and colleges, as there is in the USA, providing another 
route to top class sport for young people leaving school. All of this was to be developed by a 
variety of agencies, the private sector, Sports Council, partnerships, coaches, and others. It 
wasn't for the government to run sport, but to make sure there was an appropriate framework 
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for it to run itself with government backing. 
I.S. - It's just a pity Labour didn't carry through with it when they came to power in 1997. 
Tony Banks felt he had to disown it because it was Tory policy and he was told to by Tony 
Blair. Tom Pendry, Labour's sport spokesman when I was Minister, was very much in favour 
of it. [A.McM. - I spoke to him and he gave me your address. He said that Labour and 
the Conservatives really had a bipartisan approach to sports policy. Was that true?] 
Yes we did actually. We worked very closely together and had an excellent personal 
relationship. He had actually been a good boxer at university and knew about sport. When I 
showed him a draft of Raising the Game he agreed with everything we were doing, especially 
the Academy of Sport. He only added a few suggestions and didn't want anything taken out. 
I.S. - Then one day when Tom and I were actually together in the House not long before the 
97 election he got a telephone call from Tony Blair. He came back quite upset because Blair 
had told him not to agree with Tory policy. There was not much he could do about it and 
probably hoped that Blair would forget about sport after the election because he would have 
more important things to deal with. Then Tom could get on and do what he wanted. He was 
bitterly disappointed when he didn't get the job and Banks did, after having shadowed sport 
for years. I sent him a letter of sympathy after the election and he took me out to lunch in 
return. [A.McM. - He read out your letter to me when we spoke. He was very touched by 
it and had it near to hand.] Did he now? Well I'm glad it had some beneficial effect. 
A.MeM. - How involved were you in influencing policy on sports issues? For example 
did you get closely involved in writing Raising the Game, or was it driven by civil 
servants? 
I.S. - I can say that every word of Raising the Game was mine. I did it all, but I had the good 
fortune that John Major was very much in favour of it and behind me. In fact, he tried to 
claim it as his own document. Without his backing though I doubt if I could have done as 
much. The Secretaries of State, Stephen Dorrell and Virginia Bottomley had no interest 
whatsoever. They didn't actually oppose it, but they just saw a statement of sports policy as 
being of no consequence to the greater good of the department. On the other hand I did 
actually get resistance from the civil servants. The ideas in it were mine, or ones I had 
inherited from Robert Key and Robert Atkins. Because they were not really the civil 
servants' policies they had no sense of ownership nor the will to see them through. 
I.S. - The Sports Council was also against it because they thought that the Academy would 
remove some of their functions. I knew it would but I insisted to them that we must have it. I 
also drove through the Sports Council restructuring into UK Sport and Sport England, which 
they didn't want either. I saw it as the best way forward to have a Sports Council for England 
to parallel the ones in Scotland and Wales. In that way UK Sport could concentrate on elite 
sport for the whole of the UK. This is essentially the structure that exists today. 
I.S. - Actually, to get any policy decision through it has to have the support of the Secretary 
of State at least. In my case, I really bypassed them by having a PM in Major who was 
interested in sport. Secretaries of State are very often not interested in sport because they feel 
they have more important things to do. It is not a high priority for them, so it's therefore very 
difficult for someone at my level to influence policy in normal circumstances. 
A.McM. - How would you describe your relationship with:-
(a). The Secretaries of States you worked with at National Heritage? In particular, did 
they get involved in sports policy-making or did they leave it to you? 
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Peter Brooke (Sept. 1992-July 1994) 
I.S. - None of the Secretaries of State were really interested in sport in its wider sense as an 
activity of government. However, Peter Brooke was very keen on cricket. In fact, I would say 
he was fanatical about it. I don't remember him being at all interested in any other sports. He 
was a lovely, civilised man who was very good to work with and we got on well together. But 
like all Secretaries of State he had to have the final word on decisions. He would leave things 
to me in general so long as I didn't bother him, though for anything important he had ultimate 
authority. I don't think he actually wanted the job and fell into it by accident after David 
Mellor had to leave. Unfortunately I didn't get to work with Mellor, who was genuinely keen 
on sport as well as the arts. Brooke was more of an arts man. MelIor set up the National 
Heritage department after the 1992 election and apparently did an excellent job in his short 
time there. 
Stephen Dorrell (July 1994-July 1995) 
I.S. - Dorrell knew very little about sport and showed no interest at all. In fact when I found 
out that his father had played once at county level for Worcestershire I tried to talk to him 
about it. He just said, "Oh yes, that, and by the way what about such and such museum?" He 
just didn't want to talk about it and had no feel for sport at all. He didn't actually oppose what 
I was doing but didn't actually support me either. 
Virginia Bottomley (July 1995-May 1997) 
I.S. - Virginia and I had an early row not long after she came in, not about sport but 
something else entirely. She would never have been passionate enough about sport to have a 
row about it. After that, she just left me alone to get on with it. I think she was actually quite 
a good Secretary of State in general terms, despite having no knowledge of or interest in 
sport. The person I thought who would have done really well in the job was Ann 
Widdecombe. I think she would have got it if she had been prettier. She was actually a lovely 
woman to get on with, despite her fierce demeanour, and would have been great in Cabinet. 
(b). The Sports Council and related bodies (e.g. CCPR, BOA, UK Sport)? 
I.S. - The Sports Council was a terrible organisation to work with. They were very unhelpful 
to me and tried to fight against government policy all the time, especially Raising the Game. 
And of course, they didn't like my proposals for restructuring either because it would reduce 
their influence. They only wanted us to give them money then leave them alone to spend it. 
An equally difficult, or even greater, problem were the devolved Sports Councils in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. Not only were they fighting against me, they were also fighting 
against the Sports Council as well because they saw that as an English organisation that was a 
rival for resources. The Northern Ireland one was the worst. They had responsibility for a 
number of cross-border sports and felt they should have more resources in the light of these 
particular problems. 
I.S. - There was certainly no coherent British sports policy was all these organisations, and 
that was why I wanted to set up UK Sport to address this territorial rivalry. I just did not get 
on well with any of the Councils because they saw me a trying to restrict their powers or 
dilute them with initiatives like the British Academy of Sport. The Sports Council and the 
CCPR probably thought that they drove sports policy in Britain, but they really didn't. In my 
experience, it was civil servants who mainly got what they wanted because they had control 
over the process of giving out money and they knew how to manipulate the levers of 
government most effectively. Ministers come and go but the civil servants have the benefit of 
continuity and a longer view of things. 
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1.S. - The CCPR seemed to be adequate in what it did, though we had no financial control 
over them as we had with the Sports Council. They just went their own way as an 
independent voice for the sports governing bodies that the Sports Council could not be. Denis 
Lawson was the general secretary when I was there but he left because of some financial 
misconduct. In fact, all it related to was him buying paint for his house which he charged to 
the CCPR. I got on very well with him but his biggest problem was poor record keeping. I 
kept telling him to set up proper records and he said he didn't need to because he kept 
everything in his head. He knew what was going on he told me and had everything under 
control. I think he drank too much as well. He had the support of the Duke of Edinburgh, the 
patron of the CCPR and that protected him for a while. The Duke was always a strong 
supporter when I met him. I wouldn't say the CCPR had much influence on government 
policy, though of course we consulted them because of what they were. 
I.S. - The British Olympic Association did an excellent job for Olympic sports, which of 
course is only a small part of sport in general. It's the elite end. I instituted a programme of 
grants for top athletes and I was proud to see some of the recipients doing well in the 2000 
Olympics. I could actually see some of my legacy coming through, though Labour were in 
power by then and no doubt tried to take the credit. There's always a long time-lag in things 
like that and governments very often don't get to see the results of their policies when in 
office. The next government can claim the credit, or blame their predecessors for things that 
go wrong. The BOA were strong supporters of the British Academy, because they could see 
what it might do for elite sport. As part of a world-wide movement, they tended to take their 
policy focus from the IOC, rather than government. We in turn did not interfere much with 
them, at least not since the boycott in 1980. 
(c). The heads of national governing bodies? How often did you meet with them? Were 
there structured arrangements? 
I.S. - I tended not to have a great deal to do with them, except when I met some of the 
chairmen or chief executives at sporting events. We had no formal arrangements for 
meetings, though I did sometimes have them into my office. This was more likely with 
football, in response to some crisis or other, or incident of hooliganism. I usually went to 
annual conferences of the Sports Council or CCPR, but not often to those of the individual 
organisations. There were far too many of them and, as we've already discussed, I had a lot to 
do besides sport. I did go to some annual dinners of the bigger ones and knew most of the 
main people in an informal sort of way. 
I.S. - I suppose I met more with the heads of cricket and rugby union more than the others 
because those were the sports I knew most about and liked to watch. I'm originally from the 
Borders and was brought up watching and playing rugby. I tried to bring the two codes 
together without much success. I once helped to organise a game where one half was played 
under union rules and the second was held under league rules. The number of players on the 
field depended on the code in each half. I didn't like league at first but it grew on me. There 
was always the problem of the league poaching players from the union "amateur" code and 
turning them into professionals. Now it's different of course when all the top players are 
professionals, though we have the two codes to this day. I still have a video of that match. 
(d) What about the civil servants? Did you deal with a different set for sport and non-
sports work? 
I.S. - There were many different sets of overlapping civil servants, depending on the area I 
was working on at any given time. Sir Hayden Phillips was the permanent secretary at the 
DNS from when it was set up in 1992. He was a clever little Welshman but I don't think he 
294 
had much of a sporting background. Like all civil servants who get to that level he had 
worked in a number of different departments over the years. Under him there were many 
others I worked with in the sporting and non-sporting aspects of the job. 
I.S. - The civil servants were actually more obstructive on policy initiatives than the 
Secretaries of State were. They always wanted things to go through them for referral upwards 
to get a decision. They assumed that a junior Minister couldn't take decisions, since these 
were for the Secretary of State to do. They were invariably bright, able, lively people to work 
with but always bound up with civil service norms and traditional ways of working. They 
kept me away from the PM, even on Raising the Game. They insisted I should go through the 
Secretary of State, since that was the recognised route, until John Major intervened. That 
happened when I met John Major by accident once and told him what was going on and he 
tried to help. He actually wrote me a letter to show to the civil servants, in which he 
authorised me to talk directly to him. He said to me, "Do you want me to write a letter?" and 
I said, "Yes please. It can only help." It was a bit better after that. It's quite extraordinary, but 
that's the way they work. 
I.S. - Another barrier to getting through to the PM was the special advisors he was 
surrounded by. Sarah Hogg was head of the Policy Unit for a while and there were many 
advisors who came and went. One in particular was Nick True who was total pain to me. He 
was a general factotum who drafted speeches for John Major, amongst other things, before he 
went on to greater things. But he also saw himself as some kind of gatekeeper to Major. He 
was actually quite a good cricketer, not that that gave him a real feel for sport. He thought 
Raising the Game was pointless for Major, that it was beneath him because it was only sport, 
that it was not important enough for the PM. He tried to keep me away from the PM but I 
showed him my letter of authority when I had to, even although he was not really a civil 
servant in the traditional sense. He was really a political advisor. 
A.McM. - In his biography of Major, Anthony Seldon mentions his devotion to sport, 
especially cricket, a number of times. He quotes an unnamed Cabinet source as being 
amused by this obsession. Do you think that's how it was viewed? 
I.S. - Yes it certainly was. His Cabinet colleagues just could not understand what he was on 
about with sport, or appreciate his passion. I actually think the Lottery was one of his greatest 
achievements as PM with all the money it put into sport. Nobody had ever done that before. 
His support for me on Raising the Game and the Academy of Sport were quite astonishing for 
a man in his position. 
A.McM. - To what extent and in what ways has the profile (and definition) of sport 
changed over time for the Minister? For instance, is there now more of an emphasis on 
health and fitness, rather than competitive sport? 
I.S. - I think the definition of sport is a very loose one for some people who don't know much 
about it, and I'll give you an example. When I was Sports Minister I had a terrible time with 
the civil servants and Ministers in the Education Department. I was at a cross-departmental 
meeting with them once and asked how many hours of games were played each week in 
schools. I was given a really facetious answer along the lines of, "Well Minister, that depends 
on the type of school you're talking about." It made me so angry with them. They clearly had 
no idea and didn't care either. Sport in schools was of no interest to them. Eventually they 
gave me some bogus figure for all "sports-related" activity. This included silly things like 
food, nutrition, and well-being. It even included watching videos of sport! Quite ridiculous. 
Much of it was clearly not real participation at all, which was why we tried to redress it in 
Raising the Game. To me, and most sensible people, sport means things like team games, 
athletics, swimming, tennis, etc., not just looking on or talking about it. 
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A.McM. - How important is the post of Minister for Sport? How important, in your 
view, should it be? (e.g. Cabinet?). Was it a disadvantage being at the PUSS or Minister 
of State level in terms of policy-making? 
I.S. - It will never be in the Cabinet, and it probably doesn't deserve to be either. You can't 
really justify it being at the same level as defence or foreign policy, or other things like that. 
Of course it would make a difference if it was in the Cabinet because that immediately raises 
the level of importance just by being there. My job was really too junior to change things, 
even with the backing of the PM on some occasions. Definitely Secretaries of State have a lot 
more power than junior Ministers, with their Cabinet status and permanent secretaries 
reporting to them. In my situation, I felt like I was reporting to the permanent secretary, who 
in turn reported to the Secretary of State. There's a subtle distinction there. Even when I was 
promoted to Minister of State after two years that relationship did not change. I was still a 
junior Minister outside the Cabinet and as such could not command the full attention of the 
civil servants. Their primary duty was to the Secretary of State, not to me. 
A.McM. - Did you know any of the other Ministers who held the office? Could you 
comment on any of them? 
I.S. - I can tell you a little of what I remember of some of them, so long as you don't attribute 
it directly to me. Some of them are still around and I don't want to be critical. Can you 
remind me of some of them? [A.MeM. - First there was Denis Howell then Eldon 
Griffiths.] Oh yes, Denis was a fine chap, with whom I got on well. He was an excellent 
Minister in the best tradition of cross-party working. An old Labour man and patriot of the 
best sort. Towards the end, just before he died, he used to tell me that Tony Blair was no 
good and a bit of a fraud. All that stuff about him watching Jackie Millburn play when he was 
a boy was a pack oflies. He just couldn't have done it because of his age. 
I. S. - Eldon Griffiths was a lovely man who actually wrote widely on other things like foreign 
affairs. He was a Minister before I was in the House and I don't really know how effective he 
was. As a person, when I knew him, he was a very decent man. Robert Atkins was a fine 
chap but rather lazy. He was there not long before me and I picked up on some of his work on 
reorganising the Sports Council. The "Atkins' Review" had been kicking around for a long 
time. Robert Key was only there for a year before me and didn't do very much about it. He 
really had no time to make an impact. 
I.S. - Tony Banks was useless. Tom Pendry should have been given the job. Banks didn't 
even know very much about football beyond Chelsea. Kate Hoey was a lovely girl and quite 
good in her time at sport. She wasn't there long enough and couldn't quite pull it together 
somehow. 
I.S. - The current Minister, Richard Caborn, is a person I don't know much about. He doesn't 
seem to do very much and doesn't have much to show for six years in the job. That's the 
longest unbroken stint ever, longer even than Denis Howell managed. 
A.MeM. - Did you expect to stay as long in the post? Was there a possibility to a move to 
another post, or promotion to Cabinet after you became a Minister of State in 1995? 
I.S. - Being out of Parliament 1983-92 really damaged my political career, there's no doubt 
about that. In the period leading up to the 1983 election I saw a list of the new Cabinet that 
Mrs Thatcher was going to have if she won the election. I was on that list to be in the Cabinet 
as Secretary of State for Transport. Unfortunately I lost my seat and it took ages to get back 
in again. I could actually have gone to the Lords then, but I wanted to get back into the 
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Commons and resume my career there. By the time I got back it was too late for the Cabinet. 
I suppose I got a consolation prize at sport. When I was there 1993-97 I didn't really expect 
to move on to the Cabinet at that time because my opportunity had really gone. I even missed 
out on the knighthood because there are no longer political awards any more and the offer of 
a Lords' seat never came again. Timing is everything in politics. 
A.MeM. - Do you have any regrets about your political career? 
I.S. - I actually think I've been very lucky in politics. I've met or worked with every Prime 
Minister since Churchill. I was taken to Parliament in 1954 and introduced to Churchill and 
he muttered something to me which I didn't understand. I got on well with Mrs Thatcher and 
worked as her advisor from time to time. I think she would have promoted me if I had stayed 
in Parliament while she was there. Then there was Major. He was a weak man in many ways 
and had his faults but he was a very genuine man at heart. He meant well and did his duty for 
the country. He had a great sense of duty. 
I.S. - The PM I got on best with was actually Harold Wilson. He was very friendly to me 
when I was a Minister at Trade and Industry in 1981-83. I was responsible for lots of 
quangos, including one on statistics of which Harold was the chairman. The government was 
all for abolishing quangos at the time so I wanted to abolish that one. I was advised by the 
civil servants not to because Harold only had three months to live and this gave him a sense 
of purpose in life, so I let it go. After a few months he showed no signs of dying so I asked 
the officials what was happening. They said, "Oh, he's had a recovery and is now OK for 
another three months." So I let it go again and he actually lived for some years after that. We 
got to know each other quite well and when I lost my seat in 1983 I asked him for a signed 
photograph which he kindly sent me. He was a very decent man. As PM he thought there was 
enough evidence to deal with P.G. Wodehouse as a traitor from during the War. I used to read 
a lot of Wodehouse and Harold told me this story about him. He refused to have him 
prosecuted because Wodehouse was an old man and no good would come of it. A very kind 
thing for Harold to consider. 
LS. - I also got to see many sporting events I would not otherwise have done and meet some 
of the greatest sportsmen and women of the age. For instance lan Botham was a man I liked 
and respected. He was also a very good Conservative. I once heard him on the radio during 
one of his long-distance walks and he was absolutely brilliant in his defence of why he voted 
Conservative. He was also a great role model for young people coming into sport and I 
appointed him to the Sports Council. One of the best things about sport is meeting people like 
him. I was really very privileged. 
A.McM. - Were there things you still wanted to do for sport in 1997? 
LS. - Certainly there were. I wanted to see through Raising the Game and establish a British 
Academy of Sport. There were still things to do and I would have liked the greater time 
available to Ministers now under DCMS. I had too many other responsibilities. By the way, I 
would be very willing to come to Loughborough and give a talk if anybody is interested. 
Some scholars contacted me in the early days after 1997 but very rarely now. 
A.McM. - Thank you very much for that offer, which I'll pass on to my supervisor at 
Lougbborough. I'm sure he might be interested. Thank you for your assistance as well 
today. Can I quote you in my dissertation? 
LS. - You can cite me in general terms and use some quotes, so long as they're not 
disparaging of living individuals. 
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A.MeM. - Can you suggest anyone else I might contact (e.g. eivil servants or Ministers)? 
1.8. - As far as civil servants are concerned, it's best with retired ones. Those still working 
would fmd it hard to co-operate. I would try Sir Hayden Phillips. I think he must be retired by 
now. John Major might speak: to you ifhe's not too busy. 
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5. Mr Richard Tracey (11 April 2007) 
A.McM. - Could you please tell me about the circumstances that led to your 
appointment in 1985, since you had only been in Parliament from 1983? 
R.T. - Yes, that's right, I had only been an MP for two years, when I was appointed by Mrs 
Thatcher. You know it happens that some MPs get promoted quickly. I was lucky because I 
became a Parliamentary Under-Secretary pretty quickly. Alongside me there were people like 
Michael Howard who also became a Minister pretty quickly. Others did in our particular 
intake. In the intake before us there were various people that did get promoted very quickly 
also. It just depends on who they spot as being quite good in the House and so on, with a bit 
of a record of being involved in politics before. So that was the way it happened. 
R.T. - Speaking for myself, I followed on after Neil Macfarlane. Neil had been doing it for a 
few years alongside other things. In his time there was the Heysel Stadium disaster with 
football hooliganism and Mrs Thatcher, who appointed me, particularly asked me to give a 
lot of attention to football hooliganism which I did. 
A.McM. - Was it a surprise to become Sports Minister, even although you had a strong 
interest in sport? Who's Who lists riding and boating as your current sporting interests, 
and you had also been a motorsport journalist before becoming an MP. 
R.T. - No, not really, it was not a total surprise. I was involved in sport at university and 
school in rugby and rowing and things. Subsequently when I was at the BBC I was involved 
in quite a lot of sports reporting and sports writing. So I did have a pretty good knowledge of 
sport and I was always interested in it. I also used to come to where you live in Canterbury to 
see the annual Canterbury cricket festival. It's a wonderful cricket ground and I loved the old 
tree. There was a great friend of mine who was much involved, a fellow called Doug Smith 
who was a PR man and very keen on sport, particularly on cricket. I think he was the chap 
who used to run the all-party cricket group in the House of Commons, though he wasn't an 
MP. He used to invite some of us down to the Canterbury cricket week. For instance Jonathan 
Aitken, who was MP for Thanet, and Roger Gale who is still a Kent MP. I also knew the 
Canterbury MP, Julian Brazier, who was in the House in my time. 
R.T. - Although I should explain to you that the Sports Minister, when I took it on, was one 
of the responsibilities of the Department of the Environment. It did change around from 
different departments to another. Actually the first man responsible for sport, would you 
believe, and he used to tell me quite often, was Lord Hailsham. At the time he did it sport was 
in the Education Department. He was really prior to Denis Howell in doing it I think. It 
would have been in the previous government before Wilson decided to appoint Denis Howell. 
A.McM. - Could you tell me something about what the job entailed on a day-to-day 
basis? You seemed to spend a great deal of time on planning, housing, listed buildings, 
historic sites, etc., and relatively little on sport. 
R.T. - I came in to do the job and was immediately told by the Secretary of State, Kenneth 
Baker, that, "Actually you're one of the planning Ministers as well." So I was assisting 
another Minister in the Department of the Environment on planning. Royal Parks and Palaces 
I also had to do, which included obviously the likes of Hyde Park and Richmond Park and the 
main Royal Palaces in central London, but also Hampton Court and so on. I also had a lot of 
regeneration stuff to deal with which was in some ways part of planning. I was involved in 
the Bristol docks, Hull docks, Salford, and the New Towns too. We had all those running, 
you know the New Town Development Corporations like Peterborough, Washington and 
various other ones. 
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R.T. - So you'll understand that, in a Tory government, we were really expected to do a lot of 
other things as well as sport. I suppose one tended therefore to be able to get out and about to 
sports events, either in the evenings during the week or Friday, Saturday and Sundays. 
Admittedly, a lot of sporting events do take place at weekends, but I always felt we were 
somewhat constrained. Denis Howell, incidentally, was a good friend of mine for many years 
before I was ever in the House. I knew him because I worked for the BBC before I was a 
politician. Denis was defInitely able to get around and to do a lot more for sport than the rest 
of us were able to because I think he had more time to devote to it than we Conservative 
Ministers did. 
A.McM. - What were the main sports policy issues during your time in office? 
R.T. - Football hooliganism, I suppose that was one of the major things we had to deal with. 
It was one of the major tasks I had and the major achievement of my time. I worked very 
closely with, on the one hand the Metropolitan Police and indeed the Special Branch. We 
were devising various methods to catch these people or to prevent them ever causing their 
hooligan antics. We developed the closed circuit television of course, partly through the 
Police, and partly through the FA and the Football League. Over time, they've now 
developed to the point where they can spot them in the crowd. You know, the camera will 
actually pick them up. We were dealing also with television on trains and on the routes to the 
grounds. 
R. T. - There were also a whole lot of intelligence operations about who was doing these 
things. So the Home Office and Special Branch, and so on, were building up quite a dossier 
on the major hooligans and in that way that was the route we took to eventually cutting down 
on the numbers that caused problems. They were really causing some very serious problems. 
It blows up again still, but not as badly. In those days there were some serious fIghts that 
would go on in the crowds. Of course Mr Justice Popplewell sat on the enquiry that brought 
in the idea of all-seater stadiums. That was a very good idea that was in my time too, which I 
supported. I think a lot of the problems did grow up as a result of the very uncongenial 
conditions on some of the terraces. These have had a big impact. 
R.T. - That was a major part of what we did for football. One thing that Mrs Thatcher was 
very keen on, and I don't know who put the idea to her, was all-ticketed matches, 
membership schemes, ID cards, and all that kind of thing. I was never very keen on them 
though. The FA and the Football League saw them as very difficult to administer. You know 
what it's like with crowds. A bit like last night with Manchester United and Roma at Old 
Trafford where there were a lot of people trying to get into the ground causing trouble. If you 
had turnstiles and people with membership cards or identity cards it would have been even 
more difficult to let people in. 
R.T. - So I think over time with the FA and the Football League feeding in their information, 
and the Police too, that idea was dropped. I think it wasn't fmally dropped until my 
successor, Colin Moynihan, who took over as Minister after me, did so. They tried it out at 
Luton. But it was a smaller club of course than some of the very large ones with large 
grounds which made it more difficult to work. The view of the Police and the FA said it 
could only work with very great difficulty and it was eventually dropped. 
R.T. - Otherwise, in my time, we did a lot to try and promote school sport and dual use of 
school facilities. That was an area in which I had several conferences involving ILEA school 
sport and others from the education world and the sports clubs as well. We invited a lot of 
people to sit down and talk about how it could best be done to allow the clubs to use school 
facilities in the evenings and on holidays and also to encourage the clubs to go into the 
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schools to talk to the young people. You may have found that some sports clubs are not very 
welcoming to new members, so that was something that I was trying to break through. 
R.T. - I don't think I entirely succeeded, though I think it is probably better now. I'm 
involved now as Chairman of Sport England South London. We have an operation that's 
called "Pro-Active South London", one of these great new names. I think we're fmding there 
that there's a lot more co-ordinated approach in that the clubs welcome the young people in. 
There's a lot more effort being made to encourage them into the clubs and get them involved. 
So I suppose that's something where the basis was laid 20 years ago when I was trying to do 
it first and it's slowly developing. 
A.MeM. - Having read all your Parliamentary speeches and questions, I noticed you 
spoke a lot on tobacco sponsorship. It was clearly a very important issue at the time, 
wasn't it? 
R. T. - Yes it was. Interestingly enough, in my time, it was my relationship with the BBC that 
brought it about. The BBC producers of sports programmes, particularly in those days, and I 
know it's a funny thing to look back now, had a problem with snooker. Snooker was one that 
found that the intrusion of tobacco advertising was really getting to them. The producers 
found that the tobacco companies were beginning to put up hoardings all round the snooker 
tables. They were also trying as well to paint the tables. For example, Gold Leaf was one of 
the major tobacco companies around. They wanted to paint the tables gold with their brand, 
all that kind of thing. 
R.T. - What the producers said to me was that, because the BBC's not supposed to advertise, 
it was becoming increasingly difficult to get a shot of a player playing a ball on the table 
without having Gold Leaf or Benson and Hedges, or whatever else in the background. So 
they said that they wanted to be more controlled. So what we got involved in with the tobacco 
companies was a series of discussions. I mean they were quite acrimonious discussions 
because in those days smoking was not looked upon in the way it is now. Twenty years later 
it's interesting that there was a lot more support for smoking back in those days. 
R. T. - A lot of quite influential people, for example one Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Nicholas Ridley, was a chain smoker, a total life-long chain smoker. To try and 
convince him of what we were trying to do was very much more difficult than convincing 
somebody like Kenneth Baker, who was my other Secretary of State. He was my first 
Secretary of State. Alongside Nicholas Ridley you'd got the influences of Denis Thatcher. 
Dear old Denis, whom I was very fond of, was there in the background also as a sort of 
freedom of the smoker man. There were people like that who knew a lot of those in the 
tobacco industry. So it was quite acrimonious dealing with Imperial Tobacco and some of the 
other main companies to try and persuade them that really smoking was not ideal for 
sportsmen and women was a jolly long battle. I fact we did manage to tighten up on the 
regulations, particularly of televising sport and also warning young people that smoking was 
bad for their health and that kind of thing. 
R.T. - So we did have some success. We certainly cut down on the amount of advertising 
around sports events, particularly snooker, but I don't think it actually made me very popular 
with Mrs Thatcher for one, or did my career any good. Certainly commentators over the years 
have said that I fought a battle, long before what goes on today in advance of my time really 
to try to persuade people that smoking was really bad for them, particularly sports people. 
There we are; that's where life is. 
A.McM. - You also spoke a great deal on South Mrican issues, such as sporting links, 
tours, the Gleneagles Agreement, and so on. You followed on really from NeiI 
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Macfarlane on this, didn't you? 
RT. - Yes, it was very difficult area. One of the things in my time regarding my involvement 
in apartheid issues, and the Thatcher attitude to it was the Commonwealth Games in 
Edinburgh. The 1986 Games coincided with my time in office and that was an enormous 
struggle to keep them on course. There were various black African states that were going to 
drop out because Mrs Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe the Foreign Secretary wouldn't come out 
categorically against apartheid. That really was a tightrope-walking job to convince them that 
we were understanding and wanted to encourage black athletes to go to the Games. We 
wanted full participation, and goodness that was difficult. It was a success to a certain extent 
because we kept the Commonwealth Games together and they were a success when they were 
on. 
R.T. - Of course there was the financial chaos afterwards because, if you remember Robert 
Maxwell got involved in it. Then of course he didn't pay over the money afterwards. But 
that's part of the Maxwell heritage and legacy. The Games themselves were good though, 
despite the partial boycott. 
A.MeM. - How would you describe your relationship with the Secretary of States you 
worked with Kenneth Baker (Environment; Sept 1985-May 1986) and Nicholas Ridley 
(Environment; May 1986-June 1987)? 
R.T. - Well they got involved in policy quite a lot in things that interested them. Nicholas 
Ridley certainly did on issues like tobacco sponsorship that we spoke of earlier, but he was 
not interested in sports policy as such in any wider sense, because he didn't know much about 
sport. However, he would ask me a number of questions such as, "Why are you doing this?" 
or, "Why is this necessary?" We did get into some quite complex discussions on matters of 
sports policy, though he had the ultimate say ifhe wanted it. 
RT. - Kenneth Baker got involved with many other things in sport, though they tended to be 
at a high level naturally. One of the things that coincided with my time in office was when 
Birmingham bid for the Olympics. I did get involved, partly because I'm from Warwickshire 
and Denis Howell was a Birmingham man and MP. And Denis Howell asked me. He fronted 
up their bid and did ask me to involve myself as Sports Minister. He said to me, "Come on 
you're a Midlander; you should be supporting this," and I did. I went to the IOC with them 
when they made their pitch and so did Sebastian Coe who was there with us. I had made 
Sebastian Coe deputy chairman of the Sports Council, particularly to promote youth sport 
because he was still running then, although coming to the end of his running career. He had 
just won his medals in Los Angeles in the 1984 Olympics, so he was a great figure to have 
along. We pushed that bid up to a point, although it was always probably set up for 
Barcelona, that particular one. Samaranch was a Barcelona man, he was president of the IOC, 
so he got the Olympics for them. 
RT. - Then of course after my time Manchester tried to get the Olympics but did not succeed. 
Here we are now with London and that's good really. Over the years we obviously developed 
a better technique. In my time I remember there seemed to be many more borough councils in 
London that. were Conservative-controlled. Across the board, not just Conservative but 
Liberal Democrat and Labour leaders of the councils were not all that keen on having the 
Olympics in London for all sorts of reasons. You know, traffic congestion, potential terrorism 
was already beginning to show up a bit on the radar. Basically they seemed to think in those 
days that London would be crowded out, and then there was the cost. 
R.T. - I remember that when I stopped being Sports Minister I was chairman of the London 
MPs at the beginning of the 1990s. London started to try to make a bid at that point. 
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Sebastian Coe was involved. There was chap called Richard Sunray who is on the London 
2012 board, who is a local government man in the Labour Party in London. As we talked to 
various people in London local government at that point it was very clear that many of them 
were not at all keen on having the Olympics in London. Over time, with a Labour 
government, and a whole lot of Labour local government leaders in the period when they 
were building up to making the bid, and with Labour politicians nationally they got a lot 
more support. 
R.T. - What always happens with the Olympics is that the national government of the country 
has to put down a bond really, a bond of support for the Olympics. That was an area which in 
Mrs Thatcher's time that kind of thing had to go to the Cabinet. It probably still does and I 
imagine the Labour government had to take it to the Cabinet. In my time there were people in 
the Cabinet who were not wildly enthusiastic about having the Olympics, with all the 
ramifications of it. It wasn't something that I had to present to the Cabinet. I think probably 
Kenneth Baker had to take it to the Cabinet. But there were people such as Norman Tebbit 
who was one who was not very keen on the Olympic Games. That was when Birmingham 
and Manchester were bidding, going right back to that time. 
R.T. - So anyway, Secretaries of State did get involved in policy. After my time, people like 
Chris Patten was Secretary of State for the Environment and he got involved. After that, sport 
went back to Education for a bit, after Colin Moynihan it did. Robert Atkins was in 
Education, then I think Robert Key. I kind of rather lost track of all the different places it 
went to, though of course it finished up in Culture, Media and Sport as it is now. It was there 
when MelIor was the Secretary of State. [A.McM. - It was actually National Heritage 
when he was there.] Oh yes, that's right. After Key I think the last Tory Sports Minister was 
lain Sproat. 
A.MeM. - How involved were you personally in influencing sports policy? 
R.T. - One area of policy I did get involved in as Minister was with the Sports Council. I had 
a lot to do with the Sports Council. As Sports Minister I used to meet the chairman of the 
Sports Council and all the Regional chairs a couple oftimes a year. We used to sit down for a 
whole couple of days and have policy discussions. Something that emerged from that time 
was the need for a National Lottery. I was always impressed with the idea. So after my time 
as Sports Minister I got involved in the campaigns in the House to get the National Lottery 
going. There was a chap called Sir Ivan Lawrence who is still around, though not an MP any 
more, but he was a great promoter of the idea of a Lottery. At various times we launched 
debates in the House after my time as Sports Minister to discuss the National Lottery. 
R.T. - We never really got very far with Mrs Thatcher because she always saw it as an area of 
gambling almost. But we did make progress when John Major became Prime Minister. So 
there was Major as the Prime Minister and I think it was Lamont as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. That's when we really did go forward. Of course it was then that the National 
Lottery Bill was produced around that time. I think Robert Key was the Sports Minister then. 
I was on the Lottery Bill committee. I took it through the House with Key as Minister. It was 
interesting actually because I remember there has been quite a bit of debate recently on the 
use of National Lottery funds for things other than sport and heritage. Of course, there we 
were, a Conservative government in power taking the Lottery Bill through and on the other 
side the Labour Opposition were arguing about all this money that's raised must be used for 
sport and good causes and all that. We'd say, "Yes, we don't have a problem with that, we 
absolutely agree that it should be". Look at what's happened now, with a Labour government 
when National Lottery money is being used for hospitals, and all sorts of other things. This is 
absolutely what they were opposed to in those days, so the old wheel turns full circle. 
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RT. - The Sports Council had a network of regions and we had some very good people as 
chairmen of the regions. There were people like Bobby Charlton, who was involved in the 
North West; Richard Sharp the former rugby international in the South West; Peter Yarranton 
in London; Trevor Brooking in East Anglia. All these chaps were staffing up the ranks in the 
regions as administrators and leaders. It was very good, I found, the Sports Council with the 
likes of those sorts of people. You got some fantastic feedback from them in the regions. I 
don't know if the same sort of thing exists any more as it did then, but I don't think so. 
You've obviously been talking to David Pickup, as you said in your letter, so he can tell you 
too. 
A.McM. - You said you worked closely with the Sports Council. Did you also work 
closely with other bodies, such as the CCPR and the BOA? 
RT. - Oh yes, of course we did. We had to work with all of them. But the CCPR was an 
unofficial body in the sense that it was independent of government, whereas the Sports 
Council had been formed by government, and by Denis Howell. In fact in Denis Howell's 
time I think when he was Sports Minister he was actually chairman of the Sports Council. 
But of course that had all stopped by my time. The chairman in my time was John Smith, 
who was the chairman of Liverpool Football Club and also chairman of the FA at that time. 
He held all those jobs and he was a great man. The CCPR was a body that used to be quite 
critical of the Sports Council and at the same time of the Sports Minister if he wasn't 
agreeing with them. They probably got on better with Denis Howell than they did with any of 
the Tory Ministers. 
RT. - Prince Philip was very much involved with the CCPR He was the patron or president 
of it. There was a chap, I forget his name now, Peter somebody or other. [A.McM. - Peter 
Lawson?] Yes, that's right. He was chief executive, I think when I was Minister. He got into 
trouble and left under a cloud due to some financial mismanagement. That was after my time, 
though he was around for a very long time. He was quite a difficult character to deal with 
because he was very critical, particularly of Conservative governments' sports policy. He 
used to summon Sports Ministers to go and speak at the CCPR conference, which I did a 
couple of times, and then give them a hard time. As I say, it was a less official body than the 
Sports Council. 
A.MeM. - Could you teU me something about your dealings with the civil servants at the 
DoE. Did you find them good to work with? 
RT. - I got on very well with them. The officials were all great guys across the board, both 
for sport and my other work. Of course, a great deal of policy and ideas come from them 
because they tend to be there for longer than Ministers and can take a longer view. There's 
one who is, I think, much involved still in the East End for the London Docklands 
Development Corporation, a chap called Eric Sorenson, who was very bright civil servant 
that I dealt with on regeneration. Of course he then ended up in the LDDC dealing with the 
London Arena and all that kind of thing in subsequent years. 
RT. - I don't know if you've spoken to any of them. There was a chap called David Teasdale 
who was the main sports civil servant in the Department of the Environment when I was 
there, who's retired now. David Pickup may still have a contact number for him. He was 
seconded to the Sports Council at one point after my time but then I think he retired from the 
civil service. He was involved in some business venture with Sebastian Coe's leisure centres 
that he started up in Trust House Forte hotels. 
RT. - David Teasdale was a significant guy around in my time. Another one who is now in 
public relations is Warwick Smith. Now you might be able to track him down because he had 
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quite a lot to do with sport. Before my time he was private secretary to Neil Macfarlane. Then 
in my time he was actually working with Teasdale as one of the civil servants in the 
Department of the Environment. He was sort of deputy to Teasdale but he was working for a 
PR firm called Huntsworth more recently. I think he's left there now but you could probably 
track him down by that route if you want to talk to officials. 
A.M.cM. - Did you fmd it difficult dealing with different sets of civil senrants for the 
sport and non-sports part of your work? 
R.T. - Yes, that's right, it could be difficult, absolutely. You had to switch from one mode of 
operation to another. For example, I'd have a meeting with officials from sport in my office 
and then I'd possibly have a meeting with a lot of people from planning or from regeneration 
or the New Towns or something else. Part of planning was dealing with things like sand and 
gravel pits. You could end up having meetings with them but equally you might in the 
evening or even during the day have to go to a conference and make a speech about sand and 
gravel development or regeneration development of a New Town. Yes, it did require 
amazingly flexible thinking. As I mentioned earlier on Denis Howell didn't really have to 
deal with that kind of complexity of having his brain jumping from one thing to another. But 
it could be tricky. 
A.MeM. - How important is the post of Minister for Sport? How important, in your 
view, should it be? For example, should it be at Cabinet level? 
R.T. - Obviously the job did grow in importance because Harold Wilson I think probably 
gave Denis Howell only that responsibility and not much more. I know he was responsible 
for drought, wasn't he? [A.McM. - Yes, but he did an awful lot of other things, including 
water supply, canals, National Parks, and so, even education matters at different times.] 
He probably was given more time to devote himself to sport than we were. Certainly a whole 
lot of my colleagues and predecessors and following Sports Ministers in Tory governments 
did find that they did have a lot of other things to do. 
R.T. - Well I was an Under-Secretary and this is a rather typical sort of Conservative thing. 
We were all Under-Secretaries for sport in the Tory governments. In Labour governments 
they are more likely to have been made Ministers of State. Dick Cabom, I think is a Minister 
of State and Denis Howell certainly was. I don't know what Tony Banks was. [A.McM. - He 
was an Under-Secretary and so was Kate Hoey.] Oh were they? I wasn't sure of that. 
RT. - Well some other countries have a Cabinet Minister for sport. Some people in sport 
think that should be the same in Britain. You know, people who have been in sport all their 
lives are more likely to say that. I'm not sure that it's important enough or does justify that. I 
think maybe the Minister of State level is right. But in all honesty if you've got a Secretary of 
State who is in the Cabinet that's really sufficient. I had Kenneth Baker and Nicholas Ridley. 
RT. - I'm not sure about Tessa Jowell as a Minister, full-stop. I don't think she comes from a 
sporting background. Dick Cabom is somebody I've known for years. He was involved in 
developing youth games in Sheffield. He has probably got a deeper sporting background than 
me. 
RT. - I'm not sure that some ex-top sportsman would necessarily make for a good Minister, 
though Moynihan was, I suppose, a cox, but that's hardly a real sporting pedigree compared 
with some. He'd been involved with rowing at university at Oxford or Cambridge, wherever 
he was. Sebastian Coe obviously springs to mind as an Olympic gold medallist who got into 
Parliament and never got near to being a Minister. I think he may have been a Whip when he 
was in the House of Commons. I don't think you need a top sportsman any more than you 
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need to be a BBC commentator to be an expert in sport. 
A.MeM. - Chris Chataway, for example, didn't become Minister for Sport when he was 
in the House. Do you think he was more ambitious? 
RT. - Chris is still running you know. He's about 75 years old now and I saw him running a 
half-marathon in Richmond Park about a year or so ago. It was started by Roger Bannister. 
Poor old Roger's now got serious arthritis. He started the thing and there was Chris Chataway 
running in it. He did terribly well too, and he ran in the last London Marathon. He never was 
a Sports Minister of course, and ended up in the Cabinet I think at Post and 
Telecommunications under Ted Heath. He's a very old friend of mine, is Chris, because he 
was a broadcaster too at the BBC. He certainly wasn't around in the Thatcher government. I 
think he's given up politics before she became Prime Minister in 1979. 
A.MeM. - You left office after only two years and held no other government office. 
Were there things you still wanted to do for sport? 
RT. - Well, I'd completed most of the major things I was asked to do. As I said earlier, the 
football hooliganism thing was what I was asked to do. I think I near enough completed that 
in the two years. The schools sport was an ongoing thing, particularly when school sports 
grounds were being turned over by education authorities for house building and things like 
that. But that's always gone on and still does. 
RT. - But I think it's good thing for Ministers to move on. I've never been convinced that 
politicians should stay for too long. After all, it's not like being an official who needs to sit 
there for years and years in ajob. It's better to move to another department and bring a fresh 
mind to bear on things. So I went on to do other things. I was on the Public Accounts 
Committee for four years, which was a tremendously interesting area. 
R.T. - I was also involved after I stopped being Sports Minister in developing the televising 
of Parliament. I was on the Select Committee that did that. We did actually bring about a lot 
of changes to the ideas that had been around for televising Parliament. In the late 1980s there 
had been ideas of having big cameras in the chamber, which would have been horrendous 
because the House of Commons chamber is a very small one really for 650 Members, though 
you can't actually get 650 Members inside in any case. That was an interesting area in my 
time where we brought in the remote control cameras, some small ones hanging below the 
galleries and all that kind of thing. I think it very much improved the whole area of televising 
the House. That's me really, I do like to have a new challenge. 
A.MeM. - You've spoken quite a lot about Denis Howell, Colin Moynihan and others. 
Could you comment any further on them or others? 
R.T. - Well, Eldon Griffiths was between Howell's two stints. He must be quite an old man 
by now. [A.MeM. - He told me by em ail from California that he's writing his memoirs 
now. It would be helpful if you would as well.) I guess he might write his, but he was quite 
a while before me and I didn't know him well. Perhaps he's been around more and has more 
to say. He must be over eighty by now. But I have no plans to write them. 
R.T. - Dear Hector Monro is dead now but Neil Macfarlane is still alive. [A.MeM. - I spoke 
to him a couple of months ago and he was very helpful.) He did it for quite a while. We 
talked before about tobacco. Well he was much more willing to allow the tobacco industry to 
be involved in sport than I was probably. He took the view that sport's got to get money from 
somewhere and of course it got a great deal from tobacco. But as we've seen over the years 
since the medical view of tobacco in sport is that the two just don't go together. 
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A.McM. - You are still involved in sport through South London Sport England. Did you 
carry on with your sporting interests after leaving Parliament in 1997? 
RT. - Yes, I am still doing things in sport, as I mentioned earlier, in relation to my work with 
Sport England South London. So I've still kept my interest in sport going after my time as 
Minister for Sport. Sport is something that's a lifelong interest for those of us who love it. 
However, I still work for a living and my job is actually with the Battersea project here in 
, London. 
RT. - I've been three years doing the community relations for the company running the 
project, which in fact has just changed. It was a Chinese company that had been at it for quite 
a long time. They've come up with some extravagant and exciting plans for the power 
station. But they sold out recently. I think the main chap was more an ideas and design man 
than a developer really and he probably became a bit exhausted. He sold out to a big Irish 
developer called Treasury Holdings. They've only been there for three months. I'm still 
involved in plugging them into the local community, the local authority, the Greater London 
Authority and all the rest of it. With a big project like this you need all the friends and 
support that you can get. With any luck it will go forward now. It's been in a derelict state for 
a good many years. It is very, very complicated in planning terms. Of course the building 
itselfis a Grade 2 listed building and that doesn't make it any easier. That's what I do now, 
though not full-time. I'm semi-retired really, but I do quite a lot from home. 
A.MeM. - Thank you very much for your assistance. Can I quote you in my 
dissertation? 
RT. - Yes of course you can, absolutely. I've said almost everything I have to you on the 
record. 
A.MeM. - Can I call you again if I need to follow anything up? 
RT. - Yes, sure. My home number is probably the best way to get hold of me. That's 020-
8870-3184. My email addressisrdicktracey@msn.com. If you want any help with contacts 
let me know and I'll see if I can help with any of my fellow Sports Ministers. You can get 
hold of Colin Moynihan through the House of Lords. There are several routes to get to him. 
He's the Chairman of the British Olympic Association, which is in Wandsworth, at 
Wandsworth Plain where their offices are. He's also involved with London 2012; he's on the 
committee of that. I think he does turn up at the House of Lords. He got a sort of strange 
hereditary peerage after his half-brother died and he inherited it. Robert Key, of course is still 
in the House. Robert Atkins is in the European Parliament. [A.McM. - I've tried both and 
got no reply.] I'm surprised really, because Robert is still very interested in sport. [A.McM. -
lain Sproat didn't reply either.] He may still be involved with Rothman's Cricket 
Yearbook. I've rather lost track with lain because he certainly didn't become a Lord or 
anything, nor an MEP. I don't know that he's much involved in sport now though cricket is 
his great love. 
A.McM. - Tony Banks is dead. Kate Hoey didn't get back to me but she got a chap 
called Patrick Cheney to call me, who was very helpful. Do you know him? 
RT. - Yes, I knew Patrick Cheney. He was some kind of policy adviser to Denis Howell, 
possibly private secretary to him. He is obviously still around for Kate Hoey. If I can give 
you any help with politicians, or with any of those civil servants I mentioned, do let me 
know. 
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A.McM. - Thank you again Mr Tracey. I'm very grateful for your help and your kind 
offers with contacts. 
R.T. - My pleasure. 
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Appendix 7: Notes 
1. At the soccer European Cup final between Liverpool and Juventus on 29 May 1985 in the 
Heysel Stadium in Brussels, 38 fans were killed and over 400 were injured after a riot 
broke out. It led to a ten-year ban on English clubs playing in Europe, later reduced on 
appeal to five years. The Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, became convinced that identity 
cards were essential as a means of controlling entry to grounds, although the football 
authorities were opposed to them. The ID card scheme was finally dropped in 1990 when 
Colin Moynihan was Sports Minister. Macfarlane, N. (1986) Sport & Politics: A World 
Divided London: Collins; Kelly, G. (1999) Sweet F.A. London: Collins 
2. The increase in funding to the Sports Council 1972-90 was more than double what could 
be expected if it had only risen in line with inflation, when it would have gone up to 
£18.6m, rather than the £41.9m awarded. There was then a period of stability from 1990 
to 1995 when the rise was broadly in line with inflation, but much greater rises thereafter 
which were well above inflation. "Quarterly Index of Retail Prices", 
www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdataset [accessed 3 November 2008] 
3. The Tote was set up by Act of Parliament in 1928, effectively as a government 
bookmaker. There have been attempts to privatise it over the years, none of which have 
succeeded. It remains under the control of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
until a long-term private sector solution is found. "The Tote", www.culture.gov.uk 
[accessed 3 November 2008] 
4. Fox hunting was abolished on 19 November 2004 by the Hunting Act 2004, when the 
Government used the Parliament Act 1949 to force through the legislation in both Houses 
of Parliament. Cowan, R. (2004) Police Fear Hunting Ban Strain The Guardian 20 
November 2004. 
5. Manchester hosted the Commonwealth Games in July 2004 in a brand new stadium that 
subsequently passed on to Manchester City Football Club with the running track removed 
Final Report of the Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games (2003) Manchester 
Commonwealth Games Legacy 
6. Lord Donoughue never actually held government office under Harold Wilson or James 
Callaghan. As Head of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit in the 1970s he was classed as a 
civil servant, though he clearly felt he had more power in that role than as a junior 
Minister some twenty years later. Donoughue, B. (2003) The Heat of the Kitchen 
London: Politico's 
7. From 1965 to 1970 the chairman of the advisory Sports Council was Denis Howell. Since 
he was also Minister for Sport, the body had a very close link with government. When the 
Sports Council was made an executive, independent body in 1972 by Eldon Griffiths, he 
ended this dual role as chairman and Minister for Sport. Sir Roger Bannister then became 
the first independent chairman in 1972. Coghlan, IF. (1990) Sport and British Politics 
Since 1960 London: Falmer 
8. The poll tax or "community charge" as Mrs Thatcher liked to call it, had its origins in the 
mid-1980s, when civil servants and Ministers were charged with finding a new way of 
financing local government to replace the "rates". Despite much public opposition, it was 
introduced in Scotland in 1989-90 and England and Wales in 1990-91. Because of its 
unpopularity, and difficulty of collection, it was replaced by the "council tax" in 1993 
when Michael Heseltine was Secretary of State for the Environment. Heseltine, M. (2001) 
Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography London: Coronet Books 
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9. Ken Bates was owner and chairman of Chelsea Football Club from 1982 to 2003, when 
he sold it to Roman Abramovich, although he remained chairman until 2004. He was a 
very prominent member of the FA for many years and a driving force behind the 
rebuilding of Wembley Stadium. He was chairman of the consortium charged with its 
reconstruction, Wembley National Stadium Ltd (WNSL) from 1997 to 2001. When he 
resigned this role he blamed lack of progress in the project on Kate Hoey as Minister for 
Sport. The construction of a running track around the stadium was a feature strongly 
supported by Hoey but opposed by Bates (and Tony Banks), who wanted the stadium to 
be used exclusively for football. WNSL received £12Om in public funding for the project 
from Sport England, only £2Om of which was ever returned. Bower, T. (2003) Broken 
Dreams: Vanity, Greed and the Souring of British Football London: Simon and Shuster 
10. When Glasgow bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games it was intended that the main 
stadium would be Hampden Park, which was largely rebuilt in the 1990s and the running 
track removed. The plan is to take out several rows of seats nearest to the playing field 
and install a track around it. When the Games are over, this temporary arrangement will 
be reversed and the seats replaced. Interview with Ms Patricia Ferguson (24 August 
2007). 
11. The debate of 17 March 1980 on the UK's response to the American call for an Olympic 
boycott lasted for almost seven hours. On the Conservative side, it was led by Ian 
Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal, who was deputy to the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, 
who was in the House of Lords and thus not able to lead the debate personally. Mrs 
, Thatcher saw it as a foreign policy issue, rather than a sporting one, so the Minister for 
Sport was sidelined. Other speakers that day included Michael Heseltine (Monro's boss at 
the Department of the Environment, and senior figures from the main parties. Hansard: 
House of Commons Debates, 17 March 1980, vol. 98, cols. 31-168; Macfarlane, N. 
(1986) Sport and Politics: A World Divided London: Collins 
12. On July 242006, The Football Association, the England and Wales Cricket Board, the 
Rugby Football Union, and the Lawn Tennis Association all signed up with UK Sport to 
observe the W ADA code of practice for drug testing and control. Failure to adhere to the 
code should result in the withdrawal of public funding. Kelso (2006) British Sports Sign 
up to Hard Line The Guardian (Sport) 25 July 2006, p. 4 
13. In actual fact it was a series of metal crush barriers on stairway number 13 that gave way 
on the terracing under the pressure of human bodies, not the stand. The terracing was not 
overcrowded by the standards of the time. Holt, R. and Mason, T. (2000) Sport in Britain 
1945-2000 Oxford: Blackwell 
14. Although the reorganisation of the UK Sports Council into the English Sports Council 
(later Sport England) took place in 1996, the regional bodies were established for many 
years before this. In fact, they were created in 1965 by Denis Howell, just after the Sports 
Council itself. Coghlan, J.F. (1990) Sport & British Politics Since 1960 London: Falmer 
15. Only 4 of the interviewees were female, while the remaining 25 were male. 
16. William of Occam was a 14th century English philosopher and Franciscan monk. He 
postulated that it was likely to be the simplest explanation of a problem which turned out 
to be the correct solution, unless it is known to be wrong. Burnham, P., Gilland, K., 
Grant, W., and Lay ton-Henry, Z. (2004) Research Methods in Politics Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
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